officer explicitly informed Folsom that he could not give him any deal in exchange for truthful information. Therefore, the statement in this case was not induced by the hope of benefit. Id.
4. Finally, Folsom contends that all of his statements, pre- and post- Miranda, should have been suppressed because he was under the influence of prescription medications to an extent that his statements were rendered involuntary. Determinations of fact and credibility made by a trial court following a voluntariness hearing must be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. Screws v. State, 245 Ga. App. 664 (1) (538 SE2d 547) (2000). In this case, the trial court fully reviewed all of the evidence, including the videotape of Folsom’s interrogation, and determined that Folsom was lucid and comprehended the questions asked of him, in spite of any medications he may have taken. “Because the trial court's findings as to the voluntariness of the statement are supported by the evidence, we find no error in its admission at trial. See Shelby v. State, 265 Ga. 118 (2) (453 SE2d 21) (1995).” Carter v.
 Ms Carius, Manager Workforce Services, Princess Alexandra Hospital, gave evidence that her team then known as Workforce Relations urgently required some administrative support and general case management, similar to Ms Lemeki’s previous role. The actual role that needed filling was an A04 role, which was beyond Ms Lemeki’s competence. Ms Carius gave evidence of observations of a lack of comprehension on the part of Ms Lemeki in relation to some tasks, lack of attention to detail, failure to pick up on corrections to her work and difficulty completing a spreadsheet of industrial action. She said that she raised these matters informally with Ms Lemeki.
Commission staff believes accepting the argument that the Commission should somehow be responsible for providing security protection for filers or the building security policy regarding door access should be suspended when access is substantially the same as an unlocked door is not a policy that should be set. “Each candidate for public office has the responsibility to assure that his or her nomination papers are prepared, circulated, signed, and filed in compliance with statutory and other legal requirements.” Wis. Admin. Code EL § 2.05(1). If such arguments are accepted, what would stop future candidates from claiming they were late because of a high number of red traffic signals slowed delivery, an unexpected detour because of road construction caused the trip to take a couple minutes longer, a slow or maximum capacity elevator, or the plan to park in the front of the building had to be modified because all available spots were filled and they had to park a block away. Candidates need to plan ahead and arrive in time to get into the building and file the papers in the office of the Commission prior to the deadline, there are no exceptions under the statute or the relevant case law. 2 Commission staff did receive a call from Ms. Ruhland at 4:57 indicating she was on her way to the office to file. Commission staff received that call on an office cell phone while on the first floor of the building waiting to let potential filers in the building if they arrived.
required proof of an element the other did not. Thus, the decision in Murphy does not expressly and directly conflict with the decision of this court in Meshell.
Murphy also argues that the decision of the Fifth District expressly and directly conflicts with this court’s decision in Paul, supra. However, in Valdes this court receded from its decision in Paul and adopted the reasoning of Justice Cantero’s special concurrence in Paul. Valdes, at 1068. Again, Murphy was convicted of separate crimes, the crimes charged concerned separate acts, the crimes charged were in violation of separate statutes, and each crime required proof of an element the other did not. Even had this court not receded from Paul, there would be no conflict.
The State of Florida appeals the order of the postconviction court vacating Christopher Stephen Kemp’s (“Defendant’s”) second judgment and resultant shortened prison sentence, reinstating his originally-imposed judgment and sentence as well as his previously-pending Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief directed to his original judgment and sentence, and rescheduling a hearing on this motion.
h. Previous employers; names for the past five years and the dates of defendant’s employment there; and
i. Whether or not at the time of the collision referred to in plaintiff’s petition, this defendant was performing any business task or job at the request of or on behalf of defendant’s employer, and if so, please state the nature of the task or job being performed and the name of the employer.
Yitzhari v. Yitzhari, 906 So. 2d 1250, 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citing Gaetani-Slade v. Slade, 852 So. 2d 343, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).
The court described in its amended final judgment that when Former Husband decided in 2009 to take an active role in Palmer Timber, he found that “the financial standing of the company was bleak for a variety of reasons.” The parties each presented evidence as to whether Former Husband’s efforts or labor had improved the financial condition of Palmer Timber. The trial court, while acknowledging that Former Husband was not involved in the “day-to-day management role” of the company, nevertheless detailed the various “leadership efforts” and “marital labor” that Former Husband did provide to Palmer Timber from 2009 up to Former Wife’s filing for dissolution of marriage in May 2018 that it found to have directly benefited or improved Palmer Timber’s financial condition and, thus, the value of his stock.
judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Wilmington Trust had standing to foreclose on the note and mortgage in question. We agree, and accordingly, reverse.
