The international system has changed considerably since the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. The world system has evolved from a bipolar system wherein the USSR and the US/the West maneuvered to keep their respective levels of globalpower, into a unipolar system dominated by the US. With this change, the position of small states also shifted, In the bipolar world system small states can use the power blocks in their favor by balancing them out by making use of the blocks searching for allies. The strategies and opportunities for small states increase by being in the current unipolar liberal world system, but so do the risks. The small states have more freedom over their foreign policy and economy and small states have more influence within international relations due to the
When it comes to considerations of the fundamental nature of the liberal order, Chinese positions have been relatively consistent. Where things have changed – and changed quite considerably in recent years – is when it comes to thinking about the relative power of China and other actors within this order, and what China might be able to do to bring about change. Facing widespread opprobrium and the possibility of international isolation in the post-Tiananmen period, China’s international strategy came to be dominated for the best part of two decades by the taoguang yanghui concept associated with Deng Xiaoping. Directly translating as “hide brightness and foster obscurity” it was part of a wider exhortation to effectively “keep a low profile” while China was still relatively weak and the dominant (liberal) global powers unprepared to accommodate its interests. In the 1990s, the same basic understanding was manifest in the China threat thesis – the idea that those hostile to China would look for any evidence to show that China was mounting a challenge to the Western- led order. Thus, even as China’s relative globalpower increased, the logic of maintaining a low profile remained firm. 28
The progression made by Deng Xiaoping, who is expecting the Chinese economy for the improvement of the economy of the entire World to open, made the second largest power on earth and the world the prerequisite. China's Financial growth and its blend in the global economy bring past Advantages. As indicated by Moni Ruzzaman (2013, p.1), sound monetary improvement in China wants to "move the epicenter of Western political limit eastwards and realize human advancement".
Jin Canrong points out that US-Asia trade is twice as important as US-EU trade, and says China is the only country in the world that can defy the US. Immigration from Asia, and even Barack Obama’s semi-Asian identity, are causing America to turn towards Asia. The process has been going on for some time; it was put on hold by the Iraq and Afghan wars, but it has now regained impetus and urgency. But Jin outlines important limits to America’s involvement in China’s regional sphere of influence. America and China’s maritime neighbours may have coinciding interests right now, but their strategic aims are not the same. The US is stoking regional fears, while neighbours “borrow force to use it“ (jieli dali). It is a balancing game, but not a military alliance. “The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak” (xin youyu er li buzu): China’s neighbours are locked into close links with China because of their economic interests. However, Jin says that relations with America are at a critical juncture. His advice is tactical, not strategic – he says that China should help and guide the US to avoid the rise of extremism. Jin is probably implying that China should try to manage the transition of power from the United States to China rather than that China should reconsider its fundamental strategic direction.
The impact of climate change in the Arctic Ocean such as ice melting and ice retreat facilitates natural resources extraction. Arctic fossil fuel becomes the drivers of geopolitical changes in the Arctic Ocean. Climate change facilitates natural resource extractions and increases competition between states and can result in tensions, even military ones. This article investigates through a political and legal analysis the role of China as an emerging regulatory sea power in the Arctic Ocean given its assertive “energy hungry country behaviour” in the Arctic Ocean. The United Na- tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council (AC) are taken into con- sideration under climate change effects, to assess how global legal frameworks and institutions can deal with China’s strategy in the Arctic Ocean. China’s is moving away from its role as “humble power” to one of “informal imperialistic” resulting in substantial impact on the Arctic and Antartic dynamism. Due to ice-melting, an easy access to natural resources, China’s Arctic strategy in the Arctic Ocean has reinforced its military martitime strategy and has profoundly changed its mari- time military doctrine shifting from regional to global in the context of UNCLOS. In particular, it is wondered, what China understands about the public order dimension of UNCLOS. The article con- cludes that despite China’ assertive behaviour towards the Arctic environmental ocean and its rise
Trump's policies are an attempt to re-implement the Washington Consensus in its most fundamentalist neo-liberal form. These include major tax breaks for the rich, attacks on labor and social services, deregulation of finance and energy, privatization of the infrastructure, and charter schools to undermine public education. All of these are cherished goals of the original TCC project as it emerged under Reagan and Thatcher, and were consistently pursued at the WTO and IMF. Trump's cabinet is a shrewdly built alliance between market fundamentalist and the theocratic Right, with major economic and commerce positions given to the TCC, and positions over social issues conceded to the reactionary Christian wing of the Republican Party. From the TCC we have CEO Rex Tillerson from Exxon-Mobile as Secretary of State, billionaire and former Goldman Sachs partner Steven Mnuchin at Treasury, president of Goldman Sachs Gary Cohn as head of the Council of Economic Advisors, Scott Pruitt representing the fossil fuel TCC at the EPA, and private equity billionaire Wilbur Ross as Commerce Secretary. On the theocratic Right we have Vice-President Pence, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Housing and Urban Development under Ben Carson, Tom Price as (ex)Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Betsy DeVos at the Department of Education. Trump himself is deeply involved in transnational capitalism with investments in twenty countries including: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, China, Dominican Republic, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Panama, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, St. Martin, South Korea, Turkey, the UAE, and Uruguay. All these investments and deals create deep ties to the TCC in both the global north and south.
