G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City.
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On board the Victory Liner, Daniel Obiña was seated on the second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obiña. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a woovenburi bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was something unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were unlawful? Held:
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc& De los Angeles for defendant-appellant. PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
The trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue: Whether or not the search of the accused personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.: FACTS:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
IdelAminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks and a third "weeks before June 25."
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
The accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an Information[1] filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line.[7] Yus companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter.
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.
The trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest and seizure were illegal
HELD:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same.[31] The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant,[32] subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches;[33] (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;[34] and (6) a "stop and frisk."[35]
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.[36] In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed.[37] At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.[38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"[40] it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.[41]Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
There was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
There was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
WHEREFORE, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is
REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:
Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the quashal of the search warrant and the validity of which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court.
ISSUE:
W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction
HELD:
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.
A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.
A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction there over.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequentlybe governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefore.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different information or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED.
Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968] En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur
Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain BienvenidoNaguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge HilarionJarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by
effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 79 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Alvarez vs. CFI
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that
a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money
lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent
Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant.
Facts:
The crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search
warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. In the
process, the authorities seized, among others, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by
Atty. Remo to be his and contained some letters, documents and papers belonging to
his clients. Also, books belonging to Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized.
Issue:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the provisions
of the law and of the Constitution relative thereto?
2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue belong to Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
Ruling:
The search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in the affidavit that the books,
documents or records referred to therein are being used or are intended to be used in
the commission of fraud against the Government and, notwithstanding the lack of such
allegation; the warrant avers that they are actually being used for such purpose.
Also, it assumes that the entire building is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, when the only
ground upon which such assumption is based is the BIR agent's statement which is
mere hearsay (coming from an informant) and when in fact part thereof was occupied
by Atty. Remo. It was not asked that the things belonging to Atty. Remo and to others
also be searched and seized.
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are
very well founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art
metal filing cabinet, together with the key thereof seized by the internal revenue agent
by virtue of the judicial warrant in question, which is hereby declared null and void, be
immediately returned unopened to the appellant; and that a copy of this decision be
sent to the Solicitor-General for him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful
investigation of the facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained
and executed the warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of
the Revised Penal Code, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Prudente vs Dayrit Case Digest
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that: 1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers 3. Search warrant was a general warrant
4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
– This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms etc. – – Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case.
Stonehill vs. Diokno 20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)
June 19, 1967
CJ Concepcion Facts:
Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.
In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations. Issues:
1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.
2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search warrants.
3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its seizure.
Held: I
Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
II
The Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the elimination of general warrants.
III
Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner v
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent
Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO
FACTS:
A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives started
searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of
the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges
against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for
possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358,
respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted him in Criminal
Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.
The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible
because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
ISSUES:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure
of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light
of the “plain view doctrine.”
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause
to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue
of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar
as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from
Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being
founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the
police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered
on Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the
cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court
affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.
Yousef Al Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.
Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and explosives.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at the trial.
ISSUE: W/N the items described in the warrant were sufficiently described with particularity. HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged
nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz , 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that
one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination
of the Search Warrants shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No.1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives.
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937] First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of
Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3
