Late Digests
ABANGAN v ABANGAN
40 Phil 476
AVANCENA
FACTS
- On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponents appealed.
- The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three
witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.
ISSUE
WON the will was duly admitted to probate.
HELD
YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. But when these
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant case) signed at the bottom by the
testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary as such will be purposeless.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be
hidden.
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
SUROZA v HONRADO
A.M. No. 2026
AQUINO; December 19, 1981
FACTS
- Respondent judge admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably forged.
- Mauro Suroza, a member of the US Army married Marcelina Salvador. They were childless but they reared a boy named Agapito. Mauro died and Marcelina became a pensioner of the Federal Government.
- Agapito married Nenita and had a child Lilia. Agapito was eventually disabled and Nenita was appointed guardian when he was declared as incompetent in a court proceeding. Arsenia dela Cruz also wanted to be Agapito's guardian. She tried to prove that Nenita was unfaithful to Agapito. The second guardianship proceeding was dismissed and Nenita's appointment was confirmed.
- Spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who was entrusted to Arsenia and later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza. Marilyn was brought up as the supposed daughter of Agapito, but she was not legally adopted. Marliyn married Oscar Medrano
- Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was
thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
When Marcelina died, she owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place.
- Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will, filed with the Court a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
- Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix.
- Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof. That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
-Judge Honrado issued an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.
- Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.
- Marina in her answer admitted that Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and
Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted.
- Judge Honrado dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing.
- In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in English which is not known to her.
- Judge Honrado "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita.
- Nenita "filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings which was assigned to Judge Honrado. It was dismissed. - Judge Honrado closed the testamentary proceeding.
- About ten months later, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son named Agapito, who was preterited in the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.
- Nenita filed in the CA against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void. Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did
not appear before him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.
- The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari .
HELD
- We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the decedent's estate.
- A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
- Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for serious misconduct or inefficiency. Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules"
- In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
- In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.
KALAW v RELOVA
132 SCRA 237
MELENCIO-HERRERA; September 28, 1984
FACTS
- On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
- The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
- ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
- After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3, citing that the NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same person. Consequently, the will was in the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. However the Court finds, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in the not to be authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate.
- From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that Article 814 of the Civil Code being clear and explicit requires no necessity for interpretation.
- From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari
ISSUE
WON the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix
HELD
- Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
- However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
ROUNDS 2 and 3
VII. REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION
LIPANA v LIPANA
70 PHIL 865
MORAN; June 28, 1940
NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. FACTS
- Eliodora Lipana filed an application for the probate of a will supposedly executed by the deceased, Manuela Lipana. - Natividad Lipana filed an opposition, alleging that evidence was unnecessary upon the supposed facts and that the will was not executed according to law.
- The application was dismissed on the ground that such copy could not be admitted to probate, it not having been signed by the testatrix and the attesting witnesses at the end thereof and on the left margin of each page.
ISSUE
WON the dismissal by the respondent court was correct HELD
NO
Reasoning
- The pronouncement made by the respondent court that the will had not been executed in accordance with law, is founded undoubtedly on the erroneous assumption that the probate of the carbon copy of the will was being applied for. Such copy was attached to the application merely to corroborate the allegation as to the existence of its original and not to establish a full compliance with the requirements of the law as to the execution of the will.
- Under section 623 of Act No. 190, if a will is shown to have been torn by some other person without the express direction of the testator, it may be admitted to probate, if its contents, due execution and its unauthorized destruction are established by satisfactory evidence.
- The applicant, therefore, was entitled to hearing to prove the due execution of the original will and its loss or destruction, and the respondent court had no statutory authority to dismiss the application without such hearing. - It is alleged therein that the original was in the possession of a third person or that it was either lost or destroyed by some person other than the testatrix. The applicant, therefore, was entitled to hearing to prove the due execution of the original will and its loss or destruction, and the respondent court had no statutory authority to dismiss the application without such hearing, all in accordance with Sec. 623 of Act 190.
