Nowadays, China has a better relationship with the United States comparing to the past because of economic interactions, such as the FDI. In fact, the United States has been investing in China for many years. Since China joined the WTO, it attracts foreign investment to come in and both China and the other countries achieved benefits from these investments. In fact, China is considered one of the largest suppliers and consumers in the world. Chow (2010) shows that China has become the second largest export countries since 2007 . In fact, no one would refuse to cooperate with China including the United States due to China’s tremendous market. For example, as a labour intensive country, China produces and exports cheap manufacturing goods, while the United States imports these goods and exports high- tech products to China. By doing this, the United States has surplus each year. Chow found that the US had a trade surplus with China of 2.7 billion in 1980. In other words, the United States is better-off by allocating most of its labour in high-tech industry because it has comparative advantage in producing high-tech products. It is the best strategy for making money because labour is much more expensive in America. This can indirectly prove China’s “win-win” strategy.
Institutional components may also play a role in explaining the differences between China and Mesoamerica regarding the performance of the outward-oriented development model. For example, the concentration of economic power is a distinctive feature of Mesoamerican countries as compared to China. 25 This concentration has led to economic inefficiencies because of a high incidence of monopolies, oligopolies, structural high- income inequality, large levels of social exclusion, and low internal demand. These conditions have become a serious impediment to balanced economic development in Mesoamerica because the economic benefits arising from the new opportunities offered by the globalization process have been reaped by only a small portion of the population. Corruption and weak institutions have also been persistent features of Mesoamerican countries, and these have hindered the consolidation of long-term policies or effective wealth-redistribution programs, thereby creating conditions for political and social instability.
The impact of China’s economic engagement in Africa is hotly debated. Some argue that it is neo-colonial in nature : almost exclusively about getting access to natural resources. Further, the inﬂux of competitive Chinese products, small-scale Chinese traders, and Chinese labour in in- frastructure projects is seen as a serious threat to African manufacturers, market vendors, and workers. In this view, Chinese engagement is unlikely to beneﬁt Africa’s long-term development (Marysse & Geenen 2009 : 392). On the other hand, the Chinese have regularly announced pledges of state-sponsored ‘ economic cooperation ’ with Africa. As part of these pledges, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is supporting the development of six (possibly seven) economic and trade cooperation zones in ﬁve (possibly six) African countries. Chinese enterprises have also set up a handful of industrial zones outside the MOFCOM programme. Chinese leaders describe these cooperation zones as an important measure to help African countries develop industries and expand local employment (People’s Daily 2010). Still, some worry that the zones might be primarily ‘ political ’ investments, linked to Beijing’s long-term geo-strategic ambi- tions, and unlikely to foster sustainable local development (Gayan 2008). Relatedly, others fear that they may be intended primarily for transship- ment of Chinese products, for relabelling and re-export to protected markets as ‘ African ’ products.
ECE would be a real threat to the prosperity, peace and security of cyberspace and the real world if it remains unregulated. Since ECE is a global problem, we should draw on the ideas and approaches for the international governance of other global public spaces, such as the aerospace and international waters. Historically, the governance of global public space is based on the consensus of major powers and the participation of various stakeholders. The creation of the norms and rules for cyberspace also need major countries to reach a consensus on the basic principles, such as the sovereign jurisdiction, the innocent passage, the freedom express and so on. The U.S. should not expect other major countries to acknowledge that the U.S. has the right to freely access and monitor others’ communication networks and the Internet in the name of anti-terrorism and at the same time prohibit, in the name of ECE control, other countries from engaging in similar activities. And China, with its increasing interests, capabilities, dependence and vulnerability with respect to cyberspace, will also be involved in the process of common governance, playing a
Until recently, regulating of the shadow banking system has been lax, perhaps due to the authorities’ recognition of the positive effects in fuelling economic growth as described above. There is little regulation of entrusted loans and bank acceptances. Under current capital rules, which are based on Basel II, banks do not need to set aside capital for entrusted loans, nor are they included in credit quotas imposed on banks. Capital requirements do apply to bank acceptances, but they are exempt from measurements used in calculating credit quotas. Therefore, entrusted loans and bank acceptances have become methods for circumventing capital requirements and/or loan quotas.
