ABSTRACT: Contrary to the popular belief, DDR type RAM modules retain stored memory even after power is cut off. Provided physical access to the cryptosystem, a hacker or a forensic specialist can retrieve information stored in the RAM by installing it on another system and booting from a USB drive to take a RAM dump. With adequate disassembly and analytic tools, this information stored in the RAM dump can be deciphered. Hackers thrive on such special-case attack techniques to gain access to systems with sensitive information. An unencrypted RAM module will contain the decryption key used to access an encrypted file system. Bits of data are stored in capacitors where a charge or a discharge denotes a 0 or a 1. Even on withdrawal of power from the RAM module, the capacitors still retain their values for a certain time frame. This window of time is highly vulnerable to a coldbootattack, and it can be extended by using proper cooling techniques. Coldboot attacks have been widely demonstrated even on modern Android handsets with the use of a custom recovery. We go through various flaws present in modern RAM technology and take a look at some of the counter-measures that ensure safety. We present an approach to design a preventive technique that will reduce the possibility of a coldbootattack.
Abstract. In this work, we consider the ring- and module- variants of the LWE problem and investigate coldboot attacks on cryptographic schemes based on these problems, wherein an attacker is faced with the problem of recovering a scheme’s secret key from a noisy version of that key. The leakage resilience of cryptography based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem has been studied before, but there are only limited results considering the parameters observed in coldbootattack scenarios. There are two main encodings for storing ring- and module-LWE keys, and, as we show, the performance of coldboot attacks can be highly sensitive to the exact encoding used. The first encoding stores polynomial coefficients directly in memory. The second encoding performs a number theoretic transform (NTT) before storing the key, a commonly used method leading to more efficient implementations. We first give estimates for a coldbootattack complexity on the first encoding method based on standard algorithms; this analysis confirms that this encoding method is vulnerable to coldboot attacks only at very low bit-flip rates. We then show that, for the second encoding method, the structure introduced by using an NTT is exploitable in the coldboot setting: we develop a bespoke attack strategy that is much cheaper than our estimates for the first encoding when considering module-LWE keys. For example, at a 1% bit-flip rate (which corresponds roughly to what can be achieved in practice for coldboot attacks when applying cooling), a coldbootattack on Kyber KEM parameters has a cost of 2 43 operations when the second, NTT-based encoding
Our today’s mobile devices store sensitive data about their owners in both volatile and non-volatile memory. These include contact details, user credentials, personal and business emails, pictures, location history, or perhaps even the user’s health states. That is why mobile devices are of special interest for forensic investigations. Mod- ern mobile device operating systems, like Android and iOS, increase the confidentiality of data by encrypting the file system. The utilized Full Disk Encryption (FDE) key is therefore stored in main memory at runtime, leaving it prone to extraction with a coldbootattack . More- over, an attacker can retrieve sensitive user data exposed in RAM, including passwords, key material, pictures, and further confidential information [2, 3].
Limitations of previous work. There has previously only been one paper that considers key-recovery in the discrete logarithm setting . We believe that this paper delivers only a small advantage over brute-force attacks. Furthermore, the analysis seems to be flawed: in an execution of a coldbootattack, the authors assume that the number of key bits that flip is upper-bounded by the expected number of bits that will flip. When the number of bit flips exceeds the expected amount, the algorithm will fail to recover the private key, but this is not accounted for in the analysis. Furthermore,  does not explicitly cover the case of asymmetric errors that appear in physical coldboot attacks, despite the fact that this is the motivation for the paper. Instead, the focus is on an idealised setting in which only 1 or 0 bits flip, but not both: however, in practice both 0 and 1 bits have the potential to flip, as described above.
his paper describes a day-long orientation for new accounting majors, which our Department of Accounting calls a boot camp. As the name boot camp suggests from its military roots, it was an effort to offer junior students a brief view of the realities of a professional accounting career, their responsibilities during their last student years and the social networking and other resources that help to build a successful career. Both accounting professors and members of the professional community, most of them our alumni, acted as facilitators for the event. The accounting boot camp was scheduled as a day-long event early in the fall semester. The schedule for the boot camp is included in the Appendix A. The timing of the event was important because we wanted to provide information intended to be helpful in the students’ recruiting process, which typically begins in early October.
prevent the Service from collecting a substantial amount of tax revenue that could otherwise help reduce the federal budget deficit. 255 Deferral of loss, on the other hand, both protects against contrived transaction structuring by shareholders for tax avoidance purposes and preserves congressional intent to defer losses in corporate reorganizations. 256 Requiring shareholders to allocate boot in § 356 transactions on a pro rata basis is the fairest and most practical way to accomplish deferral because shareholders can preserve any unrecognized target share losses in the tax basis of the newly acquired shares for which their surrendered target shares were directly exchanged. 257 Pro rata allocation of boot is also consistent with the treatment of boot in § 351 transactions, and it is safe from scrutiny under the economic substance doctrine. 258 Although a shareholder could also defer loss recognition through basis-shifting, this method would result in a practical circumvention of § 356 if transaction- splitting, as permitted under the proposed 2009 regulations, is allowed. 259 Thus, the Treasury Department should close this loophole by modifying the proposed 2009 regulations to conform more closely to congressional intent requiring mandatory § 356 application and loss deferral when shareholders exchange target stock for both acquiring stock and cash in a reorganization. 260
To get more information about the initial strain situation a ski boot, first, the buckling process was analyzed. The 4 stages of the buckling are shown in figures 5a and b. The spatial distribution of the strains was measured at all 4 stages. A linear increase of the major strain value with increasing section length and a maximal strain value of 2.5 % was observed after the fourth stages.
Period 2 Boot Camp Partner Lindsey Ahn Patrick Bohan Emily Balmaseda Bruce Siavichay Joshuan Barba Dasiah Christmas Patrick Bohan Lindsey Bohan Mario Camacho Caleb Rhee Dasiah Christmas Joshuan Barba Tristan Co Sofia DIamantopoulos Jiro Dela Cruz Rynn Dragomirov Juno Dela Cruz Sian Han