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(1)Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations. Thesis Collection. 2000-06. What should the role of the National Guard be in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hokanson, Daniel R. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7834.

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(3) MONTEREY CA 93M3-5101.

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(6) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California. THESIS WHAT SHOULD THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BE IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. by Daniel R. Hokanson. June 2000 Thesis Advisor:. Paul N. Stockton. Second Reader:. Jon Czarnecki. Approved for public. release; distribution. is. unlimited..

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(8) Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0 J 88. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Public reporting burden for this collection of information. is. estimated to average. 1. hour per response, including the time. for. reviewing. and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions. instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering. information. Send. comments regarding. this. Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. for reducing this burden, to. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank). I.. 2.. REPORT DATE June 2000. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED. 3.. Master's Thesis. TITLE AND SUBTITLE What Should the Role of the National Guard be in the Joint Chiefs. FUNDING NUMBERS. 5.. of Staff. AUTHOR(S) Hokanson, Daniel R.. 6.. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. 8.. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). 7.. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9.. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). 10.. N/A SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views official policy or position. expressed in. this thesis are. those of the author and do not reflect the. of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. 12a.. Approved. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER. 12b.. DISTRIBUTION CODE. for public release; distribution is unlimited.. 13.. ABSTRACT. The. role. of the National Guard has evolved from a strategic reserve force during the Cold. part of today's Total Force. in the joint environment, a. War. to. an integral. The new roles and missions of the National Guard require it to operate seamlessly role that was traditionally covered by its active counterparts. With this evolution,. the National Guard's role in the Joint Chiefs of Staff must increase to insure. represented and planned for in joint operations. This thesis reviews the. new. roles. its. forces are accurately. and missions of the National. Guard, as identified in the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, and the directorates within the Joint Staff that will influence them. integration are then identified. The and. Guard recommendation of current and proposed. specific areas within each directorate that influence National. prioritized.. The. result is a. positions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in priority order due to anticipated resource constraints, that best. support integration of the National Guard into joint operations. The thesis concludes with specific recommendations on the selection and management of the National Guard personnel assigned to Joint Staff positions. 14.. SUBJECT TERMS National Guard Bureau, Air National Guard, Army National. Guard, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study,. 15.. NUMBER OF. PAGES. 74. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986. 16.. PRICE CODE. LIMITATION. 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF. 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS. 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. 20.. REPORT. PAGE. OF ABSTRACT. UL. Unclassified. Unclassified. Unclassified. NSN. 7540-01-280-5500. OF ABSTRACT. Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by. ANSI. Std. 239-18.

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(10) Approved. for public release; distribution. is. unlimited. WHAT SHOULD THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BE IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Daniel R. Hokanson. Major, Oregon. Army National Guard. B.S., United States Military. Submitted in. Academy, 1986. partial fulfillment. of the. requirements for the degree of. MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS from the. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2000.

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(12) OOL. ABSTRACT. The Cold War has ended and strategic reserve force to. an integral part of today's Total Force.. representation in the joint environment. mission and could present risk the National Guard.. if. The new. it is. roles. however. The National Guard's. representative of. is still. not updated to reflect the. new. its. Cold War. roles and missions of. and missions of the National Guard require. operate seamlessly in the joint environment, a role that. active counterparts.. Guard has evolved from a. the role of the National. was. traditionally covered. it. to. by. its. This evolution in roles and missions requires the National Guard's. role in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase to accurately represent. involvement in joint operations.. This thesis reviews the. National Guard, as identified in the Reserve. new. roles. and plan for Guard and missions of the. Component Employment 2005. the directorates within the Joint Staff that directly influence them.. Study, and. Specific areas within. each directorate that influence National Guard integration are identified and then prioritized.. The. result is a. recommendation of current and proposed positions within the. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in priority order. due. to anticipated resource constraints, that will. best support seamless integration of the National. Guard. into joint operations.. The. thesis. concludes with specific recommendations on the selection and management of National. Guard personnel assigned. to Joint Staff positions..

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(14) TABLE OF CONTENTS. I.. INTRODUCTION THE ISSUES AT STAKE A. B. C.. II.. 1 1. METHODOLOGY SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS. THESIS. 6 7. THE RISE OF JOINT DECISION MAKING INSTITUTIONS JCS STRUCTURE. 11. A.. 12. SUMMARY THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RCE 2005 A. POST COLD- WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS B.. III.. B. IV.. 13 15. 16. 1.. Homeland Defense. 16. 2.. Smaller Scale Contingencies. 17. 3.. Shaping the International Environment. 17. 4.. Major Theater Wars. 18. SUMMARY. 20. RECOMMENDATIONS A.. IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUE AREAS 1. 2.. 3.. 22. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS) a.. Assistant. to. the. CJCS. for. National. Guard. 22. Matters. (ACJCS/NG). 22. b.. Legislative Assistant Office. 24. c.. Public Affairs Office. JCS Boards, Councils and Committees a. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) The Joint Staff. 25. 25 25. 27. a.. J-l. 27. b.. J-2. 28. c.. J-3. 29. d.. J-4. 35. e.. J-5. 36. f.. J-6. 39. g.. J-7. 42. h.. J-8. 46. i.. DOM. j.. B.. 21. 48. Existing Positions. SUMMARY. Not Already Addressed. 49 52. vn.

(15) V.. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS 54 THE NEED FOR A LARGER ROLE ON THE JOINT CHIEFS OF A. STAFF. 54 55. C.. THE RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS. D.. SUMMARY. 56. B.. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST. 56. 58. Vlll.

(16) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The world has changed. drastically since the collapse of the Berlin Wall; yet. National Guard involvement in joint decision making remains largely stuck in the past.. The lack of National Guard in joint operations. current National. representation in the joint environment creates potential risk. where National Guard forces are involved.. This thesis reviews the. Guard representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommends 30. positions as necessary to insure the. The recommendations. Guard. better integrated into the joint environment.. is. are prioritized to account for potential resourcing issues. when. filling the positions.. During the Cold War, the National Guard did not require significant Joint Staff. was. representation because the Guard's primary mission. and joint decisionmaking played only a minor role operational issues.. to serve as a strategic reserve. in defense planning,. budgeting and. Only with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of. Defense Reorganization Act of. in. 1986 did the. As. contributor to defense policymaking.. Joint Staff begin to. emerge as a key. a result, both the Guard's and the Joint Chiefs. of Staff roles have changed dramatically.. The National Guard now than. environment.. Guard. War and must now. did during the Cold. it. —. to. be. Joint Vision. carries far greater responsibilities for National. operate. 2010 requires every component. .fully integrated into. Defense. seamlessly in the joint. —. including the National. the joint environment as part of Joint Vision 201 0's. Full-Spectrum Force. Joint institutions. and coordination. have made. for the Active. terrific. progress in facilitating joint decisionmaking. Component (AC), however;. very limited partner in the process.. Little. growth has occurred. representation in the Joint Staff, even as National. expanded.. Raw. statistics. make. the National. Guard. roles. this under-representation evident.. IX. Guard remains a. in National. Guard. and missions have Today, the National.

(17) Guard makes up 21 percent of the U.S. military but. than two percent of the Joint. is less. Chiefs of Staff. Yet, these raw statistics understate the degree to which the Reserve lacks adequate representation. in the. What. is. important. is. Component. not just the percentage of the forces. Reserve Component (RC), but their new responsibilities for national defense. With. overseas military operations proliferating and the armed services having shrunk by a third since the Cold. War, the Pentagon has been forced. to rely. more heavily on. Reserves to conduct such operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. likely to persist. In addition to overseas requirements, the. roles. and missions. in the areas. Guard. is. the. Guard and. That reliance. also fulfilling. is. new. of Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies,. Shaping the International Environment and Major Theater Wars.. What. is at. risk if the National. joint decisionmaking?. components. until. it is. Guard continues. to. be excluded from key aspects of. The National Guard cannot operate seamlessly with fully integrated into the Joint Chiefs. of. Staff.. the other. Anything short of. integration in the joint arena could create unnecessary risk in joint operations. full. involving National Guard forces. The unnecessary risk could develop from any aspect of. National Guard employment where joint planning or joint decisions are. thorough understanding of the National Guard.. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study the. AC. ability. with. RC. made without. This concern was emphasized by the. (RCE 2005) which. said unfamiliarity within. missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the. of the Department of Defense. to use the. RC. most. effectively.. The Guard needs. adequate representation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce potential risk in roles. a. and missions.. its. new.