The fact that the overall difference between the total funding of the two groups is less than 4000 yuan (row 9) means one of two things: either students are nearing a funding saturation point, and students who received the 4000 yuan scholarships, therefore, do not feel the need to seek out as much additional funding; or that the students who received the 4000 yuan scholarships were penalized from receiving other funding, thereby reducing their additional funding vis-à-vis the control group. Both of these potential reasons are consistent with the analysis of Kipnis and Li (2010) that availability of funding for education in China, while unequal between the rich and the poor, is not particularly low overall compared to other nations. This finding is mirrored by the work of Yang (2010) and Loyalka et al. (2012) , who consistently show that poor students receive more aid than other students. This also suggests that additional scholarship programs, while potentially helpful, may be nearing a point of decreasing marginal returns at least at the midpoint of students' college experience (which was the period of time in which of our evaluation survey was conducted).
To conduct these analyses we first regressed the stereotype threat manipulation onto each of the possible mediators. Then we conducted a hierarchical regression with the potential mediator on the first block and the stereotype threat manipula- tion on the second block. As can be seen in Fig. 4, the part of anxiety that is not explained by evaluation apprehension may show some evidence of mediation of the stereotype threat manipulation in this experiment. The stereotype threat manipulation had a marginally significant effect on this part of anxiety, and this anxiety in turn was negatively related to performance, and when this variable was included with the stereotype threat manipulation in a regression analysis, the effect of the stereotype threat manipulation was somewhat weakened and was no longer significant. The test for the change in significance for the direct path from the stereotype threat manipulation to score on the test when anxiety was included in the analysis did not reach significance, however, Z ⫽ 1.08, p ⫽ .14. This result suggests that we have not found strong evidence of anxiety as a mediator of performance in this experiment. It does not, however, allow us to rule out anxiety as a mediator. Anxiety still might be a mediator of the manipulation in this experiment, particularly if it was measured with error (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). Self-efficacy and the part of evaluation apprehension that was not related to anxiety did not show evidence of mediation. There was no reliable evidence that self-efficacy was effected by the stereotype threat manipulation and self-efficacy did not predict test performance and, thus, there was no evidence that self-efficacy mediated the effect of the stereotype threat manipulation on women’s test performance. Also, even though evaluation apprehension was related to women’s performance, its being unaffected by the stereotype threat manipulation means that we did not find evidence that evaluation apprehension was a mediator of the effect of stereotype threat on test performance either. However the failure of these variables to mediate the effects in this study must be interpreted with caution given our relatively small sample size and therefore our limited power to detect mediation.
The Chinese economy is a mixed economy as it combines important features of a market economy and a planned economy. To understand the role of economic planning in China it is necessary to review its history briefly. During the period from 1953 when the first Five-Year Plan began to the end of the 1970s China practiced central planning under the direction of the State Planning Commission (SPC). The main function of planning was to direct the production of major products by state-owned enterprises. The State Council had a large number of ministries most of which were responsible for the production of the corresponding products. There were ministries for agriculture and fisheries, forestry, coal, petroleum, chemical products, metallurgy, consumer products, textile, machine building, electronics, nuclear energy, aircraft, ammunitions, space, geology and mineral resources, water resources and electric power, railroads, transportation and communications, posts and telecommunications, urban and rural construction and environmental protection, finance, commerce, etc.
The Chinese government re-directed enormous public subsidies to encourage large amounts of capitalist growth by dismantling its tired national system of free public education and health care. They also ended subsidized public housing for hundreds of millions of peasants and urban factory workers; deciding instead to provide funding to real estate investors for the construction of private apartments and office high-rise buildings (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 737). China ’s new capitalist approach as well as its rapid growth was founded on the insightful structural modifications and substantial investments made po ssible by Mao’s regime. The boom in China’s private sector was established by the huge public outlays that had been made since 1949. It was Mao’s initial investment in China’s infrastructure and industry that paved the way for capitalisms success. Through ample research many scholars have determined China’s rapid economic growth initially began closer to 1950 than 1980. Also, that growth was based on the development of its internal market; it’s rapidly growing corps of scien tists, skilled technicians and laborers. Additionally, the societal structure which both protected and promoted the working class and peasantry were products also yielded from Communism. However, if the once great nation was going to survive in the global economy, the country desperately needed to embrace the necessary economic reforms.
