In order to address the issues of poverty and human right violations, India had huge resource inflow from the InternationalAid communities. Being a poor nation the NGOs, in the development scenario seldom made any distinction in the initial stages while addressing the issues of poverty. The absence of conscious effort to address the Dalit need has left out the Dalit issues of untouchability. This has also resulted in inadequate disbursement of resources for Dalit development. Moreover, while accepting the country tradition without political analysis of the existing social structure had also influenced aid distribution negatively on Dalits. The development scenario had difficulties to facilitate the resource flow based on the size of the Dalit population.
At a time when the United States and other nations consis- tently cut foreign aid budgets, it is necessary to approach internationalaid and development from the most basic levels. As globalization occurs, it is evident that national and region- al political, social, and economic issues are becoming increas- ingly intertwined. Clear examples include the financial crisis in Asia, the instability in Russia, the chaos in the Balkans, and the challenges of peace in the Middle East. Even the recent US presidential election “crisis” implicated global eco- nomics. Indeed, “the so-called third world can no longer be perceived as a distant reality beset with problems that have little or no bearing on our comfortable lives here in the first world…the dangers of underdevelopment a continent away are similarly knocking on our door” (Hoy 1998). Issues of environmental degradation, infectious disease, civil war, and political uncertainty clearly no longer stop at a longitudinal line or riverbank (Hoy 1998).
For over 50 years, the political economy of foreign aid has been substantially debated in academic and policy-making circles. A great chunk of the literature on institutions and development has concluded that Africa is poor because it lacks good institutions: lack of property rights, weak courts and contract-enforcements, dictatorships, political instability, hostile regulatory environment for private business and high corruption (Easterly, 2005; Kodila-Tedika, 2012, 2013). According to this strand, in order to end poverty in Africa, the West needs to promote good institutions in the continent. With the concern of how aid could promote good institutions in aid-recipient countries, a substantial bulk of the literature has focused on how institutions matter in the effectiveness of development assistance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005). This paper has focused on the second strand of the challenges (highlighted in the introduction) by extending an ongoing debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ using investment and fiscal behavior
Overall, the world of internationalaid 2 and development is in constant flux. “Donor approaches change rapidly, and many agencies appear to be in a constant state of internal reform and restructuring” (de Haan, 2009, p. 60). Current times bring this instability into sharp relief, with a wave of policy changes breaking across donor countries. New Zealand led the way in 2009, aligning ODA more explicitly with non- development foreign policy goals and emphasising economic development activities. Canada and the Netherlands followed suit, with Australia in close pursuit. Following the 2016 Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom has made similar moves. None of this is novel: the way particular donors bureaucratically organise their ODA has shifted over time (for example see Barder, 2005 on the UK experience); and since its inception, non-development foreign policy motives (a donor’s own economic or strategic 3 concerns) have at least partially driven ODA (Lancaster, 2007, Alesina and Dollar, 2000). I discuss these issues further in Chapter Four. What this flux brings to the fore is questions about ODA policy change: what ideas, actors and rules shape ODA policy change, in what combination, at what time? These are, as yet, questions that evade sufficient scholarly exploration.
foreign aid. In light of Knack & Keefer (1995) 5 , we argue that investigating institutional quality as a direct effect of development assistance may be grossly misleading because it fails to account for mechanisms through which foreign aid is channeled. In uniting the two streams we argue that investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms are essential for a better understanding of the nexuses between aid and corruption. On the one hand, consistent with Easterly (2005), „Big- Push‟ (Harrod -Domar and Solow growth) models which constitute the main theoretical underpinnings of foreign aid are premised on the need for large aid-financed increases in investment in order to bridge „poverty and institutional gaps‟. On the other hand, it is common sense to acknowledge that aid affects fiscal behavior in terms of government expenditure and tax effort. Hence, the goal of this paper is to assess how development assistance affects corruption through investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms in 53 African countries. The richness of the dataset permits us to disaggregate the countries into fundamental characteristics of corruption (legal origins, petroleum exporting quality, political instability/conflicts, regional proximity, openness to sea, income-levels and religious domination), which add subtlety to the analysis. Putting aside the direct contribution of this paper to the current debate, it indirectly has other policy relevant contributions to the literature. Firstly, a great bulk of the literature is based on data collected between 1960 and 2000. By using recent data (1996-2010), we provide an updated account of the nexuses under investigation. Secondly, the global economic downturn has sparked concerns about donor‟s continued willingness to give and commitment to foreign aid
Importantly, while there is evidence that aid functions better when there are quality accountability mechanisms in place, there also has been significant evi- dence collected at the cross-country level with regard to aid decreasing institu- tional quality. 24 There are several logics with regard to why foreign aid flows would negatively impact institutional development. First, if government account- ability in the developed world grew largely out of the emergence of taxation sys- tems, which monarchs used to fund wars (Bates and Donald Lien 1985; Tilly 1985, 1990; North and Weingast 1989; Hoffman and Norberg 1994), then insofar as foreign aid alleviates (some of) the need for tax revenues, it can reduce a gov- ernment’s accountability to its citizens. Rather than the citizens holding govern- ments accountable in an aid-dependent state, writes Deborah Brautigam, ‘‘those with the loudest single voice on revenue and expenditure decisions are inter- national lending agencies’’ (1992:11). Aid projects also can directly siphon tal- ented technocrats away from the government, since the salaries offered by internationalaid organizations are likely to be much greater than those offered by the national government (van de Walle and Johnston 1996:89–92). With fewer capable civil servants, the government is less capable of being responsive to the demands of civil society. Aid also represents a source of rents for political office- holders such that it encourages government officials to look upward to inter- national agencies rather than downward to their domestic constituencies and to be more concerned with ensuring continued aid flows than with supplying pub- lic goods to the population (Svensson 2000).