GAGO v MAMUYAC
49 Phil 902
JOHNSON; Jan 29, 1927
FACTS
- Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament on July 27, 1918 (first will). On Jan, 1922, Francisco Gago presented a petition in the CFI of La Union for the probation of that will. This was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. The petition for probation was denied on the ground that the deceased had executed a new will and testament on April 16, 1919 (second will). Miguel Mamuyac died on Jan 2, 1922.
- The present petition, filed on Feb 21, 1925, is intended to secure the probation of the second will. Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is
a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
- The CFI denied the probation of the second will, upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920.
- Gago contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the evidence that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by the law; that the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the said will was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact. ISSUE
WON the CFI erred in not granting the probation of Miguel Mamuyac’s second will HELD
NO
- As to the cancellation of the will, there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. - In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. (Borromeo vs. Casquijo)
MALOTO v CA
153 SCRA 451
SARMIENTO; February 29, 1988
FACTS
- Oct.20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. However, while the case was still in progress, the parties executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did.
- 3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel (Att.Hervas), discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.
- The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the CFI of Iloilo. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
- Thus, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner came to us. We dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle.
- Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on WON the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The CA stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. ISSUES
1. WON the will was revoked by Adriana. 2. WON the case is barred by res judicata. HELD
1. NO.
Ratio The provisions of the NCC pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.1 It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
Reasoning In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind,
yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. - The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the private respondents, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
2. NO.
The respondents claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to appeal timely from the order of the trial court in the intestate proceeding denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen the case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to allow the last will and testament of the late Adriana.
The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy. We do not find here the presence of all the requisites of res judicata.
There is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. There is likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate.
MOLO v MOLO
90 PHIL 37
1 Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
ANGELO; 1951
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting to probate the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed on August 17, 1918.
FACTS
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, and another executed on June 20, 1939. THE LATTER WILL CONTAINS A CLAUSE WHICH EXPRESSLY REVOKES THE WILL EXECUTED IN 1918.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.
ISSUE
WON the declaration of nullity of a subsequent will by the probate court (the 1939 will in this case, which purports to revoke the 1918 will) would have the effect of resurrecting the prior will.
HELD YES
This is the DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION. The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and HENCE PREVENTS THE REVOCATION OF THE ORIGINAL WILL. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will."
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void (Samson vs. Naval, 41 Phil., 838)..
THE THEORY ON WHICH THIS PRINCIPLE IS PREDICATED IS THAT THE TESTATOR DID NOT INTEND TO DIE INTESTATE. AND THIS INTENTION IS CLEARLY MANIFEST WHEN HE EXECUTED TWO WILLS ON TWO DIFFERENT OCCASIONS AND INSTITUTED HIS WIFE AS HIS UNIVERSAL HEIR. THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO MISTAKE AS TO HIS INTENTION OF DYING TESTATE.
We find the same opinion in the American Law Reports, Annotated, edited in 1939. On page 1400, Volume 123, there appear many authorities on the "application of rules where second will is invalid", among which a typical one is the following:
"It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of not being executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, or where the testator has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will is procured through undue influence, or the such, in other words, where the second will is really no will, it does not revoke the first will or affect it in any manner." Mort vs. Baker University (1935) 229 Mo. App., 632, 78 S. W. (2d), 498."
These treatise cannot be mistaken. They uphold the view on which the ruling in the Samson case is predicated. They reflect the opinion that this ruling is sound and good and for this reason we see no justification for abandoning it as now suggested by counsel for the oppositors.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation".
"THIS DOCTRINE IS KNOWN AS THAT OF DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION, AND IS USUALLY APPLIED WHERE THE TESTATOR CANCELS OR DESTROYS A WILL OR EXECUTES AN INSTRUMENT INTENDED TO REVOKE A WILL WITH A PRESENT INTENTION TO MAKE A NEW TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OLD, AND THE NEW DISPOSITION IS NOT MADE OR, IF MADE, FAILS OF EFFECT FOR SOME REASON. THE DOCTRINE IS NOT LIMITED TO THE EXISTENCE OF SOME OTHER DOCUMENT, HOWEVER, AND HAS BEEN APPLIED WHERE A WILL WAS DESTROYED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A MISTAKE OF LAW . . .." (68 C. J.:. 799).
