Far more than in Narayan’s case, Roy’s critical preoccupation with the ideologies of communism and nationalism is extant in the form o f his famous debates with Lenin at the Second Congress o f the Comintern in 1920. Not only did they affect his policy and position on China as described above, but more importantly, for the purpose o f understanding his theory o f Radical Humanism, the debate engendered responses by Roy to questions that went beyond the immediate tactical desirability o f supporting nationalist movements in Asia. This proved to have had a sizeable impact on Roy’s thinking on the potential for conflict and collaboration between ideologies and the implications of these for democracy, popular participation and the concept of freedom. The extension of Marxism by Lenin in particular became important to the Indian communist and socialist movements, not in the least because o f Lenin’s focus on imperialism. Hence Roy, like Lenin, derived his politicalthought from a medley o f ideological positions, encompassing a complexity o f interrelationships that were far from stable - communism and nationalism, communism and democracy, nationalism and internationalism. What is clear though is that the ideology of communism in India, not always being accommodative of the other quite influential concepts, was weakened quite considerably in terms o f both internal institutional disintegration and external political pressures, e.g. by the banning o f communist parties, the refusal o f political cooperation by democratically inclined Marxist socialist parties. The strengthening o f the latter often resulted out o f an internal critique within the communist ranks, as seen in the cases o f Roy and Narayan who evolved their political thinking out o f their wavering belief in communism. The unquestioning acceptance o f the dictates of the CPSU as well as the inability o f the communist movement to resolve the conflicts between its Marxist heritage, the demands of nationalism and the liberal challenge o f pluralist democracy constituted the main problems that stood in the way o f a politically viable communist programme in India, thus paving the way for the augmenting o f Narayan and Roy’s discontent with orthodox ideology and their search for alternative solutions.
who has openly called upon producing a politicalthought in accordance with the Real as the sole potential of creating a revolutionary stance and an entirely new political horizon. This paper is inspired by this call and Žižek’s arguments of its liability. It is dedicated to exploring the epistemic possibilities of thinking the (political) Real by recourse to the few thinkers today who argue in favor of a “theory in accordance with the Real” and shall thereby attempt to determine the epistemological viability of the “realist thesis” advocated by Žižek. We will undertake a close reading of François Laruelle’s “realist” or non-philosophical epistemology (primarily his theory of non- Marxism), but will also take a look at the epistemological possibilities for a political realist theory that can be found in the works of Alain Badiou and Quentin
as foundation orientation that in fact caused to generate such this thinking among Fad- dists. Since system of religious beliefs and concepts are not arguable then could be ac- counted as basics and foundation of cognitive and rational system. As a result, we must be- lieve in it. Such these systems of concepts shall be believed. Therefore, according to view of faddists, the main point is that, in point of view of real believers, basis for as- sumption could be fin in system of religious beliefs itself. Religious faith is basic for pri- vate life, but if so, in this case, thinking about examining and evaluation of faith by rational and external criteria is an snafu, a failure that probably suggested to lack of real faith to reason itself, for that sometimes it has been expressed that if we arbitrate or measure word of God with our knowledge and logic, in fact, adore knowledge and logic, nor God. As a results, faddists that emphasize on real faith more than everything else, are not opti- mistic to wisdom and argument, mostly con- sider faith as a private religious experience. For this reasons, faddists and proponent to religious faith do not believe to any con- sistency between wisdom and Faith. Even more, in view of some faddists, when com- paring wisdom and contention against reli- gious beliefs, the faith will be no more meant.
