How does this relate to Arab-Israeli wars? 1967 approximated the power transition scenario in that the Arab states seemed to be approaching parity with Israel, hence a “preventive” war by the latter aimed to forestall this. After 1967 the power balance was dramatically altered in favour of Israel; however, this stimulated efforts on the part of Israel’s neighbours to right the power balance (rebuilding of the shattered Egyptian and Syrian armies) which, to a degree succeeded so that again on the eve of the 1973 war the power transition scenario could be said to have been restored. 1973 seemed to establish a balance that might have been favourable to a peace settlement, but Egypt’s separate peace again upset it in Israel’s favour, enabling Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. But once again its Arab rivals found ways of restoring some balance (Syria’s reach for “strategic parity; Hizbollah’s “asymmetric warfare”). Israel’s 1982 bid for military hegemony failed and was replaced by a certain mutual deterrence; yet in other respects the power transition scenario still held as arms races amidst unresolved grievances continued. This history shows us that power balancing will often fail to prevent war, but it does prevent victors from establishing hegemony since losing states mobilize the capabilities and allies to blunt aggression or when, after a first war they fall sharply behind, they redress the power imbalance. The lesson of the Arab- Israeli conflict seems to be that, so long as deep grievances remain unsatisfied, systemic conditions—the power transition scenario--continues to lead decision-makers to think that they can use war to impose their terms; yet because in reality no side is strong enough to do this, war after war continues to be waged.
Shlaim challenges and overturns many orthodoxies. He questions whether the formation of Israel and consequent battle with invading Arab armies really was a David versus Goliath struggle. While this is still taught in Israeli schools, it is described by Shlaim as the 'heroic-moralist version' that 'is a prime example of the use of a nationalistic version of history in the process of nation building. In a very real sense history is the propaganda of the victors, and the history of the 1948 war is no exception.' (p.34) In discussing the vicissitudes of the 1948-9 Arab-Israelwar, Shlaim emphasises the disunity of the Arab forces deployed against Israel. This allowed Ben-Gurion's generals to deal with one enemy front at a time and so achieve victory in 1948-9. In this respect, Abdullah's collusion, dealt with in Shlaim's earlier book, was a vital factor in Israel's divide and win policy. The conclusion of the chapter on the formation of Israel is telling. The theoretical concept of the iron wall alongside the reality of a comprehensive military victory in 1948 set up military toughness as a leitmotif in Israeli relations with the Arabs. As Shlaim observes (p.50): 'military power expanded the margins for political choice.' In these crucial early years, Ben-Gurion leaned towards the bellicose approach of the newly formed Israeli Defence Force (IDF). This marginalised the 'doves' led by those such as the Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister), Moshe Sharett, who sought some form of reconciliation with the Arabs. In the discussions over policy, Ben-Gurion's stamped his authority. Shlaim describes one cabinet meeting where the ministers were like 'polite and frightened children in a kindergarten' reduced to hesitantly raising hands before asking questions against the 'overpowering' authority of Ben- Gurion. (p.75) Israel dismissed Arab peace feelers as Ben-Gurion preferred to wait in the hope that with the passage of time Israel's borders and land seizures would become accepted facts.
towards a new Palestinian national identity. For after the 1967 war, and the increased mobility of the Arabs in Israel, a process of returning to the roots emerged. He defines this process as “Palestinization.” A national Palestinian identity was reinforced by Egypt’s former President Gamal Abd El Nassir and Nassir’s call for an Arab National Movement; by the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which became a leading representative voice for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; and by other major developments in the region. 13 This new period of political mobilization towards “Palestinization” was driven by and centered on Arab political parties and political figures that did not “stimulate a revised ideological-political program.” 14 Rather, political parties were simply forced to push for an Arab-Palestinian identity within the existing Israeli political framework. In describing this challenge, Rekhess branches off from Smooha’s definition of radicalism. Rekhess defines radicalization as the process of nationalization amongst political parties and other extra-legal or extra-parliamentary groups such as the “Sons of the Village,” who refused to work within the system or participate in any Israeli governmental activity. Radicalism, to Rekhess, is not a function of the majority and how distant the minority’s views are from this majority. It is inherent to the minority views and is independently linked to the activities of this minority. To Rekhess, radicalization is not only applicable to groups who work outside the political system, but also to political groups who work in Parliament. This view of radicalism is different from that of various authors, who understand radicalism as being the orientation of extra-parliamentary groups that work outside the state structure and call for complete separation from Israel. For these authors, political parties are not radicalized, but rather, politicized, or adaptive. That is, though political parties’ views may be interpreted as radical, their working within Israel’s political system must be noted as a distinguishable factor from groups or individuals who refuse to work within this system. Such scholars define the
Around the same time, Israeli officials started to publicly emphasise the ‘substantive change’ of deep Arab anxiety about the threat from Iran. Amos Gilad, the influential direc- tor of the Defense Ministry’s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, pointed to opportunities for enhanced relations with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, based on common threat percep- tion. Saudi irritation with the Palestinians was another factor after King Abdullah brokered the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas in February 2007, only to see it collapse a few months later. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, attended the Annapolis Con- ference that November but stated that normalisation of relations with Israel would come only as a result of peace and not before it. A clearer sign of the improving relationship was Olmert’s agreement to include Saudis in a committee of religious leaders administering the Muslim holy places on Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif, which had long been the preserve of the Jordanian government, a status enshrined in the 1994 Peace Treaty. Prince Turki bin Faisal, former head of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) and ambassador to London and Washington (after Bandar), took to participating in track II fora with former and serving Israeli officials. One held in Britain in October 2008 focused on reviving the API. It was billed as a private event but was reported in Israeli media. 73
This study suggests that the Israeli public is anticipat- ing severe outcomes of a war taking place in Israel in all layers of its societal fabric, including the impact on the family’s routine. Despite enduring this threat for de- cades, the notion of war remains intimidating to most Israelis. It is therefore not surprising that responders tend to alienate themselves from the risk. Responders in our survey increasingly refused to answer items as they became more specific to their personal well-being. Potentially, this could be explained as a basic mechanism of denial, and could account for much of the findings presented in this paper: a perception of a severe threat may lead to denial-based coping mechanisms that are exhibited in a reduced perception of likelihood. This serves to further illustrate the difficulty in motivating the public to engage in preparedness behavior. In this context, it is also interesting to note that people residing in areas affected by armed conflict up to 2013, i.e., the north or south of Israel, are also less keen on assuming personal responsibility for preparedness behavior. This finding suits the suggested explanation that repeated experience with the threat could be counterproductive in promoting individual motivation for an engagement in preparedness behavior.
In her own memoirs, Thatcher writes that she timed her visit to coincide with Peres‘s term as Prime Minister. She felt that ―it was a great pity‖ that under the Israeli coalition rotation arrangement, he would soon be replaced by ―the hardline‖ Likud leader. 5 The FCO was greatly concerned about the regional stalemate, and the consequent danger of the radicalization of Arab states which threatened renewed conflict. 6 On this basis, Squire argued that Thatcher‘s visit to Israel was a timely opportunity to break the status quo. In a cable to London, he noted that Thatcher‘s standing was very high in Israel – in particular, after her support for the US raids on Libya. Thatcher‘s influence with President Reagan and King Hussein together with her strong stand on terrorism would therefore enable her to say unpalatable things to the Israelis that would be regarded from others as unwelcome interference in domestic affairs. He expressed the hope that the Prime Minister would send a ―tough message‖ to the Israelis on the need for a realistic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict which would take Palestinian nationalistic aspirations into account – a failure to do so would undercut moderates like Peres. Squire added that Thatcher had an opportunity to shape the debate in Israel. 7 This underlined the fact that the FCO was hoping for cooperation from Thatcher with a view to strengthening the domestic standing of Peres.
fireball unless scattered or absorbed. At thermal fluencies above 10cals/cm2 large fires can start in urban areas  although there is much debate about the level needed for mass fires [11-13]. When deto- nations result in a fireball completely below cloud level, the thermal effect can double or in extreme circumstances it can quintuple . Consequently the estimates of casualties in our scenarios could be very conservative. Clouds above the fireball produce multiple reflection paths resulting in more omni- directional thermal radiation, which produces fewer radiation “shadows” from buildings. This increases burn casualties and amplifies fire ignition probabilities. Even a few large clouds in the sky, supplemented by strong thermal winds and blast damage, could greatly increase the probability of local fires starting and sub- sequently spreading. Indeed, the intensity of fire damage can vary greatly, such as the lack of a fire- storm in the second atomic bomb at Nagasaki owing to terrain features. It is a point in fact that incendiary bombing in the Second World War in Germany at
Shmona in Israel’s Galilee led to an Israeli assault into Lebanon. The raid aimed to break Hizbullah’s ability to attack Israel by destroying its camps, supply lines, arms depots and fighters. When an Israeli Defense Forces missile struck a UN compound in the village of Qana, killing more than a hundred civilians, worldwide condemnation pushed Israel to the negotiating table. On April 27, Israel and Hizbullah reconfirmed the 1993 ceasefire terms designed to limit Israeli and Lebanese civilian injuries. The agreement also established a follow-up committee composed of the United States, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and France to deal with complaints from any party about alleged ceasefire violations.
This is qualitative research of the type known as a case study. Case studies are normally conducted in the context of human activity at a particular time and place, seeking to understand a phenomenon that is part of the everyday fabric (Behrendt, 2017; Fuadiah & Suryadi, 2019; Kalu & Norman, 2018; Stake, 2005; Utami, 2019; Yin, 2012)—violence against teachers in the education system. Thus, the researcher uses a “holistic approach” (Abuhav, 2013), focusing on un- covering, learning, and understanding the inner world of one’s “subject”, from the subject’s perspective (Toval-Mashih, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). In this approach, behavior is examined from the subject’s point of view, that is to say, definitions, beliefs, values, and ideologies (Pelto & Pelto, 1978). Most of the re- search field work is based on ethnographic, structured in-depth interviews as a primary source of information that enables the interviewee to tell his story freely while remaining focused on the research questions (Kapel-Green & Mirsky, 2013; Shkedi, 2011; Fontana & Frey, 2005; Maman, Farag-Falah, & Tkhawkho, 2018). A researcher assistant conducted the interviews in the Arab community where she lives with six teachers from the “Narkis” School, aiming to discuss their personal experience of student violence (Spradley, 1979). She contacted them with familiar acting teachers and interviewed them on face to face basis (Lamsa, 2019) in their home. Each interview took about 50 minutes. The inter- views were conducted in Arabic and were recorded throughout the interviews. As a matter of ethical confidentiality, the names of the teachers used here are fic- titious (Table 1).
The importance of nanoscience and nanotechnology, and its positive effect on the technological and medical developments, obligate us to raise the awareness and knowledge about it in order to be in parallel with scientific ad- vancements. We believe that schools are the first starting point. That means, creating future generation with sufficient scientific awareness and parallel to the leading scientific developments. In 1852 John Dewey stated “If we teach today’s students as we taught yesterday’s, we rob our children of tomorrow.” However, it is well known that often teachers teach as they were taught. As Putnam & Borko (2000) explained: “How a person learns a particular set of knowledge and skills, and the situation in which a person learns, become a fundamental part of what is learned.” (Putnam & Borko, 2000). To achieve this goal, it is desired to examine as the first step the awareness, knowledge, and at- titudes towards nanosciense and nanotechnology among teachers and stu- dents. In this article we focused on the Arab sector in Israel which represents about 20% of Israel’s population.
It is noteworthy that none of the participants in the present study described their pupils as an interface agent. This may be explained by the students being so involved in their new chal- lenges and the stress they were under that only further along the line will they be open to learning about the pupils who will be in their classes. Professional literature is rife with the term “re- ality shock” to describe the transition to field work, which is often thought of as dramatic and traumatic (Adams, 1982). The shock experienced by beginning teachers is not merely for the short term, but marks the start of internalizing a complex reality that demands from its participants continuous learning and familiarity with new elements, especially during the initial stages of student teaching (Lzovsky & Schrift, 1992). Not re- ferring to their pupils can also be attributed to the cultural con- text reflected in the teaching models the participants in the study were exposed to and internalized as students, which are a significant influence on their personal and professional devel- opment (Reichenberg & Sagi, 2003); and by the nature of Arab society, in which school children are of marginal importance and teachers are mainly concerned with meeting the expecta- tions of parents and other teachers (Dwairy, 2001). This may have influenced the participants, resulting in them not focusing on their pupils.
Apart from looking at the usual happiness determinants we will look at some additional factors, viz., religiosity, immigration, ethnicity, and the effects of war. In the literature there are many studies on the impact of religiosity on happiness, but most of those studies are found in the psychological and sociological journals (see Cohen (2002), Clark and Lelkes, (2005), (2009), Helliwell, (2003), Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer, (2007), Heady et al. (2010), Snoep (2008)). The main result of these studies is that religiously more active persons (mostly defined in terms of church attendance) tend to be happier. These results mostly refer to Christian religions, while our study focuses mainly on Islam and Judaism, two religions that can deeply impregnate the believer’s life style. Clearly, within the two religions we find a lot of gradations, ranging from ultra-orthodoxy to atheists all but in name, but it is obvious that especially for the more conservative members Islam and Judaism stand for a complex of lifestyles, ethics, and norms that deal with important issues such as one’s clothing, food, time usage, obligations with respect to the family, and procreation. In our data set we have information regarding the degree of religiosity in terms of being more secular, conservative, or ultra- orthodox.
Arab MKs have never held meaningful posts in the Knesset. Until the Twentieth Knesset, no Arab MK was appointed speaker, coalition chair, leader of the opposition, opposition whip, or committee chair, except for the two MKs who chaired the Internal Affairs and Environment Committee for part of the Knesset term, on behalf of their party (MKs Salah Tarif and Raleb Majadle in interviews with the author). Only now has an Arab been named chair of the Committee on the Status of Women and Gender Equality; she is already complaining that there are elements attempting to minimize her authority and remove central issues from the committee’s purview (MK Touma-Sliman in an interview with the author). Nor has an Arab MK ever served on important bodies such as the Judges’ Nominations Committee or on a parliamentary committee of inquiry that does not focus on the Arabs. The clearest indication of the Arab MKs’ weakness is the gross under-representation of Arabs on the Knesset payroll: only 2.5% in 2015, 11 far below the average for government ministries (9% that year, when Arabs are 20% of the population).
An important underlying factor that has perpetuated neglect of this issue in the policy analysis of Palestinian development relates to the manner in which it has been treated in most of the literature: that is, as a subtheme of an Israeli development experience rather than as a feature of the broader conflict. Much of this literature, dominated by Israeli academics, is devoted to trying to reconcile the subordinate status of Palestinian Arabs in Israel with an assump- tion of their inevitable eventual “integration” as equal citizens into the Israeli state and hence their access to equal opportunities in the national economy. The methodological acrobatics required to sustain such a suspension of be- lief are impressive. To explain persistent Arab-Jewish economic inequality in Israel, a range of socioeconomic factors have been cited, including the flight of Palestinian urban elites in 1948; resistance of the Palestinian fellahin to Is- raeli modernization; the market forces that pulled Israel into the liberalized global economy and left behind “stragglers”; and (in more recent studies) the linkage between the Palestinian minority’s perpetually low occupational status and educational achievements. Cause and effect are often reversed in the quest for an economic narrative that fits with Israel’s democratic credentials so as to buttress the notion of equal rights and opportunities for all citizens.