"The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force." (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
"This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will." (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 233.)
We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect.
IX. ALLOWANCE OF WILLS
GUEVARA v GUEVARA
74 Phil 479
OZAETA; December 29, 1943
FACTS
-In 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made bequests to his legitimate son, natural daughter and stepchildren and wife of 2nd marriage.
-On July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara conveying to him the southern half of a large parcel of land in consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable considerations.On September 27, 1933 a final decree of registration was issued in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel of land described in the deed of sale above referred to. The registration proceeding had been commenced by Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with Rosario, among others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as applicant and Rosario Guevara and her co-oppositors also withdrew their opposition, thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara died. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
-Rosario Guevara, who had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the testator's demise, she commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals sustained that theory. ISSUE
WON the procedure adopted by the Rosario Guevara is sanctioned by law HELD
No. We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force up to the time this case was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent provisions:
"Sec. 625.Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
"Sec. 626.Custodian of Will to Deliver. — The person who has the custody of a will shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
"Sec. 627.Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. — A person named as executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of the testator, present such will to the court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known in writing his refusal to accept it.
"Sec. 628.Penalty. — A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two preceding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court, shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
"Sec. 629.Person Retaining Will may be Committed. — If a person having custody of a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will."
-The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies . (Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C. P.)
-It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of a will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will.
-We hold that if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.
DE BORJA v VDA. DE DE BORJA
GR L-28040
REYES, JBL; August 18, 1972
NATURE
Appeal from decisions of CFI Rizal (handling probate proceeding of Josefa) and CFI NUeva Ecija (handling probate of Francisco)
FACTS
- Cast of Characters:
Francisco de Borja – husband/ father. Deceased 1954. Josefa Tangco – 1st wife/ mother. Deceased 1940.
Jose de Borja – son of Francisco and Josefa (of four children), also administrator of testate estate of Josefa Tasiana Ongsingco – 2nd wife of Francisco, and administratrix of testate estate of Francisco.
- Tasiana, as surviving spouse of Francisco, instituted probate proceedings upon his death. Children of the 1st marriage questioned the validity of 2nd marriage. Relationship between 2nd wife and kids of 1st marriage since then had been plagued with many suits (18 pending).
- To put and end to the numerous litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into, between Jose personally and as administrator of the estate of Josefa, and Tasiana, as the surviving spouse and administratrix of the estate of Francisco. It provided that with the mutual desire to terminate and settle the various court litigations, Jose will pay Tasiana P800,000 (P200,000 for each child) which amount shall be considered as the complete and full payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco. The compromise also served as quit claim.
- the compromise agreement was presented for approval to the courts where the probate proceedings of the estates of Josefa and Francisco were pending. However, Tasiana, apparently having had changed her mind about the compromise, opposed such submission for approval. She claims that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) it involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco and Tasiana; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect ISSUE
1. WON the compromise agreement was valid and binding HELD
1. YES
Reasoning
#1: that probate is first required before any agreement may be entered:
- Tasiana relies on the ruling in Guevara v. Guevara, wherein the court said that “the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of the estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against law and public policy.” Thus, Tasiana mainatains that since Francisco left a will, the same must be probated and any agreement to the contrary is invalid.
- However, SC ruled in this case that Guevara is not applicable since what is involved is not the distribution or settlement of the entire estate, but the sale of the share of Tasiana in favor of the other heirs.
