• No results found

EXPERT EVIDENCE REPORT

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2022

Share "EXPERT EVIDENCE REPORT"

Copied!
5
0
0

Loading.... (view fulltext now)

Full text

(1)

Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.30 Magistrates Courts Act 1980, s.5E

Criminal Procedure Rules (2014), r.33.3(3) & 33.4

EXPERT EVIDENCE REPORT

NOTE: only this side of the paper to be used and a continuation sheet to be used if necessary. All sheets and paragraphs to be consecutively numbered. If Reports are to be typed please use double spacing.

Report of : Dr. Nick Ritchie (name of expert)

Contact Address : Department of Politics

University of York Heslington

York YO10 5DD Phone: (01904) 324104 [email protected]

Qualifications :

Obtained his PhD at the University of Bradford

thesis examined the evolution of US nuclear weapons policy from 1990-2004.

Was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

Relevant experience and accreditation :

Worked for six years as a researcher at the Oxford Research Group on global security issues, in particular nuclear proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

Was a lead researcher on the Nuclear-armed Britain programme.

Executive Committee member, British Pugwash Group

(2)

2 Report

1. I have been provided with the materials forwarded to me by the prospective

Prosecutor in this instance. Insofar as I have read and digested those

materials, I am given to understand that, the prosecution posture and “theory of case” is, at least in large part, dependent upon the following political and strategic propositions with respect to the current Conservative administration’s policies concerning the continuity of the Trident ballistic missile nuclear

weapon system and especially indeed regarding its intentions for a so-called

“like-for-like” replacement of this system.

Namely, that :

a) A principal component of the government’s rationale for replacing the current Trident system beginning with the procurement of a new fleet of

‘Successor’ ballistic missile submarines is to maintain the current continuous at sea deterrent system (CASD) operational posture. This enables the UK to deliver a major nuclear strike at relatively short-notice against the command and control

structure & systems of any would-be nuclear capable aggressor ;

b) most especially since the political hardening of UK-Russian diplomatic and international relations following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent active involvement of Russian military forces in the disputed civil war in Eastern Ukraine (‘Donbass’ region), in reality, the primary, if not only, potential nuclear capable aggressor for the UK and NATO remains Russia ;

c) the ability to strike at both the political and military command and control capacity of the Russian state, that which was formerly

diplomatically termed by a senior Government official in the Cold War era as the ability to ““hold at risk key centres of Soviet state power”, in

practice, translates to a nuclear strike on certain strategic targets in and around the capital city of Moscow.

(3)

d) Such an attack or strike is consistent with the scenario as set out in the prosecution theory of case I have been shown. This reflects statements from the Liberal Democrats as part of the previous coalition government that targeting Moscow remains a core rationale for replacing the Trident SLBM nuclear weapons delivery system evidenced in, for example, former Lib-Dem MP Sir Menzies Campbell MP in his Financial Times article “Time to abandon the'Moscow Criterion” (17th May 2012), and more especially the then Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg’s MP speech to Lib-Dem Party Conference (29 October 2012), regarding the

continuation of “the ability to flatten Moscow”.

e) Finally, I have been shown the materials upon which this prospective Prosecutor proposes to rely and drawn from the formal review of

alternatives to the “like-for-like” Trident replacement by the UK Cabinet Office (titled “HMG:Trident Alternatives Review :16 July 2013 ), and further as drawn from the written evidence subsequently submitted in 2013 by the Ministry of Defence to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee enquiry titled “Deterrence in the twenty-first Century”1 and from which this prospective Prosecutor proposes to establish that :the UK does not possess nuclear weapons as part of the military inventory, that they have no function as war-fighting weapons, or to achieve military objectives; but rather the UK views its nuclear weapons as political not military or war fighting weapons.

2. I am now very happy to state that, having seen the evidence upon which this

Prosecutor proposes to base these essentially political contentions and strategic propositions, and having accordingly analyzed this rationale, I find them and it to be entirely credible and consistent, and indeed in general keeping with my own assessment of the UK Government’s political and strategic stance in these matters.

(4)

4

3. To be very clear I do not myself find this rationale to be persuasive. Such a

rationale for nuclearised UK security grossly overestimates the apparent certainties of nuclear deterrent threats, the asserted necessity of the capacity to articulate such threats in an era of complex globalisation, and the dangers of perpetuating a dangerous, risk-prone global security system based on the threat of massive nuclear violence. It reflects a UK nuclear culture or system of thought that eulogises about nuclear weapons as a ‘guarantee’ of security to the extent that it has descended into political dogma. I have argued for serious consideration of alternative force postures to the so-called “like-for- like” replacement as an interim step ‘down the nuclear ladder’ that reduce the salience of UK nuclear weapons and nuclear risk (see for instance my 2013 paper titled “Trident Tribulations: Understanding the UK’s Trident Alternatives Review” available to download at :

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_10/Trident-Tribulations-Understanding- the-UKs-Trident-Alternatives-Review)

List of any Materials referred to and exhibited hereto.

N/A

Details of any other Literature, Publications and other Material relied upon.

(1) “Trident Tribulations: Understanding the UK’s Trident Alternatives Review”

Statement of facts supplied.

N/A

Statement as to facts within knowledge All other facts

Statement regarding any examination, measurement, test or experiment done and relied upon.

N/A

(5)

References

Related documents

This document introduces the key software elements of Sophos Endpoint Security and Data Protection: management console, anti-virus, client firewall, data control, device

Speakers at the final seminar on Australia Strategic and Defence Issues were Paul Dibb (‘The Defence of Australia: the history of an idea’), Mark Thomson (‘The challenge of

Simon White, Bill Manager, Renting Homes, Welsh Government Chair: Julie Nicholas, Policy and Public Affairs Manager, CIH Cymru. Sytner BMW

Consistent with previous findings, it is expected that goal-setting and self- management training (with goal-setting components) will have different effects on the maintenance

• Organized quarterly obesity seminar series (Childhood Obesity Research Group at ICH/GOS/UCL) with Professor Tim Cole across Institute of Child Health, University College London,

Abstract: Drawing upon a sample of 460 individuals in committed romantic relationships, this study explored a key proposition of Self-Determination Theory: highly autonomous

One student said she didn’t receive support from her college when she was applying for university, it took her a long time to understand how to apply, and she approached one

Our results were summarized as below: (1) total and peak TG levels in plasma increased following strenuous exercise and remained unchanged following moderate exercise;