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A critical edition of 'Al ta'rīkh al islāmī al mukhtasar' by Shihāb al Dīn Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdullāh ibn Alī ibn Abī al Dam al Hamawī (583/1187 642/1244)

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A CRITICAL EDITION OF "AL-TPýRfKH AL-ISLKMf AL-MUKIITAýAR" BZ SHIBýB AL-DfN ABTJ ISIIýQ

IBRýHITM IBN 'ABDULIAH IBN rALf IBN ABIF JýL-DAM AL-IiAYLAWf (583/1187-642/1244)

By

JAZEEL ABDUL-JABBARLAL-IONIIARD

Thesis presented to the University of St. Andrews for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

LI, I

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ST

COPY

AVAILA

L

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a critical edition of a medieval Arabic text, which is widely known under the insufficiently attested title

"al-Ta7rTkh al-MuzaffarP'.. It is ascribed to a celebrated historian

and scholar of the first half of the 7th/13th century, Shihab al-D n abU Ishaq Ibi-ahlim b. abi al-Dam al-Hamawi al-Shafi'T (583/1187-642/1244),

40

a native and QadT Oudge) of Hamah.

The thesis consists of two parts, the introductory study and then the text. The introductory study facilitates the understanding of the

problems the text raises and clarifies the more important issues surrounding it.

The first chapter is intended to serve as a historical background. A brief account, therefore, of the AyyUbid empire, together with a brief

history of Ham9h, Ibn abFal-Dam's native town, is presented to shed 0

light on the author's time.

The second chapter of the introduction is devoted to examining the author's life. The sources concerning this part of the study are few.

Some of the author's own works are still missing, others are at present inaccessible. From the obtainable works either printed or in MSS, a

reconstruction

of the author's life and times has been made.

Sections I and 2 of the third and final chapter of the introductory

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not, what other title it could have had.

The rest of this chapter has

been devoted to Investigating and examining the MSS. in which the text has been preserved and transcribed ever since the original was composed.

In the absence of the original, I have chosen the oldest and in my opinion, the most complete of the only five surviving copies so far

identified and located. This copy, which is referred to in this thesis by the abbreviation Bo, was written in (695/1295) by a native of Hamah, 53

years after the death of the author. All the other four are almost definitely of a more recent date.

The second part of this thesis is the text, edited on the basis of

the oldest MS. which is preserved in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. The text has been transcribed retaining the conventions, orthographic and

grammatical of the copyist wherever possible. Additions and

modifications

have been avoided unless in their absence the sense of the

passage is obscured to the point of incomprehensibility. In these cases other copies, A. of Alexandria Municipal Library, E. of Edinburgh University Library, and Rand P2. of Bankipore Public Library were consulted and all differenced between these MSS.

, however minor, are shown and detailed

in the footnotes.

The text, then is supplemented by indices of towns, places,

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DEDICATION

To mY mother whose spirit and morale were the candle which illuminated her sons' paths. Whose sacrifice has yielded to the

completion of this project which she believes is worthy of devoted

effort.

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DECLARATION

I fiEREBY DECLARE THAT THE FOLLOWING IS VIE

RESULT OF RESEARCH WORK CARRIED OUT BY ME, Tl-lAT ThE T-HESIS IS MY OWN COMPOSITION AND THAT IT HAS NOT

PREVIOUSLY BEEN SUBMITTED FOR ANY OTHER DEGREE.

J. A. J. AL-JOMARD ST. ANDREWS

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CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY TtiAT JAZEEL ABDUL JABBAR AL-JOMARD hAS COMPLETED NINE TERMS OF RESEARCA WORK IN TkiE UNITED COLLEGE OF ST. SALVATOR AND ST. LEONARD, UNIVERSITY OF

I

ST. ANDREWS, THAT HE HAS FULFILLED TffE CONDITIONS OF RESOLUTION NO. 1 (1967) OF THE UNIVERSITY COURT, AND

I THAT HE IS QUALIFIED TO SUBMIT TlfE ACCOMPANYING TifESIS IN APPLICATION FOR TIIE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF P. UILOSOP11Y.

D. E. P. JACKSON (DR. ) SUPERVISOR.

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ACKNOWLEDGE MENTS

I should like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. D. E'. P. .. Jackson, my supervisor, for his guidance without which this work

would not have been accomplished. My thanks are also due to Dr. J. Burton of the Department of Arabic Studies for his valuable

, help and constant encouragement throughout the period of preparation

of this thesis.

I. I am also grateful to the Librarians of the University Library

for their persistent effort to make the academic research less toilsome. Many thanks are also due to the administration of the University of St. Andrews, especially to the accommodation officers, the warden

and staff of David Russell Hall for their kindness and tolerance towards problems caused by my personal financial difficulties.

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TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION

Consonants

(ex ce pt

z q

when initial)

b

U-

S

k

t

sh

J=

i

th

r=

m

dj

d

=

n

h

t

h

kh

Z

w

d

r

Ls

y

dh

gh

r

f

Short Vowels: Lon2 Vowels:

a

u

u

Ls

P! Phtho in2s: Double Vowels:

W.

aw c, ý- = aww

ay uww

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List of Abbreviations Used in this Edition

aft.

after

b.

born

Br. Mus.

British Museum

cross.

crossed out

damag.

damaged

d.

died

ed.

edited

f ol.

folio

9*

governed

illeg.

illegible

Ins.

Inserted

La c.

Lacuna

mis.

missing

MS.

Manuscript

MSS.

Manuscripts

marg.

margin

No.

number

om.

omitted or omission

Or.

Oriental

P.

page

PP.

pages

Part.

partly damaged

damag.

re pt.

repeated

sugg.

suggested

BUPP*

supplied

trans.

translated

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E. Br.

El. Old. El. New.

GAL. 11. Kh.

JAOS JRAS

S OAS ZDMG

Abbreviations of Names and References

The Encyclopaedia Britannica.

The Encyclopaedia, of Islam. First edition.

The Encyclopaedia of Islam. Second edition. Ges chichte'Der Arabis chen Litteratur.

Hadi di T Kha 17ifa.

journal of American Oriental Society. journal of Royal Asiatic Society.

School of Oriental and African Studies.