Although the above analysis shows that the rise strategy of central China has promoted the development of Hubei province, is it an accidental phenomenon? Is it not the result of strategy implementation? In order to enhance the effec- tiveness of the research conclusions, the placebo method will be used in this pa- per. Placebo method is from medical experiments: if you want to examine the effects of a new drug, the patients will be randomly divided into two groups, one group of taking drugs, another group of taking placebo (such as sugar pill), and the research don’t tell two groups of people taking the drug or placebo in order to avoid the interference of psychological factors, and then by looking at the condition of the two groups of people to examine the effects of new drugs. In this paper, the basic idea of placebo method is: since 25 provinces outside of Hubei province did not implement the strategy of rise of central China, then choose a province in 25 provinces, assuming that the province implements the strategy of rise of central China in 2006, we use synthetic control method to analyses this province, just like the analysis of Hubei province. The province’s per capita GDP should be similar to the per capita GDP of synthetic province, or synthetic control analysis of Hubei province is only an accidental phenomenon, has no credibility. Referring to the practices of previous researchers , this pa- per selected Jilin province, which has the largest weight in the composition and synthesis of Hubei province, as the placebo. Figure 3 depicts the development path of the logarithm of real and synthetic per capita GDP of Jilin province. We can find that, before 2006, the development paths of the logarithm of real per capita GDP of Jilin province and synthetic per capita GDP of Jilin province bas- ically coincide, indicating that the synthetic Jilin province can well fit the eco- nomic development of real Jilin province. From 2006 to 2013, the per capita GDP of real Jilin province was higher than that of synthetic Jilin province; from
Many media outlets, like the Washington Times for example, have a tendency to fuel debate for sensational reasons, and global cybercrime is no different. A simple story of the Chinese government running a nefarious and well- coordinated ring of cybercriminals will perhaps draw in readers for whom this story validates a worldview. In reality, the individuals responsible are not always state-sponsored, but usually have a broad spectrum of motivations. One key element that sets the Chinese hacker culture apart from the stereotypical western hacker is the deep-rooted nationalism of so many Chinese hackers. This can be seen throughout times of political conflict with other countries, as individuals and hacker groups become especially active. This is an aspect that my preliminary research has found is not commonly covered by the media and other academics. There is support for the research, but finding work that gives a modern collective view of the field is extremely difficult. One of the few academic texts written on the subject of Chinese hackers and nationalism is Henderson’s The Dark Visitor. It is one of the few and only books devoted exclusively to this topic. Henderson’s text was published in 2007, and provides he no follow-up. This is much the case with this field of study. Much of the information becomes outdated quickly because motivations, the relevant technology, and the nature of attacks change dramatically. This can be attributed to the growth and fluidity of the subject base, as well as a language barrier for most western academics.
Thus, in China’s case monetary policy has been targeted on the internal balance objective. This has been broadly achieved. In principle competitiveness could then be targeted on the current account objective. But competitiveness depends on much more than the nominal exchange rate, especially when it is a bilateral nominal rate. Since inflation both in China and its trading partners has not been high, perhaps there has not been a great difference between the (trade-weighted) nominal and the real exchange rate. But there is uncertainty about productivity changes in the tradeable sectors, and these cannot really be controlled. Thus policy could not easily regulate the movement from K to K’. Furthermore, the position of the internal balance line is also uncertain, and this line can move about in response to productivity changes in the non-tradeable sectors as well as structural changes and demand patterns in the economy.