- there is no legal bar to an heir (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir - being the surviving spouse of the decedent, Tasiana need not await the outcome of the probate proceedings since she was considered by law as a compulsory heir. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in
Guevara can not apply to the case of Tasiana
- the marriage has impliedly been recognized by Jose in signing the compromise agreement which described Tasiana as the “surviving spouse of Francisco.” This serves as recognition of her civil status
#3: that it ceased to have force and effect
-this was raised because Jose filed a motion AFTER submitting the compromise agreement for approval, which stated that “no amicable settlement had been arrived at” and that “the compromise agreement failed to materialize,” allegedly showing abandonment of the compromise agreement signed
-SC said that such declaration in the motion only shows that any effort to reach an amicable settlement after Tasiana unilaterally backed out of the compromise had failed. However, this does not affect the validity and binding force of the compromise agreement already reached, signed, and notarized. The failure to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise.
GALLANOSA v ARCANGEL
83 SCRA 676
AQUINO; June 21, 1978
NATURE
Special civil action of certiorari FACTS
- Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was 81 yo. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he was survived by his brother, Leon. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in CFI Sorsogon. The notice of hearing was duly published in that will. Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino: he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties to his protege Adolfo Fortajada, a minor. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs, namely, Leon and his nephews and nieces. After a hearing, wherein the oppositors did not present any evidence, Judge Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera specifically found that the testator executed his last will "enjoying good health and mental faculties and not acting under threat, fraud or undue influence " [1939 DECREE OF PROBATE]. The testator's legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate (1939) and from the order of partition and distribution (1941) of 61 parcels of land by Gallanosa spouses and Fortajada.
- On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis and nephews and nieces instituted an action in CFI Sorsogon against Pedro Gallanosa for the recovery of the said 61 parcels of land. They alleged that they had been in continuous possession of those lands en concepto de dueño and that Gallanosa entered those lands in 1951 and asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be declared the owners of the lands, be restored to the possession thereof and also claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696). [1952 COMPAINT]
- CFI: Dismissed their opposition and Ordered the probate of his will because the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period fixed by law, despite the fact that they were duly thereof, so that the said decision had become final and it now constitutes a bar to any action that the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of seeking a redetermination of their right to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis. In other words, the said decision of this Court in 1939, which they intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination of the issue that they have no legal rights to succeed to any of the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis; consequently, their present claim to the ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question is without any legal merit or basis. [1952 DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT]
- On September 21, 1967, or fifteen years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 and twenty-eight years after the probate of the will, another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the recovery of the same 61 parcels of land. They prayed for the appointment of a receiver. [1967 COMPLAINT]
ISSUE
WON allowance of will (prayed for in 1967 complaint) is valid given the 1939 decree of probate and the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696
HELD NO
Ratio After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised
anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura).
Reasoning
- The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190; sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838, Civil Code). That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs. Manahan).
-Austria vs. Ventenilla > a "petition for annulment of a will" was not entertained after the decree of probate had
become final.
"Wills; Probate; Alleged Fraudulent Will; Appeal. V. died. His will was admitted to probate without objection. No appeal was taken from said order. It was admitted that due and legal notice had been given to all parties. Fifteen months after the date of said order, a motion was presented in the lower court to have said will declared null and void, for the reason that fraud had been practiced upon the deceased in the making of his will.
"Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given parties who are displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or not an order admitting a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and as to the testamentary capacity of the testator." (See Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla, 99 Phil. 1069).
DE LA CERNA v POTOT
12 SCRA 576
REYES
NATURE
Appeal from the CA decision reversing Cebu CFI FACTS
- Spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca executed a joint last will and testament in their local dialect willing two parcels of land together with all the improvements thereon to their niece, Manuela Rebaca. The couple were childless. As a condition on the joint will, the fruits of the two parcels shall be enjoyed by either the testators while he or she is yet living.
- Upon the death of Bernabe de la Cerna in 1939 the will was submitted for probate before the CFI of Cebu which declared said will to be legal and valid. When Gervasia died in 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will was submitted before the same Cebu CFI. This time, however, the testament ws declared null and void for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in Article 669 of the Old Civil Code and Article 818 of the New Civil Code.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the Cebu CFI on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was conclusive on the due execution of the testament. The CA declared that
"* * *. It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code) prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying 'assuming that the joint will in question is valid'."
