Vol. 3 No. 1. July-December 2019 Pages 41 - 50 ISSN: 2476 – 8049 Website: www.npaw-jhss.com.ng
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The Origin and Development of the Nigerian Armed Forces
Bulus Nom Audu, Ph.D
Department of History and International Studies, Nigeria Police Academy, Wudil, Kano State, Nigeria
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
The Nigerian Armed Forces are a body made up of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. At independence, Nigeria inherited from the British colonial administration a military force which comprised the Army and Navy. There was no Air Force until 1964.
The Nigerian Army started as an amalgamation of relatively small constabularies established by various British administrations and commercial interests in the years preceding the military conquest of Nigeria by the British. As a way of understanding how the Nigerian Armed Forces emerged to become one of the largest in Africa and most dominant within the West African sub-region as at the time the country returned to civilian rule in 1999, this paper shall attempt a concise presentation of the three Armed Services by taking into consideration their troop strength, organization and functions.
More importantly, the paper aims to identify the achievements, deficiencies and inconsistencies that have affected the Nigerian Armed Forces since independence in areas of manpower development and armaments and the role that Nigerian leaders have played through their various actions and policies in consciously or unconsciously causing them.
Introduction
The origin of the Nigerian Army (N.A.); the earliest established arm of the Nigerian Armed Forces, can be traced to the many forces formed by the British in the second half of the nineteenth century to dominate the part of west Africa now called Nigeria. The forces were raised as a matter of necessity and urgency by the British colonialists to establish political dominance over Nigeria for smooth economic exploitation.1 However, desirous of having a military force which he could rely upon in the event of the need to solve minor problems of a military and police nature in the new British colony of Lagos, Captain J.N. Glover a Lieutenant in the Royal Navy was empowered to raise what later became the Lagos Constabulary; a Force charged with both military and police duties. This marked the beginning of the history of the Nigerian Army.2
At the onset, these colonial forces were small in size. But as European rivalry increased for the control of strategic trading areas the British in 1897 saw it necessary to establish a more organized, trained and equipped force capable of checkmating a large scale aggression particularly from the French. It was under that circumstance that Colonel Fredrick Lugard was tasked by the British government to raise the force which was called the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). When Lugard eventually amalgamated Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, two regiments of the North and South were also merged and became known as the Nigeria Regiment of WAFF.3
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The Nigerian Regiment grew in size and sophistication and participated in the First World War (1914-1918) and the Second World War (1939-1945) as part of WAFF.
By 1st of July, 1956, when it became apparent that the Gold Coast, one of the British colonies that formed the West African Command would be independent the following year and would therefore want the Gold Coast Regiment to be independent too, the WAFF was disbanded and its military forces of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Gambia and Sierra-Leone became independent of one another.4 Thus, the Nigerian Regiment
became known as the Nigerian Military Forces in 1956. On 1st April 1958, the British Government theoretically relinquished its control over the Nigerian Army. When Nigeria became independent on 1st October, 1960, the Nigerian Military Forces became known as the Royal Nigerian Army. In 1963 when Nigeria became a Republic, the name changed to the Nigerian Army.5
Nigeria had inherited a disciplined force from the British. However over 90 percent of the officers were British.6 The army had a force of 7,878 personnel by October 1960. This number comprised 7,600 men, 228 British officers and 50 Nigerian Army officers. The few Nigerian officers still depended largely for further training at higher military institutions in Britain, India, the United States, and so on.7 The
acceleration of the Nigerianization of the officer corps was however through the establishment of the Royal Nigerian Military Training College (R.N.M.T.C.) later called Nigerian Military Training College (N.M.T.C.) and later called Infantry Centre and School (I.C.S.), Jaji, which was established in 1960.8 By 1962, the number of British officers reduced while that of Nigeria increased; in 1964, the Nigerian Defence Academy (N.D.A.), Kaduna, was created. By 1965, the Nigerianization of the army had been completed with the appointment of the first Nigerian head of the Army in the person of Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi.9
Organization and Functions of the Nigeria Army
By the early years of independence, the Nigerian Army was organized in two Brigades and five Battalions. The 3rd Battalion was located at Kaduna and the 5th Battalion located at Kano. Both were under the 1st Brigade which had its Headquarters in Kaduna. The 2nd Battalion was based at Ikeja, the 4th Battalion at Ibadan and the 1st Battalion at Enugu. These were under the command of the 2nd Brigade based in Ibadan.
