Information is at the core of advocacynetworks development and operationalization. The concept of “information politics”, developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), has an explanatory power regarding the effects on building a collective conscience as well as contributing to influence State behavior. For the authors, it consists of the ability to generate politically usable information, moving it to where it might have more impact. On interpreting the concept, it is possible to see two complementary aspects: firstly, there is the generation of information, which maintains these initiatives as an alternative source of information on a global scale. This is an intrinsic characteristic of advocacynetworks, for whom social change can be achieved through reports, statements, and published works, because they tend to be more representative of the civil society, in comparison to governments, considering their strategic use of information and foreign affairs. The other aspect is how information is used to persuade and stimulate people to act and join the cause. Polisario Komitee acted upon both aspects, as a source of information and using information to gather collaborators.
bureaucratic and institutionalised for the term, network, to be inappropriate. In the past, the costs of communications were high enough that INGOs were not formed unless the need was felt for several areas of co-operation. Now that communications are so much cheaper, much looser networks without any institutional structure can be created. The simplest form is an information network, using an e-mail list server and/or a website to enable its participants to communicate about social, cultural, professional, scientific, economic or political issues. Administration of such networks may be undertaken by a separate, independent NGO, created solely for the purpose of information-sharing, or it may be located within a specific, national NGO or an INGO. Usually, it maintains its reputation for reliability by not being politically active and not applying for consultative status. The focus of the literature in Sociology overwhelmingly has been on transnational advocacynetworks that are defined in terms of the commitment of the members to campaigning, as a diverse coalition, sharing and promoting some common values. Issue caucuses are similar, except each of them operates solely within a specific global intergovernmental organisation (IGO) and they exist temporarily, for the duration of the relevant meetings. The NGO participants usually do not maintain any network between sessions and the composition of each caucus varies from one session to the next. 12 Finally, there are governance networks that are designed to facilitate and expand NGO participation in policy-making processes. They will be defined, below, as networks that do not attempt to influence political decision-making, except on the narrow question of participation rights for all NGOs. Although they share with issue caucuses the characteristic of being linked to a specific IGO, governance networks differ in having some continuity and in not having any common political goals. 13
mobilisation in countries such as India. The Indian national context is characterised by a strong civil society and decades of social mobilisation in a democratic system. India also has a long history of social movement organising (see Ray & Katzenstein. 2005) from the independence movement in the early 1900s to more recent farmers’ rights struggles and anti-corporate movements (Banerjee, 2011a; 2011b). These include social movements against multinational agricultural giants Cargill and Monsanto (Herring, 2005; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), protests against CocaCola in Kerala (Raman, 2010), to the current protests against mining and metal multinationals like Vedanta and the Pohang Steel Company from South Korea. National level networks and social movement organisations such as the National Alliance of People’s Movements or the National Campaign against Big Dams are examples of the very active national advocacynetworks that pose a ‘serious challenge to the dominant ideology of meaning and patterns of development’ in the country (Swain, 2010: 49).
Met behulp van het internet kunnen niet-gouvernementele organisatie (NGO’s) snel met elkaar communiceren. Hierdoor zijn organisaties in staat om veel informatie over een issue te delen en te verspreiden. Door het delen en verspreiden van informatie vormen verschillende actoren (organisaties) zogeheten transnational advocacynetworks (TAN’s). Deze TAN’s worden gevormd door organisaties die op het internet functioneren als een groep, waarbij gedeelde normen en waarden en het uitwisselen van informatie over een specifiek issue centraal staat (Rogers, 2012). In de literatuur worden TAN’s omschreven als: “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange that includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 89).
For the purpose of this thesis it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the latter two tactics, namely leverage and accountability politics. Firstly, the ultimate goal of advocacynetworks is ‘political effectiveness’, implying ‘some policy change by target actors such as governments…’ (Ibid., 30). To achieve such change often entails a power imbalance between activists and target actors. Therefore, local activists seek leverage across other network members in order to ‘influence state practices directly’, which can be of material or moral nature (Ibid., 30). Material leverage is tied to either ‘money, trade, or prestige’, whilst moral leverage is when ‘behaviour of target actors is held up to … international scrutiny’ and exposes that state practices are in contradiction of international obligations (Ibid., 31). Secondly, ‘networks devote considerable energy to convincing governments and other actors to publicly change their positions on issues’ (Ibid., 31), in order to use such commitments as mechanisms of accountability politics. This means that when a government has formally agreed to implement a policy, whilst not doing so in practice, networks emphasise that to seek for action. Accountability politics often involves the boomerang pattern, and is most prominent in the sphere of human (women) rights. An example is human rights networks in the former Soviet Union seeking for international protection by using the Helsinki Accords of 1975, to consequently spur change (Ibid., 32).
and beyond (Szasz and Bogardus 1974: 41). 16 But can we really say, as Michelle Bogre has argued, that Riis ‘proved the potency of activist photography to persuade viewers and legislators through graphic, direct imagery of real conditions’? (Bogre 2012: 31). Powerful though Riis’s photographs are, there is a danger of exaggerating their influence during a period in which progressive politics and politicians flourished (Nugent 2012). To the extent that Riis influenced this political movement – and its influences were manifold – it was by harnessing the power of advocacynetworks. The most important alliance Riis formed was with Theodore Roosevelt. In 1890, Roosevelt, then a New York City Police Commissioner, arrived in Riis’s office and announced that he had read How the Other Half Lives and ‘was here to help’ (Riis 1901: 328). ‘No one ever helped as he did’, Riis noted, ‘For two years we were brothers in Mulberry Street’ (Riis 1901: 328). An example of the Riis-Roosevelt relationship can be seen in relation to the city’s policy on police-lodgings. In the late 19 th century, the police provided a range of social services, including temporary housing for the homeless and destitute. Riis had used police lodgings when he first arrived in the United States, and his experience convinced him that the abolition of such accommodation was a key priority for social reform. Later Riis took Roosevelt on a night visit to the same police lodgings and recounted his story. ‘I will smash them tomorrow’, replied Roosevelt, who subsequently closed all police lodgings in the city (Riis 1901: 249).
The second essential element is the Organizational Platform. All norm entrepreneurs at the International level need some kind of organizational platform through which they can promote their ideas (Finnemore & Sikkink: 1998, p. 899) Sometimes such platforms already exist and are specifically constructed for the purpose of promoting norms anyway. Examples of these platforms could be Amnesty International or Greenpeace along with the corresponding advocacynetworks that they are part of. More often an entrepreneur could make use of a platform that has purposes and agenda’s, which transcends a single issue (Finnemore & Sikkink: 1998, p. 899). The United Nations, European Union or the World Bank are good examples of such platforms.
preventative over curative health funding priorities. Carden (2009) further argues that even where individual or organizational advocates exist, many do not actually use hard data or other evidence as a foundation for policy advocacy for besides a ‘shortage of statistical and other hard data to draw reliable conclusions’ (p.16), there is a lack of capacity to synthesise available research. These challenges exist despite the consensus that evidence-informed decision making should be an indispensable part of every health system practice and policy making process, including public health (Dobbins, Robeson, Ciliska, Hanna, Cameron, O’Mara…Mercer, 2009; Graham et al., 2006). This research sought to understand how evidence is used to inform policy advocacy activities and to examine the existing internal capacity to use this evidence at WashOrg.
