This model of the emergence of the national state became the basis of comparison for studies examining nation-state formation in other parts of the world (see, Skocpol, 1979; Mann, 1986, 1993; Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010). It has also provided the baseline definition for subsequent historical sociological studies seeking to develop more expansive understandings of state-formation, such as Steinmetz’s (1999) edited collection examining the significance of culture to state-formation. This volume addresses what is understood as the ‘cultural and historical decontextualization’ of many earlier studies and seeks ‘to demonstrate how taking culture seriously can change the way we understand states that have not been stereotyped as “traditional”’ (Steinmetz, 1999a: 27, 28). That is, part of the intention of this volume is to examine the emergence of state forms in the non-West and to account for broader cultural processes in terms of examining the state in Europe and the West. In maintaining an idea of the ‘traditional’ state form, however, Steinmetz and his contributors fail to re-conceptualize the idea of the nation-state by taking into account those broader processes of colonization and imperialism that are at least recognized as having happened. The chapters on non-Western states simply examine the consequences of colonization on their subsequent development; or, as Steinmetz puts it, they ‘explore the effect of Western political ideologies and state forms in non-Western, colonial and postcolonial settings’ (Steinmetz, 1999a: 32). There is no consideration of how the colonial relations of domination and subordination connected dispersed territories and populations within an imperial polity, nor of how a specific nation-state form only emerged (on both sides) as a consequence of decolonization. It did not exist prior to then. The nation state in the comparativehistoricalsociology of nation state-building is always already a colonial and imperial state.
Focusing on (3) and (4), we can immediately say why neither Collins nor Goldman is a social ontologist. As opposed to (3), neither assumes that the actual state of knowledge production tells us something deep about its conditions of possibility. Rather, both take the actual as the basis for inferring conditions under which knowledge may flourish and diminish. In other words, Collins and Goldman presume that knowers normally do not know how to know, and hence their collective efforts to date do not constitute all there is to know: a special inquiry into the matter is therefore needed (i.e. a social epistemology). Collins proceeds in terms of a comparativehistoricalsociology of philosophical cultures in European and Asian spheres of influence over the last 2,500 years, whereas Goldman argues in largely aprioristic terms about the sorts of authority structures and communication networks that will tend to encourage and inhibit the production of reliable knowledge.
If Political Marxism remains locked within a Eurocentric ontology which effectively invisibilises the non-West and only registers European-induced developments as causally linked with systemic change, where else can we turn in Marxist IHS to locate non-Eurocentric theorising? The most promising extant candidate for this task is Justin RosenbergÕs work on the concept of uneven and combined development. Theoretically, RosenbergÕs reconstruction seems to transcend many of the Eurocentric pitfalls as it strives to recapture Ôthe interactive multiplicity of social development as a historical processÕ (2006: 312). Such a position naturally requires the rejection of homogenising universalist and essentalist theoretical assumptions, for the failure to do so could easily collapse Ôthe interactive multiplicityÕ into mere static units comparable to functionally identical states in neorealist IR. Furthermore, Rosenberg takes another step forward and recognises that all units within the international system interact with each other and the system dialectically, hence Ôthe internationalÕ consists of an Ôinner differentiation of parts, across many dimensions, but within an ontological wholeÕ (2006: 316). The ultimate task for Rosenberg is then to develop U&CD as an explanatory framework within which Ôdynamic and comparative moments of analysisÕ can be incorporated within a single theoretical vantage point Ôin order to theorize a specifically inter-societal dimension of social changeÕ (2006: 312).
The comparative approach, which is advanced by all three responses to second wave historicalsociology (as well as by second wave historicalsociology itself), is established through a methodology of „ideal types‟ where different civilizational trajectories are examined in relation with each other or, more usually, with Europe, or the West. The ideal type of Western modernity, derived from an endogenous examination of Western history, continues to serve as the „universal‟ denominator against which to analyze and compare the developments and processes of, and in, other parts of the world. While „ideal types‟ are said to refer to the „real‟, they are posited as conceptual „truths‟ abstracted from any particular history and/or cultural location. This abstraction is designed to render certain connections „visible‟ and capable of being submitted to systematic examination. What is neglected is the extent to which that systematic examination reinforces the „invisibility‟ of other connections that might have been the object of investigation. The cultural turn simply „discovers‟ new particularities which are additive to the standard accounts. What is generally rendered invisible in most considerations of modernity are the colonial relationships which have comprised a significant aspect of modernity from its inception and have been no less systematic than the interconnections that have otherwise been represented within those accounts (see Bhambra 2007a; 2007b).
