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500 Anos de Utopia Cosmopolitan Challengesdiacrítica
Homenagem a René Girar
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Cosmopolitan Challenges Cosmopolitan challenges. IntroductionDavid Álvarez, João Cardoso Rosas
Implementing global taxes on natural resources: a social choice approach
Ali Emre Benli
What can cosmopolitanism bring to the political conception of justice? Thomas Nagel’s
reconstruction of the idea of global justice
Blondine Desbiolles
Schelling and the different forms of state from his New Deduction of Natural Law
Miguel Ángel Ramírez Cordón
The concept of Volk in Heidegger as an exponent of the fundamental ontological structure of Mit-sein
Fernando Gilabert
Caring for strangers: can partiality support cosmopolitanism?
Pilar Lopez-Cantero 500 Anos de Utopia
Utopia, ou a função política do imaginário
Acílio da Silva Estanqueiro Rocha
Homenagem a René Girard Théorie mimétique et philosophie. Hommage à René Girard Charles Ramond Vária A lógica do desmedido como traumatologia do ser – Martin Heidegger e Günther Anders Bernhard Sylla Benjamin y el problema de la reproducibilidad técnica Marco Marian
Playing the transatlantic card: the British anti-lynching campaigns of Ida B. Wells
Joanne Paisana
Desafios da sociedade global: a reflexão irónica de David Lodge
Maria do Carmo Cardoso Mendes
O sonho da interpretação – o sentido como reconstrução em Freud e Adorno
Ângelo Martingo e Carla Alexandra Paiva
Contested imprints: the letters of the Black Dwarf in London to the yellow bonze at Japan
Georgina Abreu
Culturas, diásporas e cumplicidades (Vieira da Silva sob os olhares de Agustina e Sophia)
Isabel Ponce de Leão
Prólogo a um estudo da hermenêutica espinosana ou o caminho de uma proposta libertadora da exegese bíblica
Paulo Alexandre e Castro
Metáforas do quotidiano, pensamento coletivo e cultura no crioulo cabo--verdiano
Elvira Gomes dos Reis
Escritas da periferia: Domingos Tarrozo (1860-1933) - um inquérito ao universo da autodidaxia em Portugal, na transição para o século XX
José António Afonso Recensões
Property-owning democracy: Rawls and beyond
Martin O’Neill & Thad Williamson Marco Loureiro ISSN 0807-8967 UNIÃO EUROPEIA
Cosmopolitan Challenges
500 Anos de Utopia
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revista do centro de estudos humanísticos
série filosofia e cultura
2016
diacrítica
Cosmopolitan Challenges
500 Anos de Utopia
Título: DIACRÍTICA (N.º 30/2–2016)
Série Filosofia e Cultura
Editor: João Ribeiro Mendes
Comissão Redatorial: Alexandra Abranches (Universidade do Minho), Artur Manso (Universidade do Minho), Bernhard Sylla (Universidade do Minho), Custódia Martins (Universidade do Minho), David Alvarez (Universidade de Vigo), Fernando Machado (Universidade do Minho), Isabel Ponce Leão (Universidade Fernando Pessoa), Jaime Becerra da Costa (Universidade do Minho), Joanne Paisana (Universidade do Minho) João Ribeiro Mendes (Universidade do Minho), João Rosas (Universidade do Minho), José Marques Fernandes (Universidade do Minho), Manuel Gama (Universidade do Minho), Maria Cristina Álvares (Universidade do Minho), Maria da Conceição Varela (Universidade do Minho), Maria do Carmo Mendes (Universidade do Minho), Mário Matos (Universidade do Minho), Roberto Merrill (Universidade do Minho), Vítor Moura (Universidade do Minho).
Comissão Científica: Acílio da Silva Estanqueiro Rocha (U. Minho), Elisa Lessa (U. Minho), Fernando Augusto Machado (U. Minho), João Manuel Cardoso Rosas (U. Minho), João Ribeiro Mendes (U. Minho), José Esteves Pereira (U. Nova de Lisboa), José Luís Barreiro Barreiro (U. Santiago de Compostela), Manuel Ferreira Patrício (U. Évora), Manuel Rosa Gonçalves Gama (U. Minho), Maria Clara Oliveira (U. Minho), Maria Xosé Agra (U. Santiago de Compostela), Mário Matos (U. Minho), Mário Vieira de Carvalho (U. Nova de Lisboa), Nel Rodríguez Rial (U. Santiago de Compostela), Richard Bellamy (U. Essex), Steven Lukes (New York University), Virgínia Soares Pereira (U. Minho), Viriato Soromenho-Marques (U. Lisboa).
Obs: Para além de artigos de professores e investigadores convidados, a revista acolhe propostas de publicação de colaboradores internos e externos ao Centro de Estudos Humanísticos da Universidade do Minho, que serão sujeitas a arbitragem científica seg-undo um modelo de revisão por pares.
Edição: Centro de Estudos Humanísticos da Universidade do Minho em colaboração
com Edições Húmus – V. N. Famalicão. E-mail: [email protected]
Publicação subsidiada por FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
ISSN: 0807-8967
Depósito Legal: 18084/87
ÍNDICE
5 Nota de apresentação João Ribeiro Mendes
COSMOPOLITAN CHALLENGES
11 Cosmopolitan challenges. Introduction
David Álvarez, João Cardoso Rosas
15 Implementing global taxes on natural resources: a social choice approach
Ali Emre Benli
33 What can cosmopolitanism bring to the political conception of justice? Thomas Nagel’s reconstruction of the idea of global justice