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CONTENTS

Pacre

Dedication W

Declaration (H)

Certif ication (iii)

Acknowledgements (iv)

List of Transliteration M

List of Abbreviations (vi)

Contents (Viii)

PART I INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 11

General Historical Background 2

1- The Ayyubids 2

2- Hamah, Its History in brief 31

CHAPTER 11 42

Ibn abTal-Dam, Ifis Life and Works 43

CHAPTER 111 62

Discussion of the Present Work 63

1 -Authenticity of the Ascription of the Work 63

2- The Title 70

3- Description of the MSS. 75

Bo. 75

E. 82

A. 86

P. 89

P2. 91

Conclusion 92

4- The Text 97

5- Methods employed in Editing 114

Bibliography 116

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PART II THE TEXT

Appendix of Qur'anlc verses

Pape

594

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PART ONE

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CHAPTER 1

I GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND THE AYY'TJBID EMPIRE

The Ayyubids

The Ayyubids After Salah al-Din

The Main Features of the Ayyubid period Education Under the Ayyubids

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2

ChAPTER I

GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ThE AYYjBID EMPIRE

1. The Ayyýbids:

The name of a dynasty which at the end of the 6th/12th 'century and in the first half of the 7th/13th century ruled Egypt, rpuslim Syria-

Palestine, the major part of Upper Mesopotamia, and the Yer; en.

-This dynasty, which is named after Nadjm al-DTn AyyUb b. Shadhi b. Marwan

(d. 568/1172) father of the founder of this family ýala`h al-Din Yusuf

(d. 589/1193), was divided into various semi-independent principalities, connected by the family relationship which was characteristic of the

rivalries between brothers and relatives as sultans or princes, and to a lesser degree between generals and officials who supported one prince

against another depending on their immediate interests. These principalities were established during the life of the founder Salgh al-DTn himself,

but flourished and went through a more independent period after his death (589/1193) and lasted in Egypt till (650/1252), in Damascus and Aleppo till I

(G58/1260), in Upper Mesopotamia till (643/1245), in Hamah till (742/1341)

and in the Yemen till (625/1228). in Hims, the descendants of Asad al-DFn

Shý7ku-h (d. 564/1168), brother of Nadjm al-I)TnAyyýb, lasted till (661/1262). 1 It is more commonly accepted that the Ayyýbids were of a Kurdish

extraction, 2 of the Rav%Fa-diyya tribe from Duwin in Azerbaydjan. 3

1EI. Old, Vol. 1, p. 221.

E I. New. Vol. 1, p. 796. Stanley Lane - Poole : The Muhammadan Dynasties., Karachl. 1969, pp. 68-73.

2. For theories attributing an Arabic origin see: Ibn Wasil;

_Muffaridj al-Kur-ub ffAkhbgr Bani Avvub. Cairo, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 3. e-

3. Ibn al-Ath'D: al-k-a; -'m7--il ffal-WrFkh. Cairo, Vol. 9, p. 255.

Ibn Khallikan: Wafayat al-AlyYn. ed. Ihsan rAbbas. Beirut, 1968-1972. Vol. 1, Pp. 255-56, Vol. 7, pp. 139-140:

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3

The father of AyyUb, Shadh Ti b. Marwan, left his native town

DuwTn and headed southwards to Iraq at the beginning of the sixth/eleventh century where he was appointed as Duzdar (castle keeper) of TikrTit by the Sal(ýJuk governor of Iraq Bihruz. When Shad-hi died, his son Ayyub

succeeded him, but because of some troubles caused by his brother

Shirkuh both discreetly withdrew from Tikrit and joined rImEd al-15in Zang7i of Mosul (g. 521/1127-541/1146) and later on his son Nur al-Din Mahmud

(d. 569/1174) proving to be good generals and reliable assistants.

Both AyyUb and Shlrkuh had sons, who shared their father's various vicissitudes of fortune and assisted them in their activities. Among

AyyUb's five sons, ýalab al-DTn Yýsuf was to become the most outstanding figure in this family, and it is he who was effective in establishing the

Ayyubid dynasty as one of the more powerful states or empires in the history

of medieval Islam.

Salah al-Din participated in the campaigns to Egypt, led by his uncle Sbýirkýh and sponsored by Nur al-Din Zangi in (564/1168), and his

participation in the third campaign, ostensibly to aid the Fatimids against

the crusaders, 2 led to his succession, after the death of his uncle, as vizier to the Fatimid Caliph al-r. ýdld (g. 555/1160-567/1171) and later on to his

suppression of the Shri Fatimid caliphate in (567/1171); he then declared

About the careers and activities of Ayyub and Shirkuh, see: Ibn al-Athir: al-Td'rfkh al-Eighir, Cairo, 1968.

Ibn Khallilýa-n: Wafayat, Vol. 1, pp. 255-261, Vol. 2, pp. 476-480. Vol. 6, pp. 139-218.

IbnShaddSd: al-Nawadiral-ýýý, Cairo, 1928. IbnWSsil: Mufarria, Vol. 1.

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4

Sunni rule once again (after 270 years of ShMi rule) in Egypt and the

return of the country to the Abbasid sphere of influence. He preserved his relationship with his master Nur al-Din Zangi despite some mutual

tension till the death of the latter (569/1174) after which he went into

open conflict with the guardians of Nur al-DIn's heir al-Salih Isma"TI and his relatives; he subsequently proclaimed himself independent, defeated the Zangids of Syria and in (570/1175) the caliph al-MustadO granted him Egypt, Nubia, the Yemen, the Maghrib from Egypt to Tripolis, Palestine

and central Syria as his sphere of influence; Saffh al-]ýIin then adopted the title of sultan and was so regarded by his contemporaries. 2

By inheriting the lands of two preceding advanced but very different states, and with the ambition of adopting a leading role in the world of

Islam, given the ever-present danger of the crusaders, which he had

experienced even before his independence, ýalah al-Din had to develop the complex systems to which he had fallen heir into an efficient, unified

military and administrative whole. 3 Sal7ah al-I; -in now adopted a combination of the Zangid and Fatimid lqýar systems which provided him with a form of

military feudalism which retained elements of both. He was thus able,

by applying to the Fatimid Iqtar system certain hereditary elements (although not all) of the Zangid system, to retain an element of legal hereditary right

within his own familywhile enabling him to dispense other Iqla"s'as a 1A more up to date study of these events and Salah al-Dings career

can be found in M. C. Lyons and D. E. P. jacksorý. Saladin. The Politics of the HoIX War Cambridge, 1982.

