A body of evidence suggests that major changes involving the atmosphere and climate have an impact on the biosphere and human environment. Increased concentrations of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide, in the earth’s atmosphere have already substantially warmed the planet, causing more severe and prolonged heat waves, temperature variability, increased length and severity of the pollen season, air pollution, forest fires, droughts, and heavy precipitation events and floods, all of which put respiratory health at risk . A synthesis of respiratory health effects due to climatechange is presented in figure 1. The main diseases of concern are asthma, rhinosinusitis, COPD and respiratory tract infections, but the extent to which these are spread will vary according to the proportion of susceptible individuals in a given population. Individuals with pre-existing cardiopulmonary diseases are at higher risk of suffering from climate changes. Areas of greater poverty with limited access to medical care will suffer more, as will areas with less well developed medical services, which are likely to include disadvantaged groups, migrating populations and areas with the greatest population growth.
For many years, advocacy of alternatives to livestock products has been based on argu- ments about nutrition and health, compas- sion for animals, and environmental issues other than carbon intensity. These arguments have mostly been ignored and the consump- tion of livestock products worldwide has increased, leading some to believe that such advocacy may never succeed. Even urging governments to mandate reductions in live- stock production on grounds of climatechange may prove ineffective because of the food industry’s own large lobbying capacity. But if the business case for meat and dairy analogs is clear, then those who normally would lobby governments can appeal directly to leaders in the food industry, who may wel- come them as champions. The business risks of analog projects would be similar to those in most other food manufacturing projects, but the risks would be mitigated by the fact that much of the necessary infrastructure (such as for growing and processing grains) already exists. The key change would be a significant reduction in live- stock products. Industry-led or supply-led growth has been successful in other industries, such as the computer and mobile-phone industries, which suggests that it can be suc- cessful with meat and dairy analogs. Generally, the food indus- try worldwide has a very sophisticated marketing capacity, making high growth from marketing new food products prac- tically a norm —even before one considers the extra lift that might be achieved from interest in slowing climatechange. The risks of business as usual outweigh the risks of change. The case for change is no longer only a public policy or an eth- ical case, but is now also a business case. We believe it is the best available business case among all industries to reverse climatechange quickly.
In their analysis of the Copenhagen climatechange summit Carter et al. (2011) concluded that ultimately the politics of domination prevailed over the politics of legitimacy. Perhaps the same could be said of Durban, with one crucial difference: the elites from a few South countries have become key players in the politics of domination both in their interactions with the North, with other South countries, as well as with civil society actors in their own regions. If effective global regulation is the only way to address climatechange, it is difficult to see how such regulation can emerge out of COP meetings post-Durban given the politics of domination described earlier. At best governments will address climatechange at the national level on a voluntary basis, which then underscores the importance of direct action at the local level to prevent the expansion of polluting industries. Thus, reclaiming space for public discussion and even intervention at different sites of decision-making becomes an important task for implementing democratically derived principles of climate justice (Banerjee, 2011b).
At the global level, one of the few studies so far to model climate shocks and their impacts on commodity prices in different regions is Willenbockel (2012). Results are indicative only but interesting nevertheless. For example, a drought in North America in 2030 of a similar scale to the historical drought of 1988 would have a dramatic temporary impact on world market export prices for maize and a strong impact on world market price for wheat. These impacts would feed through to domestic consumer prices, with particularly profound effects in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Nigeria depends almost entirely on imports of wheat, and under such a scenario the average domestic price for wheat in the country would spike by 50% above the baseline 2030 price, with potentially substantial impacts on households. The treatment of the impacts of climate variability as opposed to the impacts of slow-onset climatechange in global economic models is a heavily under-researched area, particularly how harvest failures in one continent may influence food security outcomes in others.
ASP brings together prominent American business leaders, former members of Congress, retired military flag officers, and prominent former government officials. ASP conducts research on a broad range of issues and engages and empowers the American public by taking its findings directly to them via events, traditional & new media, meetings, and publications. We live in a time when the threats to our security are as complex and diverse as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climatechange, energy challenges, and our economic wellbeing. Partisan bickering and age old solutions simply won’t solve our problems. America – and the world - needs an honest dialogue about security that is as robust as it is realistic.