Blondine Desbiolles
53 Schelling and the different forms of state from his New Deduction of Natural Law
Miguel Ángel Ramírez Cordón
73 The concept of Volk in Heidegger as an exponent of the fundamental ontological structure of Mit-sein
Fernando Gilabert
87 Caring for strangers: can partiality support cosmopolitanism?
Pilar Lopez-Cantero
500 ANOS DE UTOPIA
109 Utopia, ou a função política do imaginário Acílio da Silva Estanqueiro Rocha
HOMENAGEM A RENÉ GIRARD
135 Théorie mimétique et philosophie. Hommage à René Girard
VÁRIA
161 A lógica do desmedido como traumatologia do ser – Martin Heidegger e Günther Anders
Bernhard Sylla
179 Benjamin y el problema de la reproducibilidad técnica
Marco Marian
187 Playing the transatlantic card:
the British anti-lynching campaigns of Ida B. Wells
Joanne Paisana
205 Desafios da sociedade global: a reflexão irónica de David Lodge
Maria do Carmo Cardoso Mendes
217 O sonho da interpretação – o sentido como reconstrução em Freud e Adorno
Ângelo Martingo e Carla Alexandra Paiva
225 Contested imprints: the letters of the Black Dwarf in London to the yellow bonze at Japan
Georgina Abreu
243 Culturas, diásporas e cumplicidades
(Vieira da Silva sob os olhares de Agustina e Sophia)
Isabel Ponce de Leão
253 Prólogo a um estudo da hermenêutica espinosana ou o caminho de uma proposta libertadora da exegese bíblica Paulo Alexandre e Castro
277 Metáforas do quotidiano, pensamento coletivo e cultura no crioulo cabo-verdiano
Elvira Gomes dos Reis
297 Escritas da periferia: Domingos Tarrozo (1860-1933) um inquérito ao universo da autodidaxia em Portugal, na transição para o século XX
José António Afonso
RECENSÕES
321 Property-owning democracy: Rawls and beyond
Martin O’Neill & Thad Williamson
NOTA DE APRESENTAÇÃO
A Diacrítica principiou a ser publicada há precisamente três décadas; em 1986, portanto, esse inesquecível ano, que abriu com a integração de Portugal – de braço dado com a Espanha – na Comunidade Económica Europeia, que nos deixou desolados com a trágica desintegração do vaivém espacial Challenger a 28 de janeiro – setenta e três segundos após a descolagem de Cabo Canaveral, na Florida, provocando a morte dos seus sete tripulan-tes – e ainda mais consternados, três meses mais tarde, com o catastrófico acidente na central nuclear de Chernobil, na Ucrânia, que nos fez vibrar, junho inteiro, com o Campeonato do Mundo de Futebol, no México – sim aquele em que nos quartos-de-final, Maradona marcou à Inglaterra com a ajuda da “mão de Deus” e que terminaria com a vitória da seleção albice-leste que comandava – que num esplendoroso sábado do mês seguinte nos permitiu assistir ao, para muitos, melhor concerto de rock de sempre dado pelos Queen em Wembley, que deliciou os apaixonados pelos céus com a passagem, pela segunda vez no século XX, do cometa de Halley – depois de o ter feito no ano da fundação da República – e que nos deixou ver montes de bom cinema: Um Adeus Português, (João Botelho), El amor brujo (Carlos Saura), Blue Velvet (David Lynch), The Fly (David Cronenberg), Ginger e Fred (Federico Fellini), Hannah and Her Sisters (Woody Allen), Manon des sources (Claude Berri), Matador (Pedro Almodóvar), Max mon amour (Nagisa Ōshima), Mona Lisa (Neil Jordan), The Mosquito Coast (Peter Weir), Peggy Sue Got Married (Francis Ford Coppola)…
Nesse primeiro número – de capa despojada, onde apenas aparece ins-crito, por debaixo do nome da publicação, “Revista do Centro de Estudos
Portugueses” e, logo depois, uma ilustração muito sóbria que evoca um lago ou um pântano –, composto por nove artigos e duas breves reflexões insertas numa secção intitulada “Diálogo e debate…”, Vítor Aguiar e Silva, nas duas páginas da apresentação, após relembrar que a criação do CEP remonta a 1978 e que só em 1982 começou o mesmo a usufruir de algu-mas condições de financiamento, resultantes mais de mecanismos de gestão orçamental interna implementados pelo Reitor de então, Sérgio Machado dos Santos, que de dotações financeiras provindas do Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, acusado de cronicamente manter indefinida a política nacional de investigação científica, sublinha, num tom de vaidade, que nesse ano de 1986 se tinham conseguido finalmente «alguns milha-res de contos em apetrechamento bibliográfico» e dar à estampa o volume inaugural da Diacrítica, concretização do desígnio e do desejo de ser um contributo sério para «[u]ma Universidade [que] tem de ser, no ensino e na investigação, um diálogo e uma polifonia de saberes» e na qual «devem ocupar um lugar preeminente as ciências do homem».
Em 1994, em consequência do aumento do número de investigadores que nele se foram integrando e a ele associando, assim como do conco-mitante acréscimo na diversidade dos projetos de pesquisa e dificuldades crescentes em coligá-los, o CEP foi reorganizado – passando a contar com quatro linhas de ação: Cultura, Filosofia, Linguística, Literatura – e rebati-zado Centro de Estudos Humanísticos. A prazo, essa mudança acarretou a da própria reestruturação da Diacrítica, que ocorreu em 2003. Assim, a partir do seu número dezassete passou a ter o formato de três séries especí-ficas – Linguística, Filosofia e Cultura, Literatura – anualmente publicadas nessa ordem.
Trinta anos volvidos de publicação ininterrupta da Diacrítica – essa curiosa palavra de origem grega, Διακριτικός (que separa ou distingue), ora empregue na Linguística como sinal gráfico para diferenciar letras ou pala-vras, ora na Medicina (Patognomonia) como sintoma distintivo de uma doença de uma mesma família – merecem, pois, ser celebrados. Isso o faze-mos aqui.
Enfim, o número que aqui se apresenta, congloba cinco partes. A primeira reúne cinco textos relativos aos novos “desafios do
cosmopoli-tismo” qua doutrina política, preludiados por um ensaio introdutório de
resenha crítica dos mesmos. Sucede-lhe uma segunda com uma reflexão comemorativa do cinquentenário da clássica obra Sobre o Melhor Estado de uma República que Existe na Nova Ilha Utopia de Tomás Moro, mais conhecida simplesmente como Utopia. Na terceira colhe-se um contributo
homenageador do historiador e filósofo das ciências humanas René Girard, falecido no final do ano passado em Stanford, Califórnia, em cuja universi-dade lecionava literatura comparada. Nove textos sobre temáticas diversas, nomeadamente cultura anglófona cultura lusófona, filosofia da tecnologia, hermenêutica da música e pensamento filosófico moderno e contemporâ-neo, preenchem a quarta parte. Culmina o volume a habitual recensão crí-tica de obras.
Cosmopolitan
challenges
COSMOPOLITAN CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION
David Álvarez*
João Cardoso Rosas*
The idea of a meeting in ethics and political philosophy is a cosmopolitan notion itself. It is supposed to congregate an international array of relent-less inquirers to discuss each other’s work. To be sure, the practice always falls short of the regulative ideal. Some geographic and academic areas are under-represented and dissent has frequently the air of those family discus-sions. In this sixth iteration of our Meeting series we have decided to keep the general and open dimension of the encounter but to create also a spe-cial section with a convergent topic for our keynote speakers. The chosen topic has been “Cosmopolitan Challenges”, brilliantly addressed by Samuel Scheffler and Simon Caney.
In the opening lecture, Scheffler shook our comfortable conviction about what’s worth in our very particular lives and bonds under a hypothet-ical scenario of human extinction. Caney closed our sessions exploring the grounds for a cosmopolitan right to resistance to the global order. Between the dawn of apocalypse and the horizon of human oppression we managed to pack some very challenging perspectives on cosmopolitanism. The five papers selected reflect some unusual takes on cosmopolitanism. Instead of presenting new problems that would demand cosmopolitan solutions, these papers put cosmopolitanism under challenge from different traditions and sources. We are grateful to the authors that let us reproduce their texts as a sample of the open debate that the meetings aspire to be.
In the opening paper, Ali Emre Benli presents a surprisingly bold approach to global justice. First, he analyses three alternative models for * CEHUM-Universidade do Minho.
12 DAVID ÁLVAREZ | JOÃO CARDOSO ROSAS
global taxes. Global Taxation is perhaps the flagship and most ambitious project of the cosmopolitan tradition, which aspires to institutionalize redistributive justice at global scale. Then, Benli proceeds to adapt Amartya Sen’s work on social choice to compare and select the hybrid project for global taxation that would be more consistent with our values. Bear in mind that Sen’s recent defense of the social choice approach is presented as an alternative to what he dubs a “transcendental” style in institutional thinking. In contrast, he defends modest approaches of open impartiality, non-parochial deliberation, public scrutiny, and a comparative evaluation of paired alternatives. Benli’s proposal turns Sen’s criticism over its head in a clever way. The paper scales up the comparative method to track the converging values that would support an ideal model of global taxation to address the most urgent injustices that affect humankind.
