A previous study (Nwankwo & Nweke, 2016) on effects of corruption on educational system in Nsukka zone, Nigeria, found that corruption is a general issue within the school heads, policy makers, examination councils, teachers, supervisors and invigilators, and above all leads to the abuse of teaching as a profession like other professional bodies in Nigeria. A study by Nwaokugha and Ezeugwu (2017) focusing on corruption in the education industry in Nigeria, reveals that corruption in the education industry terribly creates infrastructural deficits that result in poor instructional delivery and making many people lack the access to education. Describing the extent of corruption in Nigeria, Okeyim, Ejue and Ekenem (2013) write that “corruption is pervasive in Nigeria” and analysing the consequences of this, Lawal and Tobi (2006: 642) write that “Nigeria presents a typical case of a country in African whose development has been undermines by the menace of corrupts practices”. However, there have been no reports showing direct linking between corruption in education system and management of primary schools in Nigeria. Hence, to fill the gap, this study seeks to examine the level of adequate provision of fund, facilities, professional expert and their relationship with management of primary schools in Nigeria.
We consider most of the suggestions, including dismissals, reorganization, changes of rules and regulations as administrative measures. Independence of inspectors and school principals is also not unequivocal. First, independent school principals will have more freedom to run the schools but equally more freedom of abusing the system on the local level. No one can guarantee that school principals will have much better intentions than do custodians. Second, whenever prescription for anticorruption campaigns includes the word independent, two questions come up: independent from whom and independent from what? There is always a public official or a politician over the independent inspector, and if the official is corrupt, it will be difficult for the inspector to perform his duties. Moreover, inspectors are not free from their self interest. They are as vulnerable to corruption as anyone else. This goes to the concept of controlling controllers or supervision of supervisors. History shows, that in many countries the largest bribe goes to someone whose duty is to make sure that there is no bribery in the system. Independency is a very arguable term.
to recruitment, promotion and transfer of teachers in the education system are yet not framed or implemented in many states and thus the human resource management in education is not well organized in India. Teachers are always afraid regarding their appointment and transfers. Sometimes teachers pay bribe for their posting and transfers. Mostly Political leaders, high-level bureaucrats and members of the teacher unions also attempt to influence decision- making regarding the recruitment and transfer of teachers (Jain and Shelly, 2013, p.31). Recently a former chief minister was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for malpractices in the recruitment of junior basic teachers. Nuland and Khandelwal (2001) remarked that the moral and ethical commitment of teachers has gradually decreased over the years due to political interference and corruption.
The research of corruption in higher education does not face the lack of methodological approaches, as they may be borrowed from other disciplines, including political sciences and economics. At the same time methodological approaches, borrowed from other disciplines and applied to corruption, have certain limitations. Petrov and Temple (2004) say that methodology of studying corruption in education may be no different from qualitative research. However, some problems are encountered by the researchers. For instance, faculty members know of each other’s corrupt activities but do not discuss them. As a result, major difficulties arise when collecting information due to specifics of the topic—corrupt practices remain illegal. The authors describe this problem in higher education systems in the Russian Federation by noting the following: “Our own experiences in our region of study suggest that even the most carefully phrased enquiry to university members of staff about the existence of corruption in their institution can be taken as a personal insult. This naturally limits the scope of data collection. Students and former university staff members have no difficulty generally in discussing the matter, however.” (Petrov and Temple 2004, 87)
Notably, there is not much research is done on corruption in the education sector, in general, how this type of corruption is related to inequality, in particular. Although, Biswal (1999) theoretically analyzed corruption in education sector, the results have not been substantiated empirically. The empirical work on this issue is also scanty. For example, Cockcroft et al. (2002) indicate that the poor have less access to health services and are less likely to enroll their children in school. The World Bank's Voices of the Poor survey (1999) reports that poor people suffer from corruption in obtaining health care, getting education for their children, claiming social assistance, and in accessing the justice system or receiving police protection. This paper contributes in this respect by offering some new evidence on what factors determine corruption in the education sector. We identify the characteristics of households who are more likely to pay bribes to get educational services from their immediate providers. These characteristics include education, wealth, and the age of the parents, as well as the strength of their network connections. Unlike firm level corruption data where business is reluctant to reveal the actual bribe payment because of its sensitivity; our data do not suffer from such bias. Specifically, our results show that non-collusive corruption in education increases inequality by disadvantaging the poor. The results also indicate the poor, less educated and lower social status people are subjected to higher red tape and they effectively pay higher bribes or are more likely to make so called “voluntary” contributions to schools. Therefore, the results of the empirical investigation are supportive of the hypothesis: namely, non-collusive corruption creates an unequal burden amongst the private agents and favors the rich and well connected over the poor and socially isolated.