The army's Brigade encompassed the artillery, recce/armour, signal and engineers but they did not exist as independent corps. There were also two reconnaissance squadrons in Lagos and Abeokuta.10 By January 1967, the total strength of the Nigerian Army was put at about 10,500 officers and men.11
However, the role of the Nigerian Army in spite of her impressive United Nations peacekeeping operations in places like Congo and Tanzania still remained largely ceremonial. This image was carried over into the early independence period as the government specifically expected the army to provide support for the fledging state, to help maintain law and order to provide the ritual marks of sovereignty with military parades, march pasts and guards of honour.12
For example, with the failure of the police to act decisively, the military was drafted to quell the Western Regional crises of 1965, the 1980 Maitatsine religious riots
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the various factional and ethnic conflicts of the 1990's such as the Zango-Kataf crises in Kaduna State.13 Other major crises of more recent times included the 2000 and 2004 Kaduna riots as well as the Jos ethno-religious disturbances of 2001. During the highly controversial April 2007 general elections, the Army again was on standby to prevent the outbreak of violence and to quell disturbances that might follow the outcome of the elections.
When the Nigeria Civil war started, it was meant to be a relatively localized military action carried out by the federal troops against Biafran forces. The Nigeria armed forces were ordered to launch a 'police action' which was to take back secessionist territory. It was a military order that eventually escalated into a full-scale civil war that would claim military and civilian lives.14 Consequently, the Nigerian civil war became a catalyst for reorganization in the army, emphasis was no longer placed on numerical strength but on fire power and mobility.15 In order to conduct and sustain all types of ground operations over extended periods in co-operation with other services of the armed forces, the government envisioned Constitutional roles for the army. Section 217 sub section (2) of the Nigerian Constitution (1999) specifies Nigerian Armed Forces roles to:
1. Defend Nigeria from external aggression.
2. Maintain its territorial integrity and secure its borders from violation by land, sea or air.
3. Suppress insurrection and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.
4. Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly.16
By 1999, the Nigerian Armed Forces had an estimated size of at least 100,000 active troops with the Army making up the bulk (85,000).17 On the other hand, the Nigerian Navy (N.N.) grew from what the British colonial administration established on the 1st of April 1956 as the Nigerian Naval Service (N.N.S.) under the command of serving and retired British officers.18 The N.N.S. was formerly gazette on 1st May, 1956.19 The initial manpower of the N.N.S was taken from the previously established government departments: the Marine, the Ports Authority and the Inland Waterways.
Before and in the early years of independence the N.N.S. like the N.A. was established and maintained as a ceremonial force. It was not specifically developed for military operations. The N.N.S. had no single warship and at independence all it had in its possession were old survey boats and a harbour craft, which were inherited from the old marine.20 By 1958 the N.N.S. which had a total of 200 officers and men was renamed the Royal Nigerian Navy and by 1963 the name was finally changed to the Nigerian Navy.21 With the passing of the Navy's Act in 1956, the Nigerian Navy was initially assigned the various responsibilities:
1. To enforce the customs laws of Nigeria.
2. To make hydro-graphic surveys.
3. To train personnel on naval duties.
4. To perform such other duties as may be directed by the council of ministers from time to time.22
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By 2004, the N.N. had been further charged in close conjunction with the N.A.
and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) with:
1. Enforcing and assisting in co-ordinating the enforcement of all customs laws, including anti-bunkering, fishery and immigration laws of Nigeria at sea.
2. Enforcing and assisting in co-ordinating the enforcement of national and international maritime laws ascribed or acceded to by Nigeria.
3. Making of charts and co-ordinating of all national hydro-graphic surveys, and
4. Promoting, co-ordinating and enforcing safety regulations in the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria.23
The Navy had its headquarters in Lagos and was organized in three commands:
the Western Naval Command, the Flotilla Command, and the Eastern Naval Command. These developments have remained the same till date. The Western Naval Command has its base in Apapa, Lagos, and its area of responsibility stretches from the borders with the Republic of Benin up to the Niger Delta. The Eastern Naval command is at Calabar with its responsibilities stretching from the Brass River entrance in the Niger-Delta to Nigeria's boundary with the Republic of Cameroon (or inland along the Cross River, near the Bakassi Peninsula).24
The Flotilla Command also has its base in Apapa, Lagos. It has no territorial boundaries as exist in the other two commands. Interestingly, its responsibilities are large as it takes full responsibility for the operational control and deployment of all the warships at the Navy's disposal and conducts patrols, search and rescue, peace and wartime operations.25
Finally, the idea to establish the Nigerian Air Force took concrete form as a result of inconveniences and difficulties Nigeria encountered when she was called upon to participate in two foreign military peace keeping missions (1960 in the Congo and 1964 in Tanganyika).26 Nigeria found herself in the embarrassing situation of having her troops and equipment airlifted by foreign air forces. But by the time the Nigerian Air Force was formed in 1964 by an Act of parliament, Nigeria's rising position in the international order made Nigeria accelerate the development of her air force. In line with this aim, the Federal Government of Nigeria went into contractual agreement with the West German Government on April 19, 1963 to 'establish, equip, train and nurture the young air force'.27 The German Air Force Assistance Group (GAFAG) was assigned this responsibility.28 The Nigerian Air Force Act designated various roles for the NAF:1. To achieve a full complement of the military defence system of the Federal Republic of Nigeria both in the air and on the ground too.
2. Ensure fast and versatile mobility of the armed forces.
3. To provide close support for the ground based and sea born forces in all phases of operations to ensure the territorial integrity of a united Nigeria.
4. To give the country the deserved prestige invaluable on international matters.29
The NAF was further charged with:
1. Enforcing and assisting in co-ordinating the enforcement of international conventions, practices and customs ascribed or acceded to by Nigeria relating to aerial or space activities in the Nigerian air space.
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2. Co-ordinating and enforcing of national and international air laws acceded or ascribed to by Nigeria.
3. De-lineating, demarcating and co-ordinating of all aerial surveys and security zones of the Nigerian air space.30
By 1999, the Nigerian Air Force consisted of a service Head-quarters, and three formations. The service Headquarters was located at the then Defence Headquarters in Lagos before being moved to the Force Headquarters in Abuja in 2000.31 The service's Headquarters has four Branches, and a Camp which oversees personnel welfare. There are three Commands: the Tactical Air Command (TAC), which is the fighting formation of the air force located at Makurdi; Training Command (T.C.) Located at Kaduna and the Logistics Command (L.C.) located at Lagos.32
However, Nigeria's military capabilities were also subject to several systemic constraints. Economic difficulties, corruption and budgetary limitations slowed the pace of military modernization, delayed new equipment procurements, hindered defence industrial growth, reduced training, and magnified logistical and maintenance deficiencies.34 The diversified equipment of foreign origin precluded standardization and compounded logistics and maintenance difficulties. Indeed, before the close of the 1980s, it was estimated that, at any given time, only one-third of Nigeria's major systems was operational while another third could be made operational within few weeks and the remainder was indefinitely unserviceable.35 Ironically, this was very typical during Nigeria's military era which saw the top military administrations become politicized, engrossed in government business, and preoccupied with internal security at the expense of professional military development.
