TABLE OF CONTENTS
PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE L. A. BRIDGES PROGRAMS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ……… i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Program Background..……… 1
Conclusions and Observations...……… 3
Recommendations...…… 9
Objectives of the Audit...…. 14
Audit Techniques and Methodology...….. 16
BACKGROUND The Organization of the Community Development Department……….. 19
Program Budget, Funding Sources and Expenditures………..……… 19
Lead Agencies………. 20
Sub-contractors………... 21
Development of Bridges ……… 21
L. A. Bridges I – Prevention and Early Intervention……… 22
L. A. Bridges II – Hard Core Gang Intervention Program……….. 24
Overview of Evaluation of Gang Programs……….. 25
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF OTHER GANG AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION PROGRAMS ……… 27
TABLE OF CONTENTS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Finding No. 1: The Bridges Programs Have Not Been Effectively Implemented
As Gang and Crime Prevention and Intervention Programs.…….… 33 Finding No. 2: The Bridges Programs Were Not Managed
Or Monitored Effectively………..……. 69 Finding No. 3: The Bridges Programs Had Over $480,000 In Questionable
Costs From the Sample of Contracts Tested………...…. 88 Finding No. 4: Contract Structures Did Not Promote Cost
Efficiency, Accountability, or Effectiveness .………. 91 APPENDICES
Appendix A Bridges I and II Program Performance Indicators Appendix B Bridges Participant Risk Factors
Appendix C Program Services Appendix D Community Outcomes
Appendix E Comparisons with Other Prevention/Intervention Programs Appendix F L. A. Bridges Audit Interview List
Appendix G Collaboration within L.A. Bridges I Program Appendix H Youth and Family Outcomes
Appendix I Data Sources
Appendix J Survey and Interview Instruments
Appendix K Responsibilities of the Community Development Department's Human Services and Neighborhood Division and
Financial Management Division
Appendix L Comprehensive Gang Initiative Program and Performance Measures: What Works?
Appendix M Definitions of a Gang and Gang Member
Appendix N Bridges I Sites - L.A. Bridges Contractors by Area Appendix O Bridges II Sites - Hard Core Gang Intervention Services Appendix P Bridges I Lead Agency Synopsis
Appendix Q Risk Profile of L.A. Bridges Program Youth Appendix R Program Retention
Appendix S Analysis of Survey of Youth Program Participants and Parents/Guardians of Youth Program Participants Appendix T Purpose of the Neighborhood Advocacy Council
Appendix U Description of the Neighborhood Advocacy Council Committee Appendix V Evaluation of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project Appendix W Comparison of Data Entered in the Bridges Database with the Initial
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance CA City Attorney, City of Los Angeles CDE California Department of Education CDD Community Development Department
CIT Community Impact Team
CLEAR Community Law Enforcement and Recovery
CPD Chicago Police Department
CPAB Community Policing Advisory Board
CRASH Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums CSSAS California Safe Schools Assessment System DA District Attorney, County of Los Angeles DARE Drug Abuse Resistance Education
FRC Family Resource Center
GREAT Gang Resistance Education and Training GRIP Gang Risk Intervention Program
GVRP Gang Violence Reduction Program
HSND Human Services and Neighborhood Division LACOE Los Angeles County Office of Education LAPD Los Angeles Police Department
LAUSD Los Angeles Unified School District LLEBG Local Law Enforcement Block Grant MIS Management Information System NAC Neighborhood Advocacy Council
NACc Neighborhood Advocacy Council Committee OCJP California State Office of Criminal Justice Planning OJJDP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Programs
RFP Request for Proposal
PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE L. A. BRIDGES PROGRAMS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PROGRAM BACKGROUND
On June 25, 1996, the Los Angeles City Council adopted, in concept, the
establishment of a juvenile justice program that resulted in the development of the L. A. Bridges (Bridges) Program1. The City of Los Angeles’ Ad Hoc Committee on Gangs and Juvenile Justice reported Bridges was created after substantial public input to the
Committee2. The committee considered various aspects that involved strategies related to prevention, intervention, suppression and recovery.
The program was originally described as a gang and crime prevention program3. Subsequently, the program was expanded to include a gang intervention component. The program was divided into two areas, Bridges I - Prevention and Early Intervention, and Bridges II - Hard Core Gang Intervention Program.
The initial Steering Committee for the program included representatives from the Commission for Children, Youth and Their Families, Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD), Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning, and the Community Development Department (CDD). The Steering Committee established program objectives and performance indicators to evaluate both programs (Appendix A).
Bridges I was intended to be the first phase in a process to deter middle school youth from gang life4. The primary focus of the program was youth crime prevention. The target population is the middle school youth from 10 – 14 years of age. It was designed as a comprehensive and coordinated City-wide effort to deter youth from engaging in gang or criminal activity.
According to the CDD, the Bridges II program’s stated intention is to support the Bridges I program with the principal objective of providing gang focused intervention services to deter participation in gang or criminal activity. The reported premise of the program was for contractors in the Bridges II program to participate in Bridges regional and local community bodies whose participants are charged with creating and enhancing a foundation of support for youth and their families.
1
Council File 96-1127
2
Council File 96-1127-S1 and CDD documents
3
Ibid.
The CDD brochure, “L. A. Bridges”, now describes Bridges as a “community-driven gang prevention and intervention program utilizing a comprehensive and integrated service delivery approach to reduce gang violence.”
The Ad Hoc Committee also recommended a Citywide Curfew Enforcement Program (Council File 96-0857) which began in mid 1996.
The CDD is responsible for administration of the Bridges programs. The programs started in July 1997 and are now in the third year of operation. For the last two fiscal years, 1997-98 and 1998-99, approximately $19.3 million was spent on the program. The total budget for Fiscal Year 1999-2000 is $11,634,000. The program is funded by the City’s General Fund, Local Law Enforcement Block Grants, Los Angeles County Probation Department funds, and the LAPD Forfeited Assets Trust Fund.
The CDD has reported 5,022 students were enrolled in the first program year (July 1997 through June 1998) and a cumulative total of 6,753 students were enrolled by the second year (July 1998 through June 1999).
The Bridges I Program Management Information System (MIS) is an automated system (database) for service providers to use in recording program participation and to enable recording and tracking of services provided to participants. As of November 17, 1999 the system showed 1,434 tertiary5 enrollments in the case management component of the program and 6,597 non-tertiary enrollments in the after-school component.
Evaluation Limitations of the Audit
The performance audit was limited by the following factors: the relatively short time period of program operations being examined vis-à-vis the length of time required to
achieve changes in individual youth and communities; and the completeness and quality of data available on program operations.