Estimates of corruption in education are a mixture of rationality, sarcasm, and a wild fantasy. Moreover, all of these characteristics may be found in the same article. Lebedev’s article titled “Corruption tax in HEIs: how to fight it?” is a good example of such a mixture. While the title indicates a quite rational economics-like understanding of corruption, the article itself presentats some estimates of corruption given in very sarcastic language: “The Minister of Education and former rector of RUDN 33 Vladimir Filippov was the first to provide the specific numbers. During the few years of his job as the Minister his former colleagues from the Council of Rectors turned into the worst enemies of the Minister-reformer. They refused to accept the EGE, which the ‘Filippov’, Bolotov’, and Co’ Partnership advertised as a licensed remedy from corruption. The rectors should have been exposed. But the minister remembered that he only had one landing pad on reserve in case of resignation, the same RUDN. That is why everything happened as in the anecdote: ‘Patient, do you have AIDS? Yes, but very little…’ Filippov modestly said that ‘there are hundreds of thousands of dollars in education.’ Therefore, we need to introduce the EGE soon in order to free the applicants from the unpleasant necessity to pay bribes.
In South East Europe there is an Anti-corruption Student Network that contributes to decrease of higher educationcorruption level and influences higher education reform. The main goals of this Network are the research on presence and different forms of corruption at universities and faculties; informing and raising awareness across academic community target groups (students, professors and administrative staff) and general public about presence of corruption in education; attract students, professors and administrative staff to actively engage in anti-corruption activities; motivating and training students to participate in the reform process; monitor higher education reform process; create transparent higher education environment and its institutional and legal framework; take transparent University regulation and inform about its content; advocate introduction of regulations and mechanisms for stopping corruption; exchange of experience and good practices with other activists within and outside of the country.
The impact of educationcorruption on economic growth remains in the realm of speculations and some theorizing. There is a lot of research done on human capital, education, economic development, and growth. There is also a substantial bloc of literature on corruption and economic development and growth. This bloc of scholarly literature, however, is represented mostly by theoretical works. Few empirical works are produced so far, primarily due to the lack of data. Reliability and validity of the existing scarce data on governance and corruption also remains an issue. We target educationcorruption, human capital, and growth in Russia and offer examples from other New Independent States (NIS). More specifically, we look at corruption in education and at its possible implications for economic growth in Russia. We consider specific aspects of educationcorruption and its probable impact on growth. These aspects include interactions between educationcorruption and total factor productivity and interactions between corruption and structure of the national economy. Educationcorruption may be harmful for productivity while higher productivity may reduce educationcorruption. Educationcorruption may to a certain extent define or influence the structure of the national economy. Corruption in the education sector may be reduced through the changes in the economic structure. All of these are rather mere speculations or hypotheses to be researched than definitive statements. The areas to be touched upon are the education sector, labor market, level of concentration of property rights, and distribution of property rights on the means of production.
Some of the perception studies do not just provide a ranking. They often provide policy advice or recommendations on how to deal with the problem. For instance, the 2004 Global Corruption Report is devoted to political corruption. The 2004 CPI recom- mends that low-income countries should increase funds devoted to anti-corruption efforts and create better public access to infor- mation about budgets, revenue and expenditures to support anti- corruption. The Higher-income countries are to combine aids with recipient-led reform while reducing tied aid. All countries are advised to promote strong coordination among the govern- ment, the private sector and civil society in order to make the anti- corruption initiatives more efficient and sustaining. The 2007 Global Corruption Report addresses corruption in the judicial system and the 2013 Report is devoted to corruption in education. Perception studies have been very useful in determining the various levels of tolerance of difference forms of corruption. A se- ries of perception studies have been able to identify the factors that influence the different levels of tolerance of various forms of corruption. They have also aided scholars to test hypotheses on the relationships between corruption and other variables of devel- opment. Empirical studies have linked the macro-economic issues of corruption such as the level of (perceived) corruption and eco- nomic growth, the level of GDP and corruption, corruption and the legal system, corruption and elections. Scholars have analysed the indexes as explanatory frameworks to produce cross country studies that model historical, cultural, political and economic de- terminants of a variety of indicators of government quality (Andvig and Fjeldstad 2000, Canache and Allison 2005, Anders- son and Heywood 2008, and Kostadinova 2009).