to as the Financial Markets Act . See Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 130; Van Deventer 2008 http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf 1-5; Myburgh and Davis 2004 http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf 8-13; also see Chitimira Enforcement of Market Abuse Provisions 354-420; Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 1-18; Botha 1990 SALJ 504-508; Chitimira Regulation of Insider Trading 137-163; Osode 2000 J Afr L 239; Jooste 2006 SALJ 437, 441-460; Van Deventer 1999 FSB Bulletin 2-3; Luiz 1999 SA Merc LJ 136-151; Luiz 2011 SA Merc LJ 151-172; Beuthin and Luiz Basic Company Law 235-238; Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 155- 165, for further related historical analysis on the regulation of market manipulation and insider trading in South Africa.
Whilst obviously problematic, aggregate union density is a widely accepted proxy of the organisational resources and societal influence of the labour movement (Stephens, 1979; Cameron, 1984; Visser, 1992; Crouch, 1993; Franzosi, 1995). Stephens (1979) in particular notes the cross-national comparative association between the extent of labour organisation, the coherence of the labour movement, collective bargaining centralisation and social democratic participation in government. Cameron’s (1984) analysis suggests similar connotations, and Crouch (1992; 1993) suggests the relevance of at least some. Many other contributions allude to these and other historical associations between the nature and effectiveness of organisation with density in the contexts of particular nations (e.g. Franzosi, 1995). The potential significance of density as an indication of the widespread membership which can constitute a barrier to employers playing one workforce off against another within their national borders might also be noted.
The American legal approach to the problem may be deduced in the laconic conclusion of James Weinstein that “for a mixture of theoretical and practical reasons, the [Supreme] Court would probably find that the most salient harm caused by Holocaust denial that government can legitimately address – the infliction of psychic injury of Holocaust survivors and their families – is not weighty enough to justify the suppression of even false statements within public discourse” (see James Weinstein, “An Overview of American Free Speech Doctrine and Its Application to Extreme Speech”, in Ian Hare & James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy, OUP, 2009, 90). Although historical revisionism (unlike hate speech) has never been an issue for the Supreme Court, the USA is definitively a hotbed of revisionist narratives among Western democracies precisely due to the libertarian construction the free speech epistemology in (“harder”) hate speech cases. For a detailed overview of differences in the approach to hate speech in the USA and Europe, see Uladzislau Belavusau, Judicial Epistemology of Free Speech Through Ancient Lenses, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 23, 2010. 165-183; Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: a Comparative Analysis”, Cardozo Law Review, 24, 2002. 1523-1567; Frederic Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and America: A Case Study In Comparative Constitutional Architecture, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Harvard University, RWP05-019, 2005. 1-25. In part, the difference in judicial reasoning in the USA and Europe may be attributed to the appraisal of Holocaust as a specifically European stigma. However, this approach does not explain why in neighboring Canada the legal prohibition is reminiscent of the European approach.