In a perhaps similar way, Blondine Desbiolles explores the cosmopoli-tan tensions in Thomas Nagel’s work. Nagel has penned one of the most consequential articles to frame the contemporary debate about global dis-tributive justice. Nagel’s critical view has also led a revival of a statist trend in the academia. “The Problem of Global Justice” has played a remarkable role in stimulating the cosmopolitan debate and in pushing for further clar-ification what are the presuppositions for valid claims of egalitarian redis-tributive justice. Desbiolles proposal drives the debate back home and tries to reconstruct the cosmopolitan conception latent in Nagel’s state-centric criticism.
The following contributions challenge the state-centric frame by dig-ging in the conceptual tools of two very unlikely sources: Heidegger’s notion of the people (Volk) and Schelling’s conception of fraternity of humankind. Miguel Ángel Cordón’s take on Schelling is a very interesting continua-tion of Nagel’s argument. We have seen that “The Problem of Global Justice” restricted relations of egalitarian justice to the state community. For Nagel this is the scope of common subjection to a legal order of coercive authority that speaks in our name. Coercive cooperation is what makes us politi-cal equals. In contrast, Cordon’s paper rescues Schelling’s conception of the state, as a coercive structure to be transcended for the equal enjoyment of absolute freedom. For Schelling the state and the law are necessary but transitional moments for the moral education of humankind. The natural evolution of the state is to create the conditions for its extinction. Once the individuals have internalized this moral dimension in their collective life under common laws, the state would have made itself redundant. Legal relations would dissolve spontaneously to give way to uncoerced bonds
13
COSMOPOLITAN CHALLENGES. INTRODUCTION
of ethical fraternity. Eventually, the artificial equality under the common law would be transcended by a new natural law of absolute freedom. This idealist vision of the state-transcending bonds of humanity contrasts with Nagel’s characterization of our basic humanitarian duties of assistance. Schelling’s project presents an idealist picture of thick fraternal solidarity and a shared ethos of universal freedom around a non-coercive church of humanity. Nagel does not deny the possibility of a historical path conducive to the realization of cosmopolitan equality. The difference lies in that for Nagel, this requires a Hobbesian process of deep institutional integration in global coercive structures.
Fernando Gilabert’s paper taps into Heidegger’s work for the recon-struction of the scope of the political community. His critical reading of Heidegger proceeds from a diagnosis of what went wrong in a project premised on the constitutive condition of being-with (Mit-sein) that ended up supporting a totalitarian and genocidal regime. In Gilabert’s recon-struction, the starting ground for a political theory is the notion of a peo-ple, as the plurality that shares constitutive conditions of communication (language), a meaningful world (tradition), and the possibility of a pro-ject (spirit). Where Scheffler explores the horizon of a finite humanity as a normative reference to re-evaluate our personal projects and attachments, Gilabert takes the notion of people (Volk) as the constitutive reference for one’s self-understanding. For Gilabert this shared ground opens the way to express solidarity and to take care of a common world in a community of interdependency. Nothing in principle prevents that different peoples could converge in a project of peaceful cohabitation, although Gilabert’s thesis seems to imply some limits to any cosmopolitan integration. The paper defends that only a political order that is respectful of the constitutive con-ditions of peopleness (language, tradition, and spirit) can also respect the constitutive structure of the individual that always finds itself being-with. Therefore, any acceptable cosmopolitan order should allow for multina-tional accommodation. This project opens the way to explore the difficult relations between the people, the state and the cosmopolitan order in con-ditions of non-alienated life.
Pilar López-Cantero’s paper is a natural continuation and perfect cul-mination of this thread. She examines the tension between the demands of cosmopolitan impartiality and the constitutive partialities that nurture a realistic moral psychology. This project shares with Gilabert’s the concern about the conditions for a non-alienated life, for the promotion of an ethos of care towards significant others, and for the protection of meaningful
14 DAVID ÁLVAREZ | JOÃO CARDOSO ROSAS
social environments. Drawing on a variety of sources, López-Cantero res-cues the Hellenistic image of the concentric circles of concern to reinter-pret the agent-neutral demands of cosmopolitanism. The stoic model of the concentric circles is also a normative model that demands that one should try to bring those in the outer circle as close to the core of ours concerns as possible. Lopez-Cantero rejects this unrealistic moral psychology and instead defends some egalitarian grounds for the protection of flourishing moral personalities. For her, the cosmopolitan project should be conceived as the universal right to have special relationships in the same degree, with the correlative duty to treat everybody according to her rightful place in the moral universe. This is – according to López-Cantero; a realistic moral cosmos where nobody would suffer illegitimate discriminations.
This collection of papers, which ranges from global taxes to the right to special relationships, shows that the cosmopolitan ideal is still a resilient and thought-provoking project. We are grateful to the authors for their crit-ical contributions; and to Samuel Scheffler and Simon Caney for providing innovative grounds for a meeting of minds.
* Center for Advanced Studies of Southeastern Europe (CAS SEE), University of Rijeka, Croatia.
IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES
ON NATURAL RESOURCES:
A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
A IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DE IMPOSTOS GLOBAIS
SOBRE OS RECURSOS NATURAIS: UMA ABORDAGEM
A PARTIR DA TEORIA DA ESCOLHA SOCIAL
Ali Emre Benli*
In this article, I compare three competing proposals for implementing global taxes on natural resources: Hillel Steiner’s ‘Global Fund’, Thomas Pogge’s ‘Global Resource Dividend’ and Paula Casal’s ‘Global Share’. Using the social choice approach devel-oped by Amartya Sen in The Idea of Justice (2009), I show that we can reach a mutual agreement on a less unjust alternative without reaching an overall agree-ment on ideal principles. First, I compare the global tax schemes by developing the social choice approach in three steps. Then, I draw two policy recommendations for reforming the Dividend towards reaching a less unjust social state.
Keywords:Global taxes on natural resources, Amartya Sen, social choice approach,
Global Resource Dividend, Global Share, Global Fund.
Neste artigo, comparo três propostas rivais para a implementação de impostos glo-bais sobre os recursos naturais: o ‘Fundo Global’ de Hillel Steiner, a ‘Divisão Global de Recursos’ , e a ‘Partilha Global’, de Paula Casal. Irei mostrar, usando a abordagem da escolha social desenvolvida por Amartya Sen em A Ideia de Justiça (2009), que podemos alcançar um acordo acerca de uma alternativa menos injusta sem termos que chegar a um acordo geral acerca de princípios ideais. Em primeiro lugar, irei comparar os esquemas de impostos globais utilizando a abordagem da escolha em três passos. E depois, irei retirar dessa comparação duas recomendações de polí-ticas públicas para a reforma da Divisão com o objectivo de alcançar um estado social menos injusto.
16 ALI EMRE BENLI
Palavras-chave: Impostos globais sobre recursos naturais, Amartya Sem,
abor-dagem da escolha social, Dividendo Global de Recursos, Partilha Global, Fundo Global.
0. Introduction
Paula Casal describes the contemporary world order as characterized by massive deprivations, inequalities and environmental problems. She reminds us that;
One-fifth of humanity lives in abject poverty on less than $1 per day, and almost half on less than $2 per day. The consequences of deprivation for the children of developing countries are particularly horrific: two in five are stunted, one-third are underweight, and one quarter of all 5 to 14-year-olds work for wages, often under harsh conditions in agriculture, mining, textile and carpet produc-tion, or prostitution. Climate change is worsening matters further still, already adding 300,000 deaths annually (Casal 2015: 308).