An extreme weather event is an event that is rare at a particular place and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile of the observed probability density function. By definition, the characteristics of what is called extreme weather may vary from place to place in an absolute sense. Single extreme events cannot be simply and directly attributed to anthropogenic climatechange, as there is always a finite chance the event in question might have occurred naturally. When a pattern of extreme weather persists for some time, such as a season, it may be classed as an extreme climate event, especially if it yields an average or total that is itself extreme (e.g., drought or heavy rainfall over a season).
In addition, the massive shifts in weather patterns will threaten critical ecosystems, endangering the ecosystem services on which human well-being depends—such as water flow and quality, pollination, soil formation, and waste decomposition. Due to the already- extensive human-induced habitat loss and frag- mentation across the globe, Earth’s remaining biodiversity is also threatened by climatechange where territorial movement is blocked or new pest and disease complexes arise. Climate sce- narios predict, for example, that more winter rains in the Sahel can create favorable breeding conditions for the desert locust (Schistocerca gregaria), a migratory plant pest that was responsible for consuming 100 percent of crops in some areas of Niger in 2004. 7
Changes in global climate will have enormous consequences for living nature as well as the economy. Even a small rise in mean annual temperature can have a major impact on a region’s ecology and biological diversity (Pounds & Puschendorf, 2004). Biodiversity is of crucial importance for the stability of ecosystems as well as for human health (Harvard, 2002). The economic impact of drought, floods and other climatechange effects will become quite substantial. Some researchers estimate that these costs are set to rise to between 5% and 20% of global income (Stern, 2006). The IPCC has not yet managed to provide a rock-solid cost estimate of the conse- quences of climatechange. It has estimated the cost of limiting further change, though. If such action is taken, global income will grow by only slightly less than if nothing is done: overall economic growth up to the year 2030 would then be 3 percentage points lower (57% instead of 60%, for example).
Abstract:- Humans did not think of ClimateChange in the past. It was all natural Greenhouse Effect maintaining the temperature of the Earth. The increase in world population and rapid industrialization by emitting anthropogenic gases by humans cause an enhanced Greenhouse Effect which results in global warming and ClimateChange. Some researchers in this field who support the theory of global warming bring out their findings some of which are really nightmarish and alarming for the readers. There is another school of thought opposing and not accepting the global warming theory. They go by saying that there is actually global cooling and not warming. This creates a turmoil between the two schools of thought and the readers. The tussle between the skeptics and prophets of global warming is considered by actually going through the research work of few of them in both the category. The author is in support of the views expressed by both the groups and maintains a status quo.
Although these costs are large, they still omit an important impact of climatechange on water supplies. The calculations described here are all based on annual supply and demand for water, ignoring the problems of seasonal fluctuations. In many parts of the West, the mountain snowpack that builds up every winter is a natural reservoir, gradually melting and providing a major source of water throughout the spring and summer seasons of peak water demand. With warming temperatures and the shift toward less snow and more rain, areas that depend on snowpack will receive more of the year’s water supply in the winter months. Therefore, even if the total volume of precipitation is unchanged, less of the flow will occur in the seasons when it is most needed. In order to use the increased winter stream flow later in the year, expensive (and perhaps environmentally damaging) new dams and reservoirs will have to be built. Such seasonal effects and costs are omitted from the calculations in this section.
Biodiversity of island ecosystems – both terrestrial and aquatic – is likely to be further stressed by climatechange. Extinction rates in the island regions are already the highest relative to other regions of the U.S. due to habitat destruction and competition from invasive species. Species have limited ability to migrate in response to these and future changes given their small populations and physical isolation. Climatechange may negatively affect forest ecosystems by increasing the risk for flooding, drought, fires, or disease (NAST 2000). Coastal mangrove swamps may also be squeezed out of existence where there is inadequate space to move inland in response to sea level rise. Warmer ocean temperatures may negatively impact coral reef communities by causing coral bleaching, in turn affecting the cultures, economies, and ecology of many island communities. Changes in cyclone intensity, frequency, and paths could also have significant impacts on islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific. There is great uncertainty as to how climatechange may affect these characteristics, however (NAST 2000). Increasing sea surface temperature in the Pacific is likely to expand areas in the Pacific where tropical cyclones form and migrate through, potentially increasing the risk of cyclones to many Pacific island communities (Shea et al. 2001).