Other factors, linked with the first one, influencing the institutional evolution of the discipline of economics in the United States were the demise of the Social Gospel movement and the use of the image of science to legitimate conservative opinions (Bateman, 1998). The discourse of Social Gospel movement concerning religion, social justice, and welfare was substituted by the discourse of conservative economists about science, efficiency, and free enterprise. “Not all American economists in 1920 would have happily identifie d with the whole range of Ely’s and Commons’s work <…> but in the glow of the Social Gospel’s golden years, historical and institutional approaches were accepted and respected” (Ibid. p. 41). These acceptance and respect disappeared, or at least decreased, with the switch from the image of science as experimental activity to purely theoretical one, in which just the fact of using mathematics already signifies its scientific character: “Whereas institutional economics seemed perfectly ‘scientific’ in 1922, b y 1947, it was no longer unquestionably regarded as such” (Ibid., p. 48). Academic freedom in the case of the discipline of economics is very relative: “During the twentieth century, there have been primarily four patrons of economics: higher education, th e government, the business community, and charitable foundations” (Goodwin, 1998, p. 54). Practically all of them contributed, including by the selective financing, to the gradual diminution of the weight of any current of economic thought different from neoclassical and considered as troublemaking (Ibid., pp. 78 – 79). Finally, because very close interaction between community of economists and community of mathematicians, evolution of economics was more influenced by the internal tendencies in the development of mathematics than by the changing economic reality with its burning problems (Weintraub, 2002). Thus the reign of neoclassical economics and its transformation into the mainstream cannot be considered to be due to its scientific superiority. The result of this evolution is disappointing. Surveys of PhD students in USA universities (Colander and Klamer, 1990), (Colander, 2007) show “a picture of a profession lost in pure theory and technicalities with little focus on ideas. There was a sense that economics dealt with mind games, not real economics problems” (Ibid., p. 9). It is just a confirmation of the evaluation of Ariel Rubinstein given in the third section of this paper: the contemporary economics has a character of a set of “fables” which has “ve ry little to say about the real world and that there are very few models in economic theory that can be used to provide serious advice”.
This article explores one of the reasons which have prevented the civil society to be grown in contemporary Iran. Since every society has specific history and mutations, in this research, historicalsociology approach is used. This approach, explored by many sociologists such as Max Weber, is widely used for understanding social and political structure in various countries and cultures. This article explores one of the main reasons of limitation of civil society in Iran, related to patrimonial culture and personal rulership in pre modern and modern Iran consecutively. In pre modern Iran there wasn’t any law and everything referred to patrimonial ruler without having any limitation in power. After the emergence of modern state in Iran, patrimonial type of domination was reborn with a new face. Here it was the personal ruler ship which controlled all social groups and institutions; and civil society was too limited at this time.
The sociology of the agents and groups involved (at any level) in the European institutional space is undoubtedly the second remarkable dimension of this emerging body of scholarship. If the sociology of the elites or the political and administrative personnel is a traditional subject in international political science, the sociology of Community elites (European officials, lobbyists, permanent representatives, etc.) is largely absent in the international literature. One could even say that it is a gap to be filled in European studies, as J. Joana and A. Smith’s remarkable book on European Commissioners shows. It would clearly be wrong to assume that identifying a central political personnel has proven sufficient, especially since the processes of its construction as a centre (see further below) have their share of grey areas. But doing completely without this analysis makes it very difficult to truly understand the relations between these arenas and others. The historical and political sociology of Europe is not only more attentive to this dimension; it turns it into a starting point from which three directions are developed.
In order to study the use of to for dative P in previous stages of the language, I extracted all tokens from the Parsed Corpora of Historical English (Kroch and Ann Taylor 2000, Taylor et al. 2003, Kroch et al. 2004, Taylor et al. 2006, Kroch et al. 2010) containing the following recipient introducing verbs (verbs that also introduce goals, e.g., SEND, were excluded): ALLOT, APPOINT, ASSIGN, AYEVEN, BEHIEGHT, BEQUEATH, BETAKE, DAELAN, FEED, GIVE, GRANT, LEND, OFFER, OWE, PAY, PROFFER, PROMISE, RESTORE, SELL, SELLAN, SERVE, SHOW, VOUCHSAFE, and YIELD. I also extracted information about whether the arguments were full noun phrases or pronouns, the relative order of the recipient and theme (and their order with respect to the verb to rule out cases of topicalisation), and whether or not the recipient was marked with to (passive data was also collected, which is discussed in Section 5.4). 17 While I delay a detailed quantitative examination of the corpus results till the next subsection, Figure 5.2 shows the raw frequency of to in various time phrases as well as the predicted frequencies according to the optimal model discussed in the next subsection. In this subsection, I provide a qualitative summary of the diﬀerent stages of English. Since the availability of cliticisation makes data from theme pronouns more complicated, in these two subsections, I focus on cases with full noun phrase themes (e.g., “John gave Mary the book”). I return to the case of theme pronouns in
What happens if we turn our attention from the philosophical musings of ‘dead white Frenchmen’ (McBride and Pates 2005: 401)? What might we gain from such a move? What might we lose? In response to McBride and Pates’ riposte to their Foucauldian critique of the psychological phenomenon of needle fixation Fraser et al. suggest ‘there are many other theoretical or epis- temological positions from which to examine this issue’ (2005: 403, my emphasis). Whilst Fraser et al. do not elaborate on what these other theoretical or epistemological positions might look like, in what follows I attend to theo- ries of injecting that concern not just the subjects but objects of drug use. My aim is to consider the impact epistemological questions of the syringe have on injecting behaviour and their consequence for social research and sociology. Moving beyond the Foucauldian observation that ‘injecting drug users are the products of discourse’ (Fraser et al. 2004: 70), I consider what a shift in focus from the discourse of needle fixation to the material objects of injecting drug use adds to knowledge of injecting practices. To begin, I address the effects of Howard Becker’s symbolic interactionist perspective for understandings of heroin addiction.