According to Casal, most individuals agree that the contemporary world order is shocking and depressing. Nevertheless, there is no consen-sus “on how to eradicate global poverty and distribute the costs of doing so.” (Casal 2015: 308). Acknowledging the injustice embedded in the inequali-ties of the current world has not led to appropriate remedies. With the aim of exploring an effective way to improve the current situation, she engages in a fruitful debate with Hillel Steiner and Thomas Pogge regarding imple-mentation of global taxes on natural resources, a domain which has pros-pects of significantly impacting the contemporary world order. The debate proceeds with Casal critically examining each author’s original tax scheme and advocating her own proposal. In light of Casal’s criticisms, Steiner and Pogge then defend and clarify their proposals. The exchange is concluded by Casal’s final reply.
The approach that Pogge and Casal share in constructing proposals dif-fers from Steiner’s. While Steiner lays out the details of a policy that would bring about the ideally just arrangement regarding the distribution of natural resources based on left-libertarian principles of justice, Pogge and Casal propose policies as initial steps towards overcoming global problems acceptable by multiple ethical perspectives. In this article, I compare the three alternative tax schemes using the social choice approach proposed by Amartya Sen in ‘What do we want from a theory of justice?’ (2006) and The Idea of Justice (2009). In the following three Sections, I develop the social
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
choice approach in three steps. I show that we can reach partial agreements that reveal the less unjust alternative in the comparison without having an overall agreement on ideally just arrangements. The questions of what is the perfectly just way to eradicate global poverty and who should bear these costs do not need determinate answers in order to improve the status quo. In Section Four, I draw two recommendations for reforming the policy pro-posals. In Section Five, I conclude.
1. Three proposals for implementing global taxes on natural resources
Following Sen, I develop the social choice approach in three steps. The first step involves describing the social states implied by the policy proposals as richly as possible (Sen 1995: 24). To this end, in line with Casal’s analysis, I discuss the three proposals of Steiner, Pogge, and Casal in terms of tax base, rate, and distributive aspects.[1] I begin with Steiner, who proposes a
dis-tributive scheme regarding global natural resources termed as the Global Fund (Pf). It is a direct implementation of the left libertarian principle of justice which “requires that persons be compensated for all, and only, those elements or proportions of their poverty that are not self-inflicted” (Steiner 2011: 329). When theorizing the distribution of global natural resources according to this principle, Steiner argues that everyone is at full liberty to occupy and use any of the world’s resources. For the only commodity that is a priori justly owned by people is their body. If anyone reserves a por-tion of the world’s natural resources for his or her exclusive use, then she is required to compensate others (Steiner 2011: 332). The Fund is designed as a policy to engender compensation in today’s world where the distribution of natural resources has been arbitrary.
The Fund imposes a global flat 100% tax on natural resource owner-ship. Natural resources are defined in a very broad way including “all global surface areas and the supra- and sub-terranean spaces contiguous to them, as well as the natural objects they contain” (Steiner 2011: 330). The tax is levied on states. As owners of locations, they are taxed the full competi-tive rental value of all its territories determined by the highest bid for each
1 At this step, I do not engage with the debate or take any position regarding the proposals. When describing the social states implied by the policies, I include only what each author accepts from another’s criticism. The arguments of the authors for their proposals and against subsequent criticisms involve empirical assumptions. I accept each author’s assumptions as valid regarding their own views, except in a few places where an obvious criticism is not addressed by an author.
18 ALI EMRE BENLI
location’s right to exclusive use (Steiner 2011: 331-332). The tax is supple-mented by ‘pollution vouchers’ that states need to pay in case of negative environmental spillovers (Steiner 2011: 332-333). The revenue collected at the Fund is distributed equally. As Steiner maintains, “each person on the globe is entitled to an equal portion of each such location’s value” (Stenier 2011: 331). The Fund distributes each nation “a per capita equal share of that aggregate revenue” (Steiner 2011: 332). The form which the distribution takes is the provision of regular payments, such as an unconditional basic income or an initial capital stake (Steiner 2011: 330). It is anti-paternalistic in “allowing individuals to decide whether to consume their share or to choose to invest with others in producing public goods” (Casal 2011: 322-323). Although the main aim of the Fund is to apply the Lockean proviso of rightful appropriation, the Fund nevertheless has considerable impact for alleviating inequality, poverty, and addressing environmental problems. The net effect of the Fund transfers resources from the rich to the poor. Moreover, as Steiner points out, the equal distribution of the revenue elimi-nates ‘poverty traps’ (Steiner 2011: 334).
Pogge’s proposal in redistributing global natural resources is called the Global Resource Dividend (Pd). It is a tax scheme that aims to alleviate global poverty and inequality. At the same time, Pd contributes to conserv-ing non-renewable natural resources for protectconserv-ing the environment and the interests of the future generations (Pogge 2011: 338). As Casal remarks, it is designed to “allow an ecumenical defense, drawing on arguments of various kinds but non-reliant on any particular position” (Casal 2011: 309) The implementation of the Dividend may be considered an improvement from different ethical perspectives such as consequentialist, contractualist or libertarian. (Casal 2011: 203, 309)
The Dividend imposes a modest flat tax on both use and ownership of natural resources. Levied on states, the tax targets a limited number of natural resources identified by a number of factors: the use or ownership of the taxed resource must be easy to monitor or estimate for keeping overall collection costs of the tax scheme low. The taxation needs to have “a small impact on the price of goods consumed to satisfy basic needs,” and at the same time it should encourage conservation of resources and environmen-tal protection (Pogge 2011: 342). Pogge argues that taxing the ownership of natural resources such as oil leads to over extraction of the resource so as to compensate for the tax. Therefore, countries owning non-renewable natural resources such as crude oils, metals, or minerals are taxed only for the extraction of the resources with the aim of encouraging conservation
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
of non-renewable resources (Pogge 2011: 339). For similar reasons, when imposing taxes on land, “rainforests and other wilderness areas as well as lands used for planting basic food stuffs for human consumption should be exempted” (Pogge 2011: 343). Moreover, contrary to Steiner’s Fund, the rate of the land tax needs to be based on the unimproved quality of the land rather than its market value in order to enable the alleviation of poverty (Pogge 2011: 348). Pogge points out that in nations such as Bangladesh, land prices are high because of the tremendous population, and the position of those should not be further worsened (2011: 348). The tax rates are to be arranged periodically based on their conservational effects as well as target revenue. Pogge tentatively aims “at about $300 billion or (in 2010) about half a percent of the sum of all gross national incomes — that would suffice to design and implement the structural reforms and policies that would end severe human poverty once and for all” (2011: 341-342). Although the flat tax rate may be regressive, it is compensated by the distributive scheme.[2]
The revenue collected by the Dividend is distributed in accordance with prioritarian values, with special emphasis on the worst off (Pogge 2011: 351). The form of revenue distribution is diversified. A portion of the revenue is distributed in cash by need-based basic income or stock of start-ing capital. However, the major portion is distributed in the form of global public goods and institutional design (Pogge 2011: 347). Pogge asserts that “using the GRD to fund such public goods as well as clean water, adequate sanitation, basic health care, basic education, careful redesign of national and supranational institutions/legislation, land reform, and measures against corruption, human trafficking, smoking and alcoholism, ensures that its introduction brings net benefits to nearly all poor people” (2011: 347-348). Compliance is sustained by rendering redistribution conditional upon government cooperation (Casal 2011: 323). Moreover, by employ-ing different distributive schemes, various incentives can be provided to diverse agents. Thereby Pogge aims to make sure that “all agents and agen-cies involved understand that they will lose funding if they do not work effectively in the interest of the poor” (2011: 351).