This commitment to taking seriously the opinions of our fellow citizens has wide- ranging implications for our reflexive understanding of political theory itself. Williams stresses that taking our fellow citizens seriously as opponents is not some kind of imperfect compromise with injustice, in the way the ‘ideal’ theorists might imply. Rather, considering which policies people will actually find acceptable, rather than those which further one’s favoured philosophical principles, can be a principled position because the question ‘how will it play in Peoria ... can involve a consideration of political right, as well as of expediency’ (IBWD, p. 151). The corollary of this is that if we genuinely want to move people to act in a particular way we must take seriously the need to speak to them in terms that they can embrace, a reminder which ties in with Williams’s belief that that ethical and political arguments will fail to guide action if they offer the sort of (conventional) philosophical theory which systematises ethical thought and reduces it to some basic principles. As we saw in Chapter One, Williams laments this modern turn to thin concepts for related reasons, primarily because they are ‘inadequate to provide any great substance to personal ethical experience’ (IBWD, p. 49). As Geoffrey Hawthorn notes, this leads Williams to malign the sort of abstract, thin and general theoretical political arguments that many political moralists articulate because they fail to offer a ‘full and satisfactory account of how we should go on … now and around here’ (IBWD, p. xiii). In what ‘What Might Philosophy Become?’ Williams develops this line of thought to make a point about the style of moral and political philosophy. He claims that ‘a philosopher may need to give us a picture of life and society and the individual, and to give it in a way that integrates it with what he or she cares about. If a philosophical writer does not solve
sometimes they have conveyed the same meanings. In fact realism is an awareness action but actualism a practical reaction. In other words realism creates potentials, but actualism, defenders. Realism in Machiavelli‟s thinking is supposed to accept vir- tue, while actualism awaits luck, realist creates concepts and objectify them, but actualist follows phenomena and events. Realism is derived from a type of thought, but actualism is a type of instinct and its manifestation is solely preserved in ob- edience to events. A realist intends to change, sta- bilize, and/ or form realities according to thought and mind and elevate her or his power of explora- tion and perhaps prediction, and put unexpected elements and choices of the outer world, in their interpretation framework, and with this back- ground to get ready to account for any change or development (3). Actualist, however, observes, the real things, or feels them, and since lacks necessary concepts and categories to understand and explore, and as a result is not able to relate and understand the meaning of actions and events, s/he can only present a passive reaction. In sum, realism con- trary to actualism has some theoretical founda- tions, regardless of these foundations, s/he might not understand, this concept, either, and anytime the concepts might interpenetrate, one might get decreased in expense of the other.
former.60 This new sensibility is one which will question the teleologies and totalisations of its predecessor and in its place will elaborate a plurality o f histories, not isolated from one another but connected in a host o f ways. Foucault criticises the old models which privilege continuity over discontinuity and specificity and which elide the differences between statements in order to press them into the preferred style of narrative. Under the heading of 'the unities of discourse', Foucault details the devices used to group statements in total histories. These include: 'tradition', 'influence', 'development and evolution', 'spirit', the 'book' and the 'oeuvre' and the idea of fixed genres like science, history, politics, and literature.61 These devices are simply taken for granted, Foucault observes, and if we are to make discontinuities and transformations visible then we must seek to avoid them as they serve to produce histories which centre primarily upon origins and continuities. Foucault's suggestion is that we should think instead in terms of a plurality of discursive formations, distinct but often interrelated and constituted by rules governing the ordering of statements within them.62 T)iscourse' is designed to be a relatively inclusive device for associating and differentiating statements, insofar as it covers a range o f statements, their objects, concepts, strategies and 'enunciative' sites as well as the rules which make the production o f statements possible.63
Some features of the book's structure too mark a break with Ullmann's. Beginning Chapter 1 in the fourth century rather than the mid-fifth allows Canning to appreciate the importance of Constantine's reign, and to set Justinian's ideology of Christian Empire in its full Late Antique context. It also means the inclusion of Augustine (pp. 39-43), and this provides the basis for consideration of 'I'augustinisme politique' in the Carolingian period. Though he accords no recognition to the work of Peter Brown (Beryl Smalley ed., Trends in Medieval PoliticalThought ( 1965), including indispensable papers by Brown and others, is quite the most surprising omission from his Bibliography), Canning writes with benefit of The Cambridge History of Medieval PoliticalThought ( l 9F) edited by J.H. Burns, and makes good use of the sections by Donald Nicol on Byzantium, and by P. D. King on the barbarian kingdoms: the notes to Canning's Chapter 1 contain seven references to The Cambridge History. Chapter 2 is clearly seen by Canning himself as an important and distinctive feature of his book: the period from the eighth century to the eleventh was, he writes (p. 44), 'of crucial significance because it witnessed the consolidation of characteristic medieval ideas about both the nature of organised society and its structures of authority and power. Many of these concepts ... were to remain basic for the remainder of the Middle Ages'. Such an appraisal contrasts with that implicit in
In the 19 th century, like many other non-western countries, Iran had a chance of entering the age of modernization. Many internal and external factors had facilitated this change and development. Newspapers, especially those, which published on exile, had much effect on the changing process. The Qanun newspaper, in many respects, had the utmost influence on the Iranian society due to its clear and frank language and also the extensive modern ideas and thoughts that were elaborated cleverly in this newspaper. The modern and Western ideologies were handled in such a way to build up the mind of the people toward the new meanings of social and politicalconcepts that were in most cases different to how these concepts were understood by the society. In this paper the injection of modern ideas did not follow a blind line, however, it had a systematic discipline that showed the ability of Malkum Khan, the founder of Qanun, to project modern ideas in traditional society such as Iran. Qanun has actually played a vital role in the process of modernization of social and political thoughts in the contemporary history of Iran and its impact is still felt in the current everyday life of the Iranian who has much yet to achieve in ongoing process of modernization especially in the age of globalization.
Given the fact that Arendt draws a rela- tionship between revolution on one hand and violence and totalitarianism on the other hand; in her view, violence is only permitted to the point where it leads to a revolution that will lead to the establishment of freedom, otherwise violence, per se, will endanger humanity with catastrophic damages. On the other hand, violence is an integral part of revolution, and if it is not put on the path to freedom and establishment of a republic, is yet another problem and defeats the purpose. It should also be noted that totalitarianism also plays an important role in politicalthought and leads to isolation and lacking of identity in human beings,and not only will it lead to the atomization of people, but also basically leads to the redundancy of human beings. In conclusion, the concept of revolu- tion plays a central role and has a pivotal po- sition in Arendt's politicalthought, and other concepts and topics make sense around the axis of revolution.
ic system and society. The main characteris- tic of Behest’s thought, which will be consi- dered before anything, is the rationality that the thought of the martyr Beheshti was based on. In considering the thoughts of martyr Be- heshti, it should be noted that the issues raised by him in the framework of which tra- dition of moral research has been raised (Alikhani et al., 2011: 413) are the founda- tions of the epistemological and politicalthought of Beheshti deriving from the Islamic tradition. Now, understanding that the thought of Beheshti originated from an Is- lamic source, we should seek to understand the ideas of Beheshti with Islamic compo- nents. These components can be divided into two categories of revelation and rationalism. Martyr Beheshti did not make any difference between reason and revelation, he believed that “a man cut from the prophets has access to only one source of knowledge, which is the same experience and power of his think- ing, but man continuously refers to the prophets, to two sources, both his experience and his thought, also the Revelation of the Prophets” (Beheshti et al., 2013; 117).
chiavelli‘s thoughts. Patricia Vishless‘ book is a volume of his collected papers on Machiavelli‘s thoughts and works and is a perfect exemplar of the interdisciplinary approach. Vishless, the editor of this collection, holds that the sexuality/gender analysis which is one the strengths of his theories, is well applicable to Machiavelli today and through this analysis the role and position of mas- culinity and femininity could be implied (Vish- less, 2007: x). In Vishless‘ view, a sound and cor- rect understanding of Machiavelli‘s thoughts, par- ticularly the central concepts of virtue and provi- dence, and of power and freedom, is essentially interdisciplinary. Machiavelli should be studied under the achievements of political science, phi- losophy, history, literature, linguistics, play and literary criticism (Ibid: ix). His book is compiled on the axis of government, society and thematic classification of reception in Machiavelli‘s works. The third domain means that Machiavelli had been seeking to influence and delve into those properties and forces that impacted the process of shaping the society. Machiavelli is the pungent critic of society and this aspect of his thought has had great influence on the Anglo-Saxon world and American literary traditions in the twentieth cen- tury (Ibid, xi, x). From this vantage, there is an emphasis on the influence of Machiavelli‘s works through their literary quality. The king overflows with such characteristics. In this regard, the paper ‗Machiavelli: king as a Literary Text‘ is interest- ing and reading-worthy (Ibid, 43).
to affirm suffering and the contingencies of life without experiencing or giving in to ressentiment. In this way, a will to self-responsibility is invoked and enacted but it is particular to a future-based active pathos. In other words, it is not the kind o f forced responsibility that obtains under the rule of law or in the social contract as we understand these concepts. Indeed, this will to self-responsibility or the right to make promises is a self-mastery that as Nietzsche puts it, “gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all short-willed and unreliable creatures” (GM II, 2). Nietzsche does not mean direct control over circumstances and nature but rather a will to affirmation in the face of life’s contingencies, the effects of one’s actions, and the effects o f others’ actions that one might suffer from. Thus, the sovereign individual does not, in a sense, need the law and the social contract the way the reactive type does since his will to self-responsibility accepts and affirms the burden of suffering and demands that he renounce ressentiment toward life and others as a result. This places the sovereign individual in an extra-moral realm above the common morality of present-day democratic values and it means that he is “self- legislating”.46
Fundamental as this is maintained to be, it is by no means, a simple task to define accurately and yet concisely exactly what is meant by these terms. Although philosophical and theological definitions abound, it is clear that to make use of them would make this a thesis on metaphysics. To the knowledge of the author, a political definition qua definition has not existed until recently and most latter-day ’'Realists” like Hans J. Morgenthau have been content to make extended descriptions.3 Even the usually-reliable political diction aries seem unwilling to do more than list common usages, ob serve that these should not be confused with the metaphysical meanings they might otherwise have, and suggest referring to the collected works of a few individuals who consider them selves members of one group or another.1*
He accounts for the three principles as the fun- damentals of the family that make the foundations of human education. The first principle, as he calls, is the feeling of religion. Religion is the sole job that pictures the real perfection for him”. In this way family should cultivate religiousness in the mind and in the heart of a child, from the very beginning”, in a way the child shows this inclina- tion toward virtuosity in his behaviors throughout his growth. The second principle is patriotism. This feeling is born with the child; if it is sup- posed that the feeling of patriotism and its teach- ing be rendered at school and the time of educa- tion, it leads to no result. “A child should be thought that whatever s/he does becomes mea- ningful, only, if it is related to love for his home- town, otherwise, it is null. This is the debt we have toward our ancestors, and our children should have toward us. “The third foundation, however, is controlling the inner self; “this is called an individual‟s ethical and moral develop- ment, and Europeans consider it as “court of con- science” which is supposed to guard the individu- al at any time. It is sometimes believed that sense is an instinctive affair depicted in human institu- tion, but this is not true, inner control can also, be achieved by education and training.” This process leads to the appearance of responsibility. Only in this situation, the person might feel responsible for his actions and there is no need for police and guardians (Amin, 1894, pp.40-41).
temporary relief. 12 However, the possibility of sovereignty acquired by conquest seems to allow for lasting reconciliation with former enemies. Hobbes reasons in all of his main political works that the state is dissolved in the event of a successful enemy invasion, implying that individuals are free to submit themselves to the victor in order to retain their life and liberty. The invader may thereupon admit those who appear trustworthy enough as his subjects in order to acquire sovereignty over another nation. 13 This method would allow for former enemies to establish a protection-
rational problems and was not able to come up with new political and social theories and basically, did not consider that to be its duty. Attention to political issues in ethical works written by ibn Moskuyeh Razi; Khajeh Nassir-ed-din in his book, Akhlaq Nasseri; and Mohaqqeq Sabzevari in his book, Rozat-ol-Anwar Abbasi, could not achieve much. Therefore, the politicalthought of Islam was limited to jurisprudential issues which paid attention to reviving religious tenets, ordering good and prohibiting vice, apostasy… in domestic policy as well as preventing domination of foreigners, contracts for behaving with non-Muslims and… in foreign policy. Such issues, as we said before were based on quotes and were expressed in the simplest way. Although they could meet political and social needs of their time hundreds of years ago, they did not follow complexity of those needs in the course of time and it seems that if they continue on the same path, they will not be capable of meeting the needs of a modern society. Even jurisprudential books that have been written in recent years have attended to such important issues within the old jurisprudential frames. viii This trend has had four consequences. Firstly, issues of politicalthought have not been established in Islam within scientific and theoretical frames commensurate with advancement of political and social systems. Secondly, some came to believe that Islam basically lacks the capacity to give rise to politicalthought and theorization in this field. Thirdly, many researchers whose goal is to delineate the politicalthought of Islam pursue this goal within jurisprudential frame and their efforts, therefore, is not possible to prove fruitful. Fourthly, proponents of a dynamic political Islam in the modern world try to defend their viewpoints on the basis of political and jurisprudential bases and the opposite side does not consider their defense to be serious or convincing. Even jurists who pay attention to such modern issues as democracy, human rights, structure of the Islamic government, party politics, political participation, and so on; do not discuss such issues in depth. ix Apart from that, fiqh has become basically stagnant with respect to new topics and it seems that there is no way to infer solutions to new problems from old texts.x 4. Generalizing Sanctities
Wilkes by his actions and by his legal battles had confirmed important liberties? but his influence was more profound than this. Hebrought Parliament into great disrepute. He demonstrated by his actions its unrepresentative nature; its dependence on the Crown; its corruption and prejudice— facts known for decades? but never so amply demonstrated ; nor had the danger to personal liberty? so inherent in such a system? been so clearly proved. And the Wilkes agitation produced new political methods. The public meeting was born and stayed alive. The Supporters of the Bill of Rights Society was founded? the first political society which used modern methods of agitationpaid agents were sent round the country to make spee ches and the Press was deliberately and carefully exploited. Politi cal dissatisfaction was given strength? and coherence? by deliberate organization. Politics were ceasing to be a part of the social life of a gentleman. Organized public opinion had become a factor in politics? and its strength increased? as the government of George III was overwhelmed by problems too vast for its comprehension. ^
This work presents methods for exploring the lexical environment of politicalconcepts using inter- active network visualisations of corpus-derived grammatical relations and word associations. The conceptual relations consist of part-of-speech tagged words connected by typed, weighted, edges indicating the strength of relations between words, as measured by pointwise mutual information of different types of co-occurrences. An interactive animated interface allows users to adjust the node degree directly, or to specify edge-weight thresholds, and observe the resulting effect on the network. The system can be searched by neighbourhood sub-graphs (‘ego graphs’) of particular sets of query terms. The force-directed layout of the network highlights conceptual structure, as terms connected by many relations are drawn together, and the user can select which subsets of relations and sub-corpora to display. Community detection (cliques) and centrality measures provide addi- tional comparative measures of the use of contested concepts in diverse political communities. As an example of such a system for exploring the structure of politicalconcepts, an implementation on com- ments from libertarian and socialist partisan online communities is presented. The work is motivated by the extensive theoretical treatment of political conceptual morphology but limited computational implementations extant in the literature.
types in Imam Khomeini’s distinctive out- look. In fact, Imam Khomeini has frequently has discussed the divine legitimacy both in- tellectually and practically, and it has been most likely due the fact that the Islamic gov- ernment primarily should be a main execu- tive tool for actualizing the divine law as true embodiment of God’s government on earth. In “Kashf-e Asrar (the Discovery of Myster- ies)”, for instance, he writes: “no one has the right of sovereignty over the nation and no one is allowed to dominate others except God; because the exclusive right of govern- ance and legislation belongs to God himself. Logically it is expected that God establishes a government for the people and makes re- quired law. But, the law is the Islamic law (Shariah), as such, which he has established originally, then it is proved that this law will be employed limitlessly at any given time and place” (Imam Khomeini, n.d: 184). Hence, from this point of view, a govern- ment, which has been founded in order to implement divine regulations or particularly the Islamic law, will have divine legitimacy within the political organization. Further- more, his later arguments on Velayat-e Faqih explained in Persian (1968) contain certain implications on divine legitimacy of rulers. For instance, he notes that: “the Islamic Gov- ernment is nothing but a government of law. I.e. the Sovereignty and Guardianship are exclusively confined to God and naturally, the only law would be God's command. This law predominates overall members of the Islamic society. Every individual must be subordinate to the divine law from Holy Prophet himself and his successors (Caliphs) to ordinary citizens. God himself forced the Prophet Muhammad (S) by direct divine in- spiration to declare and introduce his succes-