Moreover, the institutions intermediate between the rich funders and the intended beneficiaries do not tend to face the pressures that keep other institutions accountable to their funders and their beneficiaries. Consider, for example, internationalaid NGOs. Aid NGOs are not run for profit, so are not accountable for providing good projects in the same way that businesses are held accountable for providing good products and services through consumer choice. Nor of course are aid NGOs accountable to any democratic electorate. And the checks that can constrain government agencies, such as media scrutiny and academic study, in fact put quite weak pressure on aid NGOs to ensure effectiveness in aiding the poor. Since NGOs are bringing money into a poor country, typically by implementing smaller, local projects, the government and the media in the poor country generally do not give NGO effectiveness serious scrutiny. Moreover, the failure of a complex development project in a poor country is not something to which the international media ordinarily attends. While academics do publish studies of the effectiveness of NGO-implemented projects, there are presently few paths for translating these studies into sanctions for poor performance. And external audits on aid NGOs cover only the basics of financial probity, without touching on the effectiveness of the NGOs’ projects. 20
encourages school attendance. It has, thus, been a big factor in increasing school enrolment in Afghanistan. New Food Aid During President Hamid Karzai’s working visit to India on 12th January, 2009, the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh announced that Humanitarian Assistance Biscuits distribution under school feeding programme in order to help the fraternal people of Afghanistan in tiding over their current food crisis, India would gift Afghanistan a quarter of a million metric tonnes of wheat. The shipment is to be effected immediately, as soon as transit and transportation arrangements are finalised. Of this, 100–150,000 metric tonnes is expected to go towards creation of Afghanistan’s strategic food reserves. The supply of the wheat will be a considerable logistical exercise, involving transportation by sea to Iran and thereafter overland to Afghanistan by road. A faster and cheaper route across Pakistan by road and trains would depend on facilitation by Pakistan. Class room scene in Khas Kunar, Kunar Province Medical services in Afghanistan were badly affected due to decades of fighting. To attend to the massive and urgent medical needs, India rushed a team of 13 doctors and paramedics to Kabul in end-2001. Camps for fitting artificial limbs were held in different parts of Afghanistan throughout 2002. Since then, five Indian Medical Missions (IMMs) have been working in Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Mazar-e- Sharif, attending and disbursing medicines to 30,000 patients per month. The five IMMs cater to the poorest of the poor patients, many of whom come for consultation and free medicines from the contiguous provinces. Nearly 360,000 patients are availing of these services annually. India undertook the rehabilitation of the Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health (IGICH) in Kabul, the largest paediatric hospital in Afghanistan, and completed its new threestoried Surgical Block in 2005. The Polyclinic Block was completed in 2007. Now, the newly constructed Diagnostic Block is being equipped with diagnostic equipment, including CT scan and MRI facilities. Capacity building of Afghan doctors is a vital component of assistance and batches of IGICH specialists train at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi.
To assess the needs of patients faced with the decision to undergo dental treatment with sedation or GA (stage a) a series of qualitative interviews were undertaken with patients (aged 10-16 years) who had undergone dental treatment with sedation or GA and their parents/guardians. The themes identified as important in the decision-making process were then used to inform the content of a draft decision aid. Recruitment took place from August to December, 2013. Data saturation occurred following 12 joint interviews with patients (n=12) and parents/guardians (n=13). Patients were recruited from routine clinic appointments at the Charles Clifford Dental Hospital and the Royal Liverpool University Dental Hospital.
Dijk (2006) describes urbanization – the agglomeration of households in confined space – in terms of a U-shaped curve. Initially rapid urbanization is associated with considerable challenges and costs, but if managed successfully these costs can be turned into opportunities and benefits. However, as the theoretical discussion of the dual-dual model of urbanization shows the persistence of informal sectors can pose some serious problems with regards to development strategy and policy. The empirical evidence provided for Bangladesh in this paper demonstrates that this will be a long run strategic issue here in addition to the short and medium run employment creation and poverty reduction challenges. The turn-around in the U- shaped curve which is associated with economies of scale and an increase of economic and ecological efficiency, among others – is not going to be an automatic process (UN-HABITAT 2007).This proposition seems plausible for Bangladesh as well. The move towards a turn around of the U-shaped curve will require a sound public management of urban agglomerations and, all else equal, this will depend on a vibrant economy in and around urban centers. A growing urban economy must ensure sufficient revenues for urban authorities, and it must create sufficient jobs for the urban population. Otherwise, urban centers will be confronted by a spread of poverty and slums, social exclusion and crime (UN-HABITAT 2007), and the urban authorities will lack revenues to finance necessary interventions and investment, including investment in housing, water, sanitation, electricity, waste management, transport, schools and health care facilities, as well as spending on welfare programmes, and law and order.
