According to Darabi et al. (2006), a TL focuses less on development schema, learning becomes ineffective. Development of schema is very important because the schema is a knowledge structure in long-term memory that allows students to identify problems and determine the most appropriate measures to solve a problem (Sweller, 1988; Kalyuga et al., 2001). In addition, TL places little emphasis on the concept of cognitive load because the method involves extraneous activities unrelated to the performance domain (Kirschner, Paas, Kirschner, & Janssen, 2011; Tarmizi & Bayat, 2012). This situation becomes even more critical if it involves a domain that contains several problem-solving elements such as CircuitTheory.
Darina Špaldonová (doc, RNDr, CSc) was born in Košice in 1954. In 1976 she graduated at P. J. Šarárik University in Košice, in 1983 received the RNDr (MSc) degree at this university and in 1994 CSc (PhD) degree in theory of electrical engineering at Slovak University of Technology, Bratislava. In 1998 she was appointed Associate Professor of theory of electrical engineering at the Department of Electrical engineering and Electrical Measurement of the Technical university of Košice. Her current interests include circuittheory and theory of electromagnetic field.
ABSTRACT: This paper summarizes a distribution transformer design with magnetic circuittheory and finite element method magnetic (FEMM). Distribution transformer is designed for output rating of 25 KVA, 11/0.433 kV & 11/0.25 kV in this paper. Finite Element Method Magnetics (FEMM) is a finite element package for solving 2D planar and axisymmetric problems in low frequency magnetic and electrostatics. It also provide engineers with a valuable means of more accurately quantifying the electric stress in the design. Finite element method magnetic (FEMM) has been analyzed to check and ensure the initial assumption data such as flux density and current density which are assigning in the proposed transformer design.
The explanatory power of the current model for other bird species (D. major and P. collybita) was inadequate in both cases. Observations of both species were less frequent than those of the tit species, so statistical representation was weaker (total average observed abundance across both years for blue tits: 887; great tits 414; chiffchaffs 68; great spotted woodpeckers 60; see also Table 2). Although the model for blue tits was stronger, as the sample sizes would predict, the positive (if insignificant in this case) relationships for the other species suggest that the model may have explanatory value for other species such as D. major and P. collybita if refined and adapted. Abundance counts between D. major and P. collybita (not shown) were poorly correlated with one another, suggesting divergent behavioural and habitat characteristics, but supporting the general value of connectivity (as revealed by the current model) for the urban bird community. This suggests that circuittheory approaches can provide a valuable addition to the arsenal of data sources for modelling the habitat relationships and responses of birds to variation in urban form, and therefore for predicting the effects of development and urban management on biodiversity. However, our results suggest that numerous other factors besides connectivity introduce variability to urban bird abundance, and further research will
In the contemporary nanotechnoscience makes natural-scientific experimentation constitutive for design, while research results are oriented equally on interpreting and predicting the course of natural processes, and on designing devices. Nanoystems can be seen as nanoelectrical switches in a nanocircuit. In nano- circuit structure, we find traditional electronic components at different levels, realized on the basis of nanotechnology. In nanotechnoscience explanatory models of natural phenomena are proposed, and pre- dictions of the course of certain natural events on the basis of mathematics and experimental data are formulated, on the one hand, as in classical natural science; as in the engineering sciences, on the other hand, not only experimental setups, but also structural plans for new nanosystems previously unknown in nature and technology are devised. In nanotechnoscience different models (equivalent circuits with stan- dard electronic components) of electric circuittheory are used for the analysis and synthesis of nanocir- cuits, and a special nanocircuit theory is elaborated. So nanotechnology is, at the same time, a field of scientific knowledge and a sphere of engineering activity—in other words, NanoTechnoScience, similar to Systems Engineering as the analysis and design of complex micro- and nanosystems.
Discussions thus far have focused on the analysis of existing networks. All the ele- ments are in place and it is simply a matter of solving for the current and voltage lev- els of the configuration. The design process is one where a current and/or voltage may be specified and the elements required to establish the designated levels must be de- termined. This synthesis process requires a clear understanding of the characteristics of the device, the basic equations for the network, and a firm understanding of the basic laws of circuit analysis, such as Ohm’s law, Kirchhoff’s voltage law, and so on. In most situations the thinking process is challenged to a higher degree in the design process than in the analysis sequence. The path toward a solution is less defined and in fact may require a number of basic assumptions that do not have to be made when simply analyzing a network.
11. Three serious logical difficulties concerning the closure of the monetary circuit arise in such context. The first one has important accounting implications. It is related to the need of each firm and of the firms as a whole to raise profits and pay interests and dividends in money (not in nature, as in a barter economy). This implies for a circuittheory a serious analytical difficulty, as for this purpose firms must dispose of an amount of money greater than that created by the banks in the form of credit money. Government money, the primary component of the supply of money, is thus needed, in addition to credit money. This fact confers to the total supply of money a mixed nature, partly exogenous and partly endogenous. The same is true for the supply of monetary base.
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether a bankruptcy trustee can, through an adversary proceeding, avoid a debtor’s federal tax payment, or whether the Internal Revenue Service’s (‘IRS’ or ‘government’) sovereign immunity prevents such relief.” Id. at *1006. The court created a circuit split with the 7th Circuit, and noted that Bankruptcy Code Section 106(a)(1)’s abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to Section 544(b)(1) did not “alter [Section 544(b)’s substantive requirements merely by stating that the federal government’s authority was abrogated ‘with respect to’ that provision.” Id. at *1014. Although the 9th Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit’s two-prong approach’s general framework to determine IRS liability, the 9th Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s analysis regarding the second prong—inquiring whether “the source of substantive law provides an avenue of relief”—because “the fact that Congress waived sovereign immunity with respect to Section 544(b)(1), and the derivative state law, provide a substantive cause of action against the government.” Id. at *1013–14. The court further reasoned that “the statutory definitions of the relevant parties – debtors and creditors – further demonstrate that Section 544(b)(1), and the derivative law upon which it relies, contemplate suits against the government.” Id. The court noted that although it was not necessary to the current case’s disposition, the Bankruptcy Code’s principles, purpose and policy goals support the court’s decision. Id. at *1016. Accordingly, the 9th Circuit held that “the government could not rely on sovereign immunity to prevent the avoidance of tax payments at issue” because “Section 106(a)(1)’s abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to Section 544(b)(1) extends to the derivative applicable law[.]” Id. at *1007.
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a sentencing judge, under United States Supreme Court precedent, must refrain from finding facts in the “first instance, [and] merely [identify] findings or admissions that were previously made under constitutional safeguards” in determining whether prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). Id. at 273. The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits have concluded that a sentencing judge’s evidentiary sources for determining whether prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” are limited to conclusive findings by the trier-of-fact and the defendant’s own admissions pursuant to a guilty plea. Id. On the other hand, the 8th Circuit concluded that “evidentiary restrictions are not applicable in determining whether offenses were committed on different occasions.” Id. The 6th Circuit concluded that allowing a sentencing judge to make factual findings as to the first-occasion question is contrary to Supreme Court Sixth Amendment precedent because the judge would “[become] the trier of fact regarding when and where the prior offenses occurred . . . .” Id. Therefore, the court agreed with the majority of circuit courts and held that a sentencing judge is limited to the factual findings of the trier-of-fact and the defendant’s own constitutionally valid admissions in determining whether prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” under the ACCA. Id.
The 5th Circuit addressed the issue of whether special counsel’s fees and expenses can be disbursed from a Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) trust fund before all claimants are paid in whole. Id. at 612. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit found that a PACA trust is unlike most common law trusts, and “sellers, as trust beneficiaries, ‘are entitled to full payment before trustees may lawfully use trust funds to pay other creditors.’” Id. at 620 (internal citation omitted). The 2nd Circuit determined that “a PACA trustee may not use PACA funds to pay attorney’s fees incurred in collecting accounts receivable held in trust for a seller of perishable agricultural commodities.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The court noted that the 9th Circuit, however, found that a bank should be compensated for its collection costs because it performed all the work required to collect the PACA trust assets. Id. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit and 9th Circuit appear to distinguish “PACA trustees . . . who owe fiduciary duties to the PACA claims and are thus aware of the trust provision[, from] those whose primary role is outside the PACA trustee framework and do not owe duties to the claimants.” Id. After examining the attorney’s role as Special PACA Counsel, the 5th Circuit found that while not named “trustee,” the order appointing the attorney as Special PACA Counsel allowed him to serve as “the functional equivalent of a PACA trustee.” Id. at 621. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit “that a PACA trustee–or in this case, its functional equivalent–may not be paid from trust assets ‘until full payment of the sums owing’ is paid to all claimants.” Id. at 622 (internal citation omitted).
After a circuit block has been cut-off, it reaches a certain steady state. This state has to be known in order to estimate the remaining leakage current. Usually the total transistor width in the logic block is much larger than the width of the switch device. Hence the potential of the virtual power-rail(s) has to change until the leakage current of the logic block is equal to the leakage of the switch. Figure 1 shows an equiv- alent circuit which models an n-block switched circuit. The cross coupled inverters are dimensioned very large in order to describe a large logic block with half of the nodes at logic high level and half of the nodes at logic low level. This sim- ple equivalent circuit has a low transistor count, thus even large logic blocks can be modeled efficiently. The cross cou- pled inverter structure neglects interface effects between a power switched circuit block and the surrounding circuitry. Thus other models have to be used if these effects are to be investigated. In order to find the final state after switching- off a circuit block, the potential of the virtual power rail has been ramped up. The current through the switch device as well as the total current in the logic is given in Fig. 2. The steady state of the idle system is determined by the intersec- tion of the two current voltage characteristics of the switch and the logic. Depending on the transistor widths and thresh- old voltages, the potential of the virtual power rail (vvss) moves versus the non switched power rail (vdd). In typical n-block switched circuits the vvss potential as well as the potential of all internal signal nodes charges up to a value slightly below the vdd potential. Thus all transistors operate in subthreshold region:
In 1993, the Sixth Circuit’s Staff Attorney’s Office, on behalf of the Judicial Council, spent several months reviewing the consistency of rules of all districts in the Sixth Circuit. It analyzed local rules adopted under the CJRA or pursuant to other authority as well as general and standing orders that were incorporated in the local rules. The office designated potential areas of conflict between local procedures and the federal rules and Acts of Congress, submitted a thorough list of possibly inconsistent local requirements to the Council, and made recommendations regarding conflicts.
