The tasks of the budgetarypolicy define the methods of regulation of social and economic processes. In addition to the program-based approach, traditional methods of budget control are used in the development of a new budgetarypolicy: (a) The allocation of costs between different types of budgets within the budgetary system; (b) determination of permanently fixed income for each level of the budgetary system; (c) determination of taxes transferred from the higher-level budgets to the lower-level ones in order to balance the latter. These taxes are usually called regulatory taxes; (d) balancing the lower-level budget by providing it with financial support from the higher-level budget by means of irrevocable funds (grants, subventions, subsidies); (e) inter-budget lending in the form of a budget credit or a budget loan; (f) reduction of budget costs, including sequestration. The method of comparison and analogy and analytical method are also the basis for the study. The method of legal regulation in legal theory is considered the way of legal impact on the participants in public relations. Since budgetary law is a sub-sector of financial law, regulation of budget and financial relations is carried out through the same method - An imperative method. The imperative financial and legal regulation method is characterized by legal inequality of the parties, when authorities (governmental units, state and local governments and their officials) issue legally binding regulations; the execution of such mandatory requirements is ensured by coercive power of the government (Sumskaya, 2011; Official Website of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, n.d.).
This report examines the gender impact of Irish budgetarypolicy between 2008 and 2018. This exercise was designed to isolate the gender impact of tax and welfare changes, all else being constant. As such, the income changes presented should not be interpreted as actual changes for the period in question, from which it would be difficult to separate the policy effect from all other changes. In particular, changes to labour supply that could be expected in the context of changes to the One Parent Family Payment and Jobseeker’s Allowance and the introduction of the Back to Work Family Dividend are not possible to account for in this framework. Rather, we cleanly identify the effect of moving from one set of polices to another for the same population. Some important conclusions emerge.
Government law and policy, including fiscal measures such as the budget, must be based on human rights and must reflect Ireland’s ESC rights obligations. Not only is this what the Irish State legally signed up to when it ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1989; it is also good governance. ESC rights are not only concerned with how much the Irish State budgets and spends on areas such as housing, education and health judged against the resources it has, but also, importantly, how effectively and transparently it uses those resources allocated towards its stated human rights outcomes.
2 THE ROLE OF DEFAULT POLICIES FOR TAX AND WELFARE UPRATING There is wide variation in the default policies for year-to-year adjustment of tax and benefit policies along several dimensions. The starting point for many countries – including Ireland – has been that policy changes are announced on a discretionary basis, year by year: no systematic uprating rule is applied. However, the experience of high wage-price inflation during the 1970s and early 1980s led to changes in this procedure in a number of countries. One of the driving forces for this was the phenomenon known as ‘fiscal drag’ or ‘bracket creep’, i.e. high growth in nominal wages without concomitant increases in tax bands, leading to a higher proportion of income being taxed at higher rates. 5 Buchanan’s writings on public
The previous sub-section on political institution and the budget had briefly described the political or electoral system in the case of Malaysia. Related to this subject, this survey is very much interested to know from the respondents about the kind of political system which has existed in Malaysia since 1957 that has promoted good macroeconomic management and economic development through the budget policies. Should the current political system be maintained or transformed into another kind of political system to make or produce a good budgetarypolicy for the country. There are five questions constructed under this sub-section. Question 1 asks if the existing political system is effective in drafting and executing the budget plan. Only one MP did not agree and 11 MPs agreed that the current political system is effective in drafting and executing the budget (Table 12). In other words it means that the MPs agree that the current system should be preserved. Question 2 is whether the current structure of the budgetary formulation process is able to develop a good budget for the country, as depicted in Figure 1. 2 MPs did not agreed while 8 MPs agreed that the process should be maintained. Another issue which is quite relevant in respect to the budget is the timing and duration of the budgetary formulation process. Since early 2000 the duration of the process of budget formulation has been shortened. This is due to the Minister of Finance who had changed the tabling of the budget at the Dewan Rakyat from the month of November to September. The duration for budget preparation has been cut from 11 months to 9 months. We believe the rationale of the budget being tabled in September, is that members of the Dewan Rakyat would have enough time to debate the budget and the budget could be executed and implemented by late December of the year. All economic policies and disbursements of allocation will be implemented in December for the coming year. The execution and implementation of the budget will no longer begin in January of the new year, as practiced before year 2000. Based on the survey, 15 MPs agreed that the timing of budget formulation should be reviewed. The time frame or duration for preparing the budget should be longer i.e at least 10 months. The current process which takes about 9 months seems to be tiring some quarters or groups of people involved in the budget preparation including (some) MPs (backbencers) of the ruling government.