These tensions and contrasting tendencies are evident in the definition of political corruption. Most standard definitions of corruption are not informative. ‘Corruption involves the abuse of public office for private gain’ 15 , does not tell us what counts as an abuse (or what is a distinctively corrupt abuse); it encompasses many things like simple theft that seem distinct from corruption; it is overly restrictive in implying that private institutions cannot be corrupt and in restricting gain to private gain (when factional or party gain is often a major force for corruption); and it makes no mention of those who try illicitly to influence the way that those in office behave towards the public whose interests are harmed (the corruptors). David Beetham’s recently proposed redefinition - “Distortion and subversion of the public realm in the service of private interests” 16 - is similarly flawed: what counts as distortion or subversion might narrow down types of ‘abuse’ – but gives us no criteria by which to identify what these involve, and no criteria for distinguishing this set of cases as cases of corruption. ‘The public realm’ is much broader than public office, and presumes it is a single coherent domain whereas in practice competing conceptions of the public realm and its ends will make whether or not something is corrupt a function of one’s preferred conception. The ‘service of private interests’ is really no better than ‘private gain’ – and is open to the same objections about people who act in ways that are not motivated by private interests but who don’t, for example, follow the rules.
Although many research papers have focused on the impact of alcohol consumption, none has addressed its impact on corruption 1 . While only anecdotal evidence point to the possible link between alcohol consumption and corruption (Ramirez Torres, 1990), no paper, to the best of our knowledge has systematically provided empirical evidence of such an effect. Our aim in this paper is to feel this gap in the literature. This intuition motivating the hypothetical nexus is that, alcohol can weaken the conscience (Hull, 1981), hamper the smooth processing of data (Steele and Josephs, 1988) and disturb cognitive functioning. Hence, a drunk is less sensible to norms, to his/her personal expectations as well as to his/her deviation from personal codes of honor and societal norms. Consequently, a drunk is highly susceptible to adopt of certain code of conduct that is antagonistic to his/her normal state in the absence of drunkenness (Rathus, 1991). In light of the above, it is therefore logical to justify a premise for a corruption-alcohol nexus. This is because, in general terms, corruption is an abnormal and socially-repugnant behavior. Accordingly, once alcohol has taken control of someone, this person could easily become a candidate of corruption owing to a substantial decrease in the victim‟s sense of appreciation. Mo reover, alcohol could be a stimulating agent for those already deeply embroiled in the scourge. Consistent with Remirez Torres (1990), those who lack the courage to engage in the act could use alcohol as a stimulant. This paper therefore assesses the relevance of the above.
The first step of a virus infection is always the same, a few virus particles are able to adhere to a cell and move in to it and begin to proliferate. Corruption thus infects a single individual, or a few individuals (the bad apples) and if that or those individuals are unable to repel the initial infection, corruption spreads to an increasing number of people. More so, although highly unlikely, the internal spread of corruption in an organisation could then take massive proportions and over time move from an internal spread to a spread between different organisations on an epidemic (regional) and even an pandemic (global) scale. Important to note is that we are not claiming that an individual would actually die by being corrupt. It could however indicate that an individual needs to become increasingly corrupt before performing a corrupt act and infecting a substantially increased number of individuals.
vironment and are part of built-in corrupt practices. Inefficient allocation outcomes may be attained in the bidding exercise if the bribee is influenced by other factors than the size of the bribe or the briber could get away with supplying low-quality good at high-quality price. With respect to corruption as the oil for a “squeaky” economic en- gine, anecdotal evidence points to countries where corrupt officials slows down the wheels of bureaucracy in order to attract more bribes. Theoretically, there are no effi- ciency gains in an environment of asymmetric information as the briber and bribee may not have an agreement on the size of the bribe. Moreover, because of its illegality, corruption agreements are not protected by the courts of law, making it easier for the bribee to renege on the contract. Corruption also fails to achieve economic efficiency when the procurement of the government good or service requires the approval of sev- eral government officials.  notes that corrupt government officials could, instead of speeding up, reduce the speed of processing files thereby attracting more bribes.  also points out that corruption aggravates distortions in the economy because of its se- crecy and resources spent by government officials to prevent detection and punishment.  contends that existing practices in more corrupt societies tend to encourage rent- seeking activities. Thus, the beneficiaries of corrupt practices are the most successful at rent-seeking, and not necessarily the most economically efficient.