2 Pogge recognizes the regressive character of the flat tax of Pd. He points out that “While lower per-capita incomes are associated with lower natural-resource consumption, they are also asso-ciated with higher natural-resource consumption per unit of income. This is true for house-holds as well as for countries; therefore, if GRD were charged at a flat rate, poor people and poor countries would end up contributing a larger percentage of their income than rich people” (Pogge 2011: 344)
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Casal proposes the Global Share (Ps) as an improvement on the Global Resource Dividend. The aims of both policies are similar in alleviating problems of global poverty and inequality as well as encouraging conser-vation of non-renewable natural resources for environmental protection and interests of future generations. Similar to the Dividend, the Share is designed to allow for an ecumenical defense, drawing on arguments from different ethical perspectives.
Levied on the states, the Share imposes taxes on both use and owner-ship of different kinds of natural resources such as oil, land, and sea access. Tax base and tax rate are determined and modified periodically in rela-tion to a target revenue, the consequences for poverty and conservarela-tion (Casal 2011: 319-320, 323). The emphasis is on the environmental objec-tive. (Casal 2011: 358) Different from the Dividend, the states are taxed progressively. In determining the exact rates and bases for each resource, multiple poverty lines are employed. (Casal 2011: 323) In addition, taxes for the affluent states are modified in relation to their position from the global average per capita.
The revenue is distributed in a prioritized fashion. As Casal presents, the standard formulation of prioritarianism considers “(i) how many peo-ple can be benefited, (ii) the size of the benefit, and (iii) the level of advan-tage of the recipient” (2011: 323-324). Similar to the Dividend, the form of distribution is the provision of public goods rather than regular payments such as basic income, i.e., in providing “clean, efficient technologies to ena-ble developing countries to skip the unhindered carbon intensive industri-alization that others have enjoyed” (Casal 2011: 324). In order to sustain compliance to the scheme, Casal suggests that we can employ progressive import duties or withhold the distributive benefits from noncompliant states (2011: 326).
2. Ranking the proposals by ethical perspectives
Once we have at hand a sufficient description of the social states implied by the policies, we can move on to the second step. It consists in determining how the social states are valued by different ethical perspectives. Ethical perspectives do not need to be fully developed principles of justice. It suf-fices that they specify reasons for valuing one social state over another. They are ethical to the extent that they do not represent private interests and give equal weight to each individual. In addition, discriminatory perspectives are excluded from the assessment. From the exchange between the three
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
authors I single out eight different ethical perspectives. From each per-spective I derive a particular ranking of the three proposals. I characterize these perspectives as egalitarian, prioritarian, sufficientarian, consequen-tialist, libertarian as well as those that represent concerns with transitional aspects, conservation of resources and equal respect for persons.
The first three perspectives--egalitarian, sufficientarian, and prioritar-ian--are related to redistributive aspects of the proposals. Policies are valued in relation to the net outcome of the revenue collection and redistribution. In basic terms, the egalitarian perspective values reducing inequality (E); the sufficientarian perspective values minimizing the aggregate shortfall below a poverty line (S); and lastly, the prioritarian perspective values maximizing the aggregate benefit for the worst off with diminishing moral value to the benefitting (P). The Fund imposes a flat tax on natural resource ownership and distributives revenue equally. Assuming that the affluent states own more natural resources than do the less affluent states, the affluent states owe more to the Fund, which in turn is distributed equally. The net effect reduces inequality. It is an improvement compared to the status quo from prioritarian perspective since the less affluent the state, the less tax contrib-uted to the fund. (Casal 2011: 322) This consequence of the Fund is also an improvement from the sufficientarian perspective, since the least affluent contributes least and the position of individuals below the poverty line is improved. The Dividend imposes a modest flat tax on use and ownership of natural resources and distributes the revenue in a prioritarian way with spe-cial emphasis for the worst off. Similar to the Fund, the revenue collection of the Dividend reduces inequality; it is simultaneously an improvement from prioritarian and sufficientarian perspectives. Although the Dividend’s modest tax has a smaller impact for redistribution compared to the full tax of the Fund because of the former’s low rate at the revenue collection stage, the redistributive stage of the Dividend significantly changes net outcome. First, for the Dividend, the worst off have a greater claim on the distribution than do the remainder of the population. Second, the tax base and rate are periodically modified in order to achieve the redistributive aims. For exam-ple, for cases where the flat tax rate of the Dividend is regressive, such as when lower income groups need to contribute a higher percentage of their income than do higher income groups, the tax base and rate are moderated to eliminate the regressive outcome (Casal 2011: 320). So far as the Fund does not have distributive aims besides compensation for unjust appropri-ation, the Fund equally distributes the revenue. Moreover, the tax is not moderated in cases where the flat tax rate is regressive. Hence, the Dividend
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is ultimately ranked higher than the Fund in all three distributive perspec-tives E, S, and P. The Share, on the other hand, imposes a progressive tax on use and ownership of natural resources and distributes it in a prioritarian way. Due to progressive taxation at the stage of revenue collection, the Share fares better than does the Dividend from all three distributive perspectives. However, taking into account Pogge’s emphasis on helping first and fore-most the worst off and Casal’s arguments against employing any poverty line in distribution, the net outcome of the Dividend is ranked higher by the sufficientarian perspective. (Casal 2011: 322-323) Hence, the ultimate valuation from the three perspectives can be formulated as E (Ps>Pd>Pf), S (Pd>Ps>Pf), and P (Ps>Pd>Pf).
Consequentialist perspective (A) values the aggregate benefit a policy achieves in terms of poverty reduction. It relates to the revenue raising potential of the policies as well as how that revenue is used. As the Fund imposes a 100% tax on natural resource ownership, it has the highest rev-enue raising potential. However, the distribution is not directly aimed at poverty alleviation. As mentioned, the possible regressive consequences of the Fund’s tax that are not balanced at the redistributive stage undermine its ability to alleviate poverty. The Share and the Dividend, on the other hand, are similar in raising revenue since both tax use and ownership. Moreover, for both the Share and the Dividend alleviating poverty is a direct policy objective; this objective determines the choice of resources to be taxed as well as the tax rate and base. However, for Casal, the environmental objec-tive matters more than does the poverty objecobjec-tive. She suggests that “we should revise the tax base depending on its environmental impact, even in the event that we managed to achieve our initial environmental policy objective without reaching our poverty objective” (Casal 2011: 358). And for Pogge, the conservational impact of the Dividend is to be arranged in relation to a pre-fixed poverty objective. As he emphasizes, it should “suf-fice to design and implement the structural reforms and policies that would end severe human poverty once and for all” (2011: 341-342). Hence, the Dividend ranks higher than does the Share by the consequentialist perspec-tive; and the final valuation can be formulated as A (Pd>Ps>Pf)
The next perspective, conservation of non-renewable natural resources (C), values the impact of the policies on other domains such as environ-mental and intergeneration justice. Pogge and Casal point out that the high tax rate of the Fund encourages the states to extract more natural resources. As a response, Steiner proposes ‘pollution vouchers’ to be included in the Fund to compensate for any activity that damages the property of another.
