Similar transitions in representations leading to language, with varied interpretations, usually led by cognitive or linguistic theory, have been charted by Bates (1979) and Nelson (1996). Bruner (1990) and Rogoff (2003), who are interested in the interpersonal context of story-making and the learning of meaning, note that the purposes and procedures in narrating with young children may vary greatly across cultures. Gestures add metaphorical richness to conversational speech at all ages (Goldin-Meadow and McNeill, 1999) constituting a component of all languages, complementary to speech (McNeill, 2005). A deaf baby may substitute learning of contrived hand movements for spoken words, mastering hand sign language through comparable ages (Volterra, 1981; Petitto and Marentette, 1991). Donaldson (1992) gives an account of the growth of modes of narrative and explanation by expansion of the imagination and purposefulness or ‘locus of concern’ in late infancy and pre-school years, which development is reflected in the utterances of children before they develop what she calls the ‘construct mode’ of mind around three or four years. Hobson (2002) describes in similar terms how the foundations of thought are built in the affective communications of infancy, and Lüdtke (2011) reviews the evidence that relational emotions play a key role at all stages of semiotic and linguistic development and in language learning and language therapy.
Cognitivetheories have dominated for select reasons. These theories guide instructional activities in classrooms (Tracey & Morrow, 2006), and literacy experts have concluded that direct skills teaching is necessary for successful literacy acquisition (National Reading Panel, 2000; Snow et al., 1998). Chall (1983) suggested that the stage theory of literacy development “might help to prevent some of the persistent controversies that occur in the field of reading research and practice” (p. 30). The stages provide a framework by which to gauge individuals’ development and assess instructional methods. Chall, who was also concerned about the poorer reading performances of children from bilingual, minority, and low socioeconomic families, contended that the stage theory helps to identify their difficulties in order to guide teaching for their improvement. Moreover, Street (1984) also included abilities such as direc- tionality (reading and writing left to right and top to bottom), letter-sound correspondence, word recognition, spelling, and handwriting among recom- mended functional literacy skills for “ordinary everyday tasks” (p. 229). In addition, Pérez (1998) recognized that “literate students will understand that a written language is a code, and that there are particular rules for decoding and encoding and making meaning … that there are conventions to help the reader make the written text sound as much like oral speech as possible when read aloud (e.g., periods, commas, quotation marks, boldface)” (pp. 60-61). Purcell- Gates (2007) also admitted that “an obvious link between learning to read in school and using literacy in one’s life is that of skill acquisition,” which requires some form of “focused instruction” (p. 203). Last, Purcell-Gates and Tierney (2009) agreed that children must be systematically taught the skills of reading and writing. Guidance from cognitive perspectives is undeniably needed for promoting print literacy.
beliefs might connect to disciplinary beliefs, nor make any linkages to other constructs in cognition and motivation. Furthermore, the research makes no attempts to conceptually integrate the early Piagetian-framed developmental work on epistemological beliefs to other cognitive approaches such as theory of mind or conceptual change. In their analysis of research and theories on change of traditional-aged students in college, Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) include Perry’s Scheme of Intellectual and Ethical Development (1970), King and Kitchener’s Reflective Judgment Model (1994), and Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder’s (1961) Conceptual Development Theory under cognitive- structural theories. These theories concentrate on “the cognitive structure individuals construct in order to give meaning to their worlds” (p.27), and suggest students’ thinking and reasoning about issues. For example, the conceptual development theory focuses on the structure of experience that affects changes in concepts due to the mediation between environmental stimuli and individuals’ responses to the stimuli. In other words, it explains stages of development of concepts which occur as a result of individuals’ exposure to new environment and the requirement of environment for individuals’ responses to it. The theory “is relevant only to the stages of development of concepts that generate the learned responses” (p. 93), not what is being learned.
In the middle of the XX century – when several new research economic programs and approaches started to arise, originating from other social sciences such as psychology or physics - such dominant attitude became particularly evident. This new scenario - which is more and more characterizing the development of economic theory today - sees economics working, on the one side, through the same process of “appropriation - addomestication” that had already taken place in the past. On the other side, surprisingly, economics is generating a turn in tendency – a sort of “reverse imperialism” – meaning a new kind of dominance characterized – initially - by a strong impact of some sciences on economics and – later - by the takeover of the derived interaction field on the other economic programs (Davis, 2013).
