The excitement public key cryptosystems provoked in the popular and scientific press was not matched by corresponding acceptance in the cryptographic establishment, however. In the same year that public key cryptography was discovered, the National Security Agency (NSA), proposed a conventional cryptographic system, designed by International Business Machines (IBM), as a federal Data Encryption Standard (DES). Marty Hellman and I criticized the proposal on the ground that its key was too small, but manufacturers were gearing up to support the proposed standard and our criticism was seen by many as an attempt to disrupt the standards-making process to the advantage of our own work. Public key cryptography in its turn was attacked, in sales literature  and technical papers [849,1159] alike, more as though it were a competing product than a recent research discovery. This, however, did not deter the NSA from claiming its share of the credit. Its director, in the words of the Encyclopedia Britannica , pointed out that “two-key cryptography had been discovered at the agency a decade earlier,” although no evidence for this claim was ever offered publicly.
Essentially, we provide a generic construction for non-interactive deniable au- thentication schemes. Our schemes follow all the requirements defined in , but there is no interactivity involved. The recipient of the deniable ring au- thentication can verify the correctness of an authenticated message without any interaction with the ad-hoc signers. This will certainly improve the usage of de- niable ring authentication in practice. The size of the our signature scheme is the same as the original ring signature scheme together with a random number. This is significantly shorter compared to the previous construction in . Our scheme is an ID-based scheme, which means that the only requirement for the verifier (or signature recipient) is to have his ID (such as email address, a per- son’s address, etc) published. We assume that there is a trusted authority TA, that is only required when the verifier wants to generate his secret key based on his ID. We note that this assumption always exists in ID-based cryptography, as pointed out in its seminal paper in . As pointed out in , the verifier V does not necessary have to setup his public-private key before a signer (on behalf of an ad-hoc group) decides to send him a message. Based on our generic construction, we can convert any ring signature schemes to deniable ring authen- tication schemes. We note that as in any other ID based system, our scheme is very applicable in a closed network  where a TA trusted by all participants exists.
Micali  introduced a computational complexity measure of the randomness of func- tions. They defined a function to be poly-random if no polynomial-time algorithm can dis- tinguish between values of the function and true random strings, even when the algorithm is permitted to select the arguments to the function. Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali presented an algorithm for constructing poly-random functions assuming the existence of one-way functions. This theory was applied by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali  to develop provably secure protocols for the (essentially) storageless distribution of secret identification numbers, message authentication with timestamping, dynamic hashing, and identify friend or foe systems. Luby and Rackoff  showed how poly-random permu- tations can be efficiently constructed from poly-random functions. This result was used, together with some of the design principles of DES, to show how any CSPRBG can be used to construct a symmetric-key block cipher which is provably secure against chosen- plaintext attack. A simplified and generalized treatment of Luby and Rackoff’s construction was given by Maurer .
As in the second example of Theorem II, let‟s have φ(n) = 17680 which is Totient value  (Euler‟s theory) of n=131*137, Now 4 numbers having unconcealed Multiplicative Inverses which are in distance of unity from X- Axis are (1, 8839, 8841, 17679), All the numbers with unconcealed Multiplicative Inverses of this public key system (PKS)  are (1,441,1769,1871,2209,2991,3639,4081,4759, 5201,5849,6631,6969,7071,8399,8839,8841,9281,10609,1071 1,11049,11831,12479,12921,13599,14041,14689,15471,1580 9,15911,17239,17679). (Calculated and validated through various applied approaches  discussed in table 1)
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.94017 243 Journal of Information Security companies throughout the world. APIs in general are on the forefront of the world of technology today. Due to their popularity, they have been implemented for a variety of applications. This has led to a variety of different applications that have made breakthroughs in the way that we see software. Some of these applications include making backend, software, payment processing, front end, cloud as a service, or even the aforementioned cryptography as a service    . The applications are endless and there are more emerging ones that are coming out all the time but the typical applications can be seen by referring to Figure 1. Cryptography as a service is an interesting example of this and will be the focus of this paper. By examining the functionality, effectiveness, and differ- ent possible applications we will be able to come up with an understanding of why cryptography as a service can be a good thing to have for a company’s in- frastructure .
In this paper, we present an idea of adopting certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) schemes over mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which has not been explored before. In current literature, essentially there exists two main approaches, namely the public key cryptography and identity-based(ID- based)cryptography .Unfortunately, they both have some inherent drawbacks. In the public key cryptography system, a certificate authority (CA) is required to issue certificates between users’ public keys and private key stoen sure their authenticity, whilst in an ID-based cryptography system, users’ private keys are generated by a key generation center (KGC), which means the KGC knows every users’ keys (the key escrow problem). To avoid these obstacles, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed certificateless cryptography systems where the public keys do not need to be certified and the KGC does not know users’ keys. Essentially, certificateless cryptography relies between the public key cryptography and ID-based cryptography. In this work, we adopt this system’s advantage over MANET .To implement CL-PKE over MANET and to make it practical ,we incorporate the idea of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. The master secret keys are shared among some or all the MANET nodes. This makes the system self-organized once the network has been initiated. In order to provide more flexibility, we consider both a full distribution system and a partial distribution system. Furthermore, we carry out two simulations to support our schemes. We firstly simulate our scheme to calculate our encryption, decryption and key distribution efficiency. Then we also simulate our scheme with AODV to test the network efficiency. The simulations are performed over OPNET.