A major limitation to an assessment of the impacts of the Bridges programs is the relatively short period of Bridges program operations being examined. The majority of local service providers did not begin to enroll and serve significant numbers of program
participants until after January 1998. The relatively short operating time limits the number of data points that are available for analysis.
Experts6 in the fields of gangs and delinquency interviewed during the study
suggested that three to five years would provide an appropriate time frame for a meaningful assessment of program success.
5
Tertiary is the term used in L. A. Bridges contracts to define very high-risk youth program participants. For a full description of the various youth groups to be served along with contract definitions, see Appendix B.
6
Another important limitation in this audit is the lack of complete and accurate data as compiled and reported by Bridges agencies. As explained in Finding Number 2, the
accuracy and picture that can be presented is seriously reduced by the lack of adequate documentation to support an analysis of participants served and services provided.
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Impact on Gangs and Crime
We do not have sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the Bridges I Program has been effective in deterring youth from gangs and juvenile delinquency. The number of juvenile arrests in the neighborhoods surrounding the targeted middle school sites increased over the two-year term of program operations. Given the age of program participants and the fact that adults commit the majority of gang crimes, outcomes of an analysis of gang crime rates at this point in time were not considered to be a meaningful measure of program success. A valid analysis of the Bridges I Program’s impacts upon the level of gang crime would require an additional three to five years of observations. The Bridges II Program also lacks sufficient data and a valid analysis would also require more accountability and more years of observations.
In the absence of conclusive evidence of deterring youth from gangs and juvenile delinquencies, we examined program design and implementation as a way of gauging the effectiveness of the Bridges programs. As evidenced by the following pages, we gathered and analyzed data from numerous sources and developed recommendations based on extensive research and analysis. Although the Bridges Programs contain many of the important components needed for an anti-gang program, for the program to truly address the issues of gangs, it must be refocused to include the missing elements and management of the program must be improved.
Program Design and Service Delivery
The L. A. Bridges program was intended to address three elements - youth, families, and the community – generally accepted as important to deterring youth from engaging in gang or criminal activity.
Current research suggests that the Bridges program design was inadequate in terms of the conceptualization of program goals and general strategies. Experts suggest that
gang prevention and intervention programs must be focused, and cannot be effectively
combined with delinquency prevention efforts. Additionally, as shown in Appendix C, the majority of services delivered through the Bridges I Program included after school types of services, including tutoring, recreation and organized sports. Based on our analysis of
literature on gangs and anti-gang programs and discussions with experts in the field7, anti-gang programs should be expected to deliver a wider variety of services as explained beginning on page 27. Rather than after-school activities or even individual counseling, formalized training in social skills, anger management, impulse control, and/or conflict resolution are currently considered to be more promising strategies for both gang and delinquency prevention. Family counseling is also considered to be promising. Analysis of data available through the Bridges Program MIS indicated that these more specialized services were only provided to a small minority of Bridges I case managed participants and families.
Lack of Important Linkages
Limited success in establishing linkages with key stakeholders impacted the implementation of the Bridges I Program. Current research8 indicates that anti-gang
programs should include strong linkages with program providers, schools, community, local businesses, and law enforcement. Representatives of local schools, law enforcement, probation, and other service providers reported that the involvement of outside stakeholders was limited and that local Bridges agencies did not effectively coordinate their efforts with existing programs.
The three key mechanisms for generating collaboration in the Bridges program included the Neighborhood Advocacy Councils (NACs), Neighborhood Advocacy Council Committees (NACcs), and the local collaboratives of youth and family service agencies that were to deliver program services in each of the 25 targeted neighborhoods across the City.
The NAC is to provide support for community mobilization and additional linkages, coordinate collaborative efforts, and create a network of members with decision making authority to resolve issues presented to the body during quarterly meetings. Although attendees at meetings varied, attendees generally included representatives of the CDD, lead agencies, law enforcement, other City agencies, community members, parents and youth. We found a lack of business and community members at these meetings. The NACs were not held once a quarter as originally intended and the reasons for not holding these meetings (allowing NAC members to campaign for six months and to negotiate contracts with lead agencies) did not contribute to the effectiveness of the NAC.
Approximately 20% of NACcs were operating as intended, with a good mix of participants who were trying to resolve local issues. Problems with the other NACcs included the lack of participation and not addressing issues. There is a pattern of irregular meetings with gaps as long as 6 months between meetings although meetings were to be held at a minimum, once every 60 days. There is inadequate data to determine to what extent the NACcs were interacting as intended with the NACs.
7
Appendix E shows the literature reviewed and Appendix F is a listing of those interviewed.
8
Appendix E contains a detailed comparison of prevention/intervention programs. Any reference to current studies or research is referring to this section.
The LAUSD was identified as a critical partner to be involved in all levels of Bridges program operations. The local Bridges collaboratives were directed to coordinate resources and activities with the targeted middle schools to leverage program resources and to
integrate program activities into school operations to the maximum extent possible.
At the time of our fieldwork, the overall impression was that effective collaborations were not established at the majority of local program sites as described in detail in Appendix G. Although the majority of school site staff were aware of the program, they did not
perceive they were active participants in either the planning or operations of program activities.
In addition to the services that should be provided, an effective anti-gang strategy should include a suppression component or at a minimum, much stronger linkages with law enforcement9 than we found with the Bridges Program. Recent studies have shown the importance of locating gang prevention/intervention programs within a comprehensive context that includes a suppression component. Actively enforcing the law and prosecuting crimes can result in getting repeat or hard-core offenders removed from the community so they are not continually committing crimes and influencing younger community members into a criminal lifestyle. Simply put, a number of experts in this field believe removing repeat offenders makes the community a safer place to live.
The overall lack of evidence of coordination with law enforcement is also a concern because of the type of Federal funds used for the program. Federal requirements state that programs funded with Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds “…must include the active [emphasis added] involvement of law enforcement personnel.”
Not having law enforcement’s active involvement in the program may place the City at risk of having to reimburse the Federal government for some or all of the Federal grant funds used for the program. The Federal grant funds used for the program for the three years ending June 30, 2000 was budgeted at approximately $15 million dollars.
Program Achievements
The Bridges program has evolved into an after school tutoring and enrichment program which reduced the incidence of suspensions and/or slightly increased the
academic achievement of program participants who remained active in the program for at least one year10.
The program participants who remained active in the program at the same school for at least 12 months improved their grades, although the majority continued to have grades
9
Law Enforcement when referred to as linkages in this report, includes representatives of: County Probation, District Attorney, City Attorney, LAPD, Court Officials, the Sheriff’s Department and any other Federal, State or local law enforcement organization.
that indicate they remain academically at risk (see Appendix H). In addition to improved grades, there was a dramatic decrease in the incidence of suspensions (from 236 to 116) for the same participants who remained at the school sites where they became involved in the program for at least 12 months.
These findings support the importance of positive after-school programs for at-risk youth. Such programs are needed and worthwhile, however, an important question based on the outcome of the program to date is whether those outcomes can be achieved more effectively and efficiently by another service delivery method.
If the Mayor and Council decide to continue Bridges as a youth service or after school program, funding should probably be more in the range of the amounts provided for after school programs in Los Angeles County. Currently the L. A.’s Best locations operate for an average of $135,000 per site, although this program is currently only operating at elementary school sites.
Inadequate Program Administration
In the area of program administration, the Bridges program lacks significant
management controls that bring into question whether some services billed were actually delivered and whether the correct youths were targeted and/or served. We found a very troubling pattern of inadequate management of the program as well as inadequate record keeping, fiscal management, program monitoring, and follow-up to known problems. The lack of management controls resulted in a minimum of $ 488,000 in questionable
expenditures at ten service providers where a detailed fiscal review was done (See Finding Number 3).
The CDD did not monitor whether agencies complied with the matching funds provision of the contracts. Matching funds for a sample of 15 contracts over the two-year period (1997-98 and 1998-99) should have totaled over $6.8 million but could not be documented. The lack of matching funds could have contributed to contract requirements not being met, including some service providers not meeting the original goals of serving 30 tertiary youth in 1997-98 and 60 tertiary youth in 1998-99, community mobilization, and Neighborhood Advisory Council Committee requirements.
There was a significant lack of management attention to the various sources of information included in the automated L. A. Bridges database and source documents located at service agencies. This was apparent by the number of errors we found in the system and the preponderance of missing, incomplete, duplicate, and non-original documents found in service provider files. A detailed assessment of the data sources is included in Appendix I.
In addition to clearly pinpointing management’s inattention to controls, the lack of, and amount of erroneous program data makes it virtually impossible for any evaluator to
determine the effectiveness of each individual program service without an excessive investment of resources, the cost of which would far exceed the benefit.
Part of the problem with program oversight may be the result of an expansion of the program even before it got started. According to the CDD representatives, the Department originally planned to fund 18 Bridges programs in the 18 police reporting districts with the highest crime rates. The Department considered the 18 sites to be a manageable size pilot program for evaluation purposes.
During the development of the program, the City Council expanded the criteria for qualifying as a Bridges I site, and added the intervention component as Bridges II. These changes significantly increased the program sites from 18 to 26 and resulted in an
intervention program that did not have meaningful indicators of performance and which was not clearly linked with suppression elements or effective anti-gang components.
The expansion of the program diffused the funds available, and without question made the program more difficult to manage because of the complexity and lack of quantifiable measures in a program that is still considered a pilot program by the CDD.
Inefficient Structure of Bridges Contracts
The structure of the Bridges contracts did not promote accountability, such as reimbursement of expenses based on services actually provided. Contracts with lead agencies are reimbursed based on approved budgets. Bridges approved budgets are based mainly on percentages of designated personnel purportedly working on the Bridges program, and on payments to subcontractors. The structure of the contracts, which have budget line items in them, do not correlate with the services actually provided by the contractors.
Another issue is the contracts do not put a limit on administrative costs. Bridges contracts are structured so that funds pass through numerous layers of management before reaching program participants. While CDD argues that the current process does not violate Federal guidelines, we do not believe this is a valid reason for not evaluating or even
knowing the total amount of program funds spent of administration. The CDD’s portion of reported administrative costs were relatively low because some staff working on Bridges were funded from other programs.
Future Programs
Future gang prevention or intervention efforts, whether they be through a significantly revised Bridges structure or a new program, should encourage the formation or
designs that reflect known promising approaches to reducing gang involvement among at-risk youth. Subsequent funding of any program operations should be based upon verifiable evidence of effective program outcomes.
Ongoing Independent Program Evaluation
While not an objective of the original audit, we reviewed the process used by the CDD in an attempt to select an independent evaluator to review the program at an earlier stage. We clearly do not feel the intervention or controversy in the process was a positive one for the program or the City. The CDD followed the correct procedures when attempting to select an evaluator and should have been allowed to make this decision. It is unfortunate the simple concept of selecting an evaluator for the program took as long as it did and became mired in controversy.
The fact that the program included an evaluation component from the start, which could not be implemented through no fault of the CDD, is an issue that needs to be examined. Some of the problems we discovered would have been found earlier and corrected had an independent entity been examining files and outcomes. We strongly recommend no programs with an evaluation component commence unless the evaluator is also under contract.
R
ECOMMENDATIONS:
We recommend the Mayor and Council:
1) Stop funding the Bridges I Program as currently designed and operated. While it may be too early to expect measurable evidence of success for specific outcomes, in the context of current strategies on gang prevention, the current Bridges I program appears unlikely to prove effective as a gang and crime prevention program.
2) Stop funding the Bridges II program as currently designed and operated. Overly broad goals and an inability to link specific services provided with an impact on outcomes, has been contractually required of nonprofit agencies that find it difficult to comply with contract requirements. The current program also generally lacks important and necessary linkages with the Probation Department, LAPD and other law enforcement entities.
3) Reevaluate the original goal of gang and crime prevention and if there is
consensus, revise the focus of Bridges and other related programs to include, or link with, comprehensive strategies that include the following:
a) Prevention: Incorporate the LAUSD in the implementation of the gang prevention program for younger participants, starting as early as elementary school level. Include more promising components in the program such as training in the areas of social skills, anger management, and conflict resolution as well as components such as mentoring, and family strengthening
strategies.
b) Intervention: Services must be focused on youth that are already in gangs who still have potential for reform. These youth and their families should receive intensive case management services, and social intervention training which assists them to develop useful and needed social relationships and job skills.
c) Suppression: Implement the program in the context of a comprehensive city-wide strategy where the differing responsibilities of law enforcement including L. A. County Probation, District Attorney, City Attorney, LAPD, Court Officials, the Sheriff’s Department, and other Federal, State or local law enforcement organizations are included. Suppression should target hard-core gang members who tend to be adults, and it is most effective when it occurs in concert with the other two approaches.
Fund five to ten demonstration projects focusing on gang prevention and early intervention.
The program should require that applicants target specific geographical areas. Applicants must provide evidence of the potential effectiveness of their proposed prevention strategies and services with documentation from current research and/or formal program evaluations. Applicants must detail how they will coordinate with schools, law enforcement, and existing gang-related programs in delivering program services in the targeted area, and include memoranda of understanding with these agencies in their proposal. Applicants should have the option of proposing individual, family or community level strategies, or some combination of these approaches. A comprehensive evaluation of the pilot projects should be conducted by an independent, third party. The evaluator should report to a committee including a representative of each of the following agencies/organizations: the Ad Hoc
Committee on Gangs and Juvenile Justice, the Office of the Mayor, the LAPD, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and the agency administrating the program. Additionally, an expert in gangs should be included on the committee.
4) Direct the Community Development Department to take a more productive and proactive role in the operation of the program if Bridges is to continue in any form, by doing the following:
a) Improve contract management:
1) Link payments to contractors with evidence of performance 2) Enforce contract requirements
3) Keep complete records, including copies of contracts 4) Establish and follow monitoring procedures
5) Monitor contributions and matching fund requirements to ensure sufficient resources are provided for participant services
6) Enforce procedures for follow-up to audit reports or reviews of all lead agencies to ensure documents are submitted on a timely basis, and any problems are resolved
7) Comply with internal procedural guidelines by performing fiscal reviews at least once a year and preferably twice a year, scheduled to allow an adequate amount of time for corrective action before the contract period ends
8) Develop uniform guidelines for all lead agencies with subcontractors to require supporting documentation with invoices that include verification of compliance with line item budgeted amounts
9) Enforce contract requirements to complete the closeout process in a timely manner and do not accept requests for budget amendments not received by the required deadlines
11) Strengthen existing procedures to include review of files, verification of files for completeness including original and complete documents, and verification that services were provided
12) Implement controls for the Bridges database to include validation of data entry including when data was entered, and system controls to report errors in data entry such as incorrect dates and dates out of sequence with entries
13) Revise the Bridges I Monitoring Guidelines to ensure procedures are put in place to ensure there is follow-up to problems, reviews of
participants served, activities offered, and other contract requirements are included
14) Develop standard policies for progressive sanctions and apply them uniformly and timely. If performance does not improve, replace contractors
15) Negotiate contracts in a timely manner prior to the expiration of the previous contracts to maintain continuity of services for participants 16) Develop and prepare an annual Contractor Performance Evaluation for
each contractor
17) Require supporting documentation from lead agencies when
questioned expenses have been identified. If documentation is not provided, require agencies to return questioned amounts. The CDD should provide the Controller with a copy of the plan for resolution of questioned costs
18) Review accounting records of the agencies instead of relying solely on forms submitted by the agencies
19) Perform fiscal audits with the CDD staff or contract staff for all the CDD contracts over $ 50,000 to ensure contractor systems are adequate to support reported expenditures
20) Develop uniform guidelines to be followed by all lead agencies that promote accountability, cost efficiency and effectiveness. Lead
agencies should select from a range of qualified subcontractors based on the costs to provide services. Payments to subcontractors should be based on factors such as the type of activities offered and the number of participants per activity, or the CDD should contract directly with subcontractors who provide services most cost effectively and the services should be available to all lead agencies.
21) Monitor administrative expenses, particularly at the Bridges I lead agency level, which showed an increase from Year 1 to Year 2, although Bridges II lead agencies, the CDD and sub-contractors showed a decrease
b) Expedite the release of a Request for Proposal for a contractor to evaluate any on-going gang prevention/intervention program.
c) Stop funding all contracts at the same dollar level, and develop a formula for funding sites based upon the number of services, type of services, and the number of participants.
d) Fully fund all components at fewer sites versus some services at more sites. e) Establish and/or strengthen management and internal controls:
1) The CDD managers should attend training on management and internal controls.
2) The General Manager should initiate a self-assessment of the control system with the assistance of external auditors, with directives to all managers to discuss the concepts of internal control with their lead personnel, provide oversight of the initial assessment process in their areas of responsibility and report back findings. This assessment should determine if there is a need for, and how to proceed with, a broader, more in-depth evaluation. It should also ensure that ongoing monitoring procedures are in place.
f) Initiate a review of the activities of Program managers and initiate disciplinary action against those managers who did not uphold their fiscal or program responsibilities.
g) Assist contractors in obtaining a linkage between gang prevention,
intervention, and suppression programs with law enforcement to ensure all facets are integrated and to facilitate relations between the groups.
5) Direct that if Bridges is to continue as an after-school program:
a) Lead agencies and service providers are assisted to increase the interaction with stakeholders such as the LAUSD, local businesses, the community and law enforcement.
This component of the program should be open to all students attending the targeted middle school sites. Bridges I Providers must coordinate with their targeted school site to define the types of after-school programming that would be most beneficial to the student population at that site. If after-school tutoring is not currently available at the school site or is offered only on a limited basis, it must be included as one of the services to be provided since it has proven to be successful in enhancing school achievement. School site administrators must provide written approval of the planned services prior to the funding of the providers.
In the absence of adequate cost data from the Bridges I Program, it is not possible to provide a precise estimate of the costs associated with the delivery
of such services. On the basis of other programs, estimated costs would be between $135,000 to $150,000 per site.
b) A task force is directed to work with the LAUSD to develop funding alternatives and expand the after-school programs to more middle schools.
OBJECTIVES OF THE AUDIT
A performance audit is an evaluation of an entity’s effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations. Effectiveness is measured in terms of accomplishing goals and objectives while efficiency and economy are using resources to provide an intended level of service with minimal waste. A performance audit is an objective and systematic
examination of evidence for the purpose of providing an independent assessment of the performance of a government organization, program, activity, or function. The resulting findings and recommendations provide information to improve public accountability and facilitate decision-making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action.
The objectives of our audit included the three primary objectives of the performance audit process:
• Verify compliance with stated goals or contractual obligations
• Ensure the program is expending funds in accordance with regulations and guidelines
• Improve operational efficiency and effectiveness
The specific objectives for each program are itemized below. L. A. Bridges I
1) To determine what programs and services are provided at the program sites, the
characteristics of the consumers, the operations of the program and related processes. 2) To determine whether youth, families and communities exposed to Bridges programs
achieved the objectives of the program, which are: Actualizing Youth Achievement
Strengthening Family Foundations Promoting Community Action
3) To compare Year 2 with Year 1 data and identify success by locations and attempt to isolate reasons for success, and determine what, if any, programs are more cost effective.
4) To determine if other programs to deter juvenile delinquency exist, if they are more successful at deterring juvenile delinquency, and if these programs can be
incorporated into Bridges I.
5) To determine if the CDD adequately monitored the program, including ensuring financial transactions were properly recorded and categorized.
L. A. Bridges II
1) To determine what programs and services are provided at the program sites, the characteristics of the consumers, the operations of the program and related processes.
2) To determine if intervention services have deterred participation in gang or criminal activity.
3) To determine if the program was implemented per the following specifications: To what extent have contractors implemented the program elements specified in their contracts?
Have contractors provided services to the numbers of clients of each category (e.g. gang members, parents, etc.) projected for each program element?
How does the contractor define a “successfully mediated” gang incident? What criteria are used to determine whether mediation has been a success or failure? How does the contractor define status (e.g. “in-crisis”, “stable”, etc.)? How does the contractor determine whether clients in each of the program elements fall into these categories? To what extent do contractors demonstrate that the percent of clients projected to move from in-crisis to stable, have done so?
Implementing strategies for restoring/regaining the peace when crises arise. Providing liaison to youth-serving interests, including law enforcement, that is committed to the reduction of gang violence.
4) To compare Year 2 with Year 1 data and identify success by locations and attempt to isolate reasons for success, and determine what if any programs are more cost effective.
5) To determine if other programs exist to deter juvenile delinquency, if they are more successful at deterring juvenile delinquency, and if these programs can be
incorporated into L. A. Bridges II.
6) To determine if the CDD adequately monitored the program, including ensuring financial transactions were properly recorded and categorized.
AUDIT TECHNIQUES AND METHODOLOGY
We used a number of data sources during our audit, including interviews, surveys, and electronic databases. The various data sources accessed for the audit are summarized in Appendix I, and the list of interviewees is provided in Appendix F.
We contracted with Lodestar Management Research, Inc. to assist us with the audit. Lodestar staff participated in the development of data collection instruments and analysis plans, and conducted analyses of several existing data sources including: the L. A. Bridges Program MIS; Los Angeles Unified School District student records; LAPD data on juvenile arrests and gang crime; and data on school site crime. Additionally, they assisted in the review of other gang and delinquency prevention/intervention programs. Written summaries of Lodestar’s findings were provided to the Office of the Controller, and have been included in the appendices to this report.
Interviews
We interviewed numerous members of City organizations, educators, law enforcement and others involved in anti-gang programs or community services. The interviews included:
• Community Development Department staff who are responsible for managing the program, monitoring the contracts and service providers, paying invoices, and accounting for the expenditure of funds. We also interviewed a Manager of the Workforce Development Division and the General Manager of the Department. • Los Angeles Police Department representatives including the Commanding Officer
of the Juvenile Services Group, the Governmental Liaison Officer, a police officer from the Grants Unit, officers who attended the NAC and NACc meetings, representatives of the Community Policing Boards, and officers from the Bureau and geographic area Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH) units.
• Office of the Mayor including staff from the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning. • Elected officials and their staff from various Council Districts.
• A representative of a County Supervisor.
• Representatives from the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), including the principals of the schools with Bridges programs, school police, counselors and
administrators. We also interviewed LAUSD staff involved in the Steering Committee, the School Police Chief, and other administrators who are involved in the L. A. Bridges programs.
their interaction with the community and law enforcement, services provided and other relevant data.
• A representative of the Commission on Children, Youth and Their Families. • The supervisor of the Gang Unit of the City of Los Angeles’s Office of the City
Attorney.
• The Head Deputy and a Deputy District Attorney from the Hard Core Gang Division of the County of Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office.
• The Director of the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery Program (CLEAR). • Leading experts and practitioners in the fields of gangs and delinquency.
Site Visits
We audited 360 client files at the 24 Bridges I lead agencies to determine if files were complete, if students listed on the tertiary list were active participants in Bridges programs, and if the services Bridges participants were supposed to have received could be validated.
We performed fiscal audits at ten service providers.
We attended three NACc meetings, two NAC meetings, and observed two after-school activities.
Surveys
The survey and interview instruments are included in Appendix J. We surveyed and analyzed the responses of:
• School principals and school police at Bridges sites where the staff was not interviewed. • Service providers who we did not interview to obtain information on clients, their families,
their interaction with the community and law enforcement, services provided and other relevant data.
• 307 Bridges clients and 297 of their parents or guardians. • 160 NAC members, and 393 NACc members.
Electronic Database Sources
Several data sources were analyzed including existing databases maintained by the Community Development Department, the Los Angeles Unified School District and the Los Angeles Police Department. An in-depth review, including the limitations of these sources, is included in Appendix I.
We obtained and analyzed data from:
• The LAPD's Detective Support Division and the Information Services Division on juvenile arrests and gang related crime in the areas surrounding the 26 middle school sites involved in the Bridges programs.
• The LAUSD Police and school site crime reported through the California Safe Schools Assessment System (CSSAS).
• The LAUSD’s Student Information System on student records of Bridges I participants. • Lead agencies on over 900 outcome records of Bridges I participants.
Other Sources
We gathered and reviewed reports and documents pertaining to Bridges programs, including the two Request for Proposals issued by the CDD to review the programs, proposal submittals, Council files, Department files, monitoring reports, invoices, monthly service provider narratives, and other documents.
We obtained documentation on similar programs from various sources including the Internet, funding sources such as the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in the United States Department of Justice and the State of California’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning, managing organizations, and evaluating agencies. We obtained and reviewed audits and evaluations of similar programs by City and State agencies and other organizations.
The audit period covered was July 1997 through December 1999. The audit team performed the fieldwork between July 23, 1999 and February 17, 2000 in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards.
BACKGROUND
The Organization of the Community Development Department
The Community Development Department administers a variety of grant funded programs and has a total of 289 budgeted positions or employees. The CDD provides grant coordination and recommends allocation of funds through contractual agreements for
conducting work experience, classroom and on-the-job training programs, and administers grant-supported social programs and some neighborhood development activities. The CDD’s Human Services and Neighborhood Division (HSND) and Financial Management Division are responsible for managing the program and financial aspects of the Bridges programs. These divisions have 87 and 54 budgeted staff, respectively.
The funding for the L. A. Bridges programs is provided from the City’s General Fund, Local Law Enforcement Block Grants (administered by the Mayor’s Office of Criminal
Justice and Planning), the Los Angeles County Probation Department, and the Los Angeles Police Department’s Forfeited Assets Trust Fund.
The Director of the Bridges Program stated the program has 17.5 positions. Auditors reviewed the documentation provided by the CDD including the organization chart and listing of employees and determined there may be as many as 27 positions working on the Bridges program in the HSND. Additional positions in the Financial Management Division are not included in the 27 positions. A detailed listing of their responsibilities is listed in Appendix K.
Briefly, the CDD manages the contract administrators/field consultants responsible for contract negotiation and development, budget development and preparation, program and fiscal monitoring, including site visits. The HSND also contains Project Coordinators/ Community Outreach Specialists who are responsible for managing the NACs and NACcs, Bridges II contracts, and training.
The Financial Management Division coordinates with agencies responsible for Bridges funding, reviews lead agencies’ monthly invoices and processes payments based on approved expenditures submitted by lead agencies, reviews close-out reports, and prepares monthly reports of program expenditures.
Program Budget, Funding Sources, and Expenditures
The L. A. Bridges total program budget, funding sources, and expenditures for the fiscal years 1997-98 through 1999-2000 are as follows:
Funding Sources
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 Approved Budget $11,574,662 $11,347,842 $11,634,662 General Fund $ 5,100,000 $ 3,000,000 $ 7,711,000 City LLEBG* 6,134,662 5,134,662 3,098,662 County LLEBG* 340,000 340,000 340,000 Forfeited Assets Trust Fund 1,000,000 485,000 Administrative Savings (1997-98) 1,873,180
TOTAL $ 11,574,662 $ 11,347,842 $ 11,634,662 * LLEBG – Local Law Enforcement Block Grants
Reported Program Expenditures Fiscal Year 1997-98 Fiscal Year 1998-99 Fiscal Year 1999-2000 Total
Expenditures $ 9,363,244 $ 9,970,149 not yet available Breakdown of Expenditures Program Costs CDD Admin Costs Total $ 8,301,301 1,061,943 $ 9,363,244 $ 9,335,120 635,029
$ 9,970,149 not yet available Breakdown of Program Costs - Bridges I - Bridges II Total $ 7,605,926 695,375 $ 8,301,301 $ 8,333,437 1,001,683
$ 9,335,120 not yet available
Lead Agencies
During the program year 1997-98, the CDD executed contracts with 24 Bridges I contractors or lead agencies and six Bridges II intervention contractors to provide services to both tertiary and primary/secondary youths. Contract amounts for most of the Bridges I lead agencies were $340,000. Contract amounts for Bridges II contractors ranged from
$60,000 to $211,000 in program year 1997-98, and from $15,000 to $287,000 in program year 1998-99.
Lead agencies are required to submit an expenditure plan to be approved by the CDD’s Human Services and Neighborhood Development (HSND) Section. An approved expenditure plan is forwarded to the CDD’s Financial Management Division as the basis for reimbursing agency expenditures. Agency expenditure plans typically consist of personnel costs, direct costs, and equipment costs.
Personnel costs consist of lead agency personnel salaries and fringe benefits. Direct costs relate to sub-contractors’s costs and lead agency’s direct costs. Equipment costs relate to lead agency’s equipment and maintenance costs.
Lead agencies are required to submit monthly invoices when requesting
reimbursement from the CDD. HSND’s Program Monitor approves the invoice for payment and the invoice is then forwarded to the CDD’s Financial Management Division for
processing and payment.
Sub-Contractors
Each lead agency entered into a contract with a minimum of two sub-contractors to provide services to the youths that participate in the Bridges Program. Services rendered by the sub-contractors include case management for the tertiary group, individual or group counseling for youths and their families, tutorial services and homework assistance and enrichment activities, and field trips.
Sub-contractors are required to submit monthly invoices to the lead agency for reimbursement. At the end of the contract period, sub-contractors are also required to submit a close-out invoice to the lead agency. Sub-contractors expenditures are all reported as direct costs on the lead agency’s billing to the CDD.
Sub-contractor’s costs typically consist of sub-contractor’s personnel costs and other costs. Personnel costs typically relate to salaries and fringe benefits of a program director, program coordinator, counselors, youth supervisors, parenting instructors and accountants. Other costs include external accounting services, insurance, office supplies, audit fees, conferences and meetings.
Development of Bridges
The L. A. Bridges Program was established to be a community-driven gang prevention and intervention program utilizing a comprehensive and integrated service delivery approach to reduce gang violence and deter youth from joining gangs or engaging in criminal activities. Bridges was created with substantial public input to the City of Los Angeles’ Ad Hoc Committee on Gangs and Juvenile Justice. The initial Steering Committee
included representatives from the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Unified School District, the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning, the Community
Development Department, and the Commission for Children, Youth and Their Families. The program was divided into two areas, Bridges I - Prevention and Early Intervention, and Bridges II - Hard Core Gang Intervention Program.
In December 1996, the CDD first distributed the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Bridges program. Using the submittals from that RFP, the CDD developed letters of agreement and contracts for the programs that were effective July 1, 1997. The letters of agreement, which provided advance funding, were signed in July 1997. Contractors were compensated for services provided from July to September 1997. Contracts were signed in October 1997. These contracts did not require lead agencies to provide specific programs aimed at gang and crime prevention. Instead, the contracts funded programs the lead agencies were in many cases already providing. Lead agencies were expected to subcontract with other providers for any component they could not provide.
On February 24, 1997, the CDD distributed a RFP for an evaluator for the program. The evaluator, the Evaluation Training Institute (ETI), received a notice to proceed in
designing an evaluation on August 26, 1997, and operated under this notice until a contract was executed on December 17, 1997. During the period between September and
December 1997, the CDD and ETI worked together to design the data collection and reporting system for compiling data on Bridges I participants and services. This provided the foundation for the Bridges I Program MIS.
The first year report on the implementation of the program included baseline data on the schools and communities targeted by the Bridges I Program (completed in May 1999). The report also included a baseline profile of Bridges I program participants and preliminary data on the services that were provided in Year 1.
L. A. Bridges I - Prevention and Early Intervention
The City of Los Angeles Juvenile Justice Program (Bridges I - Prevention and Early Intervention) began in July of 1997 and is designed as a four year program. The primary focus of the Bridges I program is on middle school-aged youth (10 - 14 years old) and their families. The program is designed as a gang prevention program with the principal goal of deterring youth from engaging in gang or criminal activity.
There are now 26 L. A. Bridges program sites operating throughout the City. The boundaries of 24 of these sites generally conform to the school service areas of Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) middle schools. The 25th and 26th sites were to consist of five middle schools and their service areas in the City’s 7th Council District. A complete listing of the Bridges I sites is included as Appendix N.
Program Objectives
According to the CDD documents, the program has three basic objectives:
1) Provide activities that allow youth to strengthen basic educational, cognitive and self-improvement skills.
2) Strengthen the family unit through services provided at and through Family Resource Centers (FRC).
3) Implement community improvement and mobilization activities, which result in greater neighborhood safety, cohesiveness, unity and an enhanced environment for youth and their families.
The service provider contracts contained a number of program performance
indicators. These indicators were developed by the Steering Committee. Although there is insufficient evidence to enable a determination of why all of the indicators were chosen, we did determine the indicators for actualizing youth achievement were chosen because this is information which is easily obtained from the LAUSD. The indicators are listed in Appendix A and are discussed in detail in Finding No. 1.
The contracts stated the lead agencies were to provide services to 45 – 60 (depending on the contract year) tertiary youth and to a minimum of 150 primary and secondary youth. Intake forms must be completed for all program participants.
A youth, to be eligible for the program and assessed as a “Tertiary/very high risk, must exhibit risk factors under two or more of the following categories: School Issues,
Pre-Delinquent Behaviors, Substance Abuse, and/or Family Issues.” A complete listing of the risk factors is included in Appendix B. The tertiary youth must receive more intensive services such as case management and counseling. According to the lead agency contracts:
“The Tertiary client and/or family, to be considered part of the active caseload, must receive appropriate services based on their individual service plan at least twice a month.”
“For each Tertiary client, the Contractor must, assess, develop and implement a case plan, track their progress and make any adjustments to their plans, as needed, to assure positive outcomes.”
The Primary/Secondary youth do not have to be case managed. Activities provided to the youths may include recreation, tutoring, mentoring, neighborhood clean-ups, special events, counseling, etc. A detailed description of risk factors for these categories is included in Appendix B. These youth have similar characteristics as the tertiary youth but
do not have as many, or are just starting to show the negative pattern of behaviors as a tertiary youth.
Bridges II - Hard Core Gang Intervention Program
The primary focus of the Bridges II - Hard Core Gang Intervention program includes, but is not limited to: strategies for regaining the peace when crises arise; prompt
intervention services in identified gang-related conflicts; building and maintenance of peace initiatives within the community; maintaining harmony among gangs; and liaison with youth services entities committed to gang violence reduction, including law enforcement.
Although the CDD documents stated nine (9) contracts were awarded, our office found eight (8) contracts were awarded to agencies serving the six (6) L. A. Bridges service areas of the City of Los Angeles, for the contract period, October 1, 1997 through June 30, 1999. Funding was distributed based on crime statistics provided by the LAPD and varies by service area. Specific services provided by the agencies vary, as enumerated in their individual contracts. In the 1999-2000 Fiscal Year, seven (7) service agencies are serving the six service areas. A listing of the Bridges II sites is included in Appendix O.
Services were to be provided to gang members including, but not limited to 15 – 25 years of age. Program services and activities were to include: establishing and maintaining gang truces, conflict resolution/mediation, participation in Safe Passage/community
mobilization, and referrals for job training or placement, counseling services, parenting classes, field trips, tattoo removal and recreation activities.
Program Objectives
The Bridges II program is designed to support the Bridges I program with the principal objective of providing gang focused intervention services to deter participation in gang or criminal activity. The original premise of the program was for contractors in the Bridges II program to participate in Bridges regional and local community bodies whose participants are charged with creating and enhancing a foundation of support for youth and their families. The service providers were to:
1) Provide prompt intervention services in identified gang-related conflicts which might develop into gang violence.
2) Build and maintain peace initiatives within the community.
3) Preserve harmony among gang members formerly engaged in gang conflict. 4) Disseminate accurate information regarding gang activities for the purpose of
5) Collect and report data on gang intervention services and/or activities and outcomes as required by the City.
As with Bridges I, in addition to achievement of the stated objectives, the City was seeking to ascertain if the program was implemented per the specifications outlined in Appendix A. These are also discussed in detail in Finding No. 1.
Overview of Evaluation of Gang Programs
Considerable research exists on the nature and scope of the youth gang problem. The knowledge of what programs exist and what approaches are effective is inhibited by the lack of adequate models to develop programs, the challenges of conducting programs that address the problem, and difficulties in conducting evaluation research on community-based programs.
For over 20 years various organizations and agencies have directed hundreds of millions of dollars into grants for delinquency prevention programs. In 1988, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), United States Department of Justice, began concentrating on gangs as a distinct criminal element11. Within a few years, the BJA recognized that, to be effective over longer periods of time, programs aimed at combating gang-related criminal activity must incorporate both crime prevention and crime control initiatives. In 1991, a Comprehensive Gang Initiative Model (Appendix L) was developed based on adaptability, flexibility, and a multifaceted approach. This model focused on a comprehensive strategy for preventing and controlling street-gang drug trafficking and related violent crime with components ranging from prevention to suppression. The models were first funded in 1993 and 1995. The key program components include: A focus on harmful behaviors, continuous diagnosis of problems, coordination of groups or agencies in their response, monitoring of performance, evaluation of impact, and adaptation to change.
As evidenced by the numerous programs provided with grant funds, there is no one clear answer as to what works to deter youth from engaging in criminal or gang activities. However, it is important to note most of these programs also included funding for an
evaluation component to try to answer the question of “What works?” The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) Fact Sheet #71, December 1997, “Performance Measures: What Works?”, describes a better approach for measuring and evaluating performance12.
According to the OJJDP, to determine what works, it is imperative organizations are able to measure and evaluate their performance. Many programs want to use inputs to determine their success rather than outputs or outcomes, because it is much easier to measure the amount expended or the number of clients served than the outcome of those services. However, a better approach for service-oriented agencies is the change-agent model, which recognizes that an agency or program provides services that act upon the
11
Bureau of Justice Assistance Fact Sheet FS000116 November 1995, Appendix L.
environment to produce demonstrable changes in the well being of clients, families, or communities.
An evaluation of a gang prevention/intervention program is difficult as noted below. ♦ There is a lack of gang program evaluation in general, and specifically of adequate
evaluation, so there is limited feedback on which to base new programs.
♦ Many programs lack clear goals and objectives based on careful examination of the community’s problems and needs. Furthermore, also missing in many efforts are the analyses of impact on gang problems and that they instead tend to focus on activities and processes (i.e., recording attendance at a community meeting or counting the number of gang-related arrests) rather than on making quantifiable reductions in gang membership, gang activities or the harm that the gangs inflict on a community.
♦ Because program delivery will differ across sites, even when trying to implement a consistent program, it should be expected that results would also vary per site.
♦ Conducting an exhaustive evaluation of a community gang program is difficult because of a variety of issues including: lack of adequate comparison sites, attrition issues, problems with data collection, and inconsistency of police and school data collection methods.
♦ Very few evaluations compare specific program services received to outcomes achieved or intensity of treatment to outcomes, so it is difficult to know which specific strategies or combinations of strategies are most effective.
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF OTHER GANG AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION PROGRAMS
One of the objectives of the audit was to compare the Bridges Program with other gang/delinquency prevention and intervention programs. The purpose of this comparison is to identify how the Bridges Program compares both in terms of the nature and measured success of these programs as well as provide some basis for recommendations for improvement.
The primary methods employed in this comparative process were to look to the field in general for best practices and to identify programs whose evaluations indicated effective strategies. Because Bridges is defined as both a gang and delinquency program, research and evaluation from both fields were collected. Individual program evaluations were
collected wherever possible, however, many of the programs did not yet have completed products. Thus, this was complemented by meta analyses, a means of summarizing, quantitatively, the effects of a large number of programs. To augment these sources, information was also culled from key informant interviews conducted as part of the audit.
While a clear gang program model has not yet emerged, there is agreement on some key points. A detailed summary of the comparison findings is included in Appendix E.
♦ There is no clearly proven, effective gang program model.
♦ A program should distinguish between gang membership and delinquency. While the two are often related, they are not one and the same.
♦ Gang programs should be comprehensive in that they simultaneously address factors at the individual, family, school, and community levels.
♦ Gang programs work best when they involve coordinated prevention, intervention and suppression efforts.
♦ Programs aimed at combating gang-related criminal activity must incorporate both crime prevention and crime control initiatives in order to be effective over time.
♦ For comprehensive and coordinated programs to work, they require that all organizations or groups addressing the gang issue in some way, regularly and systematically
communicate and coordinate their efforts.
♦ Programs must be community-driven, by an organization with close ties to the community, to ensure that the particular community needs are met.
Suggested Program Components
Specific strategies for each type of program component, community, school, family, and individual are discussed below. Current research is that these components be
implemented in combination. Thus, while one specific strategy may be defined as effective, it does not imply its success as a stand-alone strategy.
1. Community Strategies
A neighborhood must be seen as not tolerating gangs; this is where suppression and community mobilization efforts are essential.
! It is critical for police and probation to work together to get hard core gang members off the street so they cannot commit crimes and so they cannot influence other gang members and youth.
! The most essential component of a successful gang program is community mobilization – the bringing together of all key community elements to target the problem.
! Organizational change is an essential component; it requires that involved
organizations and groups find new ways of handling problems together. This tends to be the most difficult component of a program to implement.
2. School Strategies
Strategies that involve the entire school appear to be very effective, but do take substantial commitment and time from school administration and staff.
! Interventions that target the school environment as a whole, e.g. setting school-wide norms and behavior expectations, have been demonstrated to reduce delinquency and related anti-social behaviors while also improving individual pro-social
characteristics.
! If school-wide changes are planned, every staff person on the campus must adhere to them in order to ensure the necessary consistency. This means bringing together administration, teachers, support staff and school police.
! Strategies related specifically and solely at the classroom level, e.g. changes to instruction or management, have not been found to be effective on their own, or even in combination with family-related strategies. Related changes must occur at the school environment level.
3. Family Strategies
There seems to be little agreement on the effectiveness of family-related strategies. While acknowledged as an important program component, exact strategies still seem uncertain.
! Evidence supporting the effectiveness of family relations programs is weak. ! Family programs that tend to be more effective are those that provide parents of
young children with parenting skills, as opposed to waiting until middle school intervention.
! Research indicates that family counseling programs generally have positive effects on recidivism rates of delinquent behaviors.
! Family skills programs can work at all grade levels as long as the intervention is adapted to be age-appropriate.
4. Individual Strategies
Both intervention and prevention strategies fall within this category. Many gang programs utilize traditional youth development or delinquency approaches, thus all potential strategies are discussed here. In addition, because many of the gang program evaluations do not analyze their outcomes by specific program component, there is little information on the effect of these strategies specifically on gang involvement, as
opposed to on delinquency in general.
In general, individual change programs have been shown to have effects on youth knowledge, skills and attitudes as well as some moderate effects on anti-social behaviors and fewer effects on family and peer relations. However, there is little research currently available on these effects in the long-term.
! Strategies aimed at developing social skills using cognitive training and behavioral interventions have been particularly effective in delinquency prevention.
! Programs focused on individual change demonstrated measurable results most often on suspensions and least often on violent behaviors in general.
! Instructional strategies, e.g. GREAT13
, DARE14, vary in their effect on delinquency. They seem to be more effective when they involve interactive techniques versus traditional lecture.
! While program providers generally believe that counseling is an important component of services, experts in the field do not agree on the effectiveness of counseling,
13
Gang Resistance Education and Training, Appendix E
particularly individual counseling either as a sole strategy or as a component. While some regard counseling as generally ineffective, others have reported consistent evidence for its positive effects as a sole or major strategy in working with serious delinquents. With respect to group counseling, there is less disagreement as most agree that counseling that brings together a group of high-risk youths is problematic. ! Interventions that pair high-risk youth with low-risk youth tend to have negative
consequences unless there is a strong strategy related to establishing pro-social group norms.
! Mixed and somewhat inconsistent evidence has been presented on the effectiveness of academic programs in general. Tutoring programs have been shown to improve academic outcomes but not delinquency outcomes.
! Mentoring programs seem to have an effect on school attendance, but no evaluations exist to identify its effect specifically on delinquency.
! Many existing programs include after-school, pro-social activities, and the common belief is that this is effective because it keeps youth occupied during the hours most gang activity occurs. After-school programs are only effective if they: a) provide direct supervision when it would otherwise be lacking; b) establish clear rules and behavior norms; and c) involve youth in activities that are not just leisure, e.g. provide tutoring or activities aimed at social skill development rather than just sports or
leisure time.
Suggested Program Approaches
To some extent, each type of effort – prevention, intervention, suppression – targets a specific group and relies on different strategies. Researchers and practitioners generally agree, however, that a comprehensive response to gangs requires a coordinated effort involving the full spectrum of approaches, including prevention, intervention, and suppression. Each of these approaches targets different groups and relies on different strategies. Key aspects of each approach identified by one or more experts in the field, include the following:
1. Prevention
Because prevention is a hard concept to measure, less is known about what is really effective than with suppression or intervention efforts.
! Gang prevention programs should target youth earlier than middle school age. ! Gang prevention programs should target younger kids who are not yet involved in
gangs but are most at risk of becoming involved, with strict and mutually agreed upon criteria for risk.