Abstract: This article attempts to describe and to analyse the philoshopical point of views regarding epistemology, logic and language and the possible relation bertween those three branches of philolosophical inquiries. The method used in this research is analytical method because many arguments of philosophers has to be analysed in order to portray the whole picture of the correlation between epistemology, logic and language.This article shows that there is a close connection between the study of knowledge and the study of language as a medium to express what is known. Philosophers are generally interested in discussing the relationship between mind, word and reality. Some of them have come to a conclusion that the words are at a crossroads: do they want to reflect what is in the mind or to reflect what is in reality. Then how to distinguish between the correct sentences (propositions) from the wrong ones. Grammatical analysis stops only at the limitofthe relationship between sentences and grammatical rules as a truth test of a proposition. But how to test the truth of the content (property, essence, substance) of a proposition? Many philosophical theories are put forward but still that such things as mind are a mystery, words and sentences also form their own mysteries.
Acemoglu and Robinson would presumably frame “embedded autonomy” as part of the synergy of inclusive political and economic institutions. But in the case of countries like South Korea, political institutions were arguably not inclusive when economic development took off. Political power was concentrated, and perhaps so were economic institutions, in areas such as domestic competition policy. The discipline on rent extraction came from external competition and geopolitical threats and rewards. While Subramanian highlights China and India as outliers in a cross-section regression of GDP per capita on a democracy index, there may be other examples that do not fit well (Boldrin et al., 2012). So it may be that the framework of inclusive and extractive institutions, while identifying and labeling an interaction between politics and economics that is needed for development (the creation and distribution of economic rents 3 ),
The OF have been found to be efficacious for delivering Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for depression (e.g. Perini, Titov, & Andrews, 2009; Ruwaard, Lange, Schrieken, Dolan, & Emmelkamp, 2012). Horgan & Sweeney (2010) report that online self-help for depression was found to be viable for a young adult age group, with many of these communities evaluated as being part of professionally led interventions (Eysenbach, Powell, Englesakis, Rizo, & Stern, 2004). The success of “purpose-built” OF environ- ments to collect data are consequently not representa- tive of the more naturalistic environment of peer led OFs, membership of which involves no formal recruitment pro- cess. The presence of untreated depression within these naturalistic communities (Powell, McCarthy, & Eysenbach, 2003) is acknowledged. However, OF user discussion of their experiences of depression warrants further investiga- tion, particularly when considering the potential of online chat communities to alleviate depressive symptoms (Shaw & Gant, 2002).
In this paper it explained about the selected theories and principles in Educational Psychology and their educational implications in English Language teaching. The Theories of Psychological and Language and Speech Development which talks all the language principles are strategies for teaching reading which center on meaning. The Theories of Moral Development which explains that every sequence is a part of a series of change, a more comprehensive system of understanding qualitatively than the former stage. The classical conditioning theory gave emphasis on the association between stimulus and response. As a result of the experiment, there were three features of the
Semino (2002) shows that the protagonist’s mind style is characterised by his use of the BUTTERFLY metaphor, a nonconventional and idiosyncratic conceptual metaphor, in relation to Miranda. Following the similarity between Semino’s mind style and van Dijk’s opinions, my claim is that Semino’s analysis, based on cognitive metaphor theory and blending theory, of the character’s mind style can be seen as revealing about his particular opinion about Miranda. The first time Clegg uses the BUTTERFLY metaphor in relation to Miranda is the following: T watched the back of her head and her hair in a long pigtail. It was very pale, silky, like bumet cocoons’ (p. 9). Clegg’s description of her hair includes positive lexical choices and a comparison with ‘bumet cocoons’, with positive connotations given his passion for butterflies, reinforcing his positive particular opinion about her. However, the last time Clegg uses the BUTTERFLY metaphor, a change in his particular opinion about Miranda is already observable, revealing the beginning of the application of the VULGAR WOMAN attitude schema to her. As Semino herself suggests: ‘Miranda begins to be constructed as someone unworthy of respect and not to be taken seriously. This change in Clegg’s view of Miranda will contribute to his inaction in the face of her illness’ (2002: 119).