Impact of International Sanctions on the Armed Forces, 1993-1999
Between 1993 and 1999 Nigeria passed through two different types of government. By 1993 the country was under military dictatorship which started in 1983. This tyranny was replaced in 1999 by a civilian government. In other words, as from the early 1990's the pace of manpower development started to drop drastically thereby undermining force capabilities. This followed the gradual isolation of Nigeria from the Western World over the aborted transition programme and subsequent annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections held in the country. These elections deserve more than a casual mention. Nigeria had been continuously under military rule between 1966 and 1979. In the latter year, the military, to the joy of Nigerians and the international community, returned the country to civil rule. It wrested power again from the civilians in 1983. Between 1985 and 1993 General Ibrahim Babangida fooled the country and the West with fake transition to civil rule programmes.
But his annulment of a keenly contested, free and fair presidential election in 1993 was the climax of political deception in his eight-year rule. This threw the country into confusion and placed him on a collision course with the West and the Commonwealth of Nations. Both had patiently looked forward to working with a democratically elected government in Nigeria. They clamped down on Nigeria with punitive sanctions. Thus Nigeria's development was bound to be affected adversely
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especially since Nigeria had benefited previously from several Commonwealth states in the areas of economic and technical assistance. Though Nigeria flirted with non- Western countries, these were in no position to provide the needs of the Armed Forces the way the West had traditionally done.
Basically, since 1993 training and other facilities hitherto enjoyed by officer cadets of the Nigerian Military were suspended and those undergoing training in the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (R.M.A.) in Surry England were returned to Nigeria.36 Nigeria therefore lost all benefits available in training with officer cadets from other nations in the R.M.A. The immediate effect of this on the Nigeria Armed Forces was the loss of a wider platform for comparing officer cadets training. The gates of the British Military College in Kimberly and Greenwich respectively and the Royal College of Defence Studies were shut to officers of the Nigerian Armed Forces between 1993 and 1998.37 Here again, the Nigeria Military lost all avenues for assessment and comparison of knowledge with senior officers of Britain's armed forces. The British Government withdraw British Military instructors and advisers from the National War College in Lagos, halted all defence related assistance programmes, and imposed visa restrictions on senior government personnel and military officers.38 In July 1993, the United States terminated all military assistance and training to Nigeria and the European Union member States imposed visa restrictions on members of the Nigerian Military and Security Forces and their families.39 A number of sanctions were imposed by the Commonwealth to cover visa restrictions, withdrawal of military attaches and a possible freeze of monetary assets of the regime.40
Although Babangida was compelled to relinquish power, matters did not improve for Nigeria's military. General Sani Abacha, his Minister of Defence, did not only sweep away the Interim National Government (I.NG.) which took over from Babangida but mounted an unparalleled dictatorship. Under the Abacha regime with its very poor human rights records, things got worse. In fact, never in the history of Nigeria has the country witnessed more isolation than during the Abacha years. And of course, it was the military itself that was mostly despised by the West. Immediately following the hanging in 1995 of Ken Saro Wiwa, an environmental activist from Ogoniland and eight other Ogoni citizens, the United States in November of 1995, broadened existing restrictions on military links on the issue of visas to senior military officers and their families to cover all military officers who actively formulated, implemented or benefited from policies that impeded Nigeria's transition to democracy.41
Also, the European Union member States agreed to impose visa restrictions on members of the Nigerian Provisional Ruling Council (P.R.C.) and the Federal Executive Council, other members of the military and their families. The E.U. thus agreed to expel all military personnel attached to the diplomatic missions of Nigeria in member states and to withdraw all military personnel attached to the diplomatic missions of E.U. members in Nigeria.42 Even members of the Nigerian Armed Forces (including Abacha himself) that required medical evacuation to Europe and the U.S. for further management were not allowed to enjoy this privilege. Such treatments though received in Egypt were mere substitutes.43 The over-all impact of all that has been said so far is that professionalism and opportunities available for overseas training for officers in the Armed Forces were affected thus undermining force capabilities.
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Some African countries still maintained close relations with Abacha's regime.
For example, Nigeria and Ethiopia signed cooperation agreements in October 1996, and a high level delegation of the Nigerian military officers travelled to Namibia in March 1997 for a one week familiarization visit.44 Also, Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qaddafi of Libya visited Nigeria in May 1997, and was awarded with a Nigeria's prestigious Grand Commander of the Federal Republic (G.C.F.R.), the country's highest national honour (much to the annoyance of the U.S. government which had its own problems with Libya).45 All these embargoes remained in place but were relaxed during the regime of Abdulsalami Abubakar, Abacha's Successor.
The fact was that sanctions seemed to have had serious implication in the area of procurement of military hardware because these were not manufactured locally. It was this implication that compelled Abacha to send some of his top Generals headed by Major General Abdusalami Abubakar, the then Chief of Defence Staff to China, Iran, Turkey and North Korea in August 1997 to explore possibilities of military cooperation and arms deals.46 The impact of these developments can be felt. First of all it is important to note that this shift did not really resolve the problem as these 'new friends' were not as technological developed in the manufacture of military hardware as Nigeria's traditional friends. In consequence, the Nigerian military therefore procured some low quality military equipment. Vehicles were produced with metals, iron and components of low quality. They were sluggish in mobility, unnecessary large of relatively small lift capacity and costly to maintain. There were complaints that some of the vehicles (e.g.
TATA of India) were not strong enough to withstand the roughness of Nigerian roads.47 The truth is that the Nigerian Military procured these equipments to call off the bluff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member States. But the decision of the regime to move East, in effect only made matters worse as it had the practical effect of further hardening the U.S., E.U. and other Western positions on Nigeria. This development therefore led to the further starving of the Nigerian Armed Forces of weapons and other military supplies. For example the U.S. broadened pre- existing restrictions in military links by banning the sale and repairs of military goods.
However, the death of Abacha in June 1998 aborted the signing of any defence proposal with North Korea and other Asian countries. Similarly, even the Abdulsalami Abubakar administration which came in 1998 did not achieve much in relation to the country's defence build up, for a number of reasons, the main one being that the administration was primarily concerned about normalizing relations with Nigeria's traditional friends and assuring the international community of Nigeria's resolve to return to democratic rule. However, there was a continued denial of visas to the personnel of the Nigerian Armed Forces meaning that they were being continually cut off from critical new developments in the world, contributing to the further decay of 'professionalism'.
With the return to democratic rule, Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo came out of her pariah status and was reintegrated in the international system. The two periods impacted differently on the Nigerian Armed Forces. On the one hand there was stagnation and decadence; on the other hand reform and transformation followed. The return of democracy to Nigeria on May 29, 1999 improved the country's image abroad and allowed the country to take a more productive role regionally and on the global stage. Hence, a stage by stage lifting of the sanctions had been set in motion. The Armed Forces once again became a major beneficiary of international aid and assistance. In this
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area Obasanjo at various times throughout his stay in power stressed that great emphasis was being placed on four cardinal areas which include; rationalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces, re-equipping the services and enhancing the welfare of officers and men, re-orienting the Armed Forces towards a proper appreciation of its relationship with the civil authority and its obligation to provide support to that authority on the terms outlined in the nations constitution and lastly, building, rehabilitating and strengthening the bonds of co-operation between the Nigerian Armed Forces and those of other countries around the world.48
Nigeria also participated with five other African Countries in the U.S. West African training programme in November 1999 along Ghana's coast, allowing Nigerian Naval officers to take part in various training exercises.49 U.S. President Clinton agreed to commit foreign assistance to re-professionalize the Nigerian Army in 1999, including the equipping and training of seven battalions at a cost of over 1 Billion dollars. Consequently, several hundred U.S. Special Forces troops had begun training and equipping five battalions for peacekeeping work in Sierra-Leone.50
Conclusion
In conclusion, Nigeria inherited a small military force from the British colonialist which had developed over the years from an amalgamation of relatively small constabularies. The country participated in internal and external peace-keeping operations. Since independence the Nigerian military had undergone tremendous growth as from the commencement of the country's civil war in 1967. By 1990, the Nigerian Armed Forces had grown in terms of manpower development, which includes training within and outside the country, development of indigenous training institutions, acquisition of modern and sophisticated war machines, etc; these developments depended on appropriate policy decisions, that is, harmonious relations with the West. Although the Nigerian Armed Forces suffered a period of decline in manpower development and equipment following the imposition of international sanctions by the Western powers, normalcy was however returned following the return of the country to democratic rule since 1999.
