I assumed that the operational and structural goals are in line with the Mozambican needs and demands. This is basically true, but within my paper I mentioned some cases in which this was not always right. The broad ultimate goal of donors to improve the higher education system is certainly in line with the Mozambican needs. However, some structural and operational goals are a step too far and put on the recipients as I concluded from my research of the different programmes. I found that in the demand-drivenness, one should distinguish between real demand-drivenness, when the recipients are capable to determine their needs and demands, and pretended demand-drivenness, when actions are done with the best intention for the beneficiaries by foreigners, but actually, the beneficiaries don’t know how to act and are overstrained with the donor policies. Even if not the optimum levels of all operational objectives have been fulfilled, most of the projects resulted in more of those values than would have been the case without the programme in order to improve the quality of higher education. Even though the outcome without the donoraid is only hypothetical, clear signs are visible that the programmes and projects created knowledge and management capacities, technological capacities and human capital, which would not have existed without the projects. If looking at the cost-benefit analysis, the benefits are the stated goals while the costs involve administrative expenses, the time and monetary costs. Both costs and benefits cannot be accurately estimated, which is why I did not focus on this approach. However, with having dealt for quite some time with the projects, and considering that donoraid always takes a lot of costs and time to get some results, I would say that in the GG/PA project as well as in the Sida project, the benefits are higher than the costs, while this is not the case in the other two projects.
The poverty reduction strategy (PRS) was a prerequisite for debt relief under the HIPC initiative therefore, when the NPP government subscribed to the HIPC initiative, the government had to prepare a PRS to qualify for the benefits that are associated with HIPC. The GPRS I addressed the issue of how to create wealth by restructuring the economy towards accelerated growth, so that the objectives of poverty reduction and the protection of the vulnerable and excluded could be sustained (National Development Planning Commission, 2005: 1-2). The GPRS I helped to reduce the incidence of poverty among food crop farmers by 13% in 2005 while child mortality rate for children under five dropped from 110 to 95 per thousand and enrolment in junior secondary school rose to 65% from 61% (ILO, 2004). In the social development circles, there were increased expenditure outlays in support of the medium-term priorities of the government with regard to special programmes targeted at the vulnerable and excluded. These included the rehabilitation of street children, increased access to legal- aid services for the poor, integration of Persons With Disabilities (PWDs) into mainstream production and employment, and increased access of economically marginalized women to credit through the establishment of the government’s micro-credit scheme and the Women’s Development Fund supported by the government of Japan (National Development Planning Commission, 2005:10). In addition, the GPRS I also assisted in the establishment of the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) to provide access to health care for all Ghanaians at a subsidized cost, and in 2004, government again promulgated an Educational Reform Programme to assure that every Ghanaian of school age had access to free basic education as prescribed by the National Constitution and the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (National Development Planning Commission, 2005: 14).
Although social inclusion is another fluid term (P. Bates, 2002), in this study disability inclusion means ensuring that people with disabilities have full and fair access to activities, social roles and relationships, alongside non-disabled targeted beneficiaries, in aid and development programs in Myanmar. Over the years many scholars and activists (e.g. Barnes (2012); CBM (2012); Covey (1998); Davis (2013); Deegan and Brooks (1985); Goodley, Hughes, and Davis (2012); Hughes (2012); Keith and Keith (2013); Kristiansen, Vehmas, and Shakespeare (2009); Lauber and Rössler (2007b); MacLachlan, Mannan, Huss, Munthali, and Amin (2016a); Miles (2002b); Nussbaum (2006); Schur, Kruse, and Blanck (2013); Shakespeare (2006, 2013a, 2013b); Watson, Roulstone, and Thomas (2012); Withers (2012) have shown how support can be provided so that people with disabilities can be employed rather than attend a sheltered workshop, live in their own home rather than in a hostel, and participate in friendships and community life with a diverse array of citizens, instead of conducting their whole lives within segregated disability services (Peter Bates & Davis, 2004). In the context of tackling global poverty, The World Bank (n.d.) defines social inclusion as:
In this paper we tested two opposing hypotheses regarding the effect of aid fragmenta- tion on aid tying. Results offer no support for the hypothesis that more concentrated aid confers monopoly power on donors that they exploit by tying more of their aid. Instead, we find strong evidence that lower fragmentation is associated with less aid tying. This result is predicted by a model of donor behavior adapted from Knack and Rahman (2007) and based on collective action theory. In countries where aid is less fragmented across donors, the typical donor has stronger incentives to pursue development objectives rather than commercial (or other) objectives. A given donor operating in multiple recipient countries has a stronger incentive to pursue development objectives where it has a larger share of the total aid market in a country. Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of aid tying, and to a strong set of controls (including donor and recipient fixed effects). More- over, instrumental variables tests in our panel data support the interpretation that higher donoraid shares reduce aid tying. In our cross-sectional tests, aid tying rises initially as the number of donors increases, but eventually begins to fall. This result - that aid tying is lower not only when there are very few but also very many donors - is not predicted by our theoretical approach, but nor is it consistent with concerns that fewer donors operating in a country implies enhanced leverage on their part to tie more aid. Moreover, in our panel data tests, higher donoraid shares are monotonically associated with lower aid tying.
Chong and Gradstein (2008) offer a median voter model of foreign aid, where individuals choose to contribute privately and also pay a tax on their income, which finances aid provided by their government. The aggregate aid given is the sum of private donations and official aid, where the latter is financed by income tax revenues raised for that purpose. Thus, aggregate aid is a public good for the citizens of the donor nation. Chong and Gradstein (2008) determine that the aid given is reduced by greater income inequality in the donor nation