One of the studies that investigated career development with cognitive variables independently is that by O‟Brien (2004). The qualitative study found that life meaning contributed significantly to the prediction of career orientation among the females. Abessolo (2015) report on work values and career orientations with communalities and impact on career paths also support the present findings. They showed strong link between work values career aspiration. In D‟Silva and Abdul Hamid (2014) on career anchors, work values and personality traits significantly correlate with employability orientation among students. Sock and Mui (2012) report of work values and career commitment of Generation Y teachers in Malaysia, as well as the moderating effect of cultural orientation on the work values-career commitment relationship shows the influence of cognitive appraising factors in supporting the importance of workforce culture on career development. Our study aligns with earlier reports (Battista and Almond, 1973; Reker and Wong, 1988) (Ryff and Singer, 1998). They identified meaning in life to range from coherence in one‟s life to goal directedness or purposefulness. Therefore, it was not surprising that meaning in life significantly predicted the career components in this study.
We can now reconsider the question posed in sections 1.6 and 1.6.1: what does it mean to say that the aim of theory is to save the phenomena? In those two sections I have argued that the theory-ladenness of experiments forces us to give a new meaning to this time-honoured motto, for theory saves phenomena that are shaped by it. I stressed that background knowledge is what is needed in order to subsume a pattern of observable facts under an ideal-type, which in turn constitutes what theory deals with. In the last section I have remarked on the pragmatic component of this kind of subsumption. Quine has followed a different direction. Instead of accepting that the phenomena scientists investigate are theory-laden and practice-laden, he tries to define a theory-free empirical content of scientific theories consisting o f empirical regularities that can be tested against observation sentences. After all, Quine could argue, if theory predicts unrestricted regularities at the level of the ideal-types, and if background knowledge (that is other theory) allows us to subsume observable situations under ideal-type, it should be possible in principle to formulate all the various observable regularities that correspond to the same theoretical regularity. The criticisms contained in chapter 4 are intended to show that this strategy is not available: theory cannot imply unrestricted generalities concerning the conjunction of observable situations.
This idea is further explained by means of toy examples of primitive linguistic interactions. The first such example is what we might call the builders’ language [1953, §2]. Two individuals, builder A and assistant B , are working with building stones (blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams). Builder A calls a building stone by name, and B retrieves that building stone for him. Contrast this language-game with how a child might learn how to behave in such situations. You could imagine a teacher calling a building stone by name and the learner having to point at the stone, or simply even repeat the name (to learn how to pronounce it, for example). In the original builder language, we would be inclined to say that the word ‘Slab’ means something like ‘Bring me a slab’, whereas in the learning example it means something like ‘Show me the slab’ or ‘Repeat the word Slab for me’. Now suppose all slabs are broken and builder A says the word ‘Slab’ to B. Does it have a meaning? Certainly A knows what to expect from B in that situation. B would, however, not be able to perform his usual action of retrieving a slab (at least an intact one), but he could for example shake his head to indicate that there are no intact slabs. The word ‘Slab’ still has a meaning since both parties know how to use it, even though the presumed referent of the word no longer exists. What is important then, when it comes to meaning, are the actions tied to the use of the word.
It is clear that educators can affect learning positively or negatively, that a personal or professional attitude will immediately change the awareness pupils have toward our classes. Furthermore, as educators, we can not encourage in our pupils the development of good cognitive and socioemotional strategies if we do not constitute ourselves as a model to be followed. On account of these considerations, this article focuses on what Feuerstein (1986) has termed “mediation”, its conditions and the mediator’s profile. Thus, as language teachers, we have to think about the way we could improve and enrich the experience we are offering our pupils in order to make them feel and be intelligent cognitively and emotionally.