The critics of the nationwide implementation of the test point out the numerous insufficiencies of the test and the system of testing overall in all its aspects and on all possible levels. The Chair of the Education Commission of the Moscow City Council Evgeny Bunimovich thinks that the country is not ready for the massive introduction of the test. He says that “It is impossible, when half of the population is for EGE and the other half is against, when HEIs refuse to acknowledge the results of the tests, when even computers cannot figure out the correct answers, and when there are errors everywhere. It is necessary to remake everything, from the questions in the tests to the procedure of issuing the certificates with the test results.” (Newsru.com, July 5, 2007) The metropolis of over ten million people faces many difficulties with the introduction of the test as well as the stubborn opposition from the side of the capital’s colleges and universities, some of which are the most elite HEIs in the country.
One possible reason for the deteriorating enrolment and high drop-out rates could be corruption. 9 According to Transparency International Bangladesh’s Corruption Database Report 2005 (TIB, 2006), education was ranked the most corrupt sector. 10 Corruption in the education sector in Bangladesh takes various forms. It is often the case that final examination or entrance examination papers are sold in advance to high-paying candidates or to favour particular students. It is also common to manipulate oral or practical examination results. This practice is even more open to corruption as evaluations are subjective and difficult to monitor. Although primary education is free for all, it becomes prohibitively expensive for poor families as reality requires paying for private tutors in order to pass. This private tutoring is likely to exacerbate inequalities, as teachers provide paid supplementary tutoring after school hours. These teachers usually teach only part of the curriculum during school hours, and thus force students to pay for the rest during private lessons. In addition, absent or abusive teachers often demand illegal fees. While nearly half of the poor students in rural area get stipends from the government, many are deprived of getting the right amount or face frequent problems in getting the stipend on time. According to TIB (2006), 40 percent of households reported having paid ‘donations’ or bribes to enroll their children in primary schools. These illegal payments could be fees for admission into school, payments for textbooks which are to be provided free of charge, fees for sport and recreation purposes, subscriptions for religious activities, and fees for examinations. Teachers beating students, mistreating them or fixing final results are also reported to be quite common. 11
Before regression analysis, there is a need to determine which functional form to apply for the model as given in equation (1). Some earlier studies that used a similar empirical specification retained a linear model (Gupta et al., 2002), yet others suggested a non linear relationship between social indicators, namely education and health indicators, and their standard determinants and, opted therefore for a semi-logarithmic form (Gupta et al., 2001) or a log-linear form [Baldacci et al. (2003), Al-Samarrai (2006), Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008)]. In this study, the choice of the appropriate functional form is based on the REST Ramsey test and, the McKinnon, White and Davidson (MWD) test which allows us to decide between a linear regression model and a log-linear one 8 . We begin by running regressions of the model under study using the OLS method. In this respect, we employ the White test to verify the homoskedasticity assumption. When detected, heteroskedasticity of residuals will be corrected using the white method. In using the OLS method, it should be borne in mind that such method assumes that corruption is exogenously determined. However, as pointed out by most previous empirical work, corruption could be an endogenous variable for a variety of reasons. First, this is may be to due to measurement errors of our corruption variable since the corruption index we use, like other available corruption indices, is by construction based on perceptions of the observed phenomenon. Second, endogeneity may arise from a possible simultaneity bias as the relationship between corruption and education may suffer from reverse causality. Indeed, as argued by Gupta, et al. (2001, p. 126), poor levels of education could create an environment conducive to corruption. Conversely, a better
Most of us have an idea of what corruption is. But we don’t necessarily share the same idea. That is why we need to ask the question about what corruption is. For example, do you believe giv ing money to speed up the processing of an application is corruption? Do you think awarding contracts to those who gave large cam- paign contributions is corruption? Do you think brib- ing a doctor to ensure your mother gets the medi- cine she needs is corruption? Do you think using gov- ernment construction equipment to build an addition on one’s house is corruption?
Let’s look at the key aspects of an effective process framework for managing the risks of bribery and corrupt payments. While the specific risks and best response will always vary to some extent from one organization to another, as well as from one part of an organization to another, there are key factors and steps that should be considered in any risk management process for bribery and corruption. These are all part of what we refer to in this publication as the “ABAC Program” (Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption).