As mentioned above, academics from different disciplines (criminology, sociology, political science, geopolitics, communication studies and government agencies) have begun to work together to push surveillance studies to a new and higher level. A recent collection of essays, Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity, edited by Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter (2005) emphasised the importance of studying in more depth the new dynamics of global policing and surveillance, and the demand for multi-disciplinary efforts in studying identity cards and passports. In his contribution to the book, Lyon focused on the British ID cards system and raised some questions for the future study of identity cards, for example, “How far are citizens involved in this process, and at what level?” “How accountable are the managers of these massive new systems on which the life-chances of so many are dependant?” (2005:80). Since, as Lyon noted, “the border is everywhere”, answers to these questions are urgently needed. This book contributed greatly to providing new directions for study among researchers in surveillance and identity documents studies. Sometimes asking good questions is more important than providing the answers. Morgan and Pritchard (2005) also analysed the surveillance panoptic effect in tourism, specifically in tourism industry – social sorting. Their work echoed Lyon (2002, 2004a)’s concern over the ‘social sorting’ that becomes so routine and automatic in our everyday life. In fact, Gandy (1993: 1) defines such “discriminatory process” as “panoptic sort”, which includes process “that sorts individuals on the basis of their estimated value or worth” and “reaches into every aspect of individuals lives in their roles as citizens, employers and consumers”. As Gandy (1993; 15) further argues, “the panoptic sort is a system of disciplinary surveillance” and involves three process: “identification, classification, and assessment”. Take the Britishnationalidentity card system in WWI for example, the first step was the compilation of a national registration, which covered UK population between the age of 15 and 65, which can be taken as ‘identification’ process; the second step was to sort the registered individuals into different groups – those who were eligible for military conscription, those who were skilful in engineering and manufacturing, those who were ‘suspicious’, and etc; finally, the ‘assessment’ process enabled the British government to organise and distribute human resources to various areas in order to achieve maximum effect in winning the war.
already under the control of the same ruler the Irish, English, Scots and Welsh had not developed into a British nation. Putting the confrontations and conflicts of the era at the centre of Britishnationalidentity formation, Colley concludes that the peoples inhabiting the British Isles ―came to define themselves as a single people not because of any political or cultural consensus at home, but rather in reaction to the Other beyond their shores.‖ (p. 6) Of course, it would be remiss to deny that others have reached different conclusions about the formation of British nationalism. Nairn (1981), for instance, in his influential collection of essays that make up The Break-up of Britain defines nationalism in general as ―the joint product of external pressures and an internal balance of class forces‖(p. 41). In relation to the development of British nationalism, he suggests that it ―suffered far less from external pressures and threats than any other‖ (p. 42). Though placing the emphasis on the internal dimension in his analysis, Nairn still considers the external dimension important and cites warfare as of particular relevance in the formation of British nationalism (p. 42). Both Nairn and Colley with their arguments about the past, the origin and development of British nationalism intend to illuminate the present. Nairn, identifies an overall backwardness and uneven development within Britain as the reason behind the ―territorial disintegration‖ and ―threat of secession‖ (1981, p. 14), the break-up of Britain. Colley explains ―a revival of internal divisions‖ (1992, p. 7) and a subsequent, though gradual unravelling of Britishness with the fact that former points of external conflict have disappeared or at least diminished well below the level of large scale warfare threatening the integrity of British territory. While I believe an internal dimension to be important—whether necessarily in Nairn‘s terms of class struggle is another matter—it is Colley‘s argument about the external dimension that I want to pursue here further.
In the era of nationalism and of ‘nation-states’, nationalidentity is not just a derivative of social and group identifications: it is a process highly organised and systematised through political organisation. That is because, and largely when, the nation is fused with the state. Nations that aspire for self- determination can have a high sense of nationalidentity, as the Kurdish and Tibetan examples indicate, but the actual realisation of their aspiration is a great leap forward. As the greatest difference of nations and ethnic groups lays in the formers’ capturing (or being captured by) the state, this also accounts for the greatest difference of national and ethnic identities. Nationalidentity is attributed in a sense and then constantly reminded by the organised means of the national state. National states often capture large territories, where common identities cannot be formed by local, direct contact; thus, it is the institutionalisation of the nation as national state and the constant scheduling of its maintenance and continuation that makes nationalidentity not really something essentially different, but certainly something more than ethnic identity. Some initial elements -crucial though- of one’s nationalidentity are internalised by the parents and the direct social environment of the infant during its first years of life. Thereafter, when the state undertakes the role to induce children with a stable, solid identity, it enhances and strengthens the whole process of national identification. This is mainly done so through education. Largely influencing are the mass media too, which both form and remind nationhood. In addition, the military apparatus and men’s (in most cases) military service, literature, political rhetoric etc. fulfill this role.
Consequently, in this period the in-group's conceptions of whiteness, mateship, the fair go, the digger, the battler and the mainstream values of the `ordinary bloke' became more solid by virtue of an identifiable group of people who did not partake of these typical Australian virtues. When as in the time of the White Australia policy, racism was overt, nationalidentity was a strong force for social cohesion and the notion was solid and less contested as the constituent elements of the out-group were clearly defined by skin colour. One element of the out-group was excluded from entering the country and the other was denied the same political rights as the in-group of white Australian citizens. Both elements of the out-group were thus kept at a distance, either physically or politically, all the while as the image of an out-group remained ensconced in the collective memory of in-group and strengthened the bond of community; the social function of nationalidentity was solid. Subsequently, post Second World War mass European immigration led to the adoption of state sponsored multiculturalism which according to my premise should then have weakened the in-group and out-group distinction. However, the background this group of immigrants was predominately Anglo-Celtic and wholly European, Christian and white. Although the arrival of this
While the current political atmosphere can be attributed to events over the past six monthsThe origin of identity in Montenegro and the desire for independence, lie deep in history. It represents the continuation of the movement of the inner centrifugal forces and simultaneously instigated from outside. These have existed since the old Yugoslavia, while these are deeply ingrained in the political institutions for the creation of identity in Montenegro.It is There are still internal public debates regarding the Montenegrin nationality and citizenship of this population. The issue of identity in Montenegro is closely related to the history and development of the country. The most controversial issue is related to the lack of historical continuity and is mainly argued in contesting its existence as an independent state or as a nation-state. The data show that there has been a movement of population with different national identities in the border regions of Montenegro. The issue of identity and crossing the border areas, especially when it comes to those places where borders were often the subject of discussion for change and population were found in situations where nationalidentity became increasingly fluid. The methodology of this study is based on indicators of the census in Montenegro in 1948, where the number of people who were registered as Montenegrins in Montenegro (declared Montenegrin ethnicity) was 90.67%; later on, it has been dropping to 67.15% in 1971 and to 61.86% in 1991; the number of citizens who declared themselves Montenegrin dropped sharply to 44.98% in 2011. Change of the declaration of Montenegrin ethnicity has been influenced by various factors and complex internal and external, including economic development, freedom of expression, increase of cultural level, as well as the interference of external factors (in 1948, break up relations with the Soviet Union). Determination of the elements that have contributed to the declaration of Montenegrin ethnicity is of interest herein.
Table 1. We apply logit regression analysis in columns 1 and 2, and OLS in columns 3 and 4. Data are from the World Value Survey, and include survey data from respondents in 4 waves from 1981 to 2004. Robust standard errors clustered by countries are in pa- rentheses, and all specifications include country and year dummies. The dependent vari- able “must radically change society” is a dichotomous variable that equals one when re- spondents state that “society should be changed in a radical manner” and those that say otherwise are coded zero. National pride is a dummy created from the WVS question: “How proud are you to be [e.g. French]?” with a scale from 1 to 4 (“very proud,” “quite proud,” “not very proud,” and “not at all proud”). We construct a binary main inde- pendent variable by coding 1 for “very proud” and 0 otherwise. The classification of non-democracy is based on the Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy 1800-2010. Micro-level controls such as respondent’s income quintile, age, age 2 , gender,
165 more willingly than with other people”. More recently, Miller (2000, 31-2), argued “that nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the modern world, namely how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction”. Such solidarity enables “people [to] feel themselves to be members of an overarching community, and to have social duties to act for the common good of that community, [and] to help out other members when they are in need” (ibid.). For Barry (2001, 83), nationality is important because it provides “the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities”. Barry, however, questions whether Britishidentity in particular is in fact rich or ‘thick’ enough for such purposes, suggesting that “British nationality is a very thin glue to rely on if one is concerned about social cohesion” (Barry 2001, 84). These identities can allow for a sense of belonging to ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991) in which members of such communities will never meet or know most of their fellow members. The fundamental argument underlying such claims is that some kind of meaningful common identity is needed to generate and sustain a sense of solidarity between people that are unlikely to generate such solidarity by other means, such as through face-to-face interaction. This solidarity in turn can help the stability of public institutions and the proper functioning of a democracy. Insofar as many such institutions and democratic politics happen to occur at the national level, a nationalidentity is important in generating the required solidarity.