2.1.2 Groningen Meaning Bank (GMB) GMB (Bos, 2013) is a crowdsourced semantic re- source. Its aim is to provide a large collection of semantically annotated English texts with for- mal rather than shallow semantics. It also focuses on annotating texts, not isolated sentences, and can integrate various semantic phenomena such as predicate argument structure, scope, tense, the- matic roles, rhetorical relations and presupposi- tions into a single semantic formalism: Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp et al., 2010).
The HEALS instrument may prompt self-reflection of inner healing for patients living with progressive chronic and/or life-threatening illnesses. After reviewing responses, the instrument facilitates clinicians in having focused and in- depth conversations with patients on sources of LTC and their personal growing edges. Moreover, in hospital settings, usually the palliative care physician has initial contact with the patient. Having a glimpse of the patient’s outlook on life and potential to progress toward a healing outcome will help the physician and team establish rapport while obtaining information to help the team determine where to intervene, prior to in-depth assessments that follow this initial consulta- tion. As health-care providers, we recognize that chronic and/ or life-threatening illnesses force patients to question their mortality and the meaning of their lives. Nevertheless, in many circumstances, chronic and/or life-threatening illness can give patients’ lives greater meaning and purpose – the HEALS instrument is one way to begin this conversation.
In this extract, both the quantity and quality maxims were not observed. S’s answer ‘sèjuta wah lebih inè (it was more than one million)’ in actual terms, is a rather small amount. This implies that S was withholding some truth. A simple conversion would show that the IDR1 million is about RM315. A mobile phone costs more than that amount, and so the IDR1 million appears in this case to show that S was withholding the exact amount spent on the building. By adding ‘ndèq-man buèq (but it is still not a complete yet)’ would appear strange that S would imply the obvious, of course it would cost more to construct or repair a building. Therefore, by not providing enough information, S provokes the recipient A to infer that S is not comfortable about revealing the cost or the amount he has spent so far on the building. It is also apparent that by adding that the work is not yet complete, S was implying that he was unable to give the exact cost incurred, but that he had spent IDR 1 million. It is clear that S expressed a meaning that puts a high value on what influences the other to accept the response without being obtrusive which concurs with Leech (2005).
participants recalled the lure when they were presented with 12 words than when they saw 9 words. The proportion of lures recalled was lower again when lists only included 6 words. These findings can be accounted for with reference to spreading activation (see e.g. Roediger, Watson, McDermott & Gallo, 2001). Each word in the list presented to the participants was connected to the same lure, which was therefore partially activated by every individual item. Lures were recalled when the amount of activation accumulated during the presentation of the word list was sufficient for the lure to pass a recognition threshold. Longer lists provided more opportunity for activation to accrue in the lure node. Of particular note is the study conducted by Gallo and Roediger (2003), which is the only previous work to assess the effects of both list length and age to our knowledge. In their study, participants were presented with 5, 10 or 15 item DRM lists. These lists had elicited the highest levels of false recognition responses in the Stadler, Roediger and McDermott (1999) norms. Participants were then asked to make old versus new judgements on a recognition test which included the non-presented lures. Gallo and Roediger (2003) reported that the likelihood of incorrectly categorising a lure as "old" was increased with increasing list length. Interestingly, though, there was no significant difference in false recognition rates between the older and younger adults in their study. We consider that this may be a consequence of their methodology. The Gallo and Roediger (2003) task used the DRM lists that were most likely to elicit false recognition responses in the first place. As a consequence, it may be that the association between the presented items and the lure was strong enough that there was no opportunity for any effect of cognitive ageing to be observed. That is, if the intra-network links were very strong then a) only extensive weakening of these links would result in any change in performance predicted by the Transmission Deficit Hypothesis and b) the level of inhibition that would be needed to avoid false recognition would be too great to achieve even in the absence of any inhibitory deficit and essentially inflate the false memory rate in younger adults too. 3
74. As suggested by Coffee’s brief critique, herding into a legal forum may be prompted by incentives other than attempting to free ride on the cognitive expenses borne by others. Such herding also insulates the advising attorney from criticism. “[I]t is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.” J OHN M. K EYNES , T HE G ENERAL T HEORY OF E MPLOYMENT , I NTEREST AND M ONEY 158 (1936), quoted in Mar- cel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Re- turns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 W ASH . U. L.Q. 347, 355-56 (1996). Profes- sors Kahan and Klausner assume the phenomenon represents an agency cost, Kahan & Klausner, supra, at 355, but individual parties deciding for themselves might also fear ridicule following an unconventional failure of judgment. See J. R ICHARD E ISER , S OCIAL P SYCHOLOGY : A TTITUDES , C OGNITION AND S OCIAL B EHAVIOR 36-37 (1986). Finally, herding may also reflect a “network externality”: The choice of one litigation situs over another may be self-reinforcing, as that situs builds up a larger store of precedents and thereby in- creases legal certainty. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 V A . L. R EV . 757, 841-47 (1995).
socially through interaction. Bakhtin’s speech genres can be related to Wittgenstein’s language games (Kerry, 1994). Speech genres (and language games) are more than merely styles of speaking. Different speech genres lend themselves to expression of different facets of our experience; they are associated with particular ways of seeing the world, highlighting certain aspects whilst ignoring others (Morson & Emerson, 1990). Bakhtin argues that the meaning of an utterance can never be finalised, that is, there is no final oracle to which we can appeal to identify a correct, incontestable interpretation of the utterance. Instead, every utterance implicates a field of answerability, a social and historical space in which the factors that shaped the utterance and the consequences of the utterance can always be (recursively) questioned. Hence, Bakhtin implicates the audience (as well as all the utterances that the speaker has previously made or heard) in both the form and the meaning of the utterance. The works of Bakhtin & colleagues have recently attracted the attention of researchers in human-computer interaction (Spinuzzi, 1999; McCarthy & Wright, 2004; Wright & McCarthy, 2004), as well as from digital artists (1999) and commentators in the humanities (Rockwell, 2002).
16 This may be so, for instance, if resources are so scarce that we are unable to eliminate poverty and do all of the other things that matter. This is not clearly the case in the actual world, however. For, (1) we give very little aid globally and (2) we know a lot about what makes aid work. It is well-known that most countries fall far short of the target of .7 percent of GDP in foreign aid (OECD, ‘Development Aid at its Highest Level Ever in 2008’, , www.oecd.org/do cument/35/0,3343,en_2649_34487_42458595_1_1_1_1,00.html [accessed on 28 June 2013]). On average, citizens in OECD-DAC countries gave $68 in 2002 (OECD  cited in Tarp , p. 14). Furthermore, there is a lot of good evidence that some aid works. There are many experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of health and education programs, for instance, that demonstrate their success. There are also good examples of agricultural support, microfinance, school voucher, scholarship, and de-worming programs. See Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin, ‘Female Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines’, World Development, 38/3 (2010), 333-344; Robert Cassen, Does Aid Work? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Jonathan Isham, Deepa Narayan, and Lant Pritchett, ‘Does Participation Improve Project Performance: Establishing Causality with Subjective Data’, The World Bank Economic Review 9/2 (1995), 175-200; Al Kehler, ‘When Will Ethiopia Stop Asking for Food Aid?’, in Humanitarian Policy Group (ed.), Humanitarian Exchange. Humanitarian Policy Group No. 27 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004), 22-4; Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, ‘Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit’, Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper 6059 (2007). Many of these programs have been successfully replicated and scaled up (Duflo et al. ; Hassan Zaman, ‘Poverty and BRAC’s Microcredit Programme: Exploring Some Linkages’, BRAC Working Paper Number 18 ; Jonathan Morduch, ‘Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh’, Harvard University Department of Economics and HIID Working Paper  http://www.cgdev.org/doc/RM/ Morduch%201998,%20Does%20Microfinance%20Really%20Help%20the%20Poor--New%20Evidence%20 from%20Flagship%20Programs%20in%20Bangladesh.pdf [accessed 16 July 2013]; Mark Pitt, ‘Reply to Jonathan Morduch’s ‘Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh’, Ms., http://www.brown.edu/research/projects/pitt/sites/brown.edu.research.projects.pitt/files/uploads/reply_0.pdf [accessed 20 August 2013]). Though it may not be easy to do so, it is clearly possible to create such programs. 17 There may be other arguments for considering other factors besides development or poverty in aid allocation. We might