(18) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. I. would. like to thank the following persons for their time in. providing expertise, and directing. research:. MG. me. to resources directly associated with. Michael W. Davidson, Maj. Mary Jo Patierno,. Thomas. answering questions,. R. Brown, Col. Qnapik, Col.. Thomas. LTC. my. thesis. Marie Barboza,. LT. E. Matthews, LtCol.. Hans. Naomi Manadier,. MAJ. Michael W. Bowers, Maj. Martha Aubey, Col. Roy Pansey, Col. Edward Daily,. LTC. Persson, Col.. Meinhardt, Col. Jeffery B. Harrison, Col.. Bruce Bowman, Professor. Professor. LTC. Peter Davidson, Col.. Mark. Donna K. Dougherty,. Thomas Bruneau, Professor James Dana Eyre. for. Jefferson, Col.. Professor Mitch Brown,. Wirtz, Professor Jeanne Giraldo, and. your patience and expertise.. I. would. also like to personally. thank Professor Paul Stockton for his help and guidance throughout the thesis process.. XI.

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(20) INTRODUCTION. I.. With. the end of the. in the Joint Chiefs. roles. and missions. Cold War, the requirements. for National. Guard representation. of Staff have grown sharply. The National Guard has been assigned far. beyond those. played in the past. At the same time, the need for. it. jointness in planning, resourcing and executing these missions has grown, particularly as the National. Guard and the active component work together. to strengthen Total. Integration.. The. key arena. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provides the. Force. for such joint. decisionmaking. Yet, National Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other key organizations has changed remarkably in. Guard. little. JCS. since the Cold War, despite the dramatic shift. responsibilities.. This thesis identifies specific shortfalls in National Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other Joint organizations,. and recommends changes. that. would have. greatest potential payoff for improving decisionmaking in Guard-related missions. thesis begins. defense.. by analyzing the. crucial role that jointness. Next, the thesis assesses the. new. now. the. The. plays in the national. roles and missions assigned to the National. Guard, which increase the need for Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other joint institutions.. The. institutions,. and provides a prioritized. thesis then analyzes current National set. Guard representation. in these joint. of recommendations to strengthen Guard. participation in joint decisionmaking.. A.. THE ISSUES AT STAKE Considerable attention has focused recently on the question of whether to grant. the Chief, rank.. NGB. a full seat. This thesis focuses on a. to adjust National. roles. on the. Chefs of Staff and promote the Chief to 4. Joint. much. less visible but. Guard representation. star. extremely significant issue: the need. in the Joint Staff to. match recent. shifts in. Guard. and missions.. During the Cold War, the National Guard did not require significant Joint Staff representation for. two reasons.. First, the. primary mission for the Guard was to serve as a. 1.

(21) and that mission did not appear. strategic reserve,. participation. in joint. decisionmaking.. decisionmaking played only a minor role. Only with. issues.. at. the time to. much of. Second, for in. demand the. extensive Guard. Cold War,. joint. defense planning, budgeting and operational. the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols. Department of Defense. Reorganization Act of in 1986 did the Joint Staff begin to emerge as a key contributor to defense policymaking. Staff because. it. was. Guard could. Prior to that legislation, the. little. more than. safely ignore the Joint. a rubber stamp for decisions already. made by. the. services.. Both. factors. have now changed dramatically.. greater responsibilities for National Defense than. The National Guard. did during the Cold War.. it. carries far. As noted. in. The 1998 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress, "today, Reserve Component forces are fully integrated into. war. all. operation can be successful without their participation.". —. every component. including the National Guard. —. to. plans, and. 1. be. This participation requires fully integrated into the joint. environment as part of Joint Vision 2010 's Full-Spectrum Force. General Shalikashvily operations. states,. we must be. technically.". no major military. In Joint Vision 2010,. "to achieve this integration while conducting military. fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually,. and. 2. Joint institutions have. made. terrific. progress in facilitating joint decisionmaking. and coordination for the Active Component (AC).. In important respects, however, the. National Guard remains a very limited partner in that process. In conducting the research for this thesis,. I. was. struck. by how. little. growth has occurred in National Guard. representation in the Joint Staff, even as National. expanded.. 1. Raw. statistics. Cohen, William. S.. make. Guard. this under-representation evident.. The Annual Report. to the President. and missions have. roles. Today, 38 percent of. and Congress (1998): Available [Online]:. <www.dtic.mil/execsec/ adr98/chap9.html>. [25 January 00]. 2. Shalikashvily, John. M.. Joint Vision 2010. Washington, D.C.:. The. Joint Chiefs. of Staff, 1997..

(22) U.S. military forces is. only six percent.. but. is less. come from. the Reserve. Component,. yet. its. The National Guard alone makes up 21 percent of the U.S.. military. than two percent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. Yet, these raw statistics understate the degree to which the Reserve lacks adequate representation. in the. on the JCS. representation. What. Reserve Component (RC), but. is. important. new. their. is. Component. not just the percentage of the forces. responsibilities for national defense.. With. overseas military operations proliferating and the armed services having shrunk by a third since the. Cold War, the Pentagon has been forced. to rely. more heavily on. Reserves to conduct such operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. likely to persist.. A. recent Pentagon study predicted the. deployments to remain high over the next 15 requirements, the Guard. is. also fulfilling. new. to. 20. demand. years.. 3. for. The creation of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction. Defense. (NMD). Guard. being tasked.. is. is. is. Guard and Reserve. Homeland Defense.. (WMD). Teams, the. fielding of a National Missile. also deeply involved in the area of Strategic Shaping.. Programs such as the State Partnership. for. Peace (SPP) Program, International Disaster. and ongoing Peacekeeping Operations. All of these. That reliance. system are just a few of the growing number of missions with which the. The National Guard. Relief,. Guard and. In addition to overseas. roles in the area of. Consequence Management (CM) mission, and potential. the. new mission. areas require. all. contribute directly to strategic shaping.. JCS coordination. to. integrated into and support the National Military Strategy.. ensure they are fully. In short, the. world has. changed drastically since the collapse of the Berlin Wall; yet National Guard involvement in joint decision. Who. making remains. cares?. What. largely stuck in the past.. is at risk if. the National. Guard continues. to. be excluded from. key aspects of joint decisionmaking? The National Guard cannot operate seamlessly with. ->. Myers, Steven L. "Reservist. 2000): Available [Online]:. New. Role Transforms the Military." The. < www.nytimes.com >.. [25 January 2000].. New. York Times (24 January.