Various hypothetical schemas, among them Marxism, clash hypothesis, phenomenology, typical cooperation, women's activist human science, and postmodern humanism, can all be said to have some type of a humanistic introduction as a piece of their general skeleton. Be that as it may, as a particular school, humanist social science is most promptly related to those sociologists who in their instructing, exploration, and activism float around the Association for Humanist Sociology (AHS)—established in 1976 by Alfred Mcclung Lee, Elizabeth Briant Lee, and Charles Flynn. In spite of the fact that various sociologists (Glass 1971; Goodwin 1983; Lee 1973; Scimecca 1995) have offered meanings of humanist humanism, the one I will use here is that of a previous president of the AHS, Thomas Ford Hoult (1979), who calls human science humanist if "the examination and teachings of its experts have one extreme reason to create a general public where the best capability of all people is to be acknowledged; in short to create an accommodating society" (p. 88)
In general, critical sociology can be characterized in two ways. First, those writing in the critical sociology tradition are generally opposed to functional explanations of how society works. The second form of critical sociology is more parochial, and emerges out of the tradition of radical political economy, a tradition that looks more carefully at why society is designed to generate bad outcomes for many people rather than understanding how bad outcomes occur in society. While early critical sociology was rooted in the traditions characterized as Marxism, critical sociology more generally extends beyond the material concerns of scholars writing in that tradition and embraces questions of power writ large, the importance of culture, and the nature of social relationships that are not rooted in its material conditions (e.g., racism and sexism).
When studying the sociology of education it soon becomes apparent there is an inevitable overlap with most if not all of the disciplinary focus of this book’s other chapters. We cannot examine the sociology of education without understanding its history, and the politics, economics, philosophy and psychology underpinning it. The notion of comparing education systems and peoples’ experiences of engaging with them across societies and within a given society over time is central to this process as well. This overlap is illustrated by reference to some of the key researchers and theorists cited in this chapter. American writers Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (see key figure/s 1) are considered primarily as economists, whilst Stephen Ball (see key text 1) writes largely upon policy and its implications for people. As he himself notes in the introduction to the key text referred to below, ‘…it is sometimes difficult to say who is a sociologist of education and who is not’ (2004: 1), although Ball undoubtedly is.
management practice can be traced through to business performance and growth. This approach enables a critical analysis of how contextual factors such as family and education and the wider political, cultural and historical contexts shape growth disposition and small business management practice. Moreover, the study considers the influencing characteristics such as gender and socio-economic background, and the life events of the business owner as relevant dimensions. Although an initial conceptualisation of growth disposition was used to guide the study, the research team remained open to new discoveries throughout, using ‘controlled opportunism’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539) to exploit new insights. The initial conceptual framework was flexible enough to allow for emergent categories, for instance participation in business growth programmes by some of the business owners.
was based on recognizing the foreign language press as a key factor of integration of immigrant groups and Americanization (Park 1922). Other representatives of the Chicago School also published influential early works in media sociology, like Helen MacGill Hughes (1940) who considered the human interest story as a source of public education and self-understanding. She traced the rise of the human interest story journalistic form against the backdrop of broader social changes between the 19th and 20th centuries and conceived this journalistic form as a socially integrative force in the modern American city. Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang (1953) became known for their early study of television which found