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
However, the interests of future generations remain outside policy objec-tives. Steiner maintains that “concerns for environmental degradation that damages no living persons, or that is licensed by them, may well be
grounded in other moral values but are not demands of justice” (Steiner
2011: 333) Casal recognizes that since conservation is not a demand of jus-tice, “there is no guarantee that the balance of contrary tendencies (respec-tively caused by oil ownership taxes and pollution vouchers) will always resolve in favor of appropriate conservation” (Casal 2011: 354). For Pogge and Casal, on the other hand, concerns for environment and future genera-tions are direct policy objectives. Casal emphasizes that no a priori rules exist that we can impose to ensure resource conversion (2011: 358). The tax bases, rate, and choice of resources to be taxed by the Share and the Dividend are determined and moderated periodically according to the con-servational impact. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out, Casal prioritizes the environmental objective over the poverty objective. Hence the Share ranks higher than does the Dividend, and the final valuation from the perspective of conservation of non-renewable natural resources is C(Ps>Pd>Pf).
Libertarian perspective (L) values the compensation achieved by the policies for the arbitrary acquisition of the world resources as well as the sensitivity of the policies to personal entitlements. The Fund is meant to be a direct application of the Lockean proviso to global natural resources. The determination of the full rent of natural resources and equal distributions is aimed to implement the proviso. Hence, the Fund ranks higher than do both the Dividend and the Share. However, Pogge and Casal also endorse the libertarian perspective by “taxing only non-produced resources” and appealing only to “negative duties to refrain from imposing harmful insti-tutions” (Casal 2011: 310). Comparing the Share and the Dividend, Casal argues that the progressive tax rate of the Share fares better with the liber-tarian perspective. She asserts that “Lockean principles do not determine a particular rate structure but since they justify financial charges by the harm pollution or over-acquisition causes to fellow humans, it is not strange to expect repeat offenders to be charged at higher rates” (Casal 2011: 327). Moreover, the prioritarian redistributive scheme of the Share is valued bet-ter by the libertarian perspective compared with the Dividend because “sets no thresholds but compensates more those who are harmed more by the exclusion” (Casal 2011: 327). Hence, the final valuation can be formulated as L(Pf>Ps>Pd).
The transitional perspective (T) assesses the proposals in terms of the institutions required for effectively implementing them. The valuation is
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based on the feasibility and accessibility of the proposals. The former refers to the material and political conditions of the world in order to implement the policies; the latter, to the relationship between the current world order and the proposed tax scheme. I consider the transitional perspective as ethical because evaluating a course of action that leads to less justice here and now with respect to a long term and integrated project of perfect justice requires an ethical valuation of the two options. Pogge emphasizes that the Fund is “an ideal of fully just institutional arrangement governing the use of natural wealth” (2011: 336). Even if the Fund’s tax scheme may be feasible, it requires a major change in the current world order. On the other hand, the Dividend and the Share require minor institutional reforms designed for achieving piecemeal improvements. Hence, from the transitional perspec-tive, the latter two rank higher than does the Fund. Comparing the Share and the Dividend, the institutions required to implement the former are more complex than are the latter. The progressive tax rate implied by the Share involves adjusting the price of any commodity within the tax scheme according to the per-capita income of the country. As Pogge observes, in the face of the complex international division of labor, it is difficult and costly to make the adjustments (2011: 344-345) Instead of complicated tax schemes such as progressive taxation, we need to aim at reducing inequality “through a small number of institutional mechanisms and policy instru-ments that are best suited to this task” (2011: 345) Hence, from the transi-tional perspective, the policies are ranked as T(Pd>Ps>Pf).
The last perspective I consider evaluates the three tax schemes based on how they influence the self-respect of individuals (R). Jonathan Wolff points out that the implementation of policies that aim to bring about a fairer outcome may, on the contrary, undermine the self-respect of the individuals whose position the policy aims to improve (Wolff, 1998). For example, in order to make a distribution based on responsibility, we need to know whether an individual’s advantaged or disadvantaged posi-tion results from his or her choices or circumstances beyond one’s con-trol (Wolff 1998: 110). However, acquiring the required information may conflict with the value of equal respect for everyone. For example, there may be cases in which individuals are required to reveal personal informa-tion that will potentially undermine their self-respect.” (Wolff 1998: 111) Although the authors do not explicitly discuss equal respect, it is an impor-tant value within the debate. The informational requirement of the Fund which imposes a flat tax and equal distribution is much lower than both what the Dividend and the Share require. For the latter two, the benefits are
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
means tested. The distribution is conditional on the states’ cooperation with the objectives of the tax schemes (Casal 2011: 323). The authors aim to sus-tain compliance by means of progressive import duties or withholding the distributive benefits from noncompliant states (Casal 2011: 326). Moreover, in order to make further claims on the redistribution, the less affluent states need to make the case that they are not responsible for their low income situations. The informational requirements exacerbate the position of the worse-off. As Wolff points out, “In the real world the burden of revealing data about one’s circumstances falls only on one sector of society, and that sector is already among the most disadvantaged” (Wolff 1998: 111). Hence the Fund is ranked higher from the perspective of self-respect. Comparing the Dividend and the Share, the former’s flat tax scheme requires less infor-mation from the states than does the latter’s progressive tax scheme. In addition to the informational requirement, there is another aspect from which the flat tax scheme promotes better the value of self respect than does the progressive tax scheme. As Pogge reminds us, “it is morally undesirable to exempt the poor — as if they did not care about, and could not share, our generation’s responsibility for the environment and toward future gen-erations and other species” (2011: 346). Preventing the less affluent from sharing responsibility in environmental problems undermines their agency and self-respect.Hence, from the perspective of self-respect we can rank the policies as R(Pf>Pd>Ps).
3. Rankings ethical perspectives by impartial spectators At the conclusion of the second step, we have at hand rankings of the three proposals by eight different perspectives. The next step of the social choice approach aims to identify a number of perspectives that may be judged to be superior than the others. They point to the less unjust option in the comparison. The reasoning consists of two further steps. The first step con-sists in identifying impartial spectators who give relative valuations of the rankings. Impartial spectators represent possible impartial rankings of the perspectives that are proposed in assessing policy options. Each ranking is based on different reasons found in society for valuing one ethical per-spective over another. These reasons should be cleaned of vested interests as well as the bias of tradition and custom (Sen 2009: 44-45). In the next step, we identify overlaps in the rankings of the impartial spectators. These overlaps are pair-wise valuations that the impartial spectators mutually agree on without an agreement on the overall rankings. In cases where the
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overlap points to a determinate outcome(s), we can claim that those actions are less unjust than its alternatives due the impartiality of the judgment.[3]
For assessing the discussion regarding the distribution of global natural resources I reconstruct the views of Steiner, Pogge, and Casal as impartial spectators who proffer competing arguments for relative valuations of the eight perspectives. However, in the following, I first aim to respond to an objection that Gerald Gaus raises that relates to the second and third step of the social choice approach (2012: 248-251).