(23) the other. components. until. it. Anything short of. JCS.. fully integrated into the. is. full. integration in the joint arena could create unnecessary risk in joint operations involving. National Guard forces.. The unnecessary. Guard employment where. risk. could develop from any aspect of National. joint planning or joint decisions are. Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE 2005) which. AC. ability. with. RC. a thorough. This concern was emphasized by the Reserve. understanding of the National Guard.. the. made without. said that "unfamiliarity within. missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the. of the Department (Department of Defense) to use the. RC. most. effectively.". 4. The. Guard needs adequate representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce potential in the. new. roles. and missions of Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies. (SSCs), Shaping the International Environment and Major Theater ensuring. its. first. and missions associated with Homeland Defense, potential. from a number of. state, the. Wars (MTWs), by. forces are fully integrated into joint operations.. In the roles arise. risk. factors.. First, in the. risk. can. event of a disaster or consequence within a. National Guard needs to be integrated into. all. JCS planning. as the. most. likely. Second, the National Guard has fielded Weapons of Mass Destruction. responder.. (WMD) Teams. throughout the U.S., which are trained in. Management (CM). These teams need leverage their specialized training.. to. WMD. and Consequence. be incorporated into JCS planning to. Finally, all. Homeland Defense missions. utilize. and. will require. coordination between the services and other government and non-government agencies.. The. current lack of. portion of the. Guard. joint integration in these areas. Dynamic Commitment. exercise,. Defense Review (QDR). In the vignettes for. Guard was minimal, yet. 4. in reality. it. this. which. is. was evident. part of the. would play a major role. < ww.defenselink.mil/'pubs/'rces2005 072299. 2001 Quadrennial. QDR resourcing exercise the role of the in. many of the. Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study. [Online]:. in the planning. (2. vignettes.. August 1999): Available. .html >. [28 January 2000]..

(24) of Smaller Scale Contingencies, potential risk could arise from not. In the area. Guard. fully integrating the. into. SSC. One recommendation from RCE 2005. planning.. envisions the Guard providing a brigade size Task Force in a Bosnia type scenario.. In. such a scenario, the Guard must be fully integrated into the development of the brigade. The Guard must be. task force to meet the scenario requirements.. deploy as a mission ready brigade task force to meet the regional. trained and ready to. Commander. The Guard currently lacks any representation. (CESfCs) requirements.. Warfighting Analysis Division of the J-8, which. is. in. in. Chiefs. the Joint. responsible to integrate the. RC. into. MTWs and SSCs. In the arena. of Shaping the International Environment, potential risk could. from the JCS not fully incorporating the actions of the National Guard under Partnership for Peace (SPP) Program.. The Guard. is. actively participating in. Program and developing a working relationship with the. The. associations and. states. its. arise. State. its. SPP. involved in the program.. working relationships could be leveraged by the JCS by integrating. the states involved with any operations involving the foreign state they are partnered with.. A. lack of integrating the. state National. Guard. Guard would confuse foreign. The Guard. unit.. states. with established. ties to. a. currently lacks any representation in the J-5, the. Directorate responsible for Strategic Plans and Policy.. The. roles. and missions associated with Major Theater War's present potential. because the JCS and current. AC. yet to mission all the National. forces face increased requirements. other requirements,. second. CINCs have. MTW,. in crisis planning. AC. AC. forces will need the. is short.. The. J-3. forces thin.. Guard. into the plans for potential scenarios. when time. Guard Divisions. The. from SSCs, peacekeeping operations, and. of which have stretched the. the smaller. must be integrated. for these areas. all. risk. to. now. In the event of a. be successful.. The Guard. to reduce the risk involved. and J-7 Directorates are largely responsible. and the recommended positions. in. each Directorate will greatly reduce the. current risk. Potential risk can also. be found. in resourcing,. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff play a. crucial role in allocating resources for the U.S. military.. 5. In order to successfully execute.

(25) their. new. roles and missions the. Guard must have. because the National Guard had so. the necessary funding.. representation in. little. DOD. In the past,. decisionmaking on. budget issues, the Guard often had to rely on Congressional intervention in order to secure essential funding.. impression. The intervention of Congress. of interservice squabbling and an. congressional oversight.. It. would be. at that level.. Internal resolution. Active Component/Reserve B.. THESIS. resolve. issues. without. DOD,. of the. so that resourcing issues can be. of resourcing will also be a significant step for. Component (AC/RC). integration.. METHODOLOGY. This thesis uses Department of Defense roles. to. inability. budgeting creates the. far preferable to strengthen the representation. National Guard in joint decisionmaking within resolved. in defense. and missions of the National Guard.. (DOD) documents. Specific. Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE 2005), the National Military Strategy. (NMS),. various joint documents to include. to identify the future. documents include the Reserve. the National Security Strategy (NSS),. the Defense Planning Guidance. manning documents and. (DPG), and. individual duty descriptions. of Joint Staff members. Dozens of interviews were also conducted with members of the National Guard Bureau, the. Army and. Air National Guard, members of the Joint Chiefs. of Staff and the Joint Staff Directorates, and key Goldwater-Nichols. DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.. written without the invaluable information. arguments and conclusions. I. staff. members involved with. the. This thesis could never have been. gained from these interviews. However, the. in this thesis are. my. own, and do not necessarily. reflect the. views of the officers and civilians interviewed. Chapter. JJ. reviews the rise of jointness and analyzes. defense policymaking. specifically. on the. The chapter. its. growing significance for. also reviews the composition of the JCS, focusing. Joint Staff. Chapter. III. uses the Reserve Component Employment 2005. Study and the National Security Strategy to examine the emerging roles and missions of the. National. Guard,. decisionmaking.. and. analyzes. the. requirements. of these missions. for. joint. These roles and missions include Homeland Defense and Information.

(26) Operations, Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs), Shaping the International Environment,. and Major Theater Wars (MTWs). Chapter IV reviews the current National Guard representation on the Joint Chiefs. of. and examines the issues surrounding. Staff,. that representation. Boards, Councils and Committees, and the Joint highlight. importance and. its. is. to. tied. on the OCJCS, JCS. Each issue area. Staff.. recommendations. specific. inadequacies identified in the existing arrangement.. Chapter. V. is. to. discussed to. improve the. addresses the practical. challenges of implementing these recommendations.. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS. C.. Although there are a place limit. there. its officers,. on. not only a limit on the resources available to. officers qualified to. my recommendations Guard. is. officers. V, Figure. The. fill. the jobs.. Because of these limitations,. on the Joint. Staff.. The. entire. are the top ten. list. of recommendations. recommendations of this. recommendation and highest. first. Joint Chiefs of Staff for National. This position. authorized and. Chairman of the. Joint Chiefs. influential position the. JCS. leadership. is. recommendation. is. currently filled.. Guard has on the JCS. The. critical. is. first,. found. in. Chapter. thesis.. it. is in. position.. the Office of the. of the. new. ACJCS/NG. roles. to access the. and missions of the. lacks any real authority.. The. but increase the responsibilities and role of. JCS Boards, Councils and Committees.. authorized and. is. is. currently. the Executive Officer to the filled.. This position. responsible to coordinate the staff actions and schedules for the this position is. is. the highest ranking and most. is. ability. this position is. position. The second recommendation position. This position. to gaining support for the. is to fill this. the position on the. have prioritized. Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG). of Staff (OCJCS) and. The concern with. National Guard.. but also a. priority is the existing Assistant to the. Chairman of the is. I. this,. so they can be used in an incremental process for fielding National. The following. 5-1.. of recommendations on where the National Guard should. lot. ranked second. is it is critical to. is. ACJCS/NG.. in the. OCJCS. ACJCS/NG. The. the effectiveness of the. ACJCS/NG. This. and. is. reason. and. if.

(27) there. were only two Guard personnel on the JCS,. this position. effectiveness of the. ACJCS/NG. The recommendation. The. is. third. recommendation. Division in the J-7.. This position. responsible for integrating the. RC. is to fill this. into the J-7,. is. which. Guard. it. is. fill. and. into joint exercises. analysis and joint doctrine to. this position third. The. fourth. This. the J-3.. The. the "deep fight" for the Guard.. is. training, conventional. which. is. recommendation. integrating the National. key. is. Guard. representation for the National. into the. Guard. is. this area is. JFCOM. in the. and. very important. The recommendation. This position. branch.. is. the JCS.. Command (JFCOM). branch of the. JFCOM. roles. plans, joint assessment and. member on. position.. new. is. responsible for integrating the. war. in the Joint Forces. recommended. This position. directly affects the. to joint interoperability.. with the most senior Guard. a new,. J-7. position second.. currently filled.. missions of the National Guard. The current representation in. because. the. critical to. Education and Training. in the Joint Doctrine,. authorized and. is. would be. J-3.. is. branch of. responsible for. There. is. The problem. currently. JFCOM. is. no is. assuming the role of Domestic Disaster Response and Consequence Management, an area the. Guard has. traditionally played a. The recommendation. events.. major role. is to fill this. in as the state's first. position fourth. responder in such. by re-assigning. National Guard position in the Joint History Office to this position and. the current. filling. it. with an. 0-6(ARNGorANG). The of the. J-7.. fifth. and sixth recommendations are. War (MTW), and. incorporated into Annexes political. Conventional. These positions are authorized and are currently. responsible for the Theater. Theater. in the. filled.. Engagement Plans (TEPs), planning insuring the. new. A (where the CINC. roles. War. Plans Division. These positions are for a. second Major. and missions of the Guard are. addresses the. RC) and T. (the inter-agency. and military planning annex) of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution. System (JOPES). These positions are. Guard and. its. critical to. reducing the risk of not incorporating the. Divisions into the operational planning for potential scenarios.. recommendation. is to fill. these positions fifth and sixth.. The.