Rolland and Jennifer Moon executed a note and mortgage in favor of Wells Fargo Bank in 2008. On June 15, 2015, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action against Appellees, alleging that the Moons had defaulted on the note by failing to make the payment due May 1, 2011, and all subsequent payments. Attached to the verified complaint was a copy of the note endorsed in blank, a copy of the mortgage, and a
State the names and addresses of every person known by plaintiff, plaintiff’s representatives or plaintiff’s attorney to have witnessed the occurrence mentioned in the petition, or who was present at the scene within sixty (60) minutes of the occurrence. Designate which of such people actually claim to have witnessed the occurrence.
to file a belated cross-appeal, the State voluntarily dismissed its appeal, leaving only Elma’s cross-appeal to be resolved. This court has jurisdiction. 1
In his cross-appeal, Elma argues that the postconviction court failed to grant him the appropriate remedy after it found that he was deprived of an opportunity to accept a favorable plea offer because his trial attorney misadvised him of the maximum possible sentence and misadvised him that the minimum mandatory component of the State’s offer had to be served day-for-day and was not subject to gain-time credit. We agree.
“the nature of the case, the stage which the litigation has reached, the conduct of the solicitor and the client respectively and the balance of the hardship which might result from the order the Court is asked to make.” 8
 In Stark, after pointing out that the relief being sought by the client was equitable in nature and the decision whether to grant it and on what terms a discretionary one, and in circumstances not dissimilar to those here where it was the solicitor who had determined the retainer, Keane JA said:
answers in his or her record of interview can only give rise to a reasonable doubt if they believe them, or that a preference for the evidence of the complainant over the accused's account in a record of interview suffices to establish guilt, a Liberato direction should be given. Where the risk of reasoning to guilt in either of these ways is present, whether the accused's version is on oath or in the form of answers given in a record of interview, the Liberato direction is necessary to avoid a perceptible risk of miscarriage of justice. When an accused gives, or calls, evidence there is a natural tendency for the focus to shift from the assessment of the capacity of the prosecution case to establish guilt to an assessment of the perceived strengths or weaknesses of the defence case. Recognition of this forensic reality suggests that the risk that the jury will reason in either of these ways is more likely to arise in a trial in which the conflicting defence account is on oath.”
The respondent’s submissions
 The respondent submits that the appellants’ arguments overlook the fact that this Court in Bossichix has determined that the section in the form it took at the relevant time did not require the words of the section to be replicated within the contents of the contract, and that it was sufficient if the contract provided to the effect required by the section. The section did not require a contract to “state” or “specify” a particular thing, or to use a particular form of words. The section, instead, required a contract to which it applied to “provide” that settlement not take place earlier than 14 days after the seller had given advice to the buyer that the scheme had been established or changed, as the case may be. The section’s purpose was submitted to be “functional rather than informational.”
$55 for this item.
 Item 559 claimed two units for the solicitor’s drafting an update to the matrix of land and schematics. This was disallowed by the cost assessor on the basis that there was no proof of this item on the file. That in principle would be, in an appropriate case, a proper basis to disallow the claim, but after careful examination of the material on the file I consider that I have found sufficient evidence to justify this claim. The position is that a sheet which summarised the information obtained from various company and land searches was prepared for each of the relevant companies, and on this occasion those documents were revised to include additional information which had been obtained since they were originally prepared. The documents struck me as a convenient way to summarise the effect of the searches which had been undertaken, and to collect the material relevant to each particular company in a way which would provide for ease of reference. It strikes me as not an unreasonable way to do the legal work for the defendant, which would necessarily involve coming to grips with issues about what property was owned by which company and how that company was controlled, which may well change from time to time: p 3-18. Accordingly I allowed the amount claimed for this item, two units, $99.
