This paper empirically examines whether aid recipients adopt donor preferences by voting more frequently with donors in United Nations General Assembly roll call votes after receiving foreign aid. This analysis extends the literature exploring whether foreign aid influences the political relationship between aid donors and recipients in two ways. First, it expands the donor countries considered. While most previous research focuses exclusively on the United States, this paper considers each of the 22 members of the DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee (DAC). 1 Second, this paper tests the long-run political influence by collapsing the yearly panel into three-year averages and comparing the results to the basic model. The empirical results provide evidence that Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom exhibit a positive relationship between voting coincidence and foreign aid distribution. The results also show a positive relationship between voting coincidence and aid for the United States, but only in the long run when the yearly panels are collapsed into three-year averages. The latter result may provide an explanation for why previous studies find mixed results as to whether the United States uses aid for political support. The results are robust to the inclusion of measures of economic power, military power, dependence on foreign support, and international trade patterns.
This paper examines on a panel of 22 OECD DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee countries whether fragmentation of executive power and the degree of competition in the legislative branch of government increases the amount of tied aid over the 1979-2009 period. Fragmentation and competition are broadly defined as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aid expenditure are internalized by decision makers and the relative strength of the government’s position vis-à-vis legislative composition respectively. The empirical results show tied aid, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid, increases as the number of decision makers within the government increases and decreases as the proportion of excess seats a governing coalition holds above a simple majority increases.
One of the problems built into the DAC philosophy is that ODA volume is calculated on net terms rather than gross; the loan repayment from recipient countries is deducted from the total ODA volume. This can be a real dilemma, because donors providing loan aid need to increase gross flows faster than the repayment flows in order not to prevent total loan amount becoming negative, even when effective loan projects may not be found (Carey, interview, 2012). According to a former Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) director, this is why most DAC members stopped loan schemes, but he personally thinks defining ODA in gross terms may reflect the real level of burden sharing among donors (ibid). The way that ODA is calculated together with its definition has given an impression that grant aid is superior to loan aid. If we can call this a norm then it is not fully compatible with Japanese ODA, which is more experienced with loan aid especially in Asian region. As Carey says, the definition of ODA is an international political game, where power and interests are involved (interview, 2012), in which members make a calculation about who gains and who loses. In this regard, Japan is a loser. In 2011, the total recovered amount of Japanese bilateral loan aid from recipient countries was US$ 9,334 million, which exceeded the total amount of Japanese bilateral loan aid of US$ 7,614 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 2012). Therefore, in net terms, Japan’s bilateral loan aid amount was negative. 3
I will analyze the processes of OMC decision-making in the Council and at the Member State level based on primary sources, such as Commission reports, Council and European Council conclusions, newspaper articles, Member State budgets and budget plans, secon- dary sources from research literature and statistics, as well as 18 expert interviews con- ducted in July and August 2010 with key individuals involved in ODA-policy at the EU and Member State level. Since European coordination on aid-levels is taking place in complex national policy environments and under the roof of international relations, a number of factors possibly have influence on the ODA/GNI-levels of EU Member States and thus must be controlled for. First, the role of public opinion in the Member States, the political orientation of Member State governments, and the influence of fiscal leeway or budgetary constraints. Secondly, the role of international commitments in the framework of the United Nations, the G8, and the OECD DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee and the impact of demands coming from developing countries and their groupings on the international stage. I thus hypothesize that any of these control factors could have been a sufficient con- dition for increasing ODA/GNI-levels in EU member states and analyze their influence ac- cordingly.
This paper assesses the aid-development nexus in 52 African countries using updated data (1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). The effects of Total Net Official DevelopmentAssistance (NODA), NODA from the DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee (DAC) and NODA from Multilateral donors on economic prosperity (at national and per capita levels) are also examined. The findings broadly indicate that developmentassistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development. The magnitude of negativity (which is consistent across specifications and development dynamics) is highest for NODA from Multilateral donors, followed by NODA from DAC countries. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa. Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results. Policy implications and caveats are discussed.