Endnotes
1. Ukpabi, Ukpabi Sam, 'The Evolution of the Nigerian Army under Colonial Rule', in W. T. Gbor (ed.), Military History, Nigeria from Pre- Colonial Era to the Present, Lagos, Longman Nigeria, 2004, pp. 115-116.
2. Joel Dada, The Federal Armed Forces in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Jos:
Midland Press, 2000, p. 56.
3. Ukpabi, “The Evolution of the Nigerian Army… ”, p. 115.
4. Ibid., pp. 127-129.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. M. I. Wushishi, “The Nigerian Army-Growth and Development of Combat Readiness”, in T.A. Imobighe (ed.), Nigerian Defence and Security: Issues and Options for Policy, Kuru, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1987, p. 53.
8. N. J. Miners, Nigerian Army, 1956-1966, London, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.
110.
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9. John W. T. Gbor, “The Development of the Nigerian Armed Forces since Independence”, in W.T. Gbor (ed.), Military History…, pp. 157-197.
10. Ibid., p. 161.
11. Ibid., pp. 163-164.
12. The Nigerian Army Magazine, Vol. 1, N0. 2, Lagos, 1965, p. 3.
13. Kamilu Fage, “Nigeria's Defence Policy and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century”, Defence Studies, Vol. 9, July 1991, p. 6.
14. A. Assenoh and Yvette Assenoh, African Military History and Politics, New York:
PALGRAVE, 2001, p. 3.
15. Wushishi, “The Nigerian Army… ”, p. 57.
16. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Lagos, Federal Government Press, Section 217, sub-section 2.
17. 'Nigeria Armed Forces Personnel', forces- accessed July 8, 2015.
www.indexmundi.com/facts/nigeria/armed-
18. T. A. Imobighe, “The Nigerian Navy-Evolution and Modernization”, in Imobighe (ed.), Nigerian Defence and Security…, pp. 72-73.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Nigerian Navy Act 1956.
23. 2004 Nigerian Armed Forces Decree No. 105.
24. Gbor, “The Development of the Nigerian Armed Forces… ”, p. 178.
25.'Nigeria National Security Issues and Perspectives, http//www.photious.com/
countries/nigeria/nationalsecurity/nigeria_nationa- security, accessed on 24 August, 2007.
26. Gbor, “The Development of the Nigerian Armed Forces… ”, p. 178.
27. Ibid., p. 179.
28. Ibid.
29. Nigerian Air Force Act 1964.
30. 2004 Nigerian Armed Forces Decree No. 105.
31. Gbor, “The Development of the Nigerian Armed Forces… ”, p. 181.
32. Ibid.
33. 'Nigeria National Security Issues...’
3 4 . ' N i g e r i a M i l i t a r y C a p a b i l i t i e s ' , h t t p : / / i c w e b 2 . l o c . g o v / c g i - bin/query/r?frd/estdy:@field(DOCID+ngo147), accessed on 11 March, 2007.
35. Ibid., accessed on 31 October, 2008.
36. G. O. Olusanya, “Nigeria and the Commonwealth”, Africa Quarterly, Vol.1, No.
4, January-March 1998, p. 303.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Sunday Vanguard, 30 November 1997, p. 26.
40. Ibid., pp. 26-30.
41. Sunday Vanguard, 30 November 1997, p. 26.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. ThisDay, January 9, 2000, p. 5.
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45. Major Shagaya M., Motor Transport Officer, Motor Transport Yard, N.D.A., interviewed September 24, 2008, Kaduna.
46. Soja, January-March 2000, p. 5.
47. Defence Newsletter, Vol. 1, N0. 1, October-December 1999, p. 1.
48. Daily Independent, March 28, 2003.
49. Ibi
Vol. 3 No. 1. July-December 2019 Pages 41 - 50 ISSN: 2476 – 8049 Website: www.npaw-jhss.com.ng
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