Eriksen‟s qualitative research indicated several barriers to the advocacy process. Two major obstacles noted were the lack of a clear sense of professional identity and the internal conflicts within ACA. Conflicts “within groups” represented groups inside the counseling field. This conflict was reported to cause stress, tension, and distrust among ACA members. Noted factors included polarization, dominance by subgroups within ACA, underrepresentation of the interests of other groups within the organization. Additional obstacles identified were a general lack of unification within the ACA and a lack of focus on the future as an association. Inter- group conflict, as termed by Eriksen, is the conflict caused between the counseling profession and other professional groups which causes public uncertainty, loss of status with legislators, insurance companies and other funding sources, confusion over decision makers, and success by groups merely because of the most Political Action Committee (PAC) funds. Eriksen listed many obstacles to counselor professional advocacy such as counselors‟ unwillingness to take a stand for themselves or a belief, being complacent, apathetic, satisfied with the status quo, and lack of self esteem. Participants voiced a concern that they lacked resources such as sufficient funds, position and time to make an impact. Counselors indicated that individuals can self- advocate immediately; however, strategic planning is necessary to plan group advocacy efforts. Additional obstacles included the inability of leaders to motivate membership and the
11. Cantley P, Little K, Martin JE; Zarrow Center for Learning Enrichment, Jeannine Rainbolt College of Education, The University of Oklahoma. ME! Lessons for teaching self-awareness & self-advocacy. 2010. Available at: www. ou. edu/ content/ education/ centers- and- partnerships/ zarrow/ transition- education- materials/ me- lessons- for- teaching- self- awareness- and- self- advocacy. html. Accessed August 1, 2016
Anecdotal empirical evidence aside, there are important theoretical reasons to try to model practical argumentation in terms of advocacy. To start with, decisions where various voices are heard through advocacy easier gain the crucial facet of dem- ocratic legitimacy when compared to decisions somewhat ab- stractly (or even paternalistically), “rationally considered” in detachment from actual parties claiming stake in the issue (Ben- habib, 1994). Further, advocacy might aid us in being cognitive misers; it allows us “to outsource some of the time-consuming and wearisome activity of reasoning to someone who is zealous about it” (Goodwin, 2013, p. 16). This view has been forcefully argued for by Mercier & Sperber (2011) in terms of the division of cognitive labor under the conditions of the well-known con- firmation bias:
How do we get our movements to achieve similar levels of results today? I think it takes a lot of coordination, and it takes more than just legal training, which tells you to think very linearly and syllogistically. Policymakers and the general public do not change their minds and actions because of an incredibly logical argument. To be truly persuasive, it is not enough to point out that if we have A and B, then we necessarily have C. This type of reasoning may not even work in a courtroom, as we saw in the initial cases dealing with curfews for, and relocation of, Americans of Japanese ancestry. The following pages present a couple of cases where the standard litigation model did not result in the desired outcome, but where other modes of advocacy needed to be implemented alongside litigation to achieve justice.
In terms of enablers to advocating across the spectrum, multiple resident participants referenced the idea of “sus- tainability” when discussing advocacy work as a means of guiding their future practice. Faculty participants saw patient-centredness and personal reflection as ways to maintain boundaries and reduce stress: “You need to have a patient-centred approach. If the patient wants it, it’s not just you trying to advocate for them without them wanting this in the first place.” (FM faculty 13)
of time and resources from civic society groups across Europe, and was claimed as a success by groups like CORE. However, a more significant development in corporate accountability that year was the decision of the European Commission not to require a public registration of the activities of lobbyists, including their financial arrangements and clients (Reuters 2007). Given that corporate lobbying of Eurocrats is a key mechanism in the policy process affecting corporate governance across the EU, this was a major failure, and indicated a weakness in the ability of national NGOs to quickly mobilize on EU matters that affect the frameworks within which they seek to achieve their public missions. Part of the reason for this may be that UK NGOs seek to be perceived as apolitical, in order to not alienate potential donors and to avoid audits and challenges from the UK Charities Commission which requires NGOs to be apolitical to the extent that they focus on their mandates and base any advocacy on evidence from their on-the-ground experience. During a one-day workshop in 2006, participants in the network agreed that CORE had achieved some progress since its inception, including:
Results: The Panel comprised four experts from the rare disease community who lead patient advocacy organizations; three leaders who perform advocacy functions within biopharmaceutical companies; and two facilitators, both having leadership experience in rare diseases and industry. The finalized Guidelines consist of four main sections: Identification and Engagement With Companies, Patient Engagement and Patient Privacy, Financial Contributions, and Clinical Trial Communication and Support. The Guidelines address the daily considerations, choices, and consequences of patient advocacy organizations as they engage with biopharmaceutical companies, and offer recommendations for volunteer/ paid leaders of the organizations on how to interact in a thoughtful, responsible, ethical way that engenders trust.
Abstract: Many pharmacists have expressed a desire to become more involved in patient care, in part by being compensated for patient counseling, as well as by providing services tradition- ally offered by physicians and nurse practitioners. Recent efforts to develop collaborative care models, as well as major restructurings of US health insurance coverage, provide a unique opportunity for pharmacists to become recognized as independent health care providers and be reimbursed as primary care providers. Achieving that goal would require addressing advo- cacy challenges familiar to other health care professionals who have achieved provider status under existing reimbursement rules. Historically, political advocacy has not been a major part of pharmacy practice, or even viewed as necessary. However, pharmacists would be more politi- cally effective with a single organization to speak for them as a profession, and with further education in advocacy.