Because it was designed for efficient stationary regimes, the New-Consensus Macroeconomic governance carries several drawbacks when implemented in Keynesian non-ergodic regimes. As long as Keynesian unemployment is interpreted in terms of 'natural' rate, it serves as a macroeconomic policy target in such a way that the policy mix may anchor the system far from full employment. We develop an argument that suggests a Keynesian explanation (which involves inappropriate economic policy) of what New Keynesians have referred to as unemployment hysteresis. However, difficulties do not vanish when authorities adopt the Keynesian vision of the world, for policy makers also have to deal with uncertainty. In contrast with the automatic economic-policy rules of the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM), we put forward a Keynesian pragmatic and progressive approach, based on intermediate targets designed with respect to the confidence that authorities have in the chances of success (which depends on the context and moves with it). Monetary and budgetary-fiscal policy interactions are discussed in such a context. Even if the monetary policy ability to reduce interest rates and increase effective demand is doubtful, it matters indirectly through avoiding increases in interest rates when fiscal and budgetarypolicy aims to stimulate effective demand.
According to Merchant (1985), managers’ propensity to create budgetary slack is influenced from formation and application method of budgeting system. Onsi (1973) stated that budgetary slack arises from pressure and utilizing the degree of attaining budgeted values as a main principle for performance assessment. In another study (Halioui and Leclere, 2008), it is suggested that more attention on budgetary goals for rewarding and punishment, raises the occurrence of budgetary slack. Yücel and Günlük (2007) claimed that in an environment implemented tight budgetary control; performance will be negatively affected from this. Callahan and Waymire (2007) asserted that tight budgetary control is not effective on performance; however, optimum level of budgetary control will be more beneficial. Because it provides more information to the managers, and the more information improves the ability of managers to detect slack, accounting control system would reduce the budgetary slack (Lau, 1999). If members of organization notice this situation, they don’t attempt to create budgetary slack (Lau, 1999). If According to Lau (1999), if accounting controls are advanced and tight, budgetary slack will reduce. Van der Stede (2001, 2001) obtained consistent results with Lau (1999), and concluded that tight budgetary control provides decrement in budgetary slack. Hassel (1991) found that the effectiveness of accounting control could be different in multinational organization’s domestic and foreign units due to differences in their environment.
Tufte (1978) was among the first to provide evidence of electoral cycles focusing on direct transfers, while Frey and Schneider (1978a, 1978b) show increases in government expenditures prior to elections in both the US and the UK. Krueger and Turan (1993) find pre electoral fiscal manipulation in Turkey and Gonzalez (2002) identifies the presence of political business cycles in Mexico. Studies at the multi-country level include Ames (1987), who provides evidence of political cycles in government expenditures for 17 Latin American countries, Block (2002), who reveals pre-electoral expansionary fiscal policy in 44 sub-Saharan African countries and Schuknecht (1996), who provides similar results for 35 developing countries.
Brender (2005) points out that ethnic diversity negatively affects the level of economic activity in local authorities. He claims that one of the main reasons for this is the lack of trust between the groups. Brender also shows that the rate of arnona collection in non- Jewish local authorities is significantly lower than in Jewish ones. Other studies, which compare Jewish and non-Jewish local authorities, have demonstrated significant differences in their financial situations. Razin (1999) explains the differences as being the result of, among other things, the fact that Jewish local authorities are larger than non-Jewish ones (in number of residents) and that per capita independent revenues are higher in the Jewish local authorities. This hints at a difference in behavior between the local authorities, as well as in budgetary dynamics. In view of this, Model 2 was estimated with the addition of interactive variables 16 (slope dummies) for non-Jewish local authorities. According to this method, the
such relative price changes are considered exceptional and occur only in an unanticipated manner. Real rates are then also equaliszed within the monetary union. A first transmission channel for fiscal policies takes thus the form of real interest rate changes that affect the region as a whole. A temporary fiscal expansion results in a rising trend in real interest rates. In the perspective long-term adopted here, this effect is necessary to maintain the equilibrium in the goods and services market: the expansionary effect of fiscal policy must be accompanied by a decline in wealth private.
• More feedback is a strength of democracy, and today's technologies allow faster feedback, so that the speed of decision-making can be raised. Inequality and low growth heighten conflicts that make a democracy slow moving. Therefore conflict resolution strategies that focus on the common good, and not on specific groups will help. Mechanisms that resolve conflicts in ways that increase the surplus or growth are required. For example, giving free school meals or dry rations to girl students, illustrate how policy can improve returns to choices that raise human capital. The latter carries externalities for society that benefit all. Another example is if mandated contributions to a worker's welfare fund across industries 19 accompany laws that make it easier to fire workers. This illustrates another general way of solving the collective action problem: gainers should partially compensate short-term losers. If
However, one must be careful in doing so and must take into account the following con- siderations. First, fiscal policy is a continuum along time where governments can implement fiscal expansions (that can lead to budget deficits), or fiscal consolidations (that can lead to budget surpluses). An strategy of fiscal adjustment can be defined as the group of measures designed and implemented by any government with the purpose of reducing the budget deficit or improving the budget surplus, that actually succeeds in approaching to each other public revenues and public expenditures as a percentage of GDP. As such, years in which a fiscal ad- justment occurs are only a sub-sample of the fiscal policy implemented by any government along time. Therefore, if one is to study properly the economic and political determinants of fiscal adjustment strategies in particular, it is necessary to explore first the determinants of fiscal policy in general, in order to avoid a problem of “selection bias”. Secondly, as men- tioned above, whenever any government designs a strategy to consolidate is budget, it has to decide on the timing (when to launch the adjustment), on the duration of the adjustment epi- sode, and on its composition. Since the first two dimensions of any adjustment strategy have been already studied in depth elsewhere 1 , this article focuses specifically on the third dimen- sion (the budget’s composition), and it does so by answering consecutively to the two follow- ing questions:
A prediction of the model is that ﬁscal expansions tend to generate an intertemporal trade-oﬀ: positive ﬁscal shocks are expansionary in the short run but are likely to generate persistent adverse eﬀects on economic activity in the medium run, shading some light in the debate on the so called non-keynesian eﬀects. Remarkably, it is shown that the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy crucially depend on the type of monetary policy rule adopted by the central bank, providing a sound micro-founded rationale for the view, ﬁrst suggested by Sims (1988), that empirical studies on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy should explicitly take into account monetary factors. 6 Finally, simulation analysis supports the view that balanced-budget
managerial to act in accordance with the objectives to be achieved and will be better able to regulate behavior that can improve performance. Budgetary evaluation can motivate and create a positive attitude towards the goals that have been achieved. The results of the budgetary evaluation can be an improvement for the next budget planning, thus encouraging managerial parties to make greater efforts to achieve goals and correct mistakes. Budgetary feedback is the result of achieving budget goals. When the results of achieving budget goals are lacking, it will encourage the managerial to improve them. Conversely, when the achievement of budget objectives is achieved, the managerial side will be more active in maintaining and improving performance in achieving these budget objectives. Budget goal difficulty lead to higher efforts by the managerial side. The level of budget goal difficulty should be tight but can be achieved in order to motivate the managerial because they believe that the budget can be achieved.
A number of empirical studies address the question of whether or not fiscal rules have em- pirical effects on the budget balance and the level of public debt. Much of the work in this area focuses on federal states, most notably the United States, Canada and Switzerland. The sub-federal jurisdictions of these countries have some degree of fiscal independence and cross-jurisdictional variation in their fiscal institutions, while being less heterogeneous in other political, institutional or cultural dimensions than central government fiscal author- ities might be. As such, these federal states provide laboratory-like conditions for testing the impact of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes.