the Turkish request for membership in NATO, Strang said that this was a very complicated question to which the ForeignOffice was giving thought. Thus it was important to know ‘whether the United States would be willing to assume the further commitment involved in Turkish membership.’ 546 Third, during the meeting at Strasbourg between Bevin and the new Turkish Foreign Minister two days later, Koprulu, Bevin’s tendency to follow the American decision was obvious when he asked Koprulu whether he had discussed this proposal with the United States government. 547 Fourth, every time the Turkish Ambassador to the UK, Açikalin, frequented the ForeignOffice and raised the question of Turkey’s desire for inclusion in NATO, the officials who had the meeting with him such as Pierson Dixon (Head of the offices of Deputy Under- Secretary of State, ForeignOffice), Strang and Bevin kept giving the same answer: that this matter was under discussion and it would depend upon the view of the United States government. 548 Moreover, the British Ambassador to Turkey, Charles, also spoke in similar terms when Koprulu and the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, asked him about this matter. 549 Strang and Rumbold also maintained the same answer when other NATO members, such as France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands asked them about the BritishForeign Office’s thoughts on Turkey’s application to join
London was not prepared to listen and, indeed, wished to put an end to the expression of views that seemed to run counter to the main tenets of Britain's policies in southeastern Europe. C.H. Bateman suggested to Sargent that "a short reply would be sufficient to point to the confusion of thought which appears to exist at our legation at Sofia on this Macedonian question." Otherwise, his comments, which were drafted by Sargent into a letter to Sperling, reveal a characteristic British slighting of nationalism and national movements among the so-called "small" and "young" peoples in eastern Europe. He argued that just because the Slavs of Macedonia called themselves Macedonians, "there was no reason why We or you should consent to give them a name which coincides with a piece of territory… which has not for a thousand years been an autonomous entity in any sense…" However, he could not come up with another, more acceptable name for them, except perhaps "Macedo-Slavs," which was in effect the same thing. Such intervention and argumeilts do not seem to have been sufficient to silence the legation at Sofia. At any rate, R.A.C. Sperling left Sofia shortly after, and his successor-, Sidney P.P. Waterlow, held views on the Macedonian problem that were, if anything, even more revisionist. He expressed them most cogently in a long, thoughtful and courteous letter to R.G. Vansittart, who had in the meantime become permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs. He did not believe, as the ForeignOffice did, that the Macedonian problem would simply disappear when the militant revolutionaries had been destroyed in Bulgaria and when Yugoslavia had provided the Macedonians with good administration and a civilized minority regime. Unlike Nevile Henderson, Kennard's successor as minister at Belgrade, he could not see how any amount of good administration, even if it would improve the atmosphere and facilitate the suppression of the IMRO, could be an ultimate solution. He argued that only genuine home rule-freedom to manage local affairs, churches, schools, etc.-could do that, but even here he had doubts. In any case, he seemed convinced that Belgrade was not capable of giving its Macedonian subjects anything like real local autonomy or, at least, not so long as the Macedonians considered themselves Macedonian.
Globalization, some have argued, has created a borderless world by breaking down the physical barriers to the movement of people, products and ideas. Technological advance further facilitates the free circulation of information. Despite their obsession with the past, historians, archivists and publishers in the history field have not been slow to embrace the new digital technology. In the past two decades or so, many digital resources for history, covering both primary and secondary sources, have been published. Gone were the days when historians had no choice but to travel to overseas archives or libraries for research. One of the latest digital resources is ForeignOffice Files for China  sourced from The National Archives at Kew by Adam Matthew Digital Ltd. Published in three sections (1949–56; 1957–66; 1967–80) over 2009–2010, this collection is the most comprehensive set of BritishForeignOffice/Foreign and Commonwealth Office documents on China available in digital and print forms.
In addition to continually reminding their readers of the vague nature of the complaints against the Renan governawnt, the Review also emphasizes the deep wad vivid sense of foreign inter vention apparently felt by these saaw people who were overly criti cal of the Pope's administration. These interventions, it is ex plained, were occasioned by upset conditions which resulted from the corrupting influence of French revolutionary principles and the oppressive nature of Austrian interference: that is to say, the powers who came to put down disorders were themselves greatly responsible for those disorders. Rome's reliance on Austria, which had come about through the disturbances of the French revolution and Napoleonic Wars, had led to the association of the Roman Govern ment with the despotism of Austria. But, Finlayson tells us, in March 1854, at the very time this unhappy association was being formed in the minds of Italians, the Pope himself was suffering,
There are a number of reasons why Labour MPs would have been less equipped to offer lucrative services to outside interests. In addition to the fact that they held power less often during the period we examine, their socialist policy platform (particularly in early years) was for the most part inconsistent with the interests of regulated firms. While firms might have wanted to buy the support of opponents (Dixit & Londregan 1996), the penalties resulting from being found to serve corporate interests were extremely high for many Labour MPs – a lack of support from the party and likely an end to union sponsorship (Stewart 1958). Further, while Labour MPs had access to Labour ministers and therefore to civil servants, they generally came to office with much more limited connections in business than their Conservative colleagues. Not only would this make it more difficult for Labourites to access opportunities outside of Parliament, but it would make them less valuable to business, for whom the combination of government and private sector connections of many Conservative politicians was particularly valuable.
The income derived by a permanent establishment usually consists of (i) income attributable to the permanent establishment (attribution rule), (ii) income of the head office from the activities which are similar with that of the permanent establishment (either sale of goods or furnishing services) (force of attraction rule) , and (iii) income that is effectively connected with the permanent establishment effectively (effectively connected income rule) – (see List of Table – Table V for details of each tax treaty’s applicable rules).
4.11 Where the flight is for hire or reward, prior approval must be obtained from the Department for Transport (DfT), International Aviation & Safety Directorate, Great Minister House, 76 Marsham Street, London SW1P 4DR (Tel: 0207 944 5847 or fax: 0207 944 2194), and not the CAA as specified for British aircraft in paragraph 4.2. However, the DfT does not require airlines licensed by European Economic Area (EEA) countries (i.e. EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) to seek their permission for flights, which the Department may permit without DfT approval if they are in accordance with EC Regulation 2408/92. When the flight is to or from a place outside the United Kingdom, the requirements of Paragraphs 4.12 to 4.15 are to be observed.
The political scenery is in turmoil and Damaskinos is trying to balance on adversary powers that fight for their predominance and to undermine him. The British government, with Churchill as prime minister, is planning its next moves, having “arranged”(fixed), with the agreement of Yalta Conference (04-11/02/1945) the geopolitical position of Greece. The handling of the issue of Greece by Churchill, by writing hastily in a scrap of paper (that was given to Stalin) the partitioning of Greece into vague zones of influences, 90% for Britain and 10% for Soviet Union, was a highly controversial event (criticized even by the Americans) raising a plethora of questions: why 90% and not 85% or 95% and why British allowed for Soviet Union to have some kind of influence in the strategic peninsula of Greece and finally why all this controversial bargaining – looking like an old type grocery list - was taking place behind the back of the Americans?. Evidently, the percentages themselves had no other meaning except to register and secure a Soviet zone of influence in Greece so as this to give a pretext to the British to proceed with their plans of initiating a civil strife in Greece. Without an adversary with a strong and somehow “legalized” international support the communist uprising would have no chance to seriously challenge the national (right-wing) army of Greece. Many analysts from Greece are accusing Britain of its dubious and cynical policies in Greece that caused a civil war with hundreds of thousands of victims and tremendous social and economic hardships. Britain, after all, was defending its interests there with the way so many other powers in so many other circumstances did in the past, the Greek Empire of medieval times included. It was the responsibility of Greeks to fight the symptoms of a long and lethal decay (corruption, extreme political inefficiency and antagonisms, easy subjection of the political system to foreign orders from whatever direction etc) and to impose a “cleaning” on their backyard.
In no area is the American imperial agenda more positively invoked than by neoconservatives and like-minded strategists who see an American embrace of its imperial role as the most effective means of combating global terrorism. According to Max Boot in “The Case for American Empire,” contrary to those who viewed the 9/11 attacks as a form of payback for unbridled American imperialism, in reality the terrorist attacks were the byproduct of insufficient American involvement abroad. Far from seeking isolationism and cautious engagement with foreign nations, Boot states that American foreign policy must become more expansive in its goals and assertive in carrying them out. He identifies American unwillingness to stay the course in Afghanistan in 1989 as the actual proximate cause of 9/11, and cites the successful example of “American liberal imperialism” in addressing fundamentalist radical tensions in the Balkans as proof that American intervention yields success where isolationism will always be doomed to failure. Boot draws direct comparisons between the British and American experiences in the Middle East, pointing out that American troops today follow the footsteps of generations of British colonial soldiers on campaigns in Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine, Persia, the Northwest Frontier (Pakistan). These lands themselves are not new witnesses to the presence of imperial authority—indeed the British originally entered the region to quell disorder from
Conservative MPs remained in favour of the missile, so the cancellation o f the TASM was out of the question. Just before the publication of the White Paper, officials from the RAF and the Navy reached an agreement to keep the TASM and leave the strategic Trident as a last resort.87 The 1991 White Paper ‘Britain’s Defence for the 90s’ maintained that the RAF would ‘continue to make our major contribution to the provision o f sub-strategic nuclear forces in support of NATO and to provide a national independent sub-strategic deterrent’. For this purpose, the government was ‘studying US and French options to replace [the free-fall nuclear bomb] around the end of the century with a tactical air-to- surface missile to deliver a British warhead’.88 To meet the budgetary demands, MoD ministers and officials decided to cut its civilian staff and the British troops in Germany.89 The decision was deeply unpopular with MoD troops and service suppliers. However, it allowed the MoD to keep its options regarding the future of the TASM open. The first stage of the debate, thus, ended without a major policy review by any o f the members of the British multilevel foreign policy network. However, the international opposition to the TASM had shown some impact on NATO where the British government had to accept a series of decisions which put the future role of the TASM for Europe’s nuclear defences increasingly into question. The pressure from many of the continental European governments had also weakened the rationale of the missile for the US government. In the following months this would lead to the first preference changes which resulted in President Bush’s cancellation of the American TASM in autumn 1991. The North Atlantic Council and NATO’s integrated staff followed suit within weeks.
However, this changed following the world wars (Beech, 2011), which weakened British influence thereby forcing the Conservative Party to shift its rhetoric towards a diluted form of isolationist nationalism. Faced with these realities it adopted a policy of a ‘special relationship’ with the US, since the Empire and the Commonwealth help had been insufficient against Hitler (Beech, 2011). Even then, Beech (2011, pp. 351 - 352) warns that a strong sense of nationalism still outlines ‘the diplomatic sphere for some Conservatives’ party leaders in Foreign Policy. These Conservatives view the idea of the ‘special relationship’ as either a condescending fable or an overstated mischaracterisation. He makes a further intervention that even for those, who professed their high regard for the ‘special relationship’, like Thatcher doing so was posturing within domestic politics. This political rhetoric helped her highlight differences between the Conservative and Labour policies. From this perspective, Thatcher Conservatism aligned to tradition Tory contours of national interests. Finally, Beech (2011) concludes that the Conservative Party seems to have readied itself to break with the past by following foreign policy seen through both nationalism and internationalism. Although nationalism and realism are different concepts, in particular cases the existence of one presupposes the other (Mearsheimer, 2011), as is the case in British politics. Thus, utilising the same logic this is true for internationalism and idealism.