(28) The seventh recommendation J-7.. This. is. recommended. a new,. Guard integration. into Doctrine. is in. the Joint Vision and Doctrine Division of the. position. This position will be responsible for National. Network Education and Training (DOCNET),. the Joint. Doctrine Operational Lab (JDOL), and Advanced Distributive Learning (ADL).. programs are part of the distributive training programs for joint education.. Guard representation here. the programs in the future.. assigning an 0-5. The eighth recommendation is. an authorized and currently. represent the National. because. critical. it. Guard. is critical to. The recommendation. (ARNG or ANG) to. is in. to. insure fill. it. all. services. has access to each of. by. this position seventh. the Joint Requirements Division of the J-8. This. This position. in force structure. is. responsible to integrate and. and resource analysis.. This position. mid- and long-term force structure. near-,. national security objectives, policy and strategy.. position. is. be utilized by. the position.. filled position.. recommends. that will. These. The recommendation. is. is. to. support. to. fill. this. but increase the position's responsibilities and access to the J-8. eighth,. leadership.. The ninth recommendation This. is. is in. the Information Operations Division of the J-3.. an authorized but currently vacant position.. This position. is. responsible for. providing Information Operations (IO), and Special Technical Operations (STO) support to the. JCS, SecDef and CINCs. This position. is. important because. it. provides the Guard. with an active liaison in the development of joint policy, strategy and doctrine concerning Information Operations and Information Warfare (IO/IW). The recommendation this position ninth. The. NSS, NMS, TEPs.. recommendation. tenth. recommended. and assign an 0-4. (ARNG or ANG) to this. is in. This position. position.. authorized position.. the Strategy Division of the J-5. is. currently has. is. critical. no representation. recommendation. is to fill this. This. is. a new,. responsible for integrating the Guard into the. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Planning. This position. is to fill. to the National. Document (JPD) and. Guard because the National Guard. in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.. position tenth and. Strategy Division.. 9. by assigning an 0-5 (ARNG). The. to the J-5.

(29) This thesis recommends and prioritizes a total of 30 positions on the Joint Chiefs. of Staff. The other positions (numbers 5-1.. In addition to. recommending and. would be remiss by not highlighting. recommended. the. 1 1. prioritizing the positions. in. Chapter V, Figure. on the JCS,. this thesis. the importance of finding the right individuals to. Guard positions on. the Chief, National. Guard Bureau should control the National. the Joint Staff, as well as the selection of officers to. important for three reasons.. First, representatives. National Guard works, the capabilities. Second, representatives selected to. fill. it. has,. fill. them. This. and the roles and missions. the positions. opinion of the National Guard based upon this will gain a cadre. integrate the. Guard. it. performs.. must be exceptional because they. initial. experience.. environment and the Total Force.. 10. their. Third, the National. of officers with joint staff experience that will help. into the joint. is. must be knowledgeable of how the. be working with the Active Component's future leaders and they will form. Guard. fill. positions.. The Office of. will. through 30) can be found. it. seamlessly.

(30) THE RISE OF JOINT DECISION MAKING INSTITUTIONS. II.. been slow. Joint decisionmaking has. to take root in the. The. plays a decisive role in shaping the National Defense. establish. a. formal. organization. for. The. establishment of the Joint Board.. Army and Navy and. little. Joint. charter gave. its. legal authority than. it. had. and. it. no. With. Joint. Board, but. the exception of. its. Army and Navy, which gave some guidance. World War. the. Board was not. As. World War.. Action of the II,. 1903. in. with. the the. Board was intended. actual authority.. revitalize the Joint. in 1903.. attempt by the U.S. to. occurred. The. or no impact on the conduct of the First. secretaries tried to reestablish. first. now. Board was composed of the heads of. the chief planner of each service.. plan for joint operations, but. Board had. operations. joint. United States, but. it. to. a result, the Joint. In. 1919 the Service. was given no more. 1935 publication of Joint. for the joint operations in. influential in the war. 5. In 1942, in response to the. need for coordinated staff work, a concept described by. Admiral Leahy as a "unified high command" was adopted. The group came to be known as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. in influence. to the. and became the primary agent. in coordinating. leadership, the. and giving. JCS grew. strategic direction. Army and Navy. 6 After the war, President. shifts in the security. that. Under President Roosevelt's. Truman and. officials in the. War Department. environment required an end to service autonomy.. one of the clearest lessons of World. War. II. was. argued that. Truman noted. the need for a unified direction of. U.S. land, sea and air forces. The rapid changes in warfare and technology were making. much more dependent upon each. the. "Armed. 5. "History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.". Services. < mvw.dtic.mil/iccs/core/historv js.html >. 6. "History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.". <\v\\'VN-.dtic.mil/iccs/core/'historv. The. other than ever before," hence the. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Homepage. (1999): Available [Online]:. [6 October 1999].. The. js.html >. [6. Joint Chiefs. October 1999].. 11. of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:.

(31) need for unified. command. world peace.". The National Security Act of 1947 formally. began a. '. series. "is sure to. be greater. if there is. of legislative and executive changes. any future aggression against. that. established the. JCS and. produced today's defense. organization.. The most important change was. initiated. by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of. o. Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. the. The. intent. of Goldwater-Nichols was. Department of Defense (DOD), strengthen civilian authority. to reorganize. DOD and improve. in the. the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council. (NSC) and. the. Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the Act placed clearer responsibility and authority on the. CINCs and. The. increased attention to formulating strategy and contingency planning.. Act also sought to reduce service parochialism by clearly placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. above the individual services. 9. JCS STRUCTURE. A.. The. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under. Chiefs of the four services. Staff. assists. the. is. Chairman of. composed of. the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and the. the Joint Chiefs of Staff the. Joint. Chiefs. responsibilities for the unified strategic direction. is. the Joint Staff.. of Staff in. of the combatant. The. Joint. accomplishing. his. forces; their operation. under unified command; and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces.. the. The. Joint Staff is. composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from. Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force.. about 20 percent of the number allocated to the Navy.. In practice, the 10. The. Marines make up. Joint Staff is authorized. May. 806. '. "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." Congressional Record (7. 8. "History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]:. < www.dtic.nTil/iccs/core/historv ". 1986), S 5471.. js.html >. [6 October 1999].. "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Should the General Staff be Over." (April 1997): Available [Online]: wavw.au. af.mil/aii''database /proiects/avl 997/97-. Debate. 132.pdf. .. 10. [5. "The. April 2000].. Joint Staff.". The. < wwvs-.dtic.mil/ics/core/ics. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Home Page. defn.html >. [6 October 1999].. 12. (10 December 1999): Available [Online]:.