 The second complaint concerns the supplier invoices. In most of the supplier invoices to which I was taken, the supplier identifies the type of work in which they were engaged, and identifies the work, material or services they were supplying and the amount for each of those. It is true that a few supplier invoices are quite scant as to detail. If any is so lacking in detail as to make it insufficient, then the RDG submission, about whether a payment claim is void as a whole when some of the work, goods or services for which payment is claimed is sufficiently identified and some is not and whether that might be dealt with by way of severance, would be of relevance. Because of the view I have formed about other matters in the case, it is unnecessary to go to the level of examining further each of the supplier invoices attached to other invoices attached to the RDG Invoice for the sufficiency of detail it contains.
 The heading apart, it is in identical terms with one returnable on the same day, Nicole Earthrowl vState of Queensland BD 3663/03, which was defended. Many
of the considerations are similar, so that the court’s reasons in Earthrowl, in considerable measure, may be referred to, without repeating them, here. Mr Kelly was counsel for the applicants in both matters.
 The plaintiff’s voluntary submission to the UDNDRP process meant that a complainant might submit, as the first defendant did in respect of its complaint, with respect to any challenge to a decision to transfer the Domain Name to the jurisdiction of the courts of Queensland, 35 being the principal office of the second defendant with which the plaintiff contracted. The complainant was in effect put to a choice of submitting to that jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the Domain Name holder’s address, namely the Isle of Man. Although, as the plaintiff contends in this application, “the first defendant itself chose Queensland as the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff could commence proceedings concerning the transfer of the Domain Name”, its choices under the UDNDRP process were limited. In any event, this is not a case in which a party is forced into a foreign court as the initiator of litigation to protect itself from attack in the form of self-help or a unilateral act, such as the issuing of a statutory notice that has legal consequences that do not depend upon an independent adjudication.
 None of the neurologists called in the case diagnose the plaintiff with post-concussion syndrome or any neurological conditions other than epilepsy.
 Dr Ohlrich was asked to consider the matter, and gave the opinion in both his reports that there was no organic brain damage. It did not occur to Professor Eadie in his treatment of the plaintiff, despite what I think was a particularly thorough examination consequent on his not necessarily being convinced at first that the plaintiff did suffer from epilepsy. Dr Pascoe in April 2009 suspected the plaintiff had epilepsy with some kind of psychiatric overlay. She sent him to a neuropsychologist in May 2009 “to address the issue of cognitive impairment and particularly stress related issues”. After she received the report from the psychologist, Troy, she made no comment on cognition to the General Practitioner, but did recommend that the plaintiff go to see a psychiatrist. In her report to the Court she records that a neuropsychological assessment was requested by her, “in view of the possibility of associated post-traumatic stress as it contributed to his symptoms” – paragraph 2.5. That is, she does not there record that she sought the neuropsychological assessment in relation to cognitive issues. This is also what she said in her evidence-in-chief – that the referral was in relation to psychiatric disorder rather than organic brain damage – t 3-9. Nonetheless she does record at paragraph 3.3 of her report to the Court that the assessment from the psychologist
 The appellant told Dr Beech he was aware that abstinence from alcohol was part of the supervision order but he did not regard it as a fair condition. He believed that he had committed his sexual offences while he was sober and that alcohol and drugs did not relate to his offending. He did not believe that alcohol use increased his risk of re-offending and the reference that he had made to alcohol to the IHISOP facilitators and the psychiatrists had been misinterpreted. He denied he had a drinking problem and his alcohol consumption was controlled. When Dr Beech questioned him about the earlier offences of rape he could not tell whether he was drunk or not. He acknowledged that he had told “someone” that he had been intoxicated at the time of the rapes but did not feel that it had any bearing on those offences or his other offending even though in the case of the serious assault against the police and the domestic violence orders, he was, on his own statement, drunk.
 Therefore, I assume I have power under section 318C of the Act, and act under that section, to order the applicant’s costs be paid by the defendant on the standard basis. If I am wrong about that, then I certainly would take the view that I have a discretion, and in this case, the costs should follow the event, and despite the concessions made by the defendant at the commencement of this application, nevertheless, this application had to be brought by the applicant to gain the outcome that the applicant has gained today. Bluntly, the respondent was not going to go easy, and while those concessions were made, nevertheless, the application was resisted, and the respondent failed. And on that basis, that is why I say costs would follow the event. Therefore, I order the respondent to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application, to be assessed on the standard basis.