2. E I. Old, Vol. IV, p. 86.

A

3. See about this point H. A. R. Gibb: The Achievement of Saladin. ' In

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5

personal munificence in return for services without reference to the

hereditary principle. 1 This meant that he was able to retain exclusive authority of assigning the Iqta which remained subject to recall or

modification regardless how powerful the assignee was. 2 Thus by giving the major Iqtars- 'to his sons and relatives, and then to a lesser degree his reliable generals who were given some minor Iqta*s or trusted with fortress or castles, Salah al-]ýIin created an intricate co-ordinated structure with

himself at the centre. By this method of administration Salah al-DTn succeeded in maintaining an expanding empire and financing - though sometimes with difficulty - an increasing army, a large part of which

consisted of professional warriors, many of whom were mamluks who fitted into this feudal system by being attached to the muqtals, princes or anTirs,

-r

in certain numbers which depended on the yield of these Iqta s. These warriors were kept mobilized for times of emergency. 3

Salah al-Din also tried to revive the feeble Fatimid navy and to

utilize it more efficiently against the crusaders on the coast of Syria and Palestine, or against new crusades coming from overseas, and by slow

stages achieved a limited success in this endeavour. 4 He also encouraged

traditional scholarship, probablý following the footsteps of Nur al-DTn ZangT,

in that he established many schools devoted to the sunni doctrines and

1. H. Rabie: The Financial Svstem of Eqvpt. A. H. 564-741/A. D. 1169-1341. London, 1972, p. 30. For features of the AyyUbid feudalism, see:

A. N. Poliak: The Ayyubid F- eudalism. In J. R. A. S. London, 1939, pp. 428- 2. R. Stephen Humphreys: From Saladin to the Mongols. The Ayyubids of

Damascus 1193-1260. New York, 1977, pp. 16-17. 3. See H. A. R. Gibb: *The Armies

, of Saladin.. ý In Studies on the civilization of Islam. London, 196;.,, pp. 74-86.

4. A. S. Ehrenkreutz: 'The Place of Saladin in the Naval History of th. e Mediterra nean Sea in the Middle. Ages I, ' in j. A. 0. S.

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6

theological studies in Cairo after the Fatimids. They, being sevener Shllýfs, had allowed only the strict Fatimid ImýmTdoctrine to exist.

According to Ibn Khallikan, ýalah al-Din built four madrasas in Cairo for 0

the Shafiri-s and Hanaffs, one in Jerusalem and one named after him in

Damascus, and a part from the last he assigned vast Iqtars to supply funds for them. I He surrounded himself with men of literature and scholarship,

some of whom became his advisors, like al-QSýT al-FSqU (529/1135-597/1201) who plaýed a prominent role In framing Salgh al-DIn's policy which culminated

0

in his successes and the establishment of his dynasty. 2

The AyjýUbids after SaMah al-f-in:

ýalab al-Din died in (589/1193) leaving his empire, with the absence of his paternal authority, a collection of principalities headed by young

and ambitious princes (his sons and relatives) most of them with good

education, and with their own advisers and educators who were either

appointed to assist them In their principalities by ýalah al-Din himself or 0

who came into contact with them through the considerable immigration of

scholars to Syria and Egypt because of the new and encouraging atmosphere created by ýalah al-Din or his knowledgeable adviser al-Qadi al-Fadil.

The status quo of the state and its provinces on the death of ýalah al-DTn was as follows:

1.

Damascus and its subjoined area were under the control of the oldest

son al-Afdal 'Alfb. SalEh al--Dfn.

1. Ibn Khallikan: Vvrafayýt, Vol. 7, pp. 206-207. 2. E I. New. Vol. IV, p. 376.

ý-ee

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7

r

2. Egypt and its dependencies were under the control of al- Azfz rUthman.

3. Aleppo was under al-Zahir Ghazi b. Salah al-Din.

4. The Yemen was under Sayf al-DTn abu Bakr b. Ayyub.

5. Al-Karak, al-Shawbak, and al-DjazE7a (Upper Mesopotamia) with

Diyar Bakr was under SalEh al-DTn's powerful brother al-rý. dil Sayf al-DTn b. Ayyub.

6. Hainah, Salamya, al-Maarra, Manbidj and Qalrat Nadjm were under al-Mansur Muhammad bo al-Malik al-Muzaffar TaqTal-I5-in rUmar.

ý7. Hims, al-Rahba and Tadmur (Palmira) were under Asad al-DTn Sh-irkuh 0 b. Muhammad b. Sýirkuh.

8. Ba'1bak with al-AmSDad Maqjd al-D-in Bihramshah b. Parrlikhshah b. Shýhinshah b. -Ayyu-b.

9. Busra was under al-Zafir Khidr b. Salah al-Din. He was, however, In the service of his elder brother al-Afdal of Damascus.

0

In addition to these divisions some minor towns and fortifications

had been left in the hands of major arrJrs (generals).

1

Al-Afdal, who had been recognized as heir appointed by his father and his generals and cabinet, succeeded his father, but internal strife

amongst his sons over domination of the whole empire emerged, especially

between the more powerful brotheisal-Afdal and al-rAzý`iz, both of whom had a group of supporters who once were amTrs (generals) of their father or their father's uncle Asad al-DTn, and in the two following years al-rA: ý-iz marched from Egypt on Damascus but was prevented from taking it when al-Afdal

allied himself with al-Zahir of Aleppo, and al-Mansur of Hamah. Ile

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appealed to his uncle al-'A'Edil who played the rule of mediator, and

forced al-rAzTz back to Egypt, but the struggle between the two brothers continued till a127ýdil turned to alAý&s side and managed to take over Damascus on behalf of al-rAz7iz from al-Afdal who was given only Salkhad

in (592/1196), and after the early death of al-'AzTz in (595/1198) al- Afdal,

.0

encouraged by some of the Egyptian amirs, tried to gain sovereignty over Egypt and marched against Damascus, allied with al-Zahir of Aleppo.

They beMeged the city after al-rýý. dil had entered it; the siege lasted for six months, meanwhile, al "Fidil, an experienced and skilful tactician,

succeeded in creating a rift between the two brothers al-Afdal and al-Zahir &0

weakening their solidarity which collapsed with the arrival of al-%ý-dills elder son al-Mmil Mubammad - (now 22-24 years old) as his father's

deputy in al-Djaiira (Mesopotamia) - with his army. Al-Afdal retreated to Egypt pursued by al-'Jýdil and his troops and was finally defeated at

Bilbais in (596/1200) and al-'Rdil entered Cairo as victor in(Ra]ýiral-ThEnF 596/February 1200). After a very short period as an Atabeg to al-! Aziý's

r 7% 1

child al-Mansur, al- Adil declared himself as Lord of the Ayyubid lands. Al-r, ýdil, now 58 years old (596/1199), had had long experience

gained through his association With his father, his uncle Shirkuh, and his

brother Salah al-Din. He came to Egypt with his brother under the command of Shirk; h in the last Egyptian expedition* (564/1169), stayed with Saffh

al-DTn and remained loyal to his policy, and after the death of Nu-r al-DTn (569/1174) and Salah al-Din's independence, he represented him in Egypt when ýalZb al-Din was absent in Syria, proving himself as a reliable

See Ibn Wýsil: Mufarrid) Vol. 3, pp. 26-112. .KI. Old.,

ýol. 1, p. 138.