(32) 281 enlisted personnel and 208 civilians.. officers,. of Staff. is. first. number. the second. The. is. number. is. the. number of assigned. AC. Joint Staff has. no executive authority over combatant. directs, the Joint Staff. their responsibilities. 12. The. may. Chairman of the. two numbers. in. in the directorate.. forces, and,. by. Joint Chiefs of Staff.. law,. As. its. the. JCS members. in carrying out. of Staff also play a key role. in the boards,. also assist the other. Joint Chiefs. Joint Chiefs. personnel in the directorate,. number of assigned National Guard personnel. the. direction rests exclusively with the. Chairman. The organization of the. In each directorate there are. depicted in Figure 2-1.. parenthesis, the. 11. councils and committees that directly influence the direction of effort and allocation of resources, such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).. SUMMARY. B.. The. Joint Chiefs of Staff is the premier joint decision. making organization. in the. United States. The JCS was created to ensure coordination between the military services. and. is. responsible for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces; their. operation under unified. naval and air forces.. Guard,. make. decision. 1 *. "The. it. command; and. The. responsibilities. critically. their integration into. an efficient team of land,. of the JCS, and the new role and missions of the. important the National Guard. is. an integral part of the JCS. making process.. Joint Staff Military. and Civilian Strength Report." Staff Management Branch. (J-l), Joint. Chiefs. of Staff. 31 December 1999. 12. Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (2 August 1999): Available < www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005 072299.html >. [28 January 2000].. [Online]:. 13.

(33) Office of the. Charm en,. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (73/5). Office of the Director, Joint Staff. (14/0) J-2. •J-1. Manpower and P ersonnet (33/0). Joint Staff Intelligence. (18370). J-3 Operations. Logistics. (327/1). (75/2). J-4. J-5 Strategic Plans. and Poficy. (174/1). ;Cmd, Control, CommtrtMcations and Computer Systems. (107/3) J-8. andirteroperaWBy. Force Structure, R esources and Assessment. (65/3). (120/1). OperatJona! Plans. Drectorate of Management. (109/1). Figure 2-1. .. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Active Component/National Guard). 14. |.

(34) THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RCE. III.. With. the. 2005. end of the Cold War, the role of the Reserve Components began a quiet. The National Guard's Cold War mission of containing and/or defeating the. evolution.. Soviet Union and. its allies. evolved as. it. In the past, joint operations. Total Force.. began. to. comprise a greater percentage of the. were important, but not. critical to the. Guard's missions. Today however, joint operations are an integral part of. and are. critical to. no longer a. is. strategic reserve force, but. an essential partner in. military operations from Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs) to. Guard,. 13. its. operations. achieving the Full Spectrum Dominance discussed in Joint Vision 2010.. The National Guard. (MTWs).. all. National. Although. this evolution. representation. Major Theater Wars. has changed the roles and missions of the National. on the Joint Chiefs of Staff still. reflects its. Cold War mission.. The FY2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) required alternative concepts for. employing Reserve Component (RC). forces.. The. a. study of. result. was. the. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-2005) conducted by an integrated. team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint. Staff,. Active Component (AC). and Reserve Component (RC) members. The study was conducted roles. and missions. The potential roles and missions. following three categories: (10), Smaller Scale. Homeland Defense. identified. to define potential. were consolidated. 14. into the. alternatives plus Information Operations. Contingency (SSC) alternatives, and Major Theater. alternatives plus Strategic Reserve.. RC. Another future role not identified. identified in the President's National Security Strategy,. is. in. War (MTW) RCE2005, but. Shaping the International. Environment.. ". Cohen, William. S.. The Annual Report. < w\vu'.dtic.miL'execsec/adr98/chap9.html >.. to the President. and Congress (1998): Available [Online]:. [25 January 00].. ". Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc.,1999: B-l.. 15.

(35) POST COLD-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS. A.. Homeland Defense. 1.. This alternative contains five elements. The the emerging National Missile Defense. (NMD). mission but the time frame for implementation. first is. (CONUS). 30% AC. missions (with. unknown pending. is. RC. integrated. In this case the. The. RC. normally associated with the AC. The fourth. The. fifth is to. increase. for this. is to. activate a. third is to establish a. 400-man. joint. Assurance (IO/IA) and. "Dual Mission" selected. to. Critical. RC. units for. Infrastructure Protection (CEP). by twenty-five percent. RC. units/individuals rotating. through Joint Task Forces (JTFs) for drug, border defense, and immigration missions.. The Homeland Defense missions. identified in. RCE2005 and. currently involved in require joint coordination and representation.. WMD. 15. the ones the Guard. is. The missions involve. coordination within the military services, and also inter-agency coordination.. example,. RC. could provide stability and expertise not. is. Consequence Management (CM) and. missions.. marked. the development of. The second. virtual unit for Information Operations/Information. related mission support.. WMD. it.. is. Task Force (JTF) for Homeland Defense. Joint. augmentation).. The Guard. mission.. an effective missile system and the decision to employ Continental United States. using the National Guard for. As an. teams must coordinate with the other services as well as the Federal. Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and state, local. 2.. and municipal law enforcement and emergency management agencies.. Smaller Scale Contingencies. This alternative contains five elements of which the. promise for implementation. The theater. CINCs.. first is to tailor. This refers to reducing the. Booz, Allen and Hamilton.. two hold the most. timeline restrictions established. minimum assignment. before they can be used in operations. The second. 15. first. is. the. period for. by the. RC. units. RC provides every other rotation. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Inc.,. 1999: B-l.. 16.

(36) The. of follow-on interpositional peacekeeping mission requirements.. assumes one. The. third. fourth. RC. The. element envisions a brigade sized task force in a Bosnia-type scenario.. is to. meet. initial (first. The. forces. is. Bosnia, and for the. command of AC. command. SSC. expanded. is. RC. AC. use in meeting High. assets then follow with. is. Demand/Low Density. the division of labor between. 16. for joint planning. and joint representation. is. implicit in SSCs.. currently involved in Smaller Scale Contingencies in. first. time an. ARNG Division. units in Bosnia.. of a. requirements with. issue in the fifth element. not well balanced.. The requirement The National Guard. 60 days). fifth is. (HD/LD) requirements. The. AC and RC. RC. continuous, rotational follow-on Peacekeeping Accord implementation.. full,. participation.. under. third is the. RC. The importance of. Division. highlights the need for National. (the 49th Division,. is. Guard. Texas. Kosovo and. ARNG). the decision to place. AC. is in. forces. unprecedented in recent history and further. units to be fully represented. and integrated. in the. joint planning arena.. Shaping the International Environment. 3.. The Department of Defense has an International Security Environment.. essential. role. to. DOD efforts help promote regional. or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion. To accomplish forces. this mission, the. play in shaping the stability,. on a day. to. prevent. day. basis.. Department employs a wide variety of means, including. permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas;. forces. deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military to military interactions;. and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and international arms cooperation.. !". 17. Booz, Allen and Hamilton.. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1'. Cohen, William. S.. Inc.,. 1999: B-5.. Annual Report to the President and Congress (1998):. < \vww. dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap9.hmil >.. [25 January 2000]: p5.. 17. Available [Online]:.

(37) In. Guard. National. DOD. support of the. involved. is. in. Shaping the International Environment, the. role in. the. Partnership. State. Peace. for. trains officers specifically for the shaping mission through the joint. and. Relations. Naval. Postgraduate. School. Masters. International Security and Civil-Military Relations. All of these. by creating and. shaping. fostering. with. relationships. Program,. The National Guard. International Disaster Relief, and Peacekeeping Operations.. Military. (SPP). the. also. Center for Civil-. Degree. program. programs aid military. in. in strategic. of the. forces. participating countries. Joint planning. The. and representation. actions of the National. shaping process to insure. is critical in. the strategic shaping environment.. Guard must be seamlessly efforts support. its. integrated into the entire strategic. and complement the intent of the National. Security Strategy.. Major Theater Wars. 4.. This category contains four potential increase. RC. RC. roles. participation in logistics/transportation. This would help the. AC. by eliminating. may. AC/RC. integration.. CS/CSS. stress;. it. National Guard.. reduce the. Although converting some. would. also reduce the ratio of. The concern. to the. RC. 1. force structure.. is this shift. percent.. Combat Support (CS). TEMPO. ARNG. to. stress. forces will units to. could change. and enhance. alleviate. some. CS/CSS. in the. ARNG. roles. and. ARNG combat spaces, missions, and. 8. -. The second Brigades (eSBs) in. potential area. MTWs.. developing a strategy to. 1°. AC. combat arms. missions and lead to restructuring that would reduce. first is. management by twenty-five. current shortfalls in. and Combat Service Support (CSS) and. The. and missions.. enhancing the role of. ARNG. enhanced Separate. This enhancement could occur in two separate ways.. make. Booz, Allen and Hamilton.. is. First,. ARNG units available earlier in the event of an MTW,. and. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Inc.,. 1999: B-2.. 18.