corresponds to the presuppositions of the representation/construction of a nationalidentity), should also be examined by taking into account the contemporary countervailing forces of globalisation at work. Following concerns about the perceived consequent loss of local culture and values (Geraci, 2009, cited in Teskey and Alkhamis, 2016, p. 110), some contemporary museums increasingly ‘reflect a desire to protect and promote the heritage that is central to the conception of nationhood’ (Teskey and Alkhamis, 2016, p. 110). Here it appears that the national in a sense resists the global: national museums seem to resist the contemporary global standards for social and cultural inclusiveness. However, there is controversy here, as national museums are in a process of democratising their meaning making practices; democratising in the sense that Mulcahy (2006) explains (a) the ‘democratisation of culture’ i.e. ‘equal opportunity for all citizens to participate in publicly organised and financed cultural activities’ (Dueland, 2001, p. 41) e.g. low cost performances and exhibitions; promotion of equality of aesthetic opportunity via public art education and the promotion of certain forms of cultural programming that are deemed to be a public good (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 269) and (b) ‘cultural democracy’, i.e. respect and recognition for cultural diversity, as well as substituting a pluralistic for a monocultural concept (Mulcahy, 206, p.270).
Iris recognition is very difficult to perform at a distance larger than a few meters and if the person to be identified is not cooperating by holding the head still and looking into the camera. However, several academic institutions and biometric vendors are developing products that claim to be able to identify subjects at distances of up to 10 meters ("Standoff Iris" or "Iris at a Distance" as well as Princeton Identity's "Iris on the Move" for persons walking at speeds up to 1 meter/sec) . Iris recognition solutions mainly are for criminal investigation, immigration control, and national identification systems in different regions around the world (see figure 8).
selected. Different criteria would apply to different types of collections, as prints and drawings, manuscripts, rare books, sound recordings, printed books, loose archives, seals, paintings, globes and map cabinets (to mention but a few) would all need different ways of packing (specified by the BL) and transportation. In the end five different firms were employed to move different parts of the collections. Also the quantity of material to be moved and the speed of moving would vary according to the material itself, but also ac- cording to the idiosyncracies of the source buildings − all in central London, all with local access and traffic problems. The best-known and most troublesome building to move out of was the British Museum, where mean- while local alterations and extensive re-building had to take place, occasional- ly obstructing and frequently disrupting the book moves. Negotiations with BM colleagues and their contractors started friendly enough, but became ex- tremely fraught towards the end.
The second group of refugees who were victim of the overall policy of repatriation, were the Jewish holocaust survivors that were scattered around Europe (Kushner & Knox, 1999). Many of them had nothing left. No belongings, no family, no home, and often not even a country that was willing to protect hem. Anti-Semitism was still present on the European continent and many people were all but fond of Jewish refugees returning or resettling in their country (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986). Scapegoating and hostilities were to be found throughout all of Europe. Especially in eastern European countries the public opinion of Jewish refugees was dire, mainly because five years of anti-Jewish Nazi propaganda had fueled centuries-old anti-Semitic feelings among eastern Europeans (Kochavi, 2001). Security wise, the populace felt threatened, because during the war many of them acquired former Jewish property. When the war was over, they were afraid of losing their newly acquired possessions to Jewish returnees. Unfortunately, this resulted in many violent episodes (Kochavi, 2001). A grave example of this comes from Kielce, a Polish town where in the summer of 1946 some forty Jewish holocaust survivors were killed and about seventy-five were badly injured by an angry Polish mob (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986). Events like this happened on a daily basis in the years after the end of WWII. Finally, it was not only anti-Semitism that turned European public opinion of Jewish refugees in a downward spiral. It was the Zionist movement that made things even worse, for they presumably used the grim Jewish situation to press the international community for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (Kochavi, 2001). They did this, by stating that they would instigate Jewish refugees to commit acts of violence or disrupt the public order if the Allies would not help them with opening up Palestine for immigration (Kochavi, 2001). News reports of Zionist militants in Palestine attacking British subjects by a campaign of terrorism even fueled more hate and racism among the British and other Europeans, who were afraid that these terrorist attacks would also spread throughout Europe. This furthermore negatively influenced European public opinion for they felt that national security was at stake (Greenslade, 2005).
We demonstrate empirically that national pride positively impacts welfare. Works such as Frey and Stutzer  and Frey  indicate that subjective well-being (e.g. level of happiness or life satisfaction) is a satisfactory approxi- mation of utility. As scholars often measure welfare using utility, we therefore proxy welfare using respondent happiness. We use integrated data from the Eu- ropean Value Survey (EVS) for 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008, which is a compre- hensive dataset that contains information on interviews conducted with respon- dents from 48 countries (mainly European), on opinions, beliefs, ideas, stated preferences, attitudes, and values related to family and work issues as well no- tions about religion, politics, as well as society 1 . We estimate the following using
Rather specifying categories such as age, gender or ethnicity, my criteria for interviewees was involvement in ‘British Chinese’ or ‘Oriental’ nights, terms used by participants. All were attending or had attended university, though two had left without a degree. Six worked as promoters: GK Tang and Wayne Chang were in their twenties; Jon Bock, Johnny Wan and James Baxter were in thirties, while George Lee declined to specify his age. The other participants were Jay Differ (19), a hip-hop artist, Kevin P’ng (23), formerly a club promoter and now a DJ and Jon Man, an attendee of parties and Steven Ip, a website editor and DJ, who were both in their thirties. All were London-based, except for Steven in Bristol, GK in Newcastle and James in Nottingham. Participants reflect that this nightlife scene is concentrated in London and dominated by heterosexual men, who might be described as ethnically Chinese. Yet, over the course of our interactions, participants spoke of their ethnicities and backgrounds in various ways. Jay introduced himself as ‘half Chinese half Vietnamese’, Kevin said his family were ‘Malaysian Chinese’ and Jon Bock described himself as ‘born here, Malaysian Chinese’. Steven was Hakka and born in Glasgow, Johnny’s father was ‘Chinese from Malaysia’ and his mother from Hong Kong and Jon Man and Wayne both said their parents were from Hong Kong. George laughingly described himself as ‘tropical’, born Trinidad and Tobago, with a father from Hong Kong and a mother who is ‘three-quarters Chinese’. GK’s parents ‘were from Hong Kong, then they went to Holland’ where she was born. James Baxter, who runs a club with ‘a British-born Chinese’ (hereafter, ‘BBC’) and a ‘migrant from Malaysia’ said he was white English, but, having lived in Asia, found it ‘difficult to integrate properly with English people’. His inclusion highlights the multiraciality of these nightlife spaces.
countries, businesses and organizations have an ‘innovation imperative’ in which innovation is deemed necessary for both growth and survival. These imperatives are paralleled by government policies, which seek to encourage innovation in order to achieve economic and other goals (e.g. Oram 2001; OECD 2005). In contributing to knowledge about innovation, researchers have contended that culture is a significant factor influencing national rates of innovation (e.g. Nakata and Sivakumar 1996; Shane 1992; Shane 1993). Understanding culture is, therefore, becoming increasingly important in efforts to support innovation. We utilized discourse analysis and cultural consensus analysis to build models of New Zealand culture, nationalidentity and innovation identity in order to gain insights into the wider social context in which New Zealand innovation is situated. In this way New Zealand’s strengths and weaknesses with respect to innovation can be identified.
In addition to a sense of loss within the family, many MSW experienced a ‘Lack of recognition’ and resistance from within the military community to acknowledging the legitimacy of their military service, with the potential to affect long-term health and wellbeing (Feldman & Hanlon, 2012, p.216). MSW experienced a loss of professional role and personal and professional identity upon their return from deployment. Lack of recognition and disrespect from the military community served to ‘downgrade the value’ of their operational service, and diminished their experiences of pride and contribution (Conard & Scott-Tilley, 2014; Feldman & Hanlon, 2015; Gutierrez et al., 2013). These experiences led to mixed emotions including grief, shame and anger, with the potential to leave returning MSW feeling ‘alone and empty’ (Mankowski et al., 2014). For many proud MSW, the welcome home, which might otherwise have provided validation for their service, was non- existent.
ties; MHRA: Medicines and Healthcare products Regula- tory Agency; MO: Migraine without aura; NSAIDs: Non- steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs; ONS: Office of National Statistics; PedMIDAS: Pediatric Migraine Dis- ability Assessment Questionnaire; P/GIS: Parent/Guard- ian Information Sheet; PIS: Participant Information Sheet; PM: Probable Migraine; REC: Research Ethic Committee; SOP: Standard Operating Procedure; WHO: World Health Organisation