The activities reported by teachers concerning the development of students’ thinking creativity (discussion and brainstorming sessions, solving open-ended problems, posing open-ended questions when introducing or revising the material, and other methods) are supported by research literature. Many authors (Conclin & Williams, 2011; Cheng, 2011; Cropley, 2001) argue that in the recent decades, the most popular method to increase creativity has been teaching on divergent thinking and the idea-generation strategies. In the current study, teachers seemed to understand the importance of developing students’ abilities like seeing existing situations in new ways or combining components to form something original, but acknowledged that tasks involving divergent thinking were not frequently used due to the curriculum pressure. Teachers placed an emphasis on the idea-generation strategies through discussions and brainstorming sessions, concurring with the suggestions that the above activities have been very effective ways for developing creativity in thinking (Conclin & Williams, 2011; Cheng, 2011; Cropley, 2001; Plucker & Runco, 1999). Some authors (Isaksen & Gaulin, 2005; Brown & Paulus, 2002; Sutton & Hargadon, 1996) suggest, however, that group brainstorming often produce fewer good/relevant ideas than those generated by individual brainstorming. Teachers in the current study pointed to the significance of group brainstorming in Arab schools, both for the development of creativity in thinking and for the ability to voice their opinions. The importance was emphasized of turning Arab students from quiet, passive learners into active performers in the classroom. Teachers also acknowledged that brainstorming was new to them and that they had to learn more to make it more effective.
governing coalition by beginning to radicalize their campaign messages by the definition of radicalization formed by Bochler and Szocsik in their study of the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia. According to Bochler and Szocsik, radicalization is when an ethnic party promotes more ethnically based demands that stray from the political mainstream, but the radicalization in Israel is an adoption of a more ethnically based identity that strays from the political mainstream. 104 The phenomenon has been evidenced in more recent elections dating from 2003 onwards which can partially be attributed to the shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the nationwide political shift in recent years. After the Oslo Accords and the formation of the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli public began to believe it was beginning a post-Zionist age, and the Israeli Arabs began to believe they may play a more important role in Israeli politics. They began to be dissatisfied with the current Israeli politics when their prediction failed to occur. In the 1999 election, the Israeli Arab public believed that they would have the decisive role in the election for prime minister and therefore be included in a governing coalition. However, because the winner Ehud Barak won due to a large Jewish electorate, he did not include an Israeli Arab political party in the coalition. The omission left the Israeli Arab electorate feeling bitter. 105
The Middle East region covers many countries extending from the Arabian Sea in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west. The stock markets in the Middle East have achieved positive development during the last decade. This study focuses on the three Arabic stock markets, namely, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, as well as that of Israel. The Arab countries are classified as low to middle-income by the World Bank. Israel is classified as high income country. Table 1 reports the main economic indicators for these countries. These countries have relatively active stock markets compared to other markets in the region.
Unfortunately, Israel has been frequently subjected in recent history to an open war situation, at least in some Northern and Southern regions. This was also the case in 2006. In order to estimate the effect of such situations, we analyzed the 2006 sample, by dating the interviews with regard to the Lebanon War period (July 12 to August 14, 2006). We compare the responses during the war and in the after-war period (August 15, to the end of 2006, including the period of 48 days from the ceasefire to the completion of the pull-out of Israeli troops from Lebanon) to the responses before the war (January 1 to July 11). Therefore we include the logarithm of the war days at the time of the interview and its square. We take the log because we assume a habituation effect the longer the war is lasting. We admit for a log-quadratic effect as sentiments may accrue to a maximum and ebb off thereafter or inversely. For the same reason we admit for such a log-quadratic effect for the period after the ceasefire. We do this both for life and for financial satisfaction. We assumed a parabola- like effect, decreasing at first and increasing later on for the Jewish population, and the inverted U - shape for the Arab population. We also include geographical dummies for the two northern regions, hardest and second-hardest hit by Hezbollah during the war.