Internationally, the outcomes of the 2011 United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange in Durban, South Africa, were hopeful, in that all countries, includ- ing the United States and developing nations such as India and China, agreed to work toward legally bind- ing and transparent carbon dioxide reductions, as well as to establish a fund to address inequity by transfer- ring appropriate capacity and technology from devel- oped to developing nations. However, no immediate action was endorsed. Canada won 6 Fossil of the Day awards (awards distributed by members of the Climate Action Network to countries they believe “block” prog-
As many of the case studies in this volume show, islanders are now attributing a great variety of local changes to “climatechange,” or to its recently translated equivalents in Pacific languages. This is a relatively new phenomenon, which in many Pacific societies began in the last five or ten years (Rubow, this volume). A key question, as we see it, as what exactly happens, what exactly are the consequences, when an environmental change becomes understood in this way. The contributors offer some answers to this question. A variety of different issues—water stress, migration, marine pollution, fisheries—are, for good or ill, gathered together under a single heading, and thus seem to demand an integrated, perhaps even a single, response (Newell, Connell, this volume). It becomes all too easy to assume that all of these issues will follow the same trajectory—steady intensification, worsening—even though the reality is more complex, as we see in Rubow’s chapter. The widely varying experiences of different Pacific societies are similarly grouped together—all are now “on the frontlines of climatechange,” “facing climatechange,” “vulnerable to climatechange,” and so forth, even though among Pacific Islanders are enormous differences of wealth, power, positionality, and attitude to climatechange (Rubow in this volume; Hughes, 2013). It is a bridging concept that rallies disparate Pacific societies around a central concept that looms over them all (Kelman and West, 2009). The discourse of climatechange also builds bridge between the Pacific Islanders and the citizens of high-income, industrial nations, some of whom now conceptually relate to islanders almost entirely through the idiom of “sinking islands” (Connell, this volume). Certain opportunities are unlocked. Funding earmarked for climatechange work becomes available for climatechange education, adaptation, and mitigation projects (Veitayaki and Holland, Bingeding, Rubow, Newell
Since ING does not have any business engagements with Brick, this screening process is indicated as being a new request. Cement manufacturing is one of the biggest polluters on the world, and therefore Brick is in scope of the policy. It does not have activities in tar sands, peat or lignite and therefore, the first two criteria (prohibited energy source & country) are not relevant for the risk filter. The ClimateChange Policy prescribes that companies should implement BAT and that they should have a proper mechanism in place to reduce, measure and disclose their emissions. Brick meets these conditions, and therefore business engagements of ING with Brick are allowed. Other ESR policies would also be applied to Brick. Since that is the case, the actual amount of companies that needs to be screened by ING would not increase by implementing the ClimateChange Policy. These three cases show that three major companies in scope of the policy already comply with the conditions of the policy, providing an indication that the actual impact of implementation would not have a big influence on the portfolio of ING. The developed risk filter provides a clear and simple method to screen companies that are in scope of the ClimateChange Policy. It includes all the conditions of the policy and its application is quite straightforward and applicable to any company. It as well shows the outcome of the screening process as the reasons for it (i.e. the criteria) which makes it comprehensive and complete, while still being easy and simple to understand and to apply.
The discourse around climatechange itself has a present and a future orientation, and concerns not only observed changes in climate in the recent past and the present but also, and more particularly, carefully judged scientific predictions about the future climate, its changes, and the impacts of these changes on atmosphere, seas, lands, biological communities and species, including humans. Catherine Keller uses Luke 12:56 as an epigraph to her 1993 essay, ‘Talk about the Weather’, where she writes: ‘Talk about the weather has lost its innocence.’ 38 She discusses the eschatological tone of descriptions of ‘the ecological crisis’. As Bill McKibben wrote, this crisis signals the ‘end of nature’, not that the Earth and its constituents will disappear, but that what we call ‘nature’ is under stress because of, and no longer exists separate from, human actions; the distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘human-made’ conditions is thus collapsed. 39 For Keller, eschatology ‘is the doctrinal lens through which Christian culture, consciously or not, imagines any “end of the world”’. 40 While both biblical and contemporary perspectives present a variety of eschatologies, there remains a challenge to reconstruct the ‘end’ or ‘ends’ (of habitats and homelands, communities and species) that climatechange challenges us to imagine. 41 This entails a kind of cultural change: ‘We will still talk about the weather, just because we are in it together. That’s what weather talk always did. But now the damage to the earth- home binds us all together as never before, as members of a species, indeed members of a planet.’ 42 This new or renewed sense of what it is to be human contains a hope
Project proposals can come from a variety of sponsors within a country, including public, private and not-for-profit entities. Proposal sponsors work with an accredited intermediary or Implementing Entity to develop proposals. The Implementing Entity then carries out a funding proposal appraisal to assess the entire project or programme’ s viability, assessing a variety of considerations including climatechange, environmental, social, gender, economic, and financial factors. Following the initial proposal approval process, a two-set process is followed – the first step being an analysis and recommendation from the Secretariat, then followed by a Board decision as to whether to approve the proposal.