The Report advances the view that global public goods are ‘issues that are broadly conceived as important to the international community, that for the most part cannot or will not be adequately addressed by individual countries acting alone and that are defined through a broad international consensus or a legitimate process of decision-making’ (International Task Force 2006: viii). Of particular significance is that as well applying the term global public goods to highly valued end conditions like peace, the Report follows Kaul, Grunberg and Stern’s (1999c: 13) lead by including ‘intermediate’ public goods, that is to say the institutional or instrumental mechanisms by which the final outcomes can be secured. Accordingly many public goods ‘are not abstract concepts; they are instruments to address real-world problems’ (International Task Force 2006: ix). So, just as lighthouses are often cited as examples of a public good when the desired outcome (the good) is safe passage, so an international financial regulation or regulatory regime that secures international financial stability too becomes a global public good. The same reasoning could be extended to other arenas. Thus Hamburg and Holl (1999: 377) imply that when democracy support becomes essential to establishing a ‘culture of prevention’ of deadly conflict (a ‘key public good’) it too becomes an important public good.
The beginning of the new millennium saw the unfolding of a sad economic paradox. On the one hand, the global economy seems to be on the cusp of a technological revolution that is ushering in a new era of economic prosperity for advanced countries. On the other, many of the world’s poor countries find themselves still scourged by massive poverty, which shows few signs of retreat. According to the most commonly employed international definition of poverty—those who subsist on an income of less than U.S.$1 a day, measured in purchasing power parity terms—about 1.2 billion people of the developing world would be considered poor (World Bank, 2000). 1 Of this poor population, a vast majority—about 900 million—is found in developing Asia. That is about twice as many poor people than in the rest of the developing world combined. If a more generous definition of poverty—$2 a day—were adopted, almost three billion people of the developing world would be considered poor. For developing Asia, this would include the majority of its population—about two billion people. If a broader concept of poverty is adopted that includes other aspects of human deprivation such as illiteracy, malnutrition, bad health, poor access to water and sanitation, and vulnerability to economic shocks, the picture becomes far grimmer.
Composition of the WHO regions was affected early by factors other than geographic contiguity. For example, predominance of the Islamic religion and almost universal use of Arabic or a related language help explain why the Eastern Mediterra- nean Region (EMRO) stretches from the straits of Gibraltar to Pakistan and includes much of North Africa that otherwise might have been in the Afri- can Region (AFRO). Existence of the Soviet Union as a political entity when WHO was founded led to assignment of much of Asia to the European Re- gion (EURO). Political differences between North and South Korea led to their assignment to differ- ent regions, SouthEast Asia (SEARO) and WPRO, respectively. Although Israel is geographically in EMRO and was so placed originally, unwillingness of other countries in the region to sit down with Israel resulted in its move in 1985 to EURO. Clearly, international health organization cannot be separated from politics.
The Two-Gap Model suggests that the Poor countries have to rely on the foreign resources to fill the two Gaps: Import-Export Gap and the Savings-Investment Gap. There are many forms of the foreign resources like FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), External loans & Credit, technical assistance, Project & non-project aid etc. But UDC’s (including Pakistan) don’t have the investment friendly policies. So, they have to rely on the Foreign aid and Debt rather than FDI and portfolio investments. The role of these external resources always remains questionable.
First, if concerns about poverty alleviation and economic growth are predominant in a development agency and if there is a high level of accountability attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries, such that α → 0 and γ → 1 , then a first-best linear incentive contract for a risk-neutral agent is obtained when the marginal product of the agent's effort level on both the performance measure ) ( P e and the aid agency’s true mission ( V e ) have the same variance and have perfect correlation. The first-best linear incentive contract could also be obtained under the aforementioned conditions in the cases where the accountability for effectiveness is very high and attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in corrupt countries, and vice versa, or where the accountability for effectiveness is limited but attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries. In such an aid agency, the performance measure creates an incentive to direct each unit of effort/money towards its poverty alleviation mission; the staff is encouraged to choose projects and adopt policies more likely to promote development. Furthermore, if the recipient country is highly corrupt, perfect accountability would require that the agency implement development projects and program aid whose performance evaluation is easily carried out, and vice versa (negative relation between
To achieve the objective,the author has divided this book into nine chapters. The first chapter which is the introduction offers the author’s experience of growing up as a child in the British colony which later became Malawi. The growing up of the author in a significantly aid- dependent economy in Africa seems to have considerably influenced him in forming the perceptions reflected in the book instead of more academic articles concerning the impact of trade on development, the nature and flows of foreign aid.