• cipher - algorithm for transforming plaintext to ciphertext • key - info used in cipher known only to sender/receiver • encipher (encrypt) - converting plaintext to ciphertext • decipher (decrypt) - recovering ciphertext from plaintext • cryptography - study of encryption principles/methods
If another individual were to somehow intercept the message being sent by Alice, then he or she would only be able to use a trial-and-error cryptanalysis method to attempt to decipher the message. This process could take longer than the individual’s lifetime. Therefore, in a practical sense, the message is still safe; because the individual intercepting the message did not possess the correct deciphering key. On the other hand, Bob possesses both the public enciphering portion of the key and the private deciphering portion of the key; thus, he will be able to decipher the message in a matter of moments. Once Bob has determined Alice’s message, he may then send his response in the same fashion that Alice transmitted her message. Bob would encipher his response using Alice’s public key which includes a one-way function enabling only Alice to decipher the message with the use of her private key. In this manner, Bob and Alice may agree to a joint key to be used between them for one of the ciphers from Chapter 3 if they prefer that particular method of communication. In general, public-key cryptography methods are typically slower and less direct than other methods which employ the use of a joint private key.
Of course, quantum cryptography will appeal to those who need to per- suade others that they are using the latest and most expensive technology to guard their secrets. However as I said before coding schemes are at best, cryptographic elements of larger possible cryptographic systems. If smiling white coated technicians install big gleaming machines with ‘Unbreakable Quantum Code Company’ painted in large letters above the keyboard in the homes of Alice and Bob, it does not automatically follow that their commu- nications are safe. Money will buy the appearance of security. Only thought will buy the appropriate security for a given purpose at an appropriate cost. And even then we can not be sure.
We give a brief overview of proofs in cryptography at a beginners level. We briefly cover a general way to look at proofs in cryptography and briefly compare the requirements to traditional reductions in computer science. We then look at two security paradigms, indistinguishability and simulation based security. We also describe the security models for Secret Key and Public Key systems with appropriate motivations. Finally, we cover some advanced topics and conclude with a few exercises and hints.
at least one important inquiry into the 0 - 1 Knapsack under these conditions , and some analysis of the situation as a whole  which the author takes as suggesting, contrary to the situation with codes vulnerable to Schor’s Algorithm (RSA, discrete log, elliptic curves), that the case may be that there are bounds on the possibility of finding algorithms for quantum computers that can effectively tackle some relevant lattice- based problems. To the extent which this can be currently tested, and to the extent which other concerns than security can be evaluated (for the code generally, as well as with respect to various kinds of choices of representations), I say that it is time for us to consider this code very seriously for adapting commerce and perhaps communication in light of the possibility of quantum computing. A code like this that can be im- plemented on conventional hardware, and yet that would be secure with a quantum computer somewhere “out there” would be much more convenient and cost effective than quantum cryptography, if the latter is to be understood as processes which require a quantum computer for one or both parties in communication.
Seetaiah Kilaru et.al.(2013) This paper put a light how to propose novel algorithm planted on the toy principle Rubik cube. Here, XOR operator along with two secret keys is used to design algorithm. The results also showed that the proposed algorithm is efficient in cases of eye sensitivity and key sensitivity. The main reason behind this algorithm is to produce confusion between the original and encrypted images in most possible manner. XOR operator is applied to rows and columns of an image in such a way that using the same key. After that key is flipped and applied again to the same number of rows and columns to reconstruct the image .
A research team led by Ronald Hanson, Delft University of Technology reports the both detection and the communication loopholes of first Bell experiment. The team used “entanglement swapping” which is a cunning technique to combine the benefits of using light and matter both. Theytook two untangled electrons sitting in diamond crystals which held 1.3 kilometers apart in different Delft campus labs. Each electron was individually entangled with a photon, and both of those photons were then rushed to a third location. There, the two photons were entangled with each other and which caused the entanglement of both their associate electrons too. This did not work every time. In total 245 entangled pairs of electrons over the course of nine days were managed to be generated by the team. Besides, the experiment closed both loopholes immediately, as the electrons were easy to monitor, the detection loophole was not an issue, and they were separated far enough apart to terminate the communication loophole. A loophole-free Bell test also has crucial implications for quantum cryptography, says Leifer. To block eavesdroppers companies has already sold some systems that use quantum mechanics. The systems produce entangled pairs of photons and from this pair one photon in each pair is send to the first user and the other photon to the second user. Then turn these photons into a cryptographic key by those two users that only they know. Observing a quantum system interrupt its properties, an alarm will be set off as someone tries to eavesdrop on this process it will make a noticeable effect.