equations and modern boundary conditions, changes in sys- tem mode will not (normally) fall out of climate models. The only real strategy to predict mode changes is to examine the history of climate systems from the paleo-record, to see whether and how the system has behaved in the recent geo- logical past. Some syatem changes over the last 20 000 years are now becoming well recognized, in particular the late- last glaciation abrupt cooling known as the Younger Dryas, and oscillatory changes such as Dansgaard-Oescher events. Recognition of these events allows us to estimate the direc- tion and extent of change possible in climate systems. It also may allow us to identify the trigger, which gives us the po- tential for managing some of the changes. As the quality and density of paleo-records improves we are also beginning to recognise the global teleconnections linked to climatechange events and can make useful, if still unquantified statements about far-field effects of change. Here we present one ex- ample, the Antarctic Cold Reversal (ACR) where the climate link between a change in one region (coastal Antarctica) and its effect in another (New Zealand) can be demonstrated. 4.1 The Antarctic Cold Reversal in the New Zealand record In Sect. 2.3.2 we highlighted a maar lake record from the Auckland region, New Zealand, that demonstrates strong ENSO-like periodicities (Pepper et al., 2004). Within that record the transition from the last glaciation to the present in- terglaciation presents a clear story. For most of the deglacia- tion, there is no evidence of strong inter-annual variability in the Auckland region. During two brief interludes, how- ever, strong inter-annual variability at a 7 year ENSO pe- riodicity is observed and is statistically significant (Fig. 10). The younger of these two events aligns well with the onset of the Antarctic Cold Reversal between 14 800 and 14 500 years ago (Jouzel et al., 1995; Blunier et al., 1997). The duration of the event is much shorter than the ACR, lasting about 150 years as opposed to the 1700 years of the ACR. Neverthe- less the coincidence of the timing of initiation is compelling. Furthermore, there is a strong ACR record from the ocean off New Zealand (Carter et al., 2003) and it shows up in terrestrial paleoecological records (e.g. Turney et al., 2003; McGlone et al., 2004).
As such, very early marriage for girls and expectations that couples will have large families are reasons why fertility rates in Niger are among the highest in the world. Niger is one of the rare countries in which birth rates are not just very high but increasing. The study showed that early, frequent and often back-to-back pregnancies have toxic synergies with other factors that increase vulnerability to climatechange, such as restricted mobility or lack of education. The research concludes that “it is not proposed to support Malthusian theories which are currently re-emerging and with which we are in total disagreement: According to these theories, to cut population growth would raise living standards by limiting the number of mouths to feed and, thus, also preserve the environment. Studies worldwide have demonstrated that families choose to have less children when they can afford to do so: when less labour is needed, when child mortality goes down, when living standards rise and opportunities and means to educate children are in place. [Our research] has shown that this is far from the case in Niger.” 69
For centuries these farmers have however, mitigated against unfavorable environmental outcomes by adopting various survival strategies, which include multiple cropping systems, cropping drought resistant or drought tolerant crops, or simply avoidance of bank credits (to forestall possibility of foreclosure) in the face of often threatened crops, since they may not be able to pay back loans taken on farms or employing other strategies that are meant to cushion effects of unfavorable environmental factors. But of recent climatechange is posing new challenges for these low input farmers who have before now provided the nation’s food requirements; in some cases accounting for the production of over 80 per cent crop and animal produce and products. Their ability to meet the nation’s food requirements is based on farmers’ population (over 65 per cent of the country) and not on yield per unit area, which is often low. That agriculture had provided employment for over 65 per cent of the population and that this means of livelihood is threatened by climatechange further underpin the grave implication of this process on African population.