As discussed in Chang et al. (2011), the volatility index data are closing daily prices (settlement prices) for the 30-day maturity CBOE VIX futures (ticker name VX), which may be obtained from the Thomson Reuters-Data Stream Database. The settlement price is calculated by the CBOE as the average of the closing bid and ask quote so as to reduce the noise due to any microstructure effects. The contracts are cash settled on the Wednesday 30 days prior to the third Friday on the calendar month immediately following the month in which the contract expires. The underlying asset is the VIX index that was originally introduced by Whaley (1993) as an index of implied volatility on the S&P100.
The nature of production has changed dramatically since the time that David Ricardo proposed the basic concepts that underlie our understanding of international trade. In the past, countries produced mostly complete products that they consumed and traded with other nations. Producers took advantage of the productivity gains that derive from worker specialization by dividing the production process into a variety of tasks. But these tasks had to be performed in close proximity because of the large transportation and communication costs that prevailed at the time. Today, drastic reductions in these costs have facil- itated direct trade in tasks, which has generated a global production process in a wide spectrum of industries. Now, producers and consumers can capture the traditional benefits that derive from worker specialization plus additional gains that are generated when tasks are located where they can be performed most cheaply. We have argued that to understand the consequences of this new way of organizing production we need to move away from the traditional approaches to trade in which only goods can be exchanged internationally, and move toward a new paradigm in which task trade takes center stage.
Internal barriers may include, but are not limited to, lack of awareness, insuffi- cient skills, lack of confidence, and fear. External barriers may include, but are not limited to, institutionalized obstacles such as lack of time, lack of administrative support, power imbalances, institutional policy, or legal limits.
While the wine exporters to China dream of ever increas- ing proﬁ ts, they may be disappointed if the Chinese producers out maneuver them, not only in the Chinese market but also by encroaching on markets elsewhere in the world. From April 2007 to April 2008, China’s own wine production increased 69.78%. China is now a global economic force, a leader in world exports of many products with certain production advantages that may be impossible to counteract. They have some of the largest agricultural land holdings, and plenti- ful laborers, a modern capital market with huge ﬁ nancial reserves. Moreover, China has recently assimilated the latest technology and become skillful in contemporary business strategies. The Longhai International Trading Co. Ltd, a Chinese real estate group founded in 2001, has just acquired Chateau Latour Laguens, a wine property in the Entre-Deux- Mers region, southeast of Bordeaux. Latour Laguens makes wine in both the Bordeaux and Bordeaux Supérieur categories and produces 160,000 bottles a year from 30 hectares of vines. In recent years the China-based Longhai trading company has branched out into wine business. The rationale behind this acquisition was to master the techniques of winemaking in France and win credit as a wine trader. 18
By p. 10 he is on to China, and its record of innovations. That takes one page, followed by three more that seek to explain why, as he sees it, China stopped innovating after the northern Song (which fell in 1127), and why its ‘greatest inventions, printing, gunpowder, the compass transformed the world, but not China’ (p. 11). He proceeds to compare China’s ‘contributions to world history’ (p. 13) against those of the Greeks and Romans, and finds China wanting. China, it seems, did not give rise to a philosophical system (as the Greeks did) that in turn ‘fueled anything as momentous as the Scientific Revolution’ (p. 13). Nor did it have civil law or spread Christianity as did Rome (pp. 13–14). China’s lack of innovation after the northern Song is explained by its elites devoting their energies to literary pursuits, aiming to qualify for the civil service. One can almost hear one’s Chinese history colleagues groaning as one reads these pages. Daly is engaged in a comparative exercise that in effect likens the trajectories of civilizations to a horse race. China got off to a good start from the Qin to the Song, thanks to ‘its enormous population’ and ‘good communications’, but then slowed. Europe was sluggish out of the gate but came on strong in the backstretch and approached the finish with a punishing kick. In making his comparisons, Daly relies on implicit yardsticks, the merit of which he does not discuss. Civil law, it seems, is a great contribution to world history, but Confucian thought rather less so. The spread of Christianity is a great contribution to world history, but that of Buddhism apparently is not. China history colleagues could easily write the reverse, in which the Chinese innovations are great contributions and European ones not.
In August, Chengming came up with another explanation for the controversy: rather than being a target of the media debate, Xi Jinping might well have instigated it. This row has arisen less than a year after Xi Jinping came to power, in spite of his public claim, as Chengming reports, to want to “apply the constitution” ( 落實憲法 , luosi xianfa) and to carry out “deep water reform” of the political system ( 改革的深水 區 , gaige de shenshuiqu). The conservative commentators are party members but use a quasi-revolutionary vocabulary and seem to be acting against their own leader. The writer considers two possible underlying reasons for the revolt. It might be the sign of a red elite that is viscerally hostile to any political change and is determined to take action to maintain the status quo in China. This would make the constitutional debate a battleground for supporters of both sides to assess each other’s strengths. The second possibility is that Xi Jinping is backsliding on implementing the constitution. In this scenario, the president, having pretended to support liberal views, in fact intends to initiate a return to conservative theory and practice in exercising power. The writer says that the direction of this constitutional debate is not yet clear. But, like other commentators, Chengming’s editorialist believes that the debate is based in deep-rooted trends in Chinese political circles, and that it is indicative of a violent confrontation between certain members of the
For instance, the relationship with India was successful only in the Silk Road era, when the two countries practiced only trade in goods and of religious nature (Buddhism), any other contact being hindered by two major obstacles: Himalaya Mountains and Tibetan Plateau. At the same time, China has maintained a certain distance from the Middle East, Persia and Babylon, invoking as a reason the presence of huge and hostile deserts of Central Asia. The relationship with Japan was also not friendly even if the two countries have shared a certain number of cultural and political institutions for several centuries. Regarding China's vision of Europe, the latter was classified as part of the Western Oceans, being incompatible with the Chinese lifestyle and culture and impossible to conquer.
There are only two academic societies in Sports Medicine in China, Chinese Association of Sports Medicine and Chinese College of Sports Physicians, Chinese Association of Sports Medicine was established in 1986, under the management of the China Medical Society (CMS). However, China, Chinese Association of Sports Medicine was organized by the Ministry of Public Health in 2009. Their primary missions and tasks are not yet clearly defined. As a matter of fact, there are some overlaps in terms of organization administrators and academic activities. The current post-graduate Sports Medicine training process is highly complex in China. The first Sports Medicine post- graduate training took place in 1984 at the Peking Union Medical College Hospital. Because specialty certification in Sports Medicine has not been established, formal training is not required to practice Sports Medicine in China. For those physicians that do choose to obtain training in Sports Medicine, several options are available. Graduates from medical school can apply directly to hospitals for staff physician-in-training positions, which eventually lead to a staff position at that same hospital. In addition, physicians from smaller hospitals can go to those larger academic centers for a 6 to 12-month post-graduate re-education. While these physicians may undergo the same training as the staff physicians, they will return to their own hospital once their training is completed. Finally, physicians having completed previous post-graduate training may choose to apply for fellowship positions for further training in Sports Medicine. About one decade ago, Sports Medicine residency training was centralized at the municipal levels, following the guidelines issued by The Ministry of Public Health. Residency programs in all hospitals are called residency training bases, which have to be approved by local health governments. These bases are hospital- based, but the residents are selected and managed by the municipal associations of medical education. These associations are also the authoritative body of setting up their residents' training curriculum. All medical school graduates wanting to practice medicine have to go through 5 years of residency training at designated training bases, first 3 years of general rotation followed by 2 more years of specialty-centered training.
128 branches overseas. Such comparisons show the rapid growth in the number of Confucius Institutes. Up to now, no country in the world had a system of agencies to undertake the role of promoting the culture to the massive world scale like the Confucius Institutes of China (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2014). Confucius travelled with his students to many countries, never crossing the territory of the provinces of Shandong and Henan; however, 2600 years later, the Confucius Institutes replicate this travel with strong speed on a large scale. It was an unexpected success of the Chinese government, and is the undeniable result of the tireless wars to invade exotic cultural strongholds. Obviously, the rapid development of the amount also partly reflected the growing needs to learn the Chinese language of the world, learning about the traditional culture of China, about oriental values worldview, of which Confucius was a typical representative. From here, it made many people think of the process of “reverse infiltration” of culture, from the East to the West, that is taking place in the world.
In light of these results and considering the fact that only the developed economies are members of the Inter- national Energy Agency, it is clear to see that the International Energy Agency does not have sufficient capacity to build up a global energy security strategy on its own. Neither does the OPEP, given that main consuming countries and some a few relevant producers are excluded. In order to coordinate the efforts of producers and consumers, Saz and Pierce, 2011 bring out the need for a global governance of energy. In fact, they propose quite an interesting idea: “The International Energy Agency should hasten its outreach to emerging economies, modifying its membership requirements if necessary, to allow important new consumers such as China and India to join this regime”. This idea means that the Agency has to abandon the shelter of the OECD. Perhaps it is time to do so.