(38) second, establish first,. better. Round-Up. AC/RC. between eSBs and. relationships. AC. postmobilization training should improve availability times.. the second, if establishment of. Round-Up. relationships between. Divisions demonstrates training and employment compatibility,. Out configuration. This would guarantee. The. Under. Divisions.. ARNG. Under. some eSBs and. may. lead to a. ARNG units an enhanced MTW role.. examining roles for. third area is. it. combat divisions. in. the. AC. Round-. 19. MTWs. (to. include post-conflict stage). Three assessment methods can be used to examine this area.. The. annual and postmobilization training events can be examined and compared to. first is. The second. deployment requirements.. is to. to establish a capabilities-based Strategic. The. fourth area. is to. role in Reception, Staging,. result.. CS/CSS. Divisions into the Joint. Reserve for use. in. The. forces.. third is. meeting more demanding or. 20. convert an additional ten percent of Echelon. (EAD) CS/CSS requirements. fix current. ARNG. (JSCP) apportionment tables as available. Strategic Capabilities Plan. unanticipated events.. place four. to. RC. for the first. MTW, to. Onward-movement, and. shortfalls,. but as noted. earlier,. Above Division. include up to a fifty percent. Integration (RSOI). This. may reduce. RC. would help. ARNG force structure as a. This area also assumed that single units would provide the unit personnel, which. would save $1 million per. year.. 21. National Guard involvement in joint decision making integration into. MTW. planning.. is. critical. for seamless. National Guard forces must be fully integrated in to. joint planning and training to insure. Guard Divisions and enhanced Separate Brigades. (eSBs) are missioned in support of the National Military Strategy.. *". Booz, Allen and Hamilton.. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Inc.,. 1999: B-3.. 20. Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-4. 21. Booz, Allen and Hamilton.. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report.. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Inc.,. 1999: B-4/5.. 19.

(39) B.. SUMMARY The emerging. the Full. roles and missions of the National. Spectrum Force described. in Joint Vision. Guard make. 2010.. it. an integral part of. The four main. Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies, Shaping and. MTW. categories of. all. require the. National Guard to be fully integrated into the joint environment. In the past the National. Guard could operations.. rely. on. Now. operations to insure. its. Active Duty counterparts to coordinate and plan. however, the Guard must be proactive it. fulfills its role as. in. limited joint. every aspect of joint. an integral part of the Total Force.. 20. its.

(40) RECOMMENDATIONS. IV.. The. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff are authorized. 1014 military personnel.. Within the 1014 military authorizations, the Reserve Component (RC) has 62 full-time positions.. 22. The. RC. authorizations are further divided between the. Navy. Force Reserve,. Of. authorized for the National Guard and 16 are currently In sharp contrast to their role. role in the Total Force.. The. on the. in the. 476,000, or 55 percent. 24 The defining is less. the 62. RC. Army. authorizations, 20 are. filled.. Joint Chiefs of Staff. is. Total Force (Active/Guard/Reserve). number, 38 percent, or 864,144 are. statistic reflects. Reserve, Air. Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve,. National Guard and Air Force National Guard.. Total Force, but. Army. the National Guard's. 2,246,362; of that. is. RC. 23 Within the RC, the National Guard. statistic is. the National. Guard. is. 21 percent of the. than two percent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. small National Guard representation on the JCS,. it is. is. Although. this. specific positions,. not numbers that will most benefit National Guard joint integration. In principle, joint integration. effective representation in the. of the National Guard will require appropriate and. OCJCS; JCS Boards, Councils and Committees; and. the. Joint Staff. In each of these three sub-elements of the- JCS there are specific "issue areas" that. have a direct influence on joint integration of the National Guard. The goal of. analysis. is. to identify the issue areas. 22. "The. Joint Staff Military. where the lack of Guard representation could be. The. detrimental to the Total Force.. this. issue areas highlight. where a National Guard. and Civilian Strength Report." Staff Management Branch. (J-l), Joint. Chiefs. of Staff. 31 December 1999. 23. FY2001. 24. "The National Guard. President's Budget Future in. Year Defense Program,. [1. 12,. 2000.. The National Guard Homepage (1999): Available. a Nutshell.". < \vww.nub.dtic.mil/aboumH/oodv.htm >. ODUSD (PIO(RQ), May. 1. January 2000].. 21. [Online]:.

(41) presence would help alleviate potential risk created by. JCS. unfamiliarity with the. National Guard and other problems.. IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUE AREAS. A.. The OCJCS. who. is. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS). Office of the. 1. lead. is. by. the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. a four star general or flag officer, and. is. (VCJCS). authorized 39 officers, 27 enlisted. personnel and 24 civilians. Currently there are five National Guard personnel assigned to the. OCJCS,. Army. the Assistant to the. National Guard. Chairman. (ARNG) two. Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG, an. for National. an Executive Officer (an Air National. star general),. Guard (ANG) 04), a Force Advisor (an. ARNG. 06), a. ARNG. ARNG. 05).. Guard. 05), and a Strategic Planner (an. in the. OCJCS. are the. ACJCS/NG,. JRB/JWCA. The. Action Officer (an. issue areas for the National. the Legislative Assistant Office, and the Public. Affairs Office.. Assistant to the. a.. The. position of. CJCS for National Guard Matters (A CJCS/NG). ACJCS/NG was. the result of a. Senate Legislation was introduced to promote the Chief, Chiefs of Staff.. The. legislation. Alaska) in response to the. behind the. Army. initial. compromise. NGB,. in. to a full seat. move came from. 1997 when. on the Joint. Senator Stevens (R-. Staffs treatment of the Guard during the Pentagon's. 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and a 1998 budget that shorted the Guard by $743 million.. sponsors.. The Senate added the JCS provision The. was introduced place. him on. bill. to. to the defense authorization bill with. 49 co-. however did not have equal House support and an interim proposal. promote the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB),. the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).. was the appointment of two, two-star general. 22. officer positions. The. to four stars final. and. compromise. on the Joint Chiefs of.

(42) Staff.. One. position. Reserve Matters. ACJCS/NG, and. the. is. (ACJCS/RM,. The position Report to Congress Chiefs of Staff.. Army and. the other. by a Reserve two-star. filled. description of the. Advises the Chairman on. general).. ACJCS/NG. (CNGB) and. the. Chairman on the. As. directed, represents the. FYOO Annual. as stated in the. matters within his purview affecting the. all. state governors, participates in. Defense forums such. of the Guard. Chairman. to. in. members of Congress and. description for the. CINC war. emerging missions and. ACJCS/NG. plans.. staffers.". lacks any real authority in the. environment and could be covered by the Vice-Chief, National Guard Bureau. joint. (VCNGB). or. CNGB. The ACJCS/RM. could. is. member of the JROC. not a. Resource Board (DRB), nor does the position afford the Guard the Joint Staff that officers. down. to. on the. had before.. joint staff. to. influence of a. without. it. one of "equal. component". an. two. and. is. the. The ACJCS/NG. is still. component". The. ACJCS/NG. much. or Defense. greater leverage. on. subordinate to nine general. a peer with an additional six.. The. issue of rank. comes. could be argued to be "equal in. three or four star general, but retains only the authority and. The. star general.. increasing. The. in. AC. representation on the. rank. issue of "equal in. of the. ACJCS/NG by. component" could be resolved allowing. the. position. direct. JCS Boards, Councils and Committees.. specific issue area is the National. subordinate position on the. JCS and. its. Guard. is. forced to operate from a. boards, councils and committees.. The JCS has. a. of 18 officers in the rank of two-star or higher. If the current representation does not. "Cohen Establishes. New. General Officer Positions." Newsstand (9 January 1998): Available [Online]:. < ww-w.ngaus.org/starestablish.html >. 26. 25. Board (RFPB) and the Joint Review Board (JRB). Advises. utilization. The duty. 25. for. Acts as the Chairman's personal liaison with the Chief,. Air National Guard.. as the Reserve Forces Policy. total. Chairman. the assistant to the. "Serve as Personal Staff Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint. is:. National Guard Bureau. is. Duty Description. [21 April 1999].. for Assistant to the. CJCS. for National. 23. Guard. Matters. JS. Form. 148.. DEC. 1999..