Consumer spending in China today is around 40 percent of GDP, as opposed to 70 percent in the US. Even while maintaining a high savings rate, Chinese people on average can substantially increase their
consumption (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 86). This consumption growth will be pushed by the younger generation (known collectively as the ‘young emperor generation’, and also called the ‘me generation’). This generation includes those born after the market reform started in 1978, and after the ‘one child’ policy was introduced in 1979. Typically, they have grown up indulged by their parents, who doted on them as a single child, and this was assisted enthusiastically by the grandparents. They are characterized as self-centered, frequently self-indulgent, and the most avid and savvy consumers. This generation is therefore driving demand in China, buying everything from expensive watches to imported cars (Degen, 2009, June 17, p. 1 and 6).
government undertook large-scale investments in physical and human capital during the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, by 1978 nearly three-fourths of industrial production was produced by centrally controlled, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), according to centrally planned output targets. Private enterprises and foreign-invested firms were generally barred. A central goal of the Chinese government was to make China’s economy relatively self-sufficient. Foreign trade was generally limited to obtaining only those goods that could not be made or obtained in China. Government policies kept the Chinese economy relatively stagnant and inefficient, mainly because most aspects of the economy were managed and run by the central government (and thus there were few profit incentives for firms, workers, and farmers), competition was virtually nonexistent, foreign trade and investment flows were mainly limited to Soviet bloc countries, and price and production controls caused widespread distortions in the economy. Chinese living standards were substantially lower than those of many other developing countries. The Chinese government in 1978 (shortly after the death of Chairman Mao in 1976) decided to break with its Soviet-style economic policies by gradually reforming the economy according to free market principles and opening up trade and investment with the West, in the hope that this would significantly increase economic growth and raise living standards. As Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s economic reforms, put it: “Black cat, white cat, what does it matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice?” 4
Although the Shanghai Composite initially rose after its establishment it subsequently fell dramatically in real terms. This was to a large extent due to the fact that inflation in China was very high in the early 1990s (Figure 3). Moreover, many of the securities laws and regulations were introduced during the late 1990s, and the pace of adding new firms to the exchanges slowed down after 2000. For all of these reasons we focus on the period from December 31, 2000 to the end of 2013 in the paper. The Chinese economy grew by a factor of 3.2 in real terms over this period, still much faster than India and Brazil (Figure 1, Panel B). In terms of the ‘buy and hold’ returns from 2000 until March 31, 2014, based on our calculations aggregated from firm-level returns including dividends, the performance of the Chinese market is the worst of the group of large countries, including Japan (Figure 4). Investors in the market earned negative returns in real terms in the long run. In fact, the cumulative return of the stock market is less than that of bank demand deposits (in real terms) with very low nominal interest rates over the same period, and much lower than that of 5-year deposits (Figure 5).
This table examines the stock performance of listed firms in China relative to listed firms in other countries. The dependent variables are buy-and-hold returns calculated from annual returns and annualized Sharpe Ratios in Panel A and B, respectively. In columns 1 to 4, firms listed in mainland China are excluded from the sample. In columns 5 and 6, China is included. We use stock prices in local currency adjusted for inflation in the listing country to calculate BHR. We use stock returns in USD and the US 3-month treasury rate as the risk-free rate to calculate the Sharpe Ratios. The buy-and-hold returns are calculated with the stock price in 2000 as the base price, and averaged at country-level with the market capitalization in the previous year as the weight. The annual Sharpe Ratio is calculated as the excess annual returns divided by the annualized stock return volatilities. The annual returns and annual volatilities are calculated as monthly returns and monthly volatilities multiplied by 12. In the BHR regressions, we control for the stock return volatilities during the holding period. In the Sharpe Ratio regressions, we control for the current-year stock return volatilities. We allow firms that have non-missing stock return and financial information to enter the regressions. We exclude firms listed in exchanges that have fewer than 20 stocks in any given year from the sample. The final sample is composed of firms listed in 45 countries. We use alternative sample period 1991-2013 and 2000 to 2013. We control for year, exchange and Datastream level-2 industry fixed effects. T- values calculated using the standard errors clustered by country are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
conditions of applicants, nor is there a formal check list for visiting officers to use in determining an applicant’s eligibility for MSLS support.
Another problem lies in the fact that potential MSLS applicants have to apply for this support themselves. When this procedure is compared with those for similar programmes in Latin America, there is a clear divergence in policy practices. In Mexico, for example, potential recipients of the income support programme are visited in selected neighbourhoods to inform them of the available support. In Brazil, local councils or the state typically set up shop at a local sports ground, school or church for a few days or a week to encourage households to apply for income support benefits. Given the lack of a national policy on implementation standards in China, the raising of public awareness about the availability of income support measures is left entirely to the local authority. Unlike Mexico and Brazil, the local authority in Tangshan does not identify areas in which there is potential need and does not send officials to these areas to encourage potentially eligible households to apply for MSLS support. When they visit the household of an applicant, local authority officers might ask if there are others in need within the applicant’s neighbourhood, but there is no consistent promotion of the MSLS programme in the way that occurs in Mexico and Brazil. Given the lack of effective promotion of the MSLS programme by local authority officials, there is the problem that some poor people might never know that they are able to claim this support. During the interviews, around 1 in 10 of the MSLS recipients surveyed stated that they had been initially unaware that they could apply for this income support and became aware of it only after they had been informed by friends, acquaintances or neighbours.
