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NGO PERSPECTIVE: FROM NGO PERSPECTIVE: FROM

WORDS TO DEEDS WORDS TO DEEDS

Miguel Schloss Executive Director

Transparency International

MMSD & IIED MMSD & IIED Managing Mineral Managing Mineral

Wealth Wealth

(2)

Issues Issues

• Policy distortions

• Institutional incentives

• Governance

(3)

Implications Implications

■More costly public investments

■Lower government revenues

■Lower expenditures on operations and maintenance

■Lower resource surpluses

Poorer economic performance

(4)

Controlling Bribery

Controlling Bribery and Civil Liberties and Civil Liberties

AGO

ARG

AUS AUT

BEL BFA

BRA

CAN CHL CHE

CHN

CIV CMR

COL

CRI

CZE

DEU

DNK EGY

ESP ETH

FIN FRA

GBR GHA

GRC

GTM HND

HUN IDN

IND

IRL ISL

ISR

ITA JOR

JPN KEN

KOR

LSO

LUX MAR

MEX MOZ

MUS

MWI MYS

NAM

NGA NIC

NLD

NOR NZL PER

PHL

POL

PRT RUS

SGP

SVK

SWE SWZ

THA

TUN TUR

TWN

TZA UGA UKR

USA VNM VEN

ZAF ZMB ZWE

r=0.67

Civil Liberties

Bribery

(GCS97+)

BRIBERYLOW

LOW HIGH

Source: Kaufmann and Sachs (1998)

(Freedom House)

HIGH BRIBERY

(5)

Bribery vs. Civil Service Professionalism Bribery vs. Civil Service Professionalism

BGR

SVK CZE KAZ

BRA

CAN CHE CHL

CHN COL

CRI

CZE

DEU DNK ESP

FIN FRA

GBR GRC

GTM

HKG HND

HUN IDN

IND

IRL ISL

ISR ITA

JOR

JPN KOR

LUX MEX

MYS NIC

NLD NOR

NZL PER

PHL

POL

PRT RUS

SGP SLV

SVK

SWE THA

TUR

TWN UKR

USA

VEN VNM

ZAF ZWE

r=0.86

Civil Service Professionalism

Bribery

HIGH LOW

LOW HIGH

(6)

Corruption and Rule of Law Corruption and Rule of Law

ZMB ZWE ZAR

ZAF

VNM

VEN

USA URY

UGA

TZA

TWN TUR

TUN

THA SYR

SWE SVK

SGP SAU

RUS

ROM

QAT

PRT POL PER PHL

PAN

PAK

OMN

NZL

NOR NLD

NGA

MYS MMR

MEX

MAR LKA

LBY

KWT KOR

KEN

JPN JOR

ITA

ISR

IRQ

IRN

IRL IND

IDN

HUN HKG

GRC GHA

GBR FIN FRA

ESP EGY

DZA ECU

DNK DEU CZE

CRI

COL CMR

CIV

CHN

CHL

CHE

CAN BWA

BRA BOL

BHR

BGR BGD

BEL

AUT AUS ARG

ARE AGO

r=0.82

Rule of Law (ICRG, average 1990s)

S&P-DRI Corruption Index

LOW HIGH

LOW HIGH

(7)

Bribery vs. Civil Service Professionalism Bribery vs. Civil Service Professionalism

BGR

SVK CZE KAZ

BRA

CAN CHE CHL

CHN COL

CRI

CZE

DEU DNK ESP

FIN FRA

GBR GRC

GTM

HKG HND

HUN IDN

IND

IRL ISL

ISR ITA

JOR

JPN KOR

LUX MEX

MYS NIC

NLD NOR

NZL PER

PHL

POL

PRT RUS

SGP SLV

SVK

SWE THA

TUR

TWN UKR

USA

VEN VNM

ZAF ZWE

r=0.86

Civil Service Professionalism

Bribery

HIGH LOW

LOW HIGH

(8)

Corruption and Rule of Law Corruption and Rule of Law

ZMB ZWE ZAR

ZAF

VNM

VEN

USA URY

UGA

TZA

TWN TUR

TUN

THA SYR

SWE SVK

SGP SAU

RUS

ROM

QAT

PRT POL PER PHL

PAN

PAK

OMN

NZL

NOR NLD

NGA

MYS MMR

MEX

MAR LKA

LBY

KWT KOR

KEN

JPN JOR

ITA

ISR

IRQ

IRN

IRL IND

IDN

HUN HKG

GRC GHA

GBR FIN FRA

ESP EGY

DZA ECU

DNK DEU CZE

CRI

COL CMR

CIV

CHN

CHL

CHE

CAN BWA

BRA BOL

BHR

BGR BGD

BEL

AUT AUS ARG

ARE AGO

r=0.82

Rule of Law (ICRG, average 1990s)

S&P-DRI Corruption Index

LOW HIGH

LOW HIGH

(9)

Corruption and Regulatory Discretion Corruption and Regulatory Discretion

ARG

AUS AUT

BEL

BRA

CAN CHE

CHL

CHN

COL

CRI CZE

DEU

DNK ESP

FIN

FRA

GBR

GRC

HKG

HUN IDN IND

ISRIRL

ITA

JPN

KOR

LUX

MEX

MYS

NGA

NOR NLD NZL

PHL

POL

PRT

RUS

SGP

SWE

TUR THA

TWN

USA

VEN VNM

ZAF

r=0.76

Regulatory discretion (GCS97)

Corruption

High corruption

corruption Low

Low High

Even more important (than regulatory interventions) in understanding bribery and corruption is the degree of regulatory discretion.

(10)

Unofficial Economy and Corruption Index Unofficial Economy and Corruption Index

VEN URY

PER

PAN

MEX

HND GTM

ECU

CRI

COL

CHL

BRA

BOL

ARG

SWE USA

PRT

NOR NLD

JPN

ITA

IRL

GRC

GBR

FRA

ESP DNK

DEU CHE CAN

BEL

AUT

UKR

SVK

RUS

ROM POL

LVA HUN

EST CZE

BLR BGR

r = 0.79

0%

20%

40%

60%

Corruption

Unofficial economy as percent of GDP

corruptionLow High

corruption

(11)

Time Management Spent with Bureaucrats and Time Management Spent with Bureaucrats and

Frequency of Bribery Frequency of Bribery

ARMARM

AUTAUT

AZE AZE BEN

BEN BGRBGR BLRBLR

BOL BOL

CANCAN CHECHE

CIVCIV

CMRCMR COG COG

COL COL CRI CRI

CZECZE DEUDEU

ECUECU

ESPESP

ESTEST FJIFJI

FRA FRA GBR

GBR

GEOGEO

GHAGHA

GIN GIN

GNB GNB

HKGHKG

HUNHUN

INDIND

IRLIRL ITAITA

JAMJAM JORJOR

KAZ KAZ KENKEN

KGZKGZ KORKOR

LTULTU LVALVA

MAR MAR

MDA MDA MDG MEX MDG

MEX

MKD MKD

MLI MLI

MOZ MOZ

MUSMUS MWIMWI

MYSMYS

NGA NGA

POLPOL

PRTPRT

RUSRUS SEN SEN

SGP SGP

SVK SVK TCDTCD

TGO TGO

THATHA

TURTUR

TZA TZA

UGAUGA UKRUKR

USA USA

UZBUZB

VEN VEN ZAFZAF

ZMB ZMB

ZWE ZWE

R =.77 R =.77

00 10%10%

20%

20%

30%30%

Frequency of bribery

Frequency of bribery

(WDR 1997)(WDR 1997)

% Management Time

% Management Time with bureaucrats

with bureaucrats

LowLow HighHigh

Source:

Source: KaufmannKaufmannand and WeiWei(1998) Data analysis based on survey conducted under the World(1998) Data analysis based on survey conducted under the WorldBank’s World Development Report 1997.Bank’s World Development Report 1997.

11

(12)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Former Soviet Union Sub-Saharan Africa

South Asia Latin America and Caribbean Central/Eastern Europe and Baltics

East Asia OECD

%

Middle East and North Africa

Corruption Perception By Regions

Corruption Perception By Regions

(13)

Multipronged

Multipronged Strategy for Combating Strategy for Combating Corruption

Corruption

(14)

Legal

Legal--Judicial:Judicial:

•Independence

•Judicial Strengthening

•ADR Mechanisms

Corruption Corruption Economic Policy:

Economic Policy:

•Deregulation

•Tax Simplification

Financial Financial Controls:

Controls:

•Audit

•Procurement Civil Service:

Civil Service:

•Pay

•Meritocracy

Public Oversight:

Public Oversight:

•Parliamentary Oversight

•Civil society and media

•“Power of data”/Surveys

• Independent agency/NGO

Multipronged

Multipronged Strategy for Combating Strategy for Combating Corruption

Corruption

(15)

Corruption

Public Oversight and Civil Society:

Public Oversight and Civil Society:

Ombudsman

Ombudsman in Albania and Boliviain Albania and Bolivia

•• Private Sector CoalitionPrivate Sector Coalition in Boliviain Bolivia

•• DiagnosticDiagnostic Surveys andSurveys and NGONGO monitoring in Ecuador and others monitoring in Ecuador and others

The Response The Response

Financial Controls:

Financial Controls:

Procurement

Procurement Reform in Bolivia,Reform in Bolivia, Ecuador and Georgia

Ecuador and Georgia stitutional and Civil Service

stitutional and Civil Service eform:

eform:

ransparent

ransparent PrivatizationPrivatization n Ecuador

n Ecuador Salary

Salary Reform in BoliviaReform in Bolivia Disclosure of Assets Disclosure of Assets inin Bolivia and Georgiaolivia and Georgia

egal-egal-Judicial:Judicial:

evamp of

evamp of Supreme CourtSupreme Court in Bolivia in Bolivia Competency test

Competency test of judges in Albaniaof judges in Albania Mediation

Mediation in Albaniain Albania

Economic Policy:

Economic Policy:

Deregulation and

Deregulation and DelicensingDelicensing in Boliviain Bolivia

•• Revamping Revamping CustomsCustoms in Ecuador and Latviain Ecuador and Latvia

•• Tax AdministrationTax Administration in Latvia and Ecuadorin Latvia and Ecuador

•• Tax/CustomsTax/Customs Code Reform in AlbaniaCode Reform in Albania

(16)

www.transparency.org/activiti es/lac_tool-kit/intro.html

(17)

ƒ Professional Coordination

ƒ Homogenous products

ƒ Primary data (invoices, contracts)

ƒ Information analysis (price ranges, averages)

ƒ Bulletin, Publications, Dissemination

ƒ Monitoring Results

Price Comparisons Price Comparisons

The Response

The Response

(18)

ƒ Meeting with Stakeholders, including media

ƒ Levelling Playing Field; Technical Experts

ƒ Agenda, Trade-Offs Assessment, Discussion, Minutes

ƒ Explicit Resolution of Issues

Public Hearings Public Hearings

The Response

The Response

(19)

The Response The Response

• No-bribery commitment by bidders

• Commitment of government to prevent extortion and acceptance of bribes

• Disclosure of payments

• Sanctions against bidders who violate their no- bribery commitment

• Involvement of civil society in monitoring bid evaluation, award decision process and

implementation of the contract

Integrity Pacts

Integrity Pacts

(20)

Ominous Correlations:

Ominous Correlations:

Governance Governance

Venezuela

Azerbaijan

Indonesia Ecuador

Nigeria

Cameroon Gabon

United Kingdom

Saudi Arabia Russia

Colombia Mexico

Malaysia Kuwait

Norway

Chad Angola

Algeria

Iran

155 Countries

Strong governance Weak

Source: World Bank Institute

(21)

Mining Sector: Issues Mining Sector: Issues

Sudden wealth, easy money

• Location limitations

• Conflicting interests between mine finders, mine

builders and operators, local community, governments, civil society.

• Government regulations, taxation regime, incentive

structures.

(22)

Mining Sector: Emerging Mining Sector: Emerging

Supply & Demand Forces Supply & Demand Forces

Supply-side: •OECD Convention

•Corporate Codes of Conduct

•Industry Standards

Demand-side •Local Governance Framework

•Institutional & Policy Evolution

•Role of Multilateral Organizations

(23)

40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0

19 85

19 86

19 87

19 88

19 89

19 90

19 91

19 92

19 93

19 94

19 95

19 96

19 97

19 98

19 99

20 00 Chile

Canada

USA Australia

Cash Costs: Selected Countries Cash Costs: Selected Countries

2000 currency c/lb

Others

Mining Sector: Economics Mining Sector: Economics

0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00

1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999

EUROPE USA

1: Copper Consumption Index to Industrial Production Index Ratio

Intensity of Copper Use

Intensity of Copper Use11 in Selected in Selected Developed Countries (1985=1.00) Developed Countries (1985=1.00)

Code lco

(24)

Mining Sector: Economics Mining Sector: Economics

0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

MALAYSIA TAIWAN

Intensity of Copper Use

Intensity of Copper Use11 in Selected in Selected Developing Countries (1985=1.00) Developing Countries (1985=1.00)

1: Copper Consumption Index to Industrial Production Index Ratio

Code lco

0 5 10 15 20

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000

Finland

Sweden

Germany

Japan USA

Francia

Austria Australia

Italy

Canada

Spain United Kingdom

South Korea

Malaysia Chile

Thailand Argentina South Africa

Brazil Mexico

China Indonesia India

Russia

Per Capita Refined Copper Consumption,1998 Per Capita Refined Copper Consumption,1998

Consumption (kg/person)

GDP (US$/person)

(25)

Mining Sector: Dynamics Mining Sector: Dynamics

• Order takers

• Cost cutting

• Productive focus

• Enterprise manager

Decommoditising

Downstream, End-User Strategy

Partner-approach (manufacture, regulators, complementors) Structural support (environment,

human health, transparency, scrutiny

(26)

Mining Sector: Dynamics Mining Sector: Dynamics

SEGMENTATION

GLOBALIZATION

Production Lock-in; proprietary standards Best Product; cost-advantage

Customer Solutions; promotion Global Integration; scrutiny

(27)

Addressing the Issues Addressing the Issues

• Efficient Collection of Revenues

• Extractive Industries Revenue Management

• Budgetary Discipline

• Public Expenditure Management

• Institutional Strengthening

• Transparency and Accountability

• Civil Society Participation & Tracking

(28)

Revenue Management Revenue Management

• Revenues Flow through Off-shore Audited Escrow Accounts

• X % Royalties and Dividends to Special Accounts (examples):

• 80% Poverty Reduction

• 15% Government Expenses

• 5% Local Region

• 10% Future Generations Fund

(29)

Civil Society Participation &

Civil Society Participation &

Tracking Tracking

• Information Campaign

• Surveys / Consultations

• Poverty Reduction Strategy

• Integrity Pact, Monitoring Arrangements

• Public Access; Feedback; Diagnosis

(30)

Conclusions Conclusions

Levelling

Levelling the Playing Field the Playing Field

■Establish Coalitions

■Support / Build National Chapters

■Encourage Research

■Enhance Networks, Transfer Know-how

■Experiment Integrity Pacts

■Support Reforms & Monitor

(31)

• • A Time for Optimism and Commitment A Time for Optimism and Commitment

• Greater focus and attention: irreversible commitment

• Increasingly open and participatory dialogue

• Innovation: New ideas and experimentation

• • Need for rigor and concrete actions Need for rigor and concrete actions

• Empirical and Analytical Rigor: Diagnostics

• Reforming misgoverned institutions (e.g., judiciary, tax)

• Political obstacles: powerful losers

• • A Need for Realistic Expectations A Need for Realistic Expectations

• Complex challenge: institutionalization

• Improvement, not perfection

Conclusions

Conclusions

(32)

Conclusions Conclusions

■ Competition rest on superior products/services at competitive prices.

■ Businesses establish and implement codes of conducts.

■ Businesses engage governments and civil society (PBEC Charter, need for work with TI).

■ Build-up civil society for sustainable development.

A Role for Everyone

A Role for Everyone

(33)

Back-ups

(34)

Petroleum Import Dependency

The Future Response: Example

The Future Response: Example

(35)

Government Involvement and Levels of Inefficiency

(36)

Potential Savings

Potential Savings

(37)

Oil Rents in Selected Countries Oil Rents in Selected Countries

Country @ $10/BBL @ $20/BBL @ $30/BBL

Nigeria 5.6 13.6 21.7

Norway 2.3 13.6 24.9

Indonesia 2.4 7.1 11.9

Algeria 1.8 6.1 10.5

Venezuela 8.2 19.1 30.1

Mexico 9.8 22.4 35.1

Estimated Annual Rent ($Billion)

(38)

Blessing or Curse?

Blessing or Curse?

Average Annual GDP Growth (%)

Country 1980-90 1990-98

Nigeria 1.6 2.6

Norway 2.8 3.9

Indonesia 6.1 5.8

Algeria 2.7 1.2

Venezuela 1.1 2.2

Mexico 1.1 2.5

World 3.2 2.5

Mid Income 2.8 3.9

Low Income 6.5 7.4

References

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