- Hence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna ISSUE/S
1. WON the joint will is legal and valid in so far as Bernabe de la Cerna is concerned 2. WON the joint will is legal and valid in so far as Gervasia Rebaca is concerned HELD
1. Yes. The SC ruled that the final decree of probate entered in 1939 by the Cebu CFI has conclusive effect as to the last will and testament of Bernabe de la Cerna despite the fact that the Civil Code already decredd the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party. The error committed by the probate court was an error of law that should have been corrected by appeal. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156) ; and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court 1963 Ed., P. 322). The dismissal of the action by the heirs and successors of De la Cerna was correct.
2. No. The present subject matter of the probate is the last will and testament of Gervasia who died much later than her husband. Hence, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned, the joint will must be reesamined and adjudicated de novo since the joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the Court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil., 267. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
MANINANG v CA (PRONOVE)
114 SCRA 478
MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982
NATURE
A Petition to Review the Decision CA FACTS
- Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will saying that all her real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have lived with.
- Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the CFI.
- Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.
- The two cases were ordered consolidated.
- Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
- The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case. MR denied. Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before CA.
ISSUE
WON the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case. HELD
- YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
- The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case
"shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded. - Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
- By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
PASTOR v CA (QUEMADA)
40 Phil 476
PLANA ; June 24, 1983
NATURE
This is a case of hereditary succession.
FACTS
- Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.) died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966. He was survived by his wife Sofia Bossio, their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child Lewellyn Barlito QUEMADA.
- QUEMADA filed with the CFI a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will left by PASTOR, SR. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
- The probate court appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR. to which Pastor Jr. And his sister Sofia opposed. QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate subject of the legacy which were in the names of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.
- The probate court then issued an order allowing the holographic will to probate.
- For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy.
- PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground that there is still a reconveyance suit pending with another branch of CFI.
- The PROBATE COURT then set a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but no hearing was held because of the opposition of Pastor Jr. and Sofia again on the same ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
- PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA submitted their Memorandum which in effect showed that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive was still premature. QUEMADA also submitted his Position paper. - So while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the PROBATE COURT issued an Order of Execution and Garnishment resolving the question of ownership of the royalties from ATLAS and ruling that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day.
- Pastor Jr. and Sofia filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.
- Even before the MFR could be resolved, PASTOR, JR. and his wife filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari. The petition was denied on the ground that its filing was premature because there was still an MFR pending before the PROBATE COURT. The spouses moved for reconsideration.
- While this petition was pending, the probate court issued an order which the court claims to have resolved the question of the instrinsic validity of the will and of the ownership of the mining claims, rendering moot and academic the suit for reconveyance.
- Hence this petition assailing the orders issued by the probate court. The petitioners are arguing that before the provisions of the holographic will can be implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with finality.
ISSUES
WON the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will.
HELD
No.
Contrary to the position taken by the probate court, these two issued have not yet been resolved. Therefore, the Probate Order could not have resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in alleged implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis.
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership. When the disputed order was issued, no liquidation of the community propertied transpired yet. Thus, there had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another court. There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate. Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid. The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained.
All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased would produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
There actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. It was obviously for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 years after the order was issued the Probate Court scheduled on a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.
ROBERTS v LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-55509
AQUINO; April 27, 1984
FACTS
-Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died.He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and
their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce .
- He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country.
- Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother
Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
- In that agreement, Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate. It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila. The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate".
- It was stipulated that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share. - Ethel filed in the CFI an intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.Maxine, filed an opposition and MTD the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate.
- The intestate court noted that Maxine withdrew that opposition and MTD and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators, pursuant to the Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already
found in the record.
- The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold businesses and shares of stock owned by the deceased.
- Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers (not signed by Maxine and her two children), the lower court adjudicated to Maxine ½ of the decedent's Philippine estate and 1/8 each to his four children. - For a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. Then Juanita Grimm Morris, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
- Before that motion could be heard, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine.
- The second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
- Ethel filed a MTD. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.
HELD
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's MTD.
- A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, CC).
- The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
- Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