note (”Crowe’s celebrated note of 11th August”) marked the final triumph of Crowe’s long and consistently held view that the Franco-Belgian action was illegal. That the occupation was illegal is accepted hy Crowe and Corp as irrefutable, a fact proved hy the ‘magical effect’ of the note both in Germany (where law and order returned) and on Poincaré (who began to reconsider his demands for the unconditional cessation of passive resistance). The note should im m ediately have been followed up hy action, hut was not because of differences between Curzon and Baldwin. ? As will he shown, Crowe and Corp’s an alysis has m any w eakn esses. Crowe had not con sisten tly advocated declaring the Ruhr occupation illegal, and even when the 11 August note was sanctioned the ForeignOffice were aware that their arguments were shaky and had not decided what ‘separate action’ meant. The note’s effects on both France and Germany were had: in Germany chaos mounted and the Cuno Cabinet collapsed, while in France Poincaré remained unmoved. Key Cabinet ministers had always been unhappy with the note and therefore separate action after it was never really on the agenda anyway. Moreover, Crowe and Corp’s account, in common w ith those hy Bennett, W illiams, Uxbridge and Maisel, fails to address two key issues. First, why, if they were not going to act, did the B ritish make the threats of 11 August? Second, why, rather than simply not act, did the British then compound their problems by trying to move towards France?
This is clearly problematic for the role of great power, which is global in scope and requires acceptance by not only former EU partners Germany and France but also the US and other powers. Similarly, the leader of the Commonwealth role reaches broadly but lands awkwardly on those who would have to play the corollary ‘follower’ roles and who are instead seeking better trade deals. Britain would also have to overcome many obstacles to enact the role of global trading state, as individual countries might entertain trade deals with Britain but must also consider their relationship with the EU as a global economic actor. The regional partner to the EU role is challenged by EU-27 solidarity in its economic negotiations, and British efforts to highlight the value of security and counter-terrorism partnership can’t readily be separated from other regional partner dimensions. While the role of faithful ally to the US might be achievable for post-Brexit Britain, requiring the consent of only one major actor, its longer-term viability appears uncertain. Given the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ agenda this role is itself tinged with isolationism.
To illustrate the interpretive value of adding this distinction to the ES framework the paper is divided into four sections. The first elaborates on the ES approach, adapting it to illustrate how the competing conceptions of an appropriate liberal foreign policy fit into this scheme. The second section applies the analytical framework to help interpret and assess the shift in UK foreign policy under New Labour, focusing on how the 2003 decision to support the American- led invasion of Iraq can be understood as an extension of the critique of the UN system contained within the neoliberal position. The third section examines the impact of the Iraq War on elite discourse in the UK. The central claim is that a more cautious approach to the use of force and American unilateralism did not silence the neoliberal critique of the UN system; nor did it reverse the argument that liberal states have a responsibility to intervene to prevent humanitarian emergencies in other states. This is illustrated with reference to the continued advocacy of liberal interventionism by significant voices on the political left, as well as David Cameron‘s articulation of ‗liberal conservatism‘. It is also evident in the UK‘s response to the violence that accompanied the democratic uprising in Libya, which is examined in the final section of the paper. Liberals were, for the most part, united in the defence of this intervention because it was able to square the humanitarian imperative to protect civilians with the legal imperative of a UN mandate to use force. However, the accusation that the NATO-led coalition went beyond that mandate to pursue a more ambitious liberal agenda of ‗regime change‘, and that this caused a ‗pluralist counter-offensive‘ that includes emerging powers such as Brazil, South Africa and India, prompts the kind of reflection that divides neoliberal from liberal internationalists. The paper concludes by defending the Libyan operation against its critics but argues that there are aspects of the pluralist critique that cannot be dismissed by appeals to the superior moral authority of liberal democratic states.
textiles had, throughout the period of analysis, foreign, and in particular, British expatriate entrepreneurs involved as shareholders, top managers, or both. British expatriate entrepreneurs either acted as shareholders, or top managers, or both. This meant that strategic decision taking by these textiles firms took advantage of the knowledge provided by British expatriate entrepreneurs. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the British education system was more advanced than that in Brazil. British entrepreneurs were more likely to have superior technological and marketing knowledge, and also marketing skills, in particular marketing knowledge associated with the management of brands and distribution channels. They also had superior managerial knowledge of administrative processes such as the management of labour force and book-keeping. 71 British entrepreneurs and
The international and domestic landscape that emerged following the First World War created both old and new challenges for the Foreign Enlistment Act. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 revived debates in Britain regarding recognition, non-intervention, neutrality and the applicability of the Act. Following an attempted military coup in mid-July, Spain descended into violence, with the insurgents – eventually led by General Francisco Franco – seizing parts of the country and forces loyal to the Popular Front government holding on to others. The latter sought to purchase arms from the British government in late July. In London a consensus began to form among high-ranking British policy makers against aiding the increasingly weak government in Madrid. Conservative cabinet ministers and leading ForeignOffice officials expressed concern that Moscow would use the war to increase Soviet influence in Western Europe, resulting in the emergence of Bolshevism in the Spanish Republic. Meanwhile the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was concerned about the growing influence of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. He sought to contain the conflict and prevent a European conflagration. 89
Although British employees are not used to working for a company that is run both as a business and a political entity their view of Chinese state influence on SAIC is positive. They appreciate the visits made by several high ranking Chinese officials over the years. The Prime Minister, Wen Jiaobao visited in 2010 and the mayors of both Nanjing and Shanghai made visits to SAIC’s UK engineering centre in 2011 (Interviewee A5 2012). The company’s strong ties to the government mean that some of its decisions are taken for ‘‘the good of the country rather than the business” (Interviewee A4 2012). This is somewhat different to the way British organisations are run whereby most decisions are based on the company’s best interests. British employees are used to working in environments in which the state has little or no direct involvement. From their point of view some of the decisions made by headquarters may be not make commercial sense because other wider interests they are not aware of may have been taken into account during the decision-making process.
The theory of double consciousness does not explicitly account for the dynamics of power between groups. The previous F&C research carried out by the Army in 2004 (internal qualitative report) indicated that the F&C soldiers were judging their British counterparts by F&C values and standards which they felt were incompatible with and inferior to theirs (e.g. excessive use of alcohol and inappropriate language) . The basis of the theory is that the minority, less powerful, group self-evaluates against the values of the majority group and strives to demonstrate these, in addition to holding on to their own values, which can produce a sense of inferiority. However the theory makes no mention of a potential outcome where the minority group compares themselves against the more powerful out-group and rather than judging themselves by those standards, judge those others against their standards. Tajfel and Tuner’s (1979) coping strategies of less powerful groups, assists our understanding of this early finding. Lyubansky and Eidelson (2005) have tested this premise in a large scale survey of African Americans. Similar to Tajfel and Turner’s assertions, they identified that the group experiencing double consciousness will tend to believe that they are morally superior to the more powerful out-group. This research seeks to test that premise using the data collected. It will also explore whether there can be a reversal of this proposal where a more powerful group judges itself against the values and standards of a significant minority group, albeit a less powerful one. It can therefore be argued that critical to the application of this theory is the concept of perception and self-concept. .
Otlier solid evidence can be found from his colleagues’ comments, which were negative and controversial. For example, Eden generally took Van. ’s proposal as basis of policy- making, but he wrote in his memoirs, “I have never known one to compare with Sir Robert as a relentless, not say mthless, worker for the views he held strongly himself. The truth is that Vansittart was seldom an official giving cool and disinterested advice based on study and experience. He was himself a sincere, almost fanatical, crusader, and much more a Secretaiy of State in mentality titan a permanent official.” [Avon., p.242.J Cadogan remarked, “if he has any ideas or impressions, why can’t he put tliem down straight on paper, instead of dancing literaiy hornpipes?” “He pretends to be very slick and cute but 1 can’t see tliat he does, or has any idea of doing, anything!' [Cadogan's Diaries, p. 13.] However, Sir Warren Fisher, the head of the Civil Service, asked Lady Vansittart at a party to persuade her husband “not to write these long papers for the Cabinet. They don’t like it. ... He’s exceeding his functions.” [Vansittart in Office, pp. 147-148.] Remove of Van. was not only welcomed by liis colleagues, but also by his bosses. Chamberlain told his sister that “vûter all these montlis that S[tanley] B[aldwin] wasted in futile attempts to push Van out of tlie FO it is amazing to record that I have done it in 3 days.” [DBFP 2nd-XIX, N408 note 2; Middlemas, Diplomacy o f Illusion: The British Government and Germany 1937-39, London 1972, p.78 ]