Among a number of points Gaus discusses regarding the social choice approach, the most important one, in my view, concerns the impartiality of the rankings provided by impartial spectators. He plausibly cautions that we “may well disagree on what constitutes such an objective, bona fide, perspective on justice” (2012: 249). The objection may be raised at both the impartiality of the spectators and the principles they are ranking. First, it may be argued that the spectators that we are considering are not impar-tial. Hence, their views should not be included in the assessment. Second, disagreement may arise as to the components to be considered of the list of ethical perspectives. It may be argued that an ethical perspective in the list is subjective. In Section Two and the beginning of Section Three, I point out that the reasons for the ranking of the social states by ethical perspectives and the perspectives by impartial spectators need to be cleansed of vested interests and discriminatory judgments. Is this condition sufficient to sus-tain impartiality?
The idea of ethical objectivity and reasonableness that Sen maintains is central to understand the idea of impartiality invoked here. According to Sen, a unique, impartial resolution of a question of justice is not always pos-sible. On the contrary, he emphasizes “the possible sustainability of plural and competing reasons for justice, all of which have claims to impartiality and which nevertheless differ from – and rival – each other” (Sen 2009: 12). The competing reasons of justice come from different viewpoints of social groups who have varied experiences. There are multiple spectators that have a claim to impartiality. Similarly, there are multiple ethical
perspec-3 Sen writes that demands of impartiality are “integral parts of the idea of justice and injustice.” (Sen 2009: 42) In this way, his theorizing is an instance of theorizing of justice as impartiality, which in Brian Barry’s words “makes it turn on the terms of reasonable agreement.” (Barry 1995, 7) Yet, Sen’s theorizing diverges from this framework in an important aspect. While main stream theorizing of justice as impartiality initiated by the seminal work of John Rawls in A
Theory of Justice looks for reasonable agreement on ideal principles of justice that govern the
perfectly just social state (Rawls 1999, 216), Sen aims to identify the less unjust option in an actual comparison that all can reasonably agree to. (Sen 2009: 15-18)
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
tives that have a claim to objectivity. In the face of such plurality of values, the impartiality of the spectators and objectivity of the ethical perspectives are sustained by informed public scrutiny. The type of reasons that impar-tial spectators give in support of their relative rankings and the set of ethical perspectives are assessed by the general public (Sen 2009: 45, 122). As Sen indicates, “we can take the relevant standard of objectivity of ethical prin-ciples to be linked to their defensibility in an open and free framework of public reasoning” (Sen 2009: 196).[4] With regards to the present discussion,
the exchange between Steiner, Pogge, and Casal is a good example of public scrutiny. Each author gives reasons for their proposals as well as criticisms regarding the others’ proposals. The analysis of the previous section shows that each author takes each perspective at least as reasonable. Similarly, each line of reasoning by an impartial spectator is open to public scrutiny. Hence, the rankings of Steiner, Pogge, and Casal as impartial spectators and the ethical perspectives to which they refer are included in the evaluation.
We may now return to the inquiry at hand. The first step is to identify the rankings of the perspectives by the impartial spectators. Steiner, Pogge, and Casal all have prior intuitions regarding the distribution of global nat-ural resources before they assess the comparative question at hand. One way to trace these intuitions is by looking at how each proposal fares with an ethical perspective. According to the analysis in Section One, we can assert that Casal prioritizes prioritarian and egalitarian values as well as conservation of resources, Pogge prioritizes sufficientarian, consequential-ist, and transitional values, and Steiner prioritizes libertarian values and the value of equal respect. Yet, prior intuitions are not sufficient to specify impartial rankings. There are two essential aspects that need to be realized. First, the rankings of the impartial spectators should only be concerned with the particular question at hand. The reasons each impartial spectator provides for ranking one ethical perspective over another should only refer to the policies in the comparison. In other words, the rankings of the ethical perspectives are relative to the comparative question. If the same impartial spectator assesses a question in another domain or compares different pro-posals, she is likely to offer a different ranking of the ethical perspectives.
4 Sen suggests that this kind of scrutiny may follow Thomas Scanlon’s approach in identifying reasonable principles. Scanlon holds that “thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level, thinking about what could be justifed to others on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject.” (Scanlon 1998: 5) Taking into consideration the views of others entails including in the assessment only those principles that cannot be reasonably rejected.
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Second, impartial spectators should aim to bring to surface their unique valuation of the question. Hence, the rankings of the impartial spectators should also depend on the rankings of other impartial spectators. To this end, we may identify a general rule that guides the evaluations of the impar-tial spectators: When an ethical perspective is valued more or less equally by all impartial spectators, it is ranked relatively lower in the general rank-ing by all impartial spectators. In a similar way, if there is a stark difference between the valuations of the impartial spectators regarding a particular ethical perspective, then it ranks higher in general in the ranking of an indi-vidual impartial spectator.
With this rule we can grasp the relative character of the valuations of the impartial spectators at two different levels discussed above and pose possible rankings. For Steiner, the transitional perspective (T) is not a pri-ority, since he does not take into account that the Fund requires complex institutions for its implementation. On the contrary, for Pogge and Casal, the transitional perspective is of high importance as the Dividend and the Share presuppose only minor institutional reforms in the current global order. Moreover, there is a great difference between the transitional require-ments of the Fund and both the Dividend and the Share. Similarly, there is a major difference between their relative valuations. Hence, the transi-tional perspective ranks high in the rankings of Pogge and Casal, and low in that of Steiner. Considering the libertarian perspective (L), the Fund is a direct implementation of the Lockean proviso, whereas the Dividend and the Share are only constrained by it. We can assert that there is a major difference in the valuations of impartial spectators. Hence, the libertarian perspective is ranked high in the ranking of Steiner and low in the rankings of Pogge and Casal. Similarly, the perspective of equal respect (R) is much more important for Steiner than for Pogge and Casal as the informational requirement of the Fund is much lower than both the Dividend and the Share. Hence, the perspective of equal respect ranks high in the rankings of Steiner, and low in the ranking(s) of Pogge and Casal. Still, Pogge prioritizes the perspective of equal respect slightly more than does Casal as he points to concerns of agency. Consequentialist perspective (A) is considered impor-tant by all impartial spectators. The extent of the difference between the val-uations of impartial spectators is low; hence it is ranked relatively lower. All proposals decrease inequality; hence, egalitarian perspective (E) is ranked relatively lower by all impartial spectators. Prioritarian (P) and sufficientar-ian (S) perspectives are prioritized by both Pogge and Casal, and not by Steiner. Hence, they will be ranked relatively higher than the egalitarian
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
and consequentialist perspectives by Pogge and Casal and lower by Steiner. Moreover, Pogge prioritizes sufficientarian perspective over prioritarian, and Casal prioritizes prioritarian perspective over sufficientarian. All pro-posals help in conservation of natural resources (C). However, for Casal, natural resource conservation is more important than it is for Pogge. Based on these considerations, we can pose rankings by impartial spectators as follows: Casal (T>P>C>S>A>E>R>L), Pogge (T>S>P>A>C>R>E>L) and Steiner (R>L>A>C>E>T>P>S).
After establishing the relative valuations of the perspectives, the next step is to identify overlaps in terms of pair-wise valuations. Overlapping pair-wise valuations are partial rankings that the impartial spectators mutu-ally agree on without an agreement on the overall rankings. In the above evaluation, there are five pair-wise valuation that all agree on T>P, T>S, C>E, A>E, R>L. According to the above five pair-wise valuations, there is an agreement that the social states implied by the perspectives P, S, E, and L are all inferior to at least one of the social states implied by the perspectives A, T, C, and R.[5] So far as the claim is mutually agreeable, we can assert that
the social states implied by the former are more unjust than the latter.