The need of foreign aid can be justified on the following grounds: Firstly, the main argument is “Two-Gap Model”, that is, deficits in BOP and deficit in savings is major argument in favour of foreign aid, as described earlier. Secondly, the external assistance is also assumed to facilitate and accelerate the process of development by generating additional domestic savings as a result of the higher growth rates (that is presumed to induce by the accurate utilization of foreign aid). Eventually, it is hoped that the need for the concessional aid will disappear as local resources become able to make development self-sustaining.
By 1970‘s a trend towards ‗financial mercantilism‘ of ODA among multi- and bi-lateral aid agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other ‗banks‘ emerged. This trend was further strengthened during the Latin American debt crises in the early 1980‘ and the Asian crises 1997-1998. By the end of the last century the development ‗banks‘ pursued to a certain extent aid investment policies using ‗emerging‘ economies as a model for development based neo-liberalism economics (Phillips, 1994). More recently during and subsequent to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the persistence of the European Monitory Crisis (EMC), specific needs of developing countries became increasingly sub-ordinated to political and ideological power relations between ‗real‘ economics and financial economics otherwise known as ‗financialisation‘ (Epstein 2005, Montgomerie and Williams 2009, Fine 2010). Despite the broad acceptance of the phenomenon of financialisation in the developed world there has been very limited discussion of the potential and actual implications for developing world, most particularly in regard to ODA.
interpretation of the Treaty will be discussed below to show how the competences of the Community and the member states have evolved through the development of implied and explicit powers. It is important to consider the difference between the "Community" and its individual "member states" in a legal sense. For the Community it is the Treaty which provides the basis of its legal order. Yet the Treaty is more than a contractual agreement; it is "an institutional stage of European u n i t y . P o w e r is both attributed and circumscribed by the founding and subsequent Treaties of the EC and the relationship between the Community and the member states is based upon the delegation of this power and the division of functions. Powers given to the Community by the member states can be used for conducting external
programs are budget neutral. In New Hampshire, any waiver must also be approved by statute and/or various quasi-legislative bodies, such as the Joint Health Care Reform Oversight Committee or the Fiscal Committee. Raising and expending the state general fund share (FMAP) of the program is controlled by the NH General Court. New Hampshire also relies upon certain health care provider taxes to raise money for the Medicaid program, including the Medicaid Enhancement Tax and the Nursing Facility Quality Assessment.
• Develop list of necessary permits for project development, contact information for permitting agencies, and application procedures. Identify potential fatal flaws (project location, timing of site activities, etc.), if any, which will prevent obtaining any of the necessary permits.
In order to benefit from IPARD, SEE and Turkey will need to establish national structures able to define strategies, programmes, management and monitoring conditions for IPARD type programmes. This requires enhancing the knowledge and the transparency of the Agricultural and Rural situation (rural census, farm register, land cadastre, price statistics, sector analysis for the more important agricultural sectors, etc) and involving other public bodies and the relevant civil society partners in the elaboration of a national strategy for rural development. This will in turn also require supporting the organization of key civil society partners, namely: farmers, food processors, environment and, local rural development associations. Currently, both the support of initiatives to facilitate access to credits for farmers and rural business, and the establishment of advisory and extension services for farmers and rural population are ineligible for funding under IPARD.
The environmental impacts of policies differ from one developing country to another and are thus difficult to estimate. Studies on the environmental impacts of trade policies have been carried out in some developing countries. 4 Although the results are often mixed, such studies are essential in making more informed choices for policy design and implementation, and they are an important input in designing country and regional programmes and projects to counteract negative environmental impacts. Such studies should be continued, therefore, particularly in regard to identifying the economic implications of environmental issues. The EC Treaty requires the Community to take account of the development co- operation objectives in policies likely to affect developing countries 5 . Therefore, such considerations should be systematically included in review of Commission proposals to the Council and the Parliament, particularly in the policy areas listed above. The new structure of the Commission should provide further opportunities for improving policy coherence with regard to EC economic and development co-operation.