(43) improve, the National Guard will continue to fight for resources and joint integration. from a subordinate position.. ACJCS/NG Recommendation. Recommend two-star. the. ACJCS/NG. JCS Boards,. but be given increased representation and authority on the. billet,. Councils and Committees such as the. JROC,. remain a. Joint Material Priorities and Allocation. Board and the Military Communication-Electronic Board (MCEB). Legislative Assistant Office. b.. The. legislative process in its simplest terms is "selling" the. military resourcing to those. who. write the checks.. The new. roles. importance of. and missions of the. National Guard require a larger role in joint operations and therefore increased resources. from Congress.. must have occur.. If the National. Guard. is to. legislative support in the arena. The National Guard. be successful. where. currently has. its. in its. joint decision. own. new. making and planning. it. will. legislative liaison office, but having. would not only help. representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. roles and missions,. the JCS,. it. would show. Congress the depth and willingness of AC/RC integration.. The involvement. Joint Chiefs of Staff stand to gain significantly. in the. territory in the U.S.,. National Guard.. JCS. The Guard. legislative office.. is. from National Guard. involved in every state and. and therefore every member of Congress has a vested. Additionally, as a. member of. their. Governor's. interest in the. Adjutant. staff, state. Generals have the ability to present important legislative issues to their Governors.. Guard's if. political support. can be a great asset to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and. all. The. services. used correctly. Legislative Assistance Office. new. Recommendation. Recommend. National Guard position and assigning an 0-5. (ARNG. or. ANG). creating a. in the Legislative. Assistant Office to represent the National Guard's involvement in the joint environment. and in the JCS. c.. Public Affairs Office. The members of. the. Army. and Air National Guard involved. in joint. operations require and deserve public affairs representation that reflects their unique. 24.

(44) National Guard units are an integral part of their communities and public. characteristics. affairs is. National Guard plays a larger role in joint operations and. communities.. away from. keep the close. to. tie. the. their. with their. This representation will have a great effect on morale for not only the. soldiers, but also their families, their. in the. units deploy. its. communities, they will need public affairs representation. efforts. As. important in providing a link back to their families and community.. community,. their. employers and future recruiting. Public Affairs representation for the Guard. community.. is. no more. important than that afforded the active component, but like the active component, best represented. it is. by one of its own.. Recommend. Public Affairs Office Recommendation. National Guard position and assigning an E-8 officer) to represent. and cover. (ARNG. RC participation in JCS. or. ANG. creating a. new. non-commissioned. exercises and deployments.. JCS Boards, Councils and Committees. 2.. The JCS Boards, Councils, and Committees include. the Joint Requirements. Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board and the Military Communication-Electronics. Guard. in the. Board (MCEB).. JCS Boards, Councils and Committees a.. is. The the. issue area for the National. JROC.. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC. is. required by Section 181(b) of Title 10 to assist the. identifying and assessing the priority. CJCS by. of joint military requirements (including existing. systems and equipment) to meet the National Military Strategy (NMS); considering alternatives. to. any acquisition program. that. has been identified to meet military. requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the program. and of identified alternatives; assigning joint priority. among. existing and future programs. meeting valid requirements, and ensuring that the assignment of such. 25. priorities. conforms.

(45) to. and. reflects resource levels projected. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).. The Strategic Planning. responsibilities. by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through. the. 27. of the. JROC. are associated not only with the Joint. System (JSPS), but also support the Planning, Programming, and. Budgeting System (PPBS); the Requirements Generation System (RGS); and the Acquisition. The JROC, using. Management System (AMS).. Capabilities Assessment. (JWCA). process, supports the. the Joint Warfighting. JSPS by. assisting the. providing programming assessment and advice to the SecDef. This advice in the. in. documented. Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Chairman's Program. Assessment (CPA). These documents weigh heavily decisions. made by. the. SecDef in the PPBS. Since. requirements and capabilities,. of the RGS.. it. is logical that. the. JROC. is. programming and budgeting. of this. JROC. JROC. energy. is. focused on. also has oversight responsibility. the validation and approval authority for Mission. Statements (MNSs) as they work their. way. through the RGS.. MNSs that may become expensive or are otherwise JROC. all. in the. 28. The. the. is. CJCS. forwards the. The JROC may. MNSs to. also address. JROC. significant programs.. the Defense Acquisition. non-major programs. The. Board (DAB). to resolve contentious. Need. only reviews. Upon. approval,. for consideration.. and high-interest. issues such as: designation of the lead Service or agency, requirements disconnects, or to. review programs. at. the request of the. Acquisition and Technology.. SecDef or. the. Under Secretary of Defense,. 29. 27. War. College: Available [Online]:. Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval War < www.nwc.na vy.mil/nsdm/nsdmrav l.htm>. [25 January 2000]: 4-10.. College: Available [Online]:. 29. College: Available [Online]:. Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval <www.nwc.navy.miynsdm/nsdrnravl.htm>. [25 January 2000].. 2°. Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval <www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdrn/nsdmravl.htm>. [25 January 2000]: 4-10.. 26. War.

(46) The. JROC. is. not officially a part of any of the strategic foundation. decision-making systems; however,. JROC. is. closely tied to and supports. is. it. considered the glue that bonds the systems together. 30. council of the JCS,. is. VCJCS. chaired by the. and. its. all. The. of them.. The JROC, which. members. is. a. include a four star. representative from each of the services.. The. JROC. is. one of the most. influential councils. on. the. JCS and. is. fundamental in the resourcing process. The. JROC. advice to the SecDef,. and approval authority for Mission Need. the validation. is. provides programming assessment and. Statements (MNSs), and resolves contentious and high interest issues.. Guard currently lacks the. JROC.. direct representation to present or defend. In the past, the. Guard has suffered. position on the. The. 3.. The. JROC. Joint. Directorate of. for the. into. as well.. creating. a. Guard. National. Joint Staff Staff includes the primary directorates (J-l. Management (DOM). The following. is. Guard. in. through J-8) and the. a discussion of each of the staff. each directorate.. J-l. a,. The. Guard. CNGB to directly represent Guard resourcing issues.. directorates and the issue areas for the National. responsibilities. JROC. Recommend. Recommendation.. resource concerns on. as a result. Integration of the. the joint environment requires integration into the. JROC. its. The National. J-l. of the. is. the. J-l are to. Directorate. for. Manpower and. The. Personnel.. manage manpower, formulate personnel. policies,. supervise administration of personnel, including civilians and prisoners of war.. 31. and. The. goals of the J-l include enhancing total force readiness through the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment. 30. Joint. "Joint Exercise and Training Division.". < \vAv%\.dtic.rnil/ics/ietd.htrn >. 31. (JWCA) and. Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process,. The. Joint. staff. Homepage. (1999): Available [Online]:. [24 January 2000].. "Functions of Joint Staff Divisions.". The. Joint Staff Officers. 27. Guide 1997: Available [Online]:.