We expect this trend to continue over the next couple of years. The real estate developers could accelerate investment in their acquired land so as to lock in investment return as soon as possible. However, in the face of the increasing uncertainties surrounding the economic perspectives, the property developers, in particular private ones, are still reluctant to acquire new land to make more investment. Moreover, the authorities’ concerns regarding housing bubbles have led to more tightening measures in China’s mega-cities, which does not bode well for the nascent recovery in the property market.
The United States can play a critical role in increasing the living standard of the Pakistani people and consequentially decrease the possibilities of revolution. Currently, the 2010
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA), which will continue funding until 2014, gives $1.5 billion annually of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan. 52 This monetary aid is allocated for the promotion of social and economic development and requires Pakistan to submit an Assistance Strategy Report that outlines the projects the aid will go towards before receiving funds. 53 In theory, EPPA is a strategic tool for the United States, but it can be improved. If the United States would create a U.S committee in charge of analyzing and creating a Pakistan Strategy Report, it would ensure that the Pakistan government is not allocating funds in unnecessary sectors.
Finally, besides the data about China’s GDP and FDI, one recent study of comprehensive competitiveness of China’s major cities provided additional evidence about changes in China’s Eastern coastal cities (Beijing International Institute for Urban Development, 2008). The study reported the top ten most competitive cities in China by examining ten factors such as globalization, industrial structure of post-industrialization cities, economic flows, openness of the market, entrepreneurship, innovative atmosphere, human resources, urban governance structure, urban brand, and city clustering and city alliance. Based on these factors, the top ten competitive cities are Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou, Nanjing, and Changsha. Again, the most competitive cities reported are in China’s Eastern region. The selection of Shenzhen as the top competitiveness city is a special recognition for the successful development of SEZs because Shenzhen is a new city and the city’s development is based on the provision of various incentive policies emphasized in the reform years (Guo & Feng, 2007).
The prioritisation of vulnerabilities and elimination of false-positives is a critical step to focus further testing activities on vulnerabilities that are substantial and might represent a considerable risk for the business. The illustration below shows an example architecture using Qualys for internal scanning and ImmuniWeb® for external penetration testing and managed vulnerability scanning. The incorporation of our Threat Intelligence Fusion Centre (TIFC) service is essential for the prioritisation of the obtained vulnerability data and means we can enrich your vulnerability exposure picture by basing the findings on risk, not just severity.
Smoothwall acknowledges the work, effort and talent of the Smoothwall GPL development team: Lawrence Manning and Gordon Allan, William Anderson, Jan Erik Askildt, Daniel Barron, Emma Bickley, Imran Chaudhry, Alex Collins, Dan Cuthbert, Bob Dunlop, Moira Dunne, Nigel Fenton, Mathew Frank, Dan Goscomb, Pete Guyan, Nick Haddock, Alan Hourihane, Martin Houston, Steve Hughes, Eric S.
Another example of inefficient pricing is that the low (controlled) prices received by health- care providers (“producers’ prices”) for simple treatment have induced the providers to shift resources to more sophisticated and hence more expensive treatment, where the rewards to the providers are higher. Moreover, hospitals and health clinics have in recent years financed much of their health-care provision by revenues from hefty oversubscription and excessive pricing of drugs (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997; Eggleston, 2006). 32 A more efficient price system in the health-care sector would, most likely, improve the allocative efficiency and favor the provision of basic health services. Clearly, considerably improved health-care in China as a whole also requires a relative shift of resources from urban to rural areas, as well as from affluent to poor urban areas. Realistically speaking, this cannot be achieved without more financial resources being transmitted from the central government to poor local governments. As in the case of education, this clearly requires an overhaul of the system of intragovernment transfers. On their way down to local governments, a considerable fraction of the money flows sent down from the central government to poor local governments has, in fact, tended to be siphoned off to powerful authorities – in more or less the same way as some Chinese rivers, which are full of water inland, turn out to be nearly dry when they reach the coast. 33 Most likely, a fast and drastic improvement of health services in rural areas also requires a re-establishment of public and/or cooperative health clinics in these areas, since the return may not be attractive enough for private entrepreneurs. Indeed, health-care reforms along these lines are to some extent underway.