VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN GR NO. L- 14639 MARCH 25, 1919 DOCTRINE:
"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers.
About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally re- strained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The court awarded the writ
which directed them to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant the petition for habeas corpus.
2. WON the writ may be granted even if the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; that they were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits
HELD:
1. Yes. The fiscal contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
2. Yes. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
Government of Laws. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
TUASON VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY GR NO. 70484
DOCTRINE:
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10 or an exercise of
jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property.
They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof."
A year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being
among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:
MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
ARGUMENTS:
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.
Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund.
ISSUE:
1. WON the remedy of certiorari is proper considering that Pres. Marcos is neither a judicial or quasi-judicial officer.
2. Whether or not PD 293, as exercise of the President’s emergency powers, is valid
HELD:
1. Yes. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
2. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone
knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power — i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION GR NO. L-45081
DOCTRINE:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
FACTS:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified
Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period
Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative,
2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? HELD:
1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.
In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
2. No. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS G.R. 88211 September 15, 1989 CRUZ, CHANINE
DOCTRINE:
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare; The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino’s ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition to order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manglapus, et. al to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family, and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Marcos invokes the constitutional guarantees of liberty of abode and right to travel.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines?
(2) Whether or not Marcos’ liberty of abode and travel are impaired by Pres. Aquino/’s prohibition of their return?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court: ―We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.‖ (2) No. In essence, the right involved in this case is the ―right to return to one’s country‖, which is a separate and distinct right from the liberty of abode and the right to travel. These two rights may only be restricted by reasons of national security, public order, public health, etc. Being distinct from each other, it would be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same context as those two other rights. Our Bill of Rights only embraces the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but we must take into consideration this right to return, pursuant to the generally accepted principles of international law.
CASIBANG vs AQUINO G.R. L-38025 August 20, 1979 DOCTRINE:
A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
FACTS:
Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, Dante Casibang who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge Aquino, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy. In the meantime or on September 21, 1972,
the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and t w o m o n t h s t h e r e a f t e r , m o r e o r l e s s , o r s p e c i f i c a l l y o n N o v 2 9 , 1 9 7 2 , t h e 1 9 7 1 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n p a s s e d a n d a p p r o v e d a C o n s t i t u t i o n t o s u p p l a n t t h e 1 9 3 5 Constitutin; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect". The petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, when Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally (Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2of Article XI) — a political question has intervened in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question? RULING:
No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest.
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary p a r l a n c e , n a m e l y , a q u e s t i o n o f p o l i c y . It r e f e r s t o t h o s e q u e s t i o n s w h i c h u n d e r t h e Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The trial under the Court of First Instance should proceed.
GARCIA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992 DOCTRINE:
The President is authorized by the Congress to fix tariff rates and other duties and imposts; The Tariff and Customs Code establishes the general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that
provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security."|||
FACTS:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-generating measures?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. There is explicit constitutional permission (Section 28[2] of Article VI of the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ." The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the alpha and omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take
seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which levied special duties on imported crude oil and imported oil products as a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority under the Tariff and Customs Code.
ARANETA VS DINGLASAN G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949 CRUZ, CHRISTINE
DOCTRINE:
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency.
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of three petitions filed by J. Araneta (who is prosecuted under Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings), Antonio Ma. Guerrerro (who filed a mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes but denied because it violates E.O 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines), and Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., (application for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing money under this Executive Order. Affected here is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to be held in November, 1949).
The common factor among these cases is the challenge on validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671.
During World War II, on December 16, 1941, Congress enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 671 otherwise known as the AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation.
Under this law, Congress delegated its legislative power to the President during a time of war as provided for in Section 26 Art. VI of the
Constitution. On June 21, 1947 Pursuant to this delegation, the President issued Executive Orders regulating rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings etc. The petitioner specifically Araneta, is under prosecution for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the Writ of Prohibition contending that the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect. ISSUE:
When did the Emergency Powers Act become inoperative? HELD:
The SC ruled that Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946. Since the assailed executive orders were issued after the said date, they were issued without authority of law. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness, but Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency. It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view.
The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution. If a new and different law were
necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the
continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. The fact that Congress was able to hold a regular session denotes that the emergency such as war which caused congress to delegate its legislative powers to the president no longer existed. The holding of a regular session by Congress has made the Emergency Powers Act automatically
Separate opinions:
Act no. 671 should have become inoperative when Congress held a special session on June 9, 1945. The SC did not appreciate the fact that a special session also signifies that congress is no longer prevented to conduct sessions by the threat of war or emergency. Also there shouldn’t have been a blanket voiding of all executive orders after Act no. 671 became inoperative since those laws have created rights for the people and have been issued in good faith. There should have been a careful deliberation by congress for each executive order on whether or not they could stand as valid laws on their own.
CHONGBIAN VS. ORBOS G.R. No. 96754. June 22, 1995 DOCTRINE:
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subjects as that of the challenged legislation.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Art. X, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in several provinces of Mindanao. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and TawiTawi. In accordance with the
constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides, that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shal be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shal remain in the existing
administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Pursuant to the
authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
Petitioners at the time of the filing of their petition, are members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions — some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shal remain in the existing administrative regions. Simply stated, petitioners contention is that ---while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA No. 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize.
Another petition was filed a Jaldon, filing in his capacity as taxpayer and citizen of the Philippines. Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
ISSUE:
1.WON the president has the authority to reorganize the said province/ WON there is undue delegation of legislative power to the president 2. Won the Congress has provided sufficient standard by w/c the president is to be guided in the exercise of such power
HELD:
1. There is no undue delegation. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of
local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes
2. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subjects as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.
The reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (a) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language grouping (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers
adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
KUROSAWA VA JALANDONI G.R. No. L-2662. March 26, 1949 DOCTRINE:
International rules and principles, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may
have been or shall be a signatory. FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, is charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war." Petitimer Kuroda comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the
President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit
respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Executive Order No. 68, established a National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals.It was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947.
Petitioner's contention:
1. E.O 68 is unconstitutional for it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international.
2. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United States of America, of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
3. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors, the United States not being a party in interest in the case.
ISSUE:
WON E.O 68 is unconstitutional on the ground that the philippines is not a signatory of the mentioned conventions.
E.O 68 is valid. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military of civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that — "The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generaly accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.( tingin ko 1935 constitution to since 1943 case)
Add'l info:
There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. Dissenting opinion:
Executive Order No. 68 provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trials before the War Crimes Office. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court. It further authorizes military
commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot exercise the rule making power vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commissions.
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the President of the Philippines emergency powers to promulgate rules and regulations during national emergency has ceased to have effect since the liberation of the Philippines, or at latest, upon the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945. The absurdity of the contention that these emergency acts
continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan cannot be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation, and even before the surrender of Japan, the Congress started to function normally. To let the hypothesis on continuance prevail will result in the existence of two distinct, separate and independent legislative organs. — the Congress and the President of the Philippines.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION G.R. NO. 139465, JANUARY 18, 2000 GATACELO
DOCTRINE:
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. FACTS:
In 1977, Marcos issued PD 1069, prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. Consequently, Secretary of Justice Drilon signed the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The Senate also expressed its concurrence in the ratification of
said treaty. In 1994, DOJ received from the U.S. DFA a diplomatic note requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached was the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court. Jimenez appears to be charged with conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; attempt to evade or defeat tax; fraud by wire, radio, or television; false statement or entries; election contributions in name of another.
Jimenez, subsequently, requested that he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the US Government. However, Sec. Drilon denied the request stating that evaluation by this Department of the documents is not a preliminary investigation or akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. Moreover, the formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law.
Jimenez then filed with RTC Manila a petition against the Secretary, et al. for mandamus – to compel Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively; prohibition – to restrain DOJ from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court. RTC ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE:
WON Jimenez’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty.
HELD:
No. The rule of pacta sunt servanda equires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them; in a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. In the case at bar, there is no conflict between international law and municipal or national law. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty/PD 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. Prior the filing of petition to extradite, the law is silent as to these rights. Thus, in the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Take note that Jimenez does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. He faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. Thus, the evaluation process, in essence, partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation making available certain constitutional rights to the prospective extradite. ALIH, ET AL. V. GEN. GASTRO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-69401, JUNE 23, 1987 DOCTRINE:
Respondents defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises.
FACTS:
More than 200 Philippine marines raided (commonly known as operation ―zona‖) the compound occupied by Alih, et al. in Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. The besieged compound surrendered the following morning. The military also inventoried and confiscated rifles, grenades, among others. Alih, et al. filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order – to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination. They argued further that these were taken without a search warrant pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was inforce at the time of the incident in question, and Article IV, Section 4(2).
Respondents, while admitting the absence of the required search warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders, and it was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the assassination of the Mayor. ISSUE:
WON the civilian authority has been bypassed and thus violated the Constitutional rights of the petitioners.
HELD:
Yes. The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions
committed therein against the petitioners. Alih, et al. were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty.
Moreover, if the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree."
LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NO. 151445, APRIL 11, 2002 DOCTRINE:
Sections 2, 7, and 8 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
