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Computer Security:

Computer Security:

Principles and Practice

Principles and Practice

First Edition First Edition

by William Stallings and Lawrie Brown by William Stallings and Lawrie Brown

Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown

Chapter 7 –

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Malicious Software

Malicious Software

 programs exploiting system vulnerabilitiesprograms exploiting system vulnerabilities

 known as malicious software or malwareknown as malicious software or malware

 program fragments that need a host programprogram fragments that need a host program

• e.g. viruses, logic bombs, and backdoors e.g. viruses, logic bombs, and backdoors

 independent self-contained programsindependent self-contained programs

• e.g. worms, botse.g. worms, bots

 replicating or notreplicating or not

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Malware Terminology

Malware Terminology

 VirusVirus  WormWorm

 Logic bombLogic bomb  Trojan horseTrojan horse

 Backdoor (trapdoor)Backdoor (trapdoor)  Mobile codeMobile code

Auto-rooter Kit (virus generator)Auto-rooter Kit (virus generator)  Spammer and Flooder programsSpammer and Flooder programs  KeyloggersKeyloggers

RootkitRootkit

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Viruses

Viruses

 piece of software that infects programspiece of software that infects programs

 modifying them to include a copy of the virusmodifying them to include a copy of the virus

 so it executes secretly when host program is runso it executes secretly when host program is run  specific to operating system and hardwarespecific to operating system and hardware

 taking advantage of their details and weaknessestaking advantage of their details and weaknesses  a typical virus goes through phases of:a typical virus goes through phases of:

 dormantdormant

 propagationpropagation  triggeringtriggering

execution

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Virus Structure

Virus Structure

 components:components:

 infection mechanism - enables replicationinfection mechanism - enables replication

 trigger - event that makes payload activatetrigger - event that makes payload activate

 payload - what it does, malicious or benignpayload - what it does, malicious or benign

 prepended / postpended / embedded prepended / postpended / embedded

 when infected program invoked, executes when infected program invoked, executes virus code then original program code

virus code then original program code

 can block initial infection (difficult)can block initial infection (difficult)

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Virus Classification

Virus Classification

 boot sectorboot sector

 file infectorfile infector  macro virusmacro virus

 encrypted virusencrypted virus

 stealth virusstealth virus

 polymorphic viruspolymorphic virus

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Macro Virus

Macro Virus

 became very common in mid-1990s sincebecame very common in mid-1990s since

 platform independentplatform independent

 infect documentsinfect documents

 easily spreadeasily spread

 exploit macro capability of office appsexploit macro capability of office apps

 executable program embedded in office docexecutable program embedded in office doc

 often a form of Basicoften a form of Basic

 more recent releases include protectionmore recent releases include protection

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E-Mail Viruses

E-Mail Viruses

 more recent developmentmore recent development

 e.g. Melissae.g. Melissa

 exploits MS Word macro in attached docexploits MS Word macro in attached doc

 if attachment opened, macro activatesif attachment opened, macro activates

 sends email to all on users address listsends email to all on users address list

 and does local damageand does local damage

 then saw versions triggered reading emailthen saw versions triggered reading email

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Virus Countermeasures

Virus Countermeasures

 prevention - ideal solution but difficultprevention - ideal solution but difficult

 realistically need:realistically need:

 detectiondetection

 identificationidentification

 removalremoval

 if detect but can’t identify or remove, must if detect but can’t identify or remove, must discard and replace infected program

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Anti-Virus Evolution

Anti-Virus Evolution

 virus & antivirus tech have both evolvedvirus & antivirus tech have both evolved

 early viruses simple code, easily removedearly viruses simple code, easily removed

 as become more complex, so must the as become more complex, so must the

countermeasures countermeasures

 generationsgenerations

 first - signature scannersfirst - signature scanners  second - heuristicssecond - heuristics

 third - identify actionsthird - identify actions

fourth - combination packages

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Generic Decryption

Generic Decryption

 runs executable files through GD scanner:runs executable files through GD scanner:

 CPU emulator to interpret instructionsCPU emulator to interpret instructions

 virus scanner to check known virus signaturesvirus scanner to check known virus signatures

 emulation control module to manage processemulation control module to manage process

 lets virus decrypt itself in interpreterlets virus decrypt itself in interpreter

 periodically scan for virus signaturesperiodically scan for virus signatures  issue is long to interpret and scanissue is long to interpret and scan

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Worms

Worms

 replicating program that propagates over netreplicating program that propagates over net

 using email, remote exec, remote login using email, remote exec, remote login  has phases like a virus:has phases like a virus:

 dormant, propagation, triggering, executiondormant, propagation, triggering, execution

 propagation phase: searches for other systems, propagation phase: searches for other systems,

connects to it, copies self to it and runs

connects to it, copies self to it and runs

may disguise itself as a system processmay disguise itself as a system process

 concept seen in Brunner’s “Shockwave Rider”concept seen in Brunner’s “Shockwave Rider”

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Morris Worm

Morris Worm

 one of best know wormsone of best know worms

 released by Robert Morris in 1988released by Robert Morris in 1988  various attacks on UNIX systemsvarious attacks on UNIX systems

 cracking password file to use login/password cracking password file to use login/password to logon to other systems

to logon to other systems

 exploiting a bug in the finger protocolexploiting a bug in the finger protocol

 exploiting a bug in sendmailexploiting a bug in sendmail

 if succeed have remote shell accessif succeed have remote shell access

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Recent Worm Attacks

Recent Worm Attacks

 Code RedCode Red

 July 2001 exploiting MS IIS bugJuly 2001 exploiting MS IIS bug

 probes random IP address, does DDoS attackprobes random IP address, does DDoS attack

 consumes significant net capacity when activeconsumes significant net capacity when active

 Code Red II variant includes backdoorCode Red II variant includes backdoor  SQL SlammerSQL Slammer

 early 2003, attacks MS SQL Serverearly 2003, attacks MS SQL Server

 compact and very rapid spreadcompact and very rapid spread

 MydoomMydoom

 mass-mailing e-mail worm that appeared in 2004mass-mailing e-mail worm that appeared in 2004

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Worm Technology

Worm Technology

 multiplatformmultiplatform

 multi-exploitmulti-exploit

 ultrafast spreadingultrafast spreading

 polymorphicpolymorphic

 metamorphicmetamorphic

 transport vehiclestransport vehicles

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Worm Countermeasures

Worm Countermeasures

 overlaps with anti-virus techniquesoverlaps with anti-virus techniques

 once worm on system A/V can detectonce worm on system A/V can detect

 worms also cause significant net activityworms also cause significant net activity  worm defense approaches include:worm defense approaches include:

 signature-based worm scan filteringsignature-based worm scan filtering

 filter-based worm containmentfilter-based worm containment

 payload-classification-based worm containmentpayload-classification-based worm containment

 threshold random walk scan detectionthreshold random walk scan detection

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Bots

Bots

 program taking over other computersprogram taking over other computers  to launch hard to trace attacksto launch hard to trace attacks

 if coordinated form a botnetif coordinated form a botnet  characteristics:characteristics:

 remote control facilityremote control facility

• via IRC/HTTP etcvia IRC/HTTP etc

 spreading mechanismspreading mechanism

• attack software, vulnerability, scanning strategyattack software, vulnerability, scanning strategy

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Rootkits

Rootkits

 set of programs installed for admin accessset of programs installed for admin access

malicious and stealthy changes to host O/Smalicious and stealthy changes to host O/Smay hide its existencemay hide its existence

 subverting report mechanisms on processes, files, registry subverting report mechanisms on processes, files, registry entries etc

entries etc

may be:may be:

 persisitent or memory-basedpersisitent or memory-based

 user or kernel modeuser or kernel mode

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Summary

Summary

 introduced types of malicous softwareintroduced types of malicous software

 incl backdoor, logic bomb, trojan horse, mobileincl backdoor, logic bomb, trojan horse, mobile

 virus types and countermeasuresvirus types and countermeasures

 worm types and countermeasuresworm types and countermeasures

 botsbots

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