(47) optimizing the Joint Staff organization to support the the JCS, and provide highly qualified. Commanders. manpower and personnel. in. Chief (CINCs) and. support to the staff and. other agencies.. The. J-l is lead. officers, 12 enlisted. by a one. and. star general or flag officer. is. authorized 22. personnel and 17 civilians. Although there are responsibilities within. the J-l that are of significance to the National Guard, the functions of the J-l. component. primarily. Guard. neutral.. Additionally, J-l personnel have been trained in National. The. specific J-l responsibilities.. Advisor (05) in the. J-l. current United States. Guard. Army. J-2 is the Intelligence Directorate.. of. intelligence to the Joint Chiefs. and unified commands. The J-2. to the J-l at this time.. is. Staff, Office. The. J-2 provides all-source. of the Secretary of Defense, Joint. unique on the Joint Staff because. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a combat support agency.. Chairman of foreign. situations. indications,. warning and. crisis. intelligence. also part. Staff,. of the. J-2 apprises the. to current operational. strategy.. This includes. supporting. support,. unified. intelligence requirements, developing joint intelligence doctrine, developing. joint architecture, coordinating support requirements,. and providing targeting support.. Currently there are no National Guard personnel assigned to the J-2. the National. Guard. that oversees the. in the J-2 is the. is. the Reserve. The. issue area for. Component manager. forces in support of the J-2.. [26 January 2000].. "Mission of the Directorate for Intelligence.". < www.dtic.mil/ics/core/j2.html >.. The J2R. J2R.. employment of reserve. < www.afsc.edu/pub 1 /afsc02 1 z.htm>. 32. it is. The. and intelligence issues relevant. and potential national security policies, objectives and. command. There are no. J-2. The. providing. (USAR) RC. in the J-l.. Recommendation. No recommended changes. b.. interests. Reserve. Guard concerns.. J-l adequately represents National. issue areas for the National. are. The. [24 January 2000].. 28. Joint Staff. Homepage. (1999): Available [Online]:.

(48) J2R. (1). on. the J-2 and advises the J-2. Managers. Functional. component and. all. RC. addressing. in. its utilization,. The J2R manages. Division.. all. military reserve issues for. Specific duties include assisting J-2. matters.. which impact the Reserve intelligence. issues. ensuring J-2 reserve assets are fully integrated into the J-2. mission, determining J-2 roles and missions that can be fulfilled. employment of RC forces. in support. of the. J-2.. The J2R. by reserve. and the. assets,. responsible for providing the. is. J2 with peacetime intelligence production and watch standing support as well capability to. meet. exercise, contingency operations, surge requirements,. intelligence taskings. National. Guard representation. and special. would help. in this division. as. integrate. National Guard intelligence assets into joint operations and increase Joint Staff awareness. The Guard would. of Guard capabilities.. experience through Active Duty Special. also benefit. by providing. Work (ADSW) and. its. members with. Active Duty Training. J-2. (ADT). tour opportunities in support of J-2 operations.. J2R Recommendation. Guard position officer) to. J-2R and assigning an E-8. in the. work within. the. J2R. to integrate National. (ARNG. or. creating a. ANG. Guard personnel. J-3. is. The. the Directorate for Operations.. are to assist in the direction. National. non-commissioned into J2 operations.. responsibilities. of the J-3. and control of operations and plan, coordinate and integrate. The mission of. the. Chairman. responsibilities as the principal advisor to the National. Command. operations.. new. J-3. c.. The. Recommend. the J-3. is. to. assist. developing and providing guidance to the combatant. in carrying out his. Authority. (NCA) by. commands and by. relaying. communications between the authority and unified commanders regarding current operations and plans.. The. J-3 is the directorate that. moves. military forces, conducts. detailed operational briefings to the national leadership. and serves as the operational link. between the warfighting Commanders in Chief and the. NCA. The. 29. J-3 is responsible for.

(49) synchronizing and monitoring worldwide military operations and activities in support of a national military strategy emphasizing flexible and selective engagement.. The officers,. J-3. is. by a. lead. 86 enlisted personnel and 22. personnel assigned to the J-3, an. ANG. three star general or flag officer and civilians.. ANG. is. authorized 242. Currently there are three National Guard. Operations Officer in the Readiness Division (an. 06), an Operations Officer whose position. Reserve Forces Advisor (an. 33. ARNG 05).. The. is to. be deleted (an. ANG. issue areas for the National. 3 are the Readiness Division, the Joint Forces. Command (JFCOM). 04), and a. Guard. in the J-. branch, the Deputy. Director for Information Operations, the Defense and Space Operations Division, and the Special Operations Division. (1). Readiness Division.. response to a tasking by the. CJCS. to define,. The Readiness Division was formed measure and. fix joint readiness.. in. The. division redefined readiness to include a view of readiness from the tactical, operational. and. strategic levels. issues.. of war and. is. In order to collect, analyze,. the single point of contact for. current readiness. measure and begin fixing joint readiness, the division. implemented the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) which the. all. is. briefed monthly to. VCJCS. 34 In addition to the. Warfighting Capability Assessment. JMRR,. the division chairs one of the Joint. (JWCA) teams on. joint. readiness.. The team. influences the planning, programming, and budgeting process by providing inputs to the. Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).. Additionally, the Readiness Division has responsibility for the. Resources and Training System,. 33. "Directorate. < www. dtic .mil/ 34. i. for. Operations. cs/j 3 .html >.. "Directorate. for. (J-3).". central. The. automated. registry,. of. which keeps track of. Joint. Staff. Homepage. (1999):. Available. [Online]:. Joint. Staff. Homepage. (1999):. Available. [Online]:. [24 January 2000].. Operations. < www.dtic.mil/jcs/j3.html >.. DOD's. Status. (J-3).". The. [24 January 2000].. 30.

(50) all. operational U.S. Military units and indicates the level of resources and training status. required to undertake missions for which the units were organized. 35. Readiness Division Recommendation. authorized and has assigned an. ANG. 0-6. on. RC. position's. readiness, developing readiness. and providing readiness input. JFCOM. (2). continued. Branch.. JFCOM. is. the lead organization in domestic. Homeland Defense, Consequence Management, and National. JFCOM. is. Weapons. NORAD support,. DPG. (ARNG or ANG) to this authorized position.. assignment of an 0-6. operations such as. to the. Recommend. and CJCS Program Recommendations and Program Assessment.. (MSCA),. is. by the CJCS and the SecDef to update the President and Congress, writing. the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress,. Response.. The. to the Readiness Division.. responsibilities include advising the J-3 Director. briefings used. The National Guard. also. Disaster. responsible for Military Support to Civilian Authority. of Mass. Destruction/Consequence. (WMD/CM),. management. and Counter Drug missions. The National Guard has traditionally been. a critical element in these domestic response missions.. When. interviewed, a current J-3. Guard representative would greatly enhance. its. providing National Guard planning expertise. 36. JFCOM member. ability to. accomplish. The Deputy. said a National its. missions by. Directorate for. Combating. Terrorism echoed the same comments saying they would utilize a National Guard representative for coordinating and planning the use of. Guard. assets in their planning. processes. 37. The. JFCOM. Branch also reviews unified command operational. plans, contingency plans and proposed rules. 3 ->. "Directorate. < www. dtic mi L .. 36 ->. '. j. for. cs/j 3. Interview with. Interview with. .. Operations. (J-3).". The. Joint. of engagement. Staff. Homepage. for specific operations to. (1999):. Available. [Online]:. html > [24 January 2000]. .. LTC Hans LTC. Meinhardt,. Williams,. USA, JFCOM. USA, Deputy. branch,. WESTHEM division, J-3,. 10 April 2000.. Directorate for Combating Terrorism, Plans and Policy. Division, J-3, 11 April 00.. 31.

Figure

Figure 2-1 . Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Active Component/National Guard)
Figure 5-1 . Recommended Positions in Priority Order.

References

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