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9

administrator. 1 He remained as deputy to his brother in Egypt until

(579/1183) when Aleppo was captured by Salah al-DTn and al-'Fdil was appointed as governor for three years before he came back to Egypt in

(582/1186-87). He participated in Salah al-Din's campaigns against the crusaders by taking part in the recapture of southern Palestine and Karak, and played an important role as a negotiator with Richard Coeur- de-Lion in (588/1192).

This valuable experience made of al-'AýLdil an attentive, heedful, and more importantly, aware observer of the situation obtaining in the different parts of the Ayyubid empire, in Egypt, in Syria, and in

Mesopotamia. In addition he was well-acquainted with the behaviour of the Ayyubids, their amirs and generals and with the divisions and

schisms within the structure of the state and the army; he also recognised how these elements could be exploited for his own purposes.

Al-'A-dil, like his brother Salýh al-DTn, and in response to his &0

own request, received the Caliphal decree recognizing his suzerainty

over Egypt, Da mascus, Khilat and Mesopotamia. 2 He contrived well to hold on to an almost united empire under his control by (596/1200), and apart from Aleppo, Ilims, flamah, the Yemen and some minor locations

which recognized his authority but maintained a degree of independence and family relationship not without occasional disobedience, he directly

ruled Egypt, Damascus, and Mesopotamia where he installed his sons as deputies.

-Al-K9mil Muhammad (573/1177-635/1238) was given Egypt, 0

1. Ibn Khallikan: Wafayat, Vol. 5, p. 74. E I. New. Vol. I, p. 197.

2. Ibn Taghii' Bird: al-Nudjum al-Zabira fi Muluk Misr wa al-Qahir 0

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al-Mu'zzam rTsý (576/1180-624/1227) Damascus; and MayyafariqTn

and Upper Mesopotamia first were granted to al-Awhad AyyUb (d. 607/1210) 1

and then to al-Ashraf Musa (578/1182-: 635/1237), and in (612/1215)

al-rRdil assigned the son of al-Kýmil, Salah al-Din Yusuf to a campaign to take the Yemen, he succeeded and governed it until power passed to the Rasulids in (626/1228). 2

Alý-rAdil seems to have copied Salah al-Din's method in building a reliable system by depending on his sons, and according to Ibn Taghri

BarCPs comparison, the difference between the two was that aIJAdil was less popular and his troops were less loyal to him. They tried to

assassinate him on many occasions but he was an experienced ruler who

was able to contain all these attempts, and his sons contributed much to

the maintenance of his regime and its survival. 3 Another factor behind

the success of al-CAdil's policy, which is not immediately apparent, was in his mobility and flexibility in moving between different parts of the

empire as a whole according to the seasons of the year, and in response

to the emergency as it arose, He ruled without having any particular place as: his province of residence, a policy which did not allow the natural

historical rivalry between the powers of the major cities like Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo

... etc. to make itself explicit or strong enough to cause disunion.

1. E I. New. Vol. I, p. 19 8. E I. Old. Vol. I, p. 13 8.

Stanley Lane - Poole:

-

The Muhammadan Dynasties, p. 7 1. 2. Ibn Khallik9n: WafaTcqt, Vol. 5, p. 75.

Stanley Lane - Poole: The Muhammadan Dynasties, p. 72. 3. Ibn TaghrT BirdF*. al-Nudjum, Vol. 6, p. 167.

4. Ibn KhTlItkan: ýýVol. 5, p. 75.

Franz-Josef Dahlmanns: AI-Malik Al-Adil. Aqy12ten Und Der Vordere Orient In Den Jahren 589j1193 Bis 615/1218. Universitat Gießen,

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11

Once again, as happened after the death of Salah al-Din, the

death of al-rýýdil (615/1218) caused, to some extent, the loosening of the ties which had kept the fabric of the state intact. Probably the sons of

al-qdil were lucky that the most ppwerful expected rival to their father, al-Zahir Ghazi of Aleppo, bad died two years previously (613/1216), and had been succeeded by his three-year-old boy al-rAzTz Muhammad

(g. 613/1216-634/1236). 1 At the same time the present danger of the

fifth crusade and the occupation of Damietta (615/1218), united the three dominant Ayyubid brothers at the moment of menace. Al-r. ýdil was very

much concerned with Egypt and its safety after the Frankish raids on

Rosetta (601/1204) and Damietta (608/1211) so he kept the Egyptian troops for most of the time retained on garrison duty in Egypt. 2 This sense of

danger was shared between the Ayyubids after al-rRdil's death, but they never enjoyed unity like that under Salah al-Din or al-'rRdil. In Egypt

there was al-Kýmil Mubammad (39-43 years. old), Damascus was under the sway of al-Muva': ý: pm rI-sa (37-39 years old) and al-Ashraf Musa (37 years old) was in control of Mesopotamia. Other parts of the Ayyi7bid empire

apart from Hims, 11amah, and Aleppo were left in the hands of the younger

sons of al-rTdil; some of whom, together with other princes or amirs, were in the service of one of the three dominant brothers, al-19mil, al-Murazzam and al-Ashraf. 3

1-

Op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 9-10.

2. H. A. R. Gibb; uTheAyyubidsu, p. 697.

3. IbnWasil. - Mufarridj, Vol. 3, pp. 273-275.

IbnTaghrTBirdf, - al-Nudjum, Vol. 6, pp. 172-173.

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12

Al-Kamil resumed his father's rule facing the Franks in Damietta

from his position in al-Mansura in (Sharban 616/November 1219). While he was holding the crusaders back for almost two years, the Ayyubid

forces of Syria and Mesopotamia led by the three sons of al-fFdil gathered in al-ManýZra at the end of (Djumada I/July 1221) ready for a decisive

battle; but with the Franks feeling the heavy pressure of the united forces, and with al-KamTl seeming to have inherited his father's preference of

employifig negotiation to serve his purposes, the two sides managed to

reach an agreement and to sign a peace treaty for a period of eight years; Damietta once again was handed back to the AyyUbids in (Radjab 618/

September 1221

The removal of the crusader danger left the AyyZibids to themselves, and the quarrel between the brothers and their changing alliances and

allies arose again resembling the situation just after the death of Salýh 00

al-f-in; the main difference between the two situations was that the sons of al-', ýdil were more on a par with one another as regards age, education,

political acumen and experience, and power. al-Ashraf who was initially

not on good terms with his brother al-Kamil and was convinced by his other

brother al-Murazzam to change his attitude, later came to favour co-operation with his distant brother al-Kamil to keep the powerful al-Muraýpm of

Damascus away from his domain in Mesopotamia (al-DiazTra and Diy9r Bakr). Early in (619/1222 al-Kamil and al-Ashraf concluded an alliance

against al-Murazzam who in view of this new development thought it better to give way to al-Ashraf in two disputes one over Harfiah (619/1222) and the

1. E 1. New, Vol. IV, p. 520. E 1. New. Vol. I, p. 79 9.

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13

second over Khil9t (620/1223). 1 Feeling threatened and alone between his two brothers from south and north al-Mul`aýýam took a new initiative

by adopting the policy of making an alliance with powers from without the Ayyubid domain; he invited the Kbwarizmians to attack al-Ashrafls territories from the north, 2 and agreed with Muzaffar al-DTn Kukbu-rF

0

(549/1154-630/1232) of Irbh to attack from the east probably with the approval of the caliph in Baghdad. 3 This pressure created by the well-

organized policy of al-Murazzam left al-Ashraf cut off and resulted in the a0

surrender of al-Ashraf who joined al-Murazzam in Damascus (623A226) as 00

his repentance at having been with al-Kamil against him. Al-Kamil felt

threatened by the new alliance of his two brothers in the north and realized the possibility of the imminent disintegration of the empire or at least his

own defeat. 4 Being aware of the crusade of Frederick II, al-Kýmil

offered to give up jerusalem'to the crusaders in return for a peace treaty most likely In order to avoid having to fight on two fronts at once;

al-Murazzam, however, faced with the crusaders assembling at Acre 0.

(rAkka) and the opposition of the princes of Hims and Hamah after a period 000

of subjection to him, died in (QhTal-QPda 624/November 1227), 5 and was succeeded by his young son al-Nasir Dawud (now about 20 years old) with the approval of his uncle al-Kýmil. 6 The absence of al-Mulazzam left

*0 1 See details in Ibn al-AthTr: al-Ki; mil, Vol. 9, p.

R. S. Humphreys: From Saladin to the Mongols "The Ayyubid Cold War", pp. 170-185.

2. Ibn Taghrf BirdT: al-Nudjgm, Vol. 6, p. 264. H. A. R. Gibb: "The AyyuRds, ' pp. 700-701.

3. Ibnal-Athir: al-K5mil,, Vol. 9, pp. 354,371. 4. Ibid.

, Vol. 9, p. 371.

5. Ibn Khallikan: Wafayýt Vol. 3, P. 495. Ibn al-Athfr: al-KSmil,

, Vol. 9, p. 375. I-1. A. R. G ibb: 0 Th e Ayyub ids, " p. 701.

6. Ibn al-Athir: al-KEmil, Vol. 9, p. 375. 4

371.

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14

al-IC9mil with a greater opportunity to establish his authority over the Ayylibid lands as a whole, and when the new young al-Nýsir DEwýd

dreamed of taking over his father's position in opposition to al-Kýmil and to facilitate this made an alliance with al-Ashraf, al-K9mil responded by

marching to Damascus in (626/1228). The Syrian coalition soon collapsed as al-Ashraf joined al-Kýmil abandoning. al-Nasir Dawu-d who then submitted to his uncle but was deprived of Damascus and given al-Shawbak.. instead,

and Darýascus was offered to al-Ashraf in return for certain towns in the north like Edessa, ýarran, al-Raqqa and M's al-rAyn which were handed

over to al-Kamil.

This new distribution

of lands made al-Kýmil

undisputedly the dominant figure and the senior Ayyubid at this time.

Al-Kamil, after his treaty with Frederick 11 (626/1229) in which be handed Jerusalem over to the crusaders, focussed his activities together-

with al-Ashraf on protecting and expanding their northern borders.

Al-Ashraf defeated the Khwýrizmians (627/1229) and regained Ehilat from them after they had captured and massacred its population. In (631/1233) al-Kgmil, al-Ashraf, and the other Ayyubid princes faced a setback after

they had gathered in a campaign against the Saldjuks of Rým and were forced to withdraw to ý. mid from al-SuwaydE'; the Sal! jjuks followed

al-KEmil, captured al-SuwaydiD and besieged Amid (632/1234), but in the following year (633/1235) al-Kýmil and al-Ashraf regained Harran and

0

al-Ruha (Edessa) zind destroyed Dunaysir. But in the same year the

Khw-arizmians retaliated for their defeat in KhilA by attacking M3rd-in and 2

burning Nisib-in.

1. Ibid., Vol. 9, pp. 377-379. Ibn Taqhrr Bircf-i:

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is

A rift occurred between the two brothers because of the refusal

of al-KEmil to hand over al-Raqqa to al-Ashraf, but it did not persist as they both died in the following year (635/1237).

After the death of al-KTmil the Ayyi7bid state relapsed into chaos. Like his father, al-K; mIl had installed his two sons in the government of Egypt and 'Mesopotamia. Al-qdil II abu7 Bakr, at the age of twelve

represented his father in Egypt (629/1231), and al-Salih Nadim al-Din

Ayyub (b. 603/1207) was granted al-Ruha and Ilarran in (633/1236). He 0

received Sindjar and Nisibin in (635/1238) in addition to the previous

provinces and became master of al-DjazTra province in his father's time.

2 A council of the andrs held immediately after the death of al-Kamil resulted

in the decision being made to accept the younger son al-tTWil 11 (19 years old), who was already in Egypt, as successor to his father, and al-2jawad Yunus b. Mawdud b. al-'Iidil as his deputy in Damascus. This decision

stirred up the anger of other prominent princes like al-Nasir Dawud b. 0

al-Mulazzam of al-Karak. Ile was, however, defeated after a brief 3

rebellion'and retreated to al-Karak. Al-Nasir Ismafi'l b. al-'Adil was

also planning to occupy Damascus to the government which he bad once succeeded after the death of his brother al-Ashraf Musa but was deprived

of it in the same year (635/1237) by al-KEmil. The most aggrieved at being neglected was the oldest son of al-Kýmil al-SElih AyytTb of Mesopotamia

(al-Dja2ýira) who felt himself more entitled to succeed his father, and had been himself once appointed as his father's deputy in Egypt (625/1228) but

1. Ibn Khallikan: Wafaxa: t, Vol. 5, pp. 332-333. 2. E I. Old. Vol. I, p. 138.,

-Vol. IV, p. 108.

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16

dismissed in (628/1231). 1 After certain difficulties 2 in the east with the governor of Mosul and the Saldjuks he managed to reach Damascus and

took over its government from the weak, unpopular and careless al-Djawad

in return for Sindjar and 'Ana (636/1238). Al-Salih AyYub continued heading towards Egypt purposing to take it from al-'ý, dil II; he reached Nablus and

waited there for his uncle al-SMih Ismalýil of Barlbak to join him in his campaign; al-Salih IsmaIll, instead, made a common cause with Asad al-Eilin 8h7irkuh of Hims - who is said to have considered himself more

deserving of the sultanate of the Ayyubids than any other member of the

dynasty because his grandfather had conquered Egypt for the Ayy9bids in the first instance and established the fortune of the dynasty they both

ignored the appeal of al-Salih Ayyub and successfully captured Damascus

for themselves in (the second month of 637/November 1239). At the same time, al-Nasir Dawud of al-Karak, fleeing in front of al-Sglih Ayyub,

joined al-rAdil II in Egypt, but could not come to trust the latter and came back to al-Karak, Knowing that al-Salih Ayyub had been deserted by his troops and the Syrian princes, al-Nasir Dawud managed to bring him to

al-Karak aýid put him under a form of arrest. Soon, al-f. ýdil Ii demanded

that al-Salih Ayy7-b be handed to him; al-Nasir Dawud rejected his demand, 4 instead he made an agreement with al-Salih Ayyýb to capture Egypt for him

and in return al-Nasir Dawýd would take Syria after they had finished with 5

Egypt and al- Adil II. This agreement was most likely initiated by

1. EI. Old., Vol. IV, p. 108.

2. See a brief account in Ibn Kathir: 1966, Vol. 13, p. 150.

3. Ibid.

, Vol. 13, p. 155.

4. Ibn Ta2hrl Birdi: al-Nudj'um, Vol. 5. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 310.

al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya,, Beitut,

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17

al-Muzaffar II of Hamah who sided with al-Salih Ayyub against the alliance of Damascuso

Al-Salih Isma il and his ally Asad al-Iýin SI-jrkuh of Hims marched against Nablus in their way to crush the new alliance in al-Karak, which

had already irritated al-'A-dil II; but a mutiny within alr, ýdil's army resulted in his imprisonment and al-SMih Ayyllb was invited by the rebellious

amirs to take Egypt at the end of (637/1239 )ý

In his endeavour to re-establish

a considerable and reliable army,

insofar as his present one had divided into factions and contradictory

7.

loyalties, al-, ýalih AyyUb recruited a huge number of bought - mamluks

(slaves) of Turkish origin, and replaced his old generals and amirs by

these new military elements. He started using them in the administration as well as in the army and from then on they played a great role in the destiny

of the AyyUbids and the history of the area as a whole.

3

The relations

between the AylZ-bids remained tense throughout the following years, and

combinations of alliances were formed and dissolved time and again. The most outstanding of them, was the alliance between al-S51ih Ismaril and the

crusaders In which the former handed over Safad, Belfort, Sidon (Saydý) and Tiberias (Tabariya) to the latter after an agreement to a defensive alliance

against Egypt. 4 This initiative was an effort which led to a wider

involvement of other outside powers, for al-ýaliý Ayyub, who had decided to capture Damascus, allied himself with the Khwarizmians, who were

1. H. A. R. Gibb: "The Ayyubids, " p. 7 07.

2. Ibn Taghrf BirdF*. al -Nudlu-m, Vol. 6, pp. 310-312. 3. Ibid., Vol. 6, pp. 319-7620.

E I. Old. Vol. IV, p. 109.

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18

engaged in a series of skirmishes with the Ayyubids of Aleppo and Hims, and succeeded in occupying Damascus '(643/1245). Al-Salih Ismafi-1

was defeated and retained only Barlbak, but very soon he was able

profitably to exploit the dissatisfaction of the Khawarizmians who felt betrayed by al-Salih Ayyub; he allied himself with them and besieged

Damascus in the same year causing much distress to the inhabitants of

the city. Al-Mansur of Hims who was once with al-SElih Isma"il reacted angrily dgainst the act of the Khwarizmians and al-Salih Ismý'ýil; he sided

with al-S7alih Ayyu-b, gathered, their combined troops together with the troops of Aleppo, the Turkomans and the Arabs and defeated the Khwarizmians in a decisive battle, almost destroying them, near Hims. This led to the

occupation of Damascus by al-Mansur who governed the city as al-Salih Ayy-ub's representative till his death (644/1246) after which the city was

ruled by deputies of al-Salih AyyUb. In the following years al-Salih Ayyub struggled to impose his supremacy -over other parts of Syria like

Barlbak, Busra, Sarkhad, al-Salt and other minor places. His opponents, al-Nasir Dawud of al-Karak and al-S. alih. Ismatlil, after losing their chance to overcome al-Salih Ayyub or gain more territories, now found refuge at

Aleppo with the new, more serious rival to al-Salih Ayyub, that is al-Nasir Salah al-ID7in Yýsuf 11 (627/1230-659/1261). 2 He succeeded his father

al-rA. ýIiz Muhammad b. al-Zahir Ghaý-i in (634/1236) at the age of six, and was guarded by his paternal grandmother Da"ifa Khatun bint al-! TWil I till

her deatý (640/1242) after which he assumed power in his own right. 3 1-1 e

1. Ibn Katlýiir: al-Bidýy

, Vol. 13, pp. 166-167. 2. Ibid., Vol. 13

' pp. 167,171. EI- Old, Vol. IV, p. 110.

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19

became stronger when both al-Salih Ismaril and al-Nasir Ayyub lost

their power, and when Syria, with the absence of al-Salih Ayyub in Egypt, became an open area for the youth al-Naisir Yýsuf II to demonstrate his

ambitions. In (646/1248) he laid siege to al-Ashraf Musa (627/1229-

662/12G3) in Hims, and forced him, after two months, to surrender and give up Uims in return for Tall Býshir, Tadmur and al-Rabba. 1 This act

provoked al-Salib Ayyub, who understood the expansionist ideas of 0

al-Nasiý Yýsuf, who had already brought the young prince of Hamah

al-Mansu-r Muhammad (d. 683/1284 to his side by marrying him to 2

his daughter. Therefore al-Salih Ayyub marched on Syria in the same year (646/1248) despite his illness, carrying his siege apparatus to

Damascus and Hims. ' But the campaign proved insignificant, and, 00

together with the news of the sixth crusade on Damietta and the deterioration of his health, al-Salth accepted the mediation of the envoy of the Abbasid

caliph, ended his siege of Hims leaving it to the Aleppians and withdrew

to Egypt carried by, his men; he died in (647/1249). 3 His army of Mamluks became powerful enough to crush the crusaders at Damietta 4 and even to

terminate the Ayyubid dynasty of Egypt when they killed al-Salih Ayyub's son Turanshah who had mistreated the amirs of the Mamluks; he was

5 murdered at the first month of (648/April 1250)

Abu al-Fid2': Muntakhabat min al Mukhtasar ft Akhbar al-Bashar. In Recueil Des Historiens Des Croisades. historiens Orientaux.

Tome Premier, Paris, MDCCCLXXII, p. 125. 2. H. A. R. Gibb: "The Ayyubids, ' p. 711.

3*- Op. cit., pp. 125-126.

Ibn TaghrF Birdf: al-Nudjum, Vol. 6, p. 361. 4. Abu alZr-id3l: Muntakhzibat, pp. 126-128.

5. Abý al-Fida": Muntakhabat, pp. 128-129.

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20

The termination of the Ayyubid rule in Egypt was received with

great anger and fury by the Ayy7-bids of Syria who considered the Mamluks as usurpers and traitors. The prince of Aleppo al-Nasir Yusuf took the

field against the Mamluks, together with the eminent Ayyubid princes,

al-S7alih Ismall, al-Nasir Dawt-id, al-Ashraf Musa and others who marched to Damascus and occupied it together with Barlbak, Busra, Salkhad and

most of Syria-Palestine apart from al-Shawbak and al-Karak, which were taken bý al-Mugl-ýith rUmar b. al-rlýdil b. al-Kýmil because of the period

1

of confusion in Egypt. The AyyUbids continued marching towards Egypt, defeated the Mamluks first, but were later overcome by them; (648/1250)

their army was shattered and some of the leading princes were taken

captive, like al-Salih Ismaf'il, al-Ashraf of Hims, his uncle al-Za-hi: - and others, while al-Nasir Yusuf was taken back to Damascus by some of his

2

loyal troops. This event left the Ayyubid empire weak and broken, and heading towards its end as a respected power.

For the next ten years al-Nasir YiTsuf was sandwiched between

the two more dominant powers in the region in the thirteenth century, the Mamluks from the south and the Mongols from east and north. In

(651/1253) al-Nasir Yu-suf and the Mamluks concluded a peace agreement, after a mediation by the caliphate, in which the Mamluks were given all lands up to the river Jordan and the lands beyond it in Syria were left to the Ayyubids, and according to the agreement some AyyUbid princes were

set free by the Mamluks and returned to Syria. 3

Al-Mughith remained prince of these two locations till he was taken prisonFr- by the Mamluks in (661/1262). See Ibn Khallikan:

Wafayý! t, Vol. 5, pp. 86-87.

2. Abu- al-FidEl: Muntakhahat, pp. 131-132.

Ibn Taqhrf Birdf: al-NudjuDi, Vol. 7, pp. 6-8. 3. AbU al-FidaO: Muntakhabat, p. 132.

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21

The tragic end of al-Salih Ismafil at the hands of his old rival

al-Salih Ayyubs Mamluks, and the imprisonment of al-Nasir Dawu-d in 11ims by al-Salih Yusuf, and later, his sad end in al-BuwaylEp east of

2

Damascus in (656/1258), left al-Nasir Yusuf the strongest Ayyubid ruler

in the shrinking state, ruling Syria apart from Hims, 4amah, al-Karak and other minor locations which were in the hands of some Ayy-ubid princes. 3

The increasing pressure created by the Mongols resulted in the

collapse of the caliphate and the occupation and destruction of Baghdad in (656/1258) and the imminent danger of extinction for the Ayy"u-bids made

itself felt. First, Aleppo was taken by the Mongols in (Safar 658/April

1286) and its inhabitants, as was typical of Mongol occupation, suffered a massacre; then the people of Hamah surrendered without fight and

without the acceptance of its prince al-Mansur who was with al-Nasir Yýsuf in Damascus. The two, together with their troops left Damascus for Egypt,

to Join the Mamluks and fight back the Mongols who immediately occupied Damascus and all of Syria as far as Ghazza; only al-Ashraf Musa b.

/

Ibrahim b. Shirkuh of Hims went to hulaku and did not go to Egypt with the

4

rest of the'Ayyubids. Al-Mansur of Hamah enjoyed a reception in his

honour from the Mamluks. 5 But al-Nasir Yýsuf returned to the Mongols and surrendered; he was later killed by Hulaku together with his brother

Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 180.

Ibn Ta2hrT BirdT. - al-Nudjým, Vol. 7, pp. 8-9. 2. Ibn Khallikiin: WafaySt Vol. 3, p. 496.

AbU al-Fid2l: Muntakhabat, p. 137.

Ibn TaghrF Birdf: al-Nudjum, Vol. 7, p. 34. 3. Ibid.

' Vol. 7, p. 15.

4. AbU- al-Fid2l: MuntakhabSt, p. 141. 5. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 141.

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22

al-Zahir Ghazi in (659/1260) as a retaliation when the news of the Mongols

r1

defeat at Ayn Djalut by the Mamluks reached llulalýu' in Damascus.

The Mongol occupation of Aleppo, Damascus, and Mesopotamia

(al-Djail'ra) marked the extinction of the Ayy-ubid dynasty in these areas.

Only Hims, al-Karak and Hamah, places of little Importance in this period, remained Ayyubid; they enjoyed semi-independence with their loyalty to

and co-operation with the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria, especially Hamah. This situation lasted until (661/1262), when both Hims and al-Karak were taken from the AyyFibids and governed by the Mamluks. Hamah continued to be governed, with a period of interruption, by the descendents of

al-Muzaffar Tajal-6-in "Umar b. Vaihinslrah b. Ayy-ub, till (742/1341 )o 2

Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 147.

Ibn Katlilir: al-Bid5ya, Vol. 13, pp. 218-220. E 1. Old, Vol. III, p. 864.

2. Ibn KhaldU-n: al-r1bar, Vol. S

, p. 915

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23

The main features of the Ayyýbid-perio :

The previous account has clearly shown that the structure of the Ayyubid empire consisted of rival principalities, and that this empire

went through a period of political tensions and rifts. But it is also

noticeable that there is no strong evidence that a prince killed another

prince of the family, nor that he humiliated him, especially until the death of al-Mmil. This fact carries a significant importance insofar as it

reflects the kind of relationship which knitted together the fabric of the

body-politic of the empire. This family affinity did not allow any outsider, be he amir or official, to play any drastic role against a member of the

family, although the amirs especially played a significant role in

strengthening one prince against another or in choosing one prince from

among the Ayyllbids. IA considerable standard of diplomacy existed and formed a large part of the political framework of internal and external

relationship of the empire. The changeable policy of alliances and

counter-alliances was continuous throughout the period, and was shaped

and reshaped according to the emergence of a new leader or the death of a powerful ruler, particularly as regards the distribution and redistribution of lands, cities, and provinces.

The relationship of the Ayyubids with neighbouring states and powers varied. With the caliphate in Baghdad the Ayyubids maintained mutually

friendly and respectful relations. Envoys frequently exchanged, and the

caliph always remained respected as the commander of the faithful, and his approval of the instalment or elevation of any prince to power was always

. For details see David Ayalon: "Aspects of the Mamlu-l-.

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24

sought by the princes or sultans themselves, and considered as an honour. In addition the caliphate often mediated to solve problems

between rivals within the Ayyubid family, or in difficulties in the

relationships between the Ayyubids and neighbouring powers, and it was sad for al-NaOr YGsuf when the caliph in (654/1256 ) was unable to

send him al-Khilra and instead sent it to. the Mamluk Sultan Aybak in response to the latter's demand. 1

Relationship with the Khwarazmians, as previously shown, was hostile, but on some occasions we notice that there were some alliances

contracted with them by an Ayyýbid prince against another, like the one by al-S7alih Ayy-u-b against al-Salih IsmaIll, and by the latter against the former.

Enmity between the Zengids, and the AyyUbids continued over the

period and always the possessions of the former were a favourable field of expansion for the latter.

With regard to the crusaders, apart from the battles of Damietta

in the age of al-ka-mil, and Turanshah b. al-Nasir Ayyub when new crusades 0

came to Egypt, the AyyUbids did not engage in any decisive battle or war with the crusaders. E. Sivan comments that the Ayyu-bids had a definite

detente established in their relations with the crusaders and the campaign to liquidate the rest of the crusader states on al-Sahil (the coast) was not

pursued; a state of co-existence had emerged with the Franks. To the Ayyubids this co-existence appeared to be possible and at the same time

imperative, in order not to provoke new expeditions from abroad. Probably the internal conflicts between the AyyUbids themselves helped somewhat to

1. Abu al-Fid3l: Muntakhabat, p. 134.

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25

create this situation or even to allow the Franks to regain some of their

lost territories,

1

and granted the crusaders in Syr'ia - Palestine a further

breath ing-s pace; but the mutual benefit derived by these groupings as a result of their encouragement of the Italian cities in the Middle East 2

and the favouring of some AyyUbids like al-: -rAdil and al-amil, through the use of diplomacy instead of resorting to unpredictable consequences of a

3

costly war, all helped to make this co-existence last longer. But at the same time we know from all the sources of the period that small battles

and skirmishes often took place between the two sides.

On the civilian side of the AyyUbids activities, and in addition to trade with the European merchants as part of the western existence in the

Middle East, trade with the eastern neighbouns also prospered, as also did some craft industry as part of the lively export trade of Mesopotamia which found its way to the courts of the Ayyl3bid princes. 4

Agriculture thrived in Egypt mainly in the period of al-Mmil, whose prime interest was in the maintenance of forests, irrigation works, state

cultivation of sugar cane, etc. 5 The financial system was also maintained

1. Philip K. Hitti: History of Syria London, 1951, p. G27. 2. Op. cit., p. 131.

E I. New, Vol. I, p. 800 The Italians were the masters in the

Mediterranean, and Egypt played a purely passive role in trading with them, only making a profit from the taxes and commissions (but) they were prevented from access to the Red Sea, and the commerce of the

Indian Ocean remained exclusively in the hands of the subjects of Muslim- (or Hindu) states. "

S. M. Stern: " Petit

- ions from theNyyu-bid Periodn Bulletin of SOAS, Vol. 27,1964, pp * 1-32.

3. E I. New, Vol. I, p. 799.

4. Ernst Kuhnel: Islamic Arts, trans. from German by Katherine Watson, . London, 1963, pp. 118-119.

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26

by a strict policy under al-rAdil and al-Ka7mil. 1

Education under the Ayy-ubid :

The widespread concentration on education and knowledge was one of the main characters that featured the AyyUbid period. The

establishment of schools, encouragement of scholarship and patronage

for religious studies all made Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, etc. new centres

of attraction for intellectuals,

scholars,

p-fis,

etc. from east and west of

the empire. The travels of rUlamiý' between these centres and Baghdad, Persia, North Africa and Spain became more frequent afid greater distances

2 were covere .

In fact the first steps in widening the establishment of

educational institutions was initiated by the Seldjuks, in that they both

built schools and designated rUlam3l (scholars) for these schools. Tb is phenomenon was resumed with much enthusiasm by Nur al-IýIin ZengTwho

as a response to the existence of the Christian states of the crusaders in

Syria - Palestine, and the domination of the ShIrTdoctrine in Fatimid Egypt, built SunnT schools in almost every city in Syria 3 as a part of his religious

zeal and his propaganda for the holy war.

Salah al-Din carried out his predecessor's educational and religious policy, and as J. E. Gilbert puts it: "In the Zengid and Ayyubid periods

1. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 800.

H. Rabie: The Financial Svstem of Egypt, Chapter IV, pp. 133-161. 2. See J. E. Gilbert: " Institutionailzation of Muslim Scholarship and

Professional ization of the rTJlarrra7 in Medieval Damascus, " Studia Islamica, Paris, 1980, Vol. LII, pp. 105-134.

Also see J. E. Gilbert: The"'Wama"of Medieval Damascus and the

International World of Islamic Scholarship Ph. D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1977.

(42)

27

rulers became concerned with direct patronage of religious institutions, in controlling appointments to professorships, Shaykhships, and

Qadiships, and in fostering the bureaucratization of the rUlamý'. "'

Salah al-]:; -in's sons, al-Afdal, al-Zahir, and al- rAzTz are all known to have had a good education - mainly in religion and language - in their

childhood and youth, while they with their father in Egypt, later were to become patrons of scholars themselves. 2 Their father SalEh al-DFn

himself paid attention to visiting and attending lectures of famous scholars, and appointed some of them as his officials or advisers and designated

others to his sons' services.

Founding of schools became a widespread fashion among the

Ayyubids after Salah al-Din, and there is scarcely a prince who is not

mentioned as having built one, if not more, in his principality and also in other cities. Al- rAdil continued the building of al-Madrasa al- rAdiliyya

al-KabTra in Damascus which was first founded by Nýr al-D-in. 3 Ile also

established another school for the HanbalTs in Damascus as well. 4 AI-Afdal built one in Damascus which was continued by his brother al- %2ý7iz and named after him al--Madrasa al- rAzTziyya. 5 AI-Za-hir of Aleppo founded al-Madrasa

al-Zahiriyya in Aleppo in (610/1213) and appointed his Qadi the famous historian and judge al-Qadi Bahal al-DTn b. Shaddad (d. 632/1235) to its

administration. 6 Baha" al-Ei-in himself built a school in Aleppo in (601/1204),

1-J. E. Gilbert: "Institutionalization of Muslim Scholarship, " p. 131. 2. Ibn Khallik5n: Wafayat, Vol. 3, pp. 251,418,420. Vol. 4, p. 6.

3. Ibn Shadd5d: al-Arlgq al-Khatrra ffDhikr UmarE' al-Sh5m wa al-Diazrra. ed. SjmFal-DahhSn, Damascus, 196-6, Vol. 2, p. 240.

4. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 255. 5. Ibid.

References

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