4. Two recommendations for reforming the policy proposals
The application of the social choice approach has decreased the mutually agreeable choice set regarding the ethical perspectives. Yet, what does it imply for the actual policy choice? As Sen contends, depending on the extent of similarity among the rankings, we can have different levels of guidance (Sen 2009: 104-105). In some cases, the similarity may be to an extent that it can determine a less unjust option. In other cases, when pair-wise valuations do not point to a determinate choice, they can still provide guidance for reforming policy options. The four ethical perspectives that the impartial spectators agree to be superior to at least one of the other alternatives are A, T, C, and R. As I lay out in Section One consequentialist and transitional perspectives rank Pd over Ps and Pf. However, from the perspective of conservation of resources, Ps ranks over Pd and Pf; similarly, from the perspective of equal respect, Pf ranks over Pd and Ps.
There may be multiple ways of articulating this similarity as valuable information for reforming the policies. In my view, the easiest way to arrive
5 Sen argues that “intelligent moral choice demands that we not choose –explicitly or by default--an alternative that we can see is morally inferior to another feasible alternative.” (Sen 1985: 181)
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at a mutually agreed choice seems to lay with reforming Pd. My first sug-gestion is to reform Pd to an extent that it can conserve natural resources at least as good as Ps. However, in the analysis of Section Three, I suggest that there is a tradeoff between the environmental and poverty reducing aspects of the proposals. Moreover, just as Pogge prioritizes the latter by employing a prefixed objective, Casal prioritizes the former. Hence, Pd needs to be reformed in a way that emphasizes the environmental objective more without dropping below Ps in poverty reduction. Perhaps, one way to go is reforming both policies by dropping any fixed objective on both environmental protection and poverty reduction and, instead, attaching importance to their equal improvement. Then, the tax base, rate, and choice of resources to be taxed are to be determined for each case depending on the effects on equal improvement of environmental protection and poverty reduction. This suggestion makes more sense when we consider that the worst off groups in society are subject to the worst effects of environmental problems, and, as Casal points out, that poverty diminishes the capacity of people to address environmental problems. (Casal 2011b: 319) Hence, both Pd and Ps may be ranked equally by both consequentialist and resource conservation perspectives.
My second suggestion is to reform Pd to an extent that it sustains equal respect for individuals at least as much as Pf does. As I have discussed in Section Two, both Pd and Pf imply flat taxation. Hence, the difference between the proposals in promoting to self-respect is related to the dif-ferences in the distributive mechanisms. Equal distribution of Pf requires less information than the conditional distribution of Pd regarding people who are the worst-off and states that are cooperating with the tax scheme. The condition of proving that a state cooperates with the tax scheme is a general condition that applies to all states and ensures only that the worst off are receiving the benefits. Determining which individuals or groups are the worst off, on the other hand, requires information that burdens an already disadvantaged sector. These people need to make the case that they do not bear responsibility for their worst-off position. The distribu-tive mechanism of Pd is central for the scheme and relates closely with its other aspects; hence, the mechanism cannot be dropped. Perhaps one way to reform Pd is to supplement it with a mechanism that sustains a ‘‘vul-nerability presumption principle’’. According to this principle, which has been proposed by Christian Barry for evaluating information relevant for determining responsibilities, we are to use standards of proof that “express a willingness to err in favor of the acutely deprived subjects” (Barry 2005:
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IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL TAXES ON NATURAL RESOURCES: A SOCIAL CHOICE APPROACH
221). For our case at hand, such additional mechanism implies that the benefits of the tax scheme can be withheld from those individuals if and only if it is clear that their worst-off position results from the outcome of their choices. In cases where the evidence is disputable, the benefits of the tax scheme cannot be withheld from the vulnerable. Hence, the burden of an informational requirement is minimized to an extent compatible with Pf. Reforming the Dividend in accordance with the two suggestions has the prospects of transforming the guidance derived from the pair-wise valua-tions to determining the Dividend as bringing about the less unjust social state in comparison with the Share and the Fund.
Conclusion
Steiner, Pogge and Casal offer competing global tax schemes on natural resources. Although they follow different approaches and invoke different principles in designing policies, each proposal has an equal claim to justice so far as they are based on impartial reasons. In this article, I offer a com-parison of the proposals in light of Sen’s main insight that our disagreements regarding claims of justice need not be fully resolved in order to improve the status quo. Admittedly, the analysis by the social choice approach I develop here is a small part of an open ended discussion. The aim is not to reach a conclusion in the debate regarding the implementation of global taxes on natural resources. New information and perspectives always offer original ways of moderating the outcome. Yet, the two policy recommenda-tions I draw are still valuable. Reforming Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend so that it requires less information from the vulnerable populations, and it values conservation of resources as much as poverty alleviation, renders it a policy that all can reasonably agree to. Even though the reformed Dividend does not bring about a just distribution of global resources, it enables us to reach a less unjust social state. Following Sen, “we go as far as we reasonably can” (Sen 2009: 401).
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* Institut de Recherches Philosophique de Lyon (IRPHIL), Université Jean Moulin Lyon III, France.
WHAT CAN COSMOPOLITANISM BRING
TO THE POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE?
THOMAS NAGEL’S RECONSTRUCTION
OF THE IDEA OF GLOBAL JUSTICE
QUAL PODERÁ SER A CONTRIBUIÇÃO DO COSMOPOLITISMO
PARA UMA CONCEPÇÃO POLÍTICA DA JUSTIÇA?
A RECONSTRUÇÃO LEVADA A CABO POR THOMAS NAGEL
DA IDEIA DE JUSTIÇA GLOBAL
Blondine Desbiolles*
In this paper I discuss Nagel’s seemingly radical rejection of the cosmopolitan ideal of global justice, as he develops it in “The Problem of Global Justice”. I offer here an analysis of his arguments that reveals them to be more complex than what appears and is usually acknowledged, and that can better explain how they finally come to offer, instead of a renouncement, a stimulating and original alternative to the challenge of global justice. I suggest that this alternative, which is first rooted in his political con-ception, is actually developed out of a real interest for the cosmopolitan views and of an attempt to take into account some of their claims. I then conclude with a critical assessment of the way he confronts these two conceptions of global justice.
Keywords: global justice; cosmopolitanism; institutionalism; sovereignty and legit-imacy; impartiality; equality; human rights.
Neste artigo, discuto a rejeição aparentemente radical do ideal de justiça global levada a cabo por Thomas Nagel em “O Problema da Justiça Global”. Apresento aqui uma análise dos seus argumentos que revela serem estes mais complexos do que parecem e do que normalmente se pensa, e que propõe uma explicação melhor para o facto de, afinal, estes argumentos fornecerem, em vez de uma renúncia, uma alternativa estimulante e original ao desafio da justiça global. Sugiro que esta alter-nativa, que se enraíza, em primeiro lugar, na concepção política de Nagel, de facto
34 BLONDINE DESBIOLLES
é desenvolvida a partir de um interesse real pelas perspectivas cosmopolitas, jun-tamente com uma tentativa ter em conta alguma das teses propostas. Finalmente, concluo com uma apreciação crítica do modo como Nagel confronta estas duas concepções de justiça global.
Palavras-chave: Nagel, justiça global, concepção política.
0. Introduction
If Thomas Nagel explores thoroughly the question of justice and impartial-ity at the domestic level, specifically in Equalimpartial-ity and pa