The S800-range includes an extensive range of accessories, which makes the use of the S800 High Performance Circuit Breaker even easier and therefore more user-friendly. The accessories are after assembling not only connected over lever of S800, even with the pin located on the side it is connected directly with the switching mechanism of the main device (S800).
6. If the OS circuit you are planning to install will fall within the approach to a crossing warning system activated by a motion responsive or a constant warning time device, and you plan to have the crossing control equipment feed through the OS circuit, we recommend against using an AC/DC track circuit for the OS circuit.
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether the “maritime rescue doctrine”, under which “a would-be rescuer, faced with an emergency, can only be held contributory liable for injuries resulting from his rescue attempt, if his conduct was reckless and wanton,” is the proper standard of care to be applied to maritime torts. Id. at 524. The 4th Circuit determined that “the wanton and reckless standard reflects the value society places upon rescue as much as any desire to avoid a total defeat of recovery under common law,” while the 9th and 5th Circuits held similarly. Id. at 525. The 2nd Circuit noted that “the rescue doctrine originated at a time when contributory negligence was an absolute bar to recovery.” Id. at 525. The court noted that “maritime law has long used comparative fault in resolving competing claims of negligence between the injured and the tortfeasor, and today a majority of the states do the same.” Id. at 525–26. The court reasoned that, because “under comparative negligence, of course, even a negligent rescuer can recover . . . the principal justification for the rescue doctrine — encouraging rescue — has largely disappeared.” Id. at 526. Thus, the 2nd Circuit distinguished itself and concluded that the maritime standard of care “in comparative negligence jurisdictions is that rescuers must act reasonably under emergency circumstances.” Id.
The 9th Circuit “addressed when a district court abuses its discretion by recalling jurors after dismissing them,” and what legal standard governs this analysis. Id. at 1096. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 7th Circuits have undertaken case-specific analyses and “have recognized that in certain limited circumstances, a district court may recall a jury immediately after dismissal to correct an error in its verdict,” or have allowed for recall after dismissal in “situations where the jurors have been released but effectively remained under [the] control of the court.” Id. at 1097. On the other hand, the court noted that the 8th Circuit “eschewed this case-specific analysis and instead adopted a restrictive bright-line rule prohibiting recall once the jurors have left the confines of the courtroom.” Id. at 1098. The 9th Circuit agreed with the majority of the circuits, finding that the totality of circumstances analysis “strikes a sensible balance between fairness and economy” if “a proper inquiry into the circumstances [is made] to ensure jurors were not exposed to prejudicial influences during the brief period of dismissal.” Id. at 1099. The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 8th Circuit as to its rigid rule regarding the courtroom door “[p]recisely because we live in an age of instant electronic communication,” making the courtroom door an improper place to draw the line between exposure to outside influences and protection from such influences. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “that in limited circumstances, a court may recall a jury shortly after it has been dismissed to correct an error in the verdict, but only after making an appropriate inquiry to determine that the jurors were not exposed to any outside influences that would compromise their ability to fairly reconsider the verdict.” Id. at 1100.
The 9th Circuit addressed the “degree of specificity required to state a claim for failure to pay minimum wages or overtime wages under the [Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)]” in light of Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 640. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Circuits determined that “in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime payments must specifically allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime hours worked during that workweek.” Id. at 644-45. Conversely, the 11th Circuit found that in order to state a plausible claim for relief, the plaintiff need only state that the employer in question violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum hourly wages and failing to pay overtime in hours worked over 40 hours.” Id. at 645. The 9th Circuit joined the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Circuits and held that “detailed factual allegations regarding the number of overtime hours worked are not required to state a plausible claim . . . [but] conclusory allegations that merely recite the statutory language are [not] adequate.” Id. at 644.
so difficult to prove–that they are routinely tolerated.” Id. at 1269. The court posited that the reliance on a consular letter would not violate the asylum petitioner’s due process, because “[w]here the petitioner has the burden of proof, there’s nothing unfair about having a U.S. government agent check out some of his basic facts and inform the [immigration judge] of possible discrepancies.” Id. at 1275. The court remarked that the permissive standards of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits, rather than “allow[ing] more of the world’s oppressed” to obtain asylum, do more to “favor the canny, the dishonest, the brazen and those who have the means and connections to purchase fraudulent documents.” Id. at 1281. Thus, the 9th Circuit rejected the reasoning of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits, and held the immigration judges admission of the State Department Letter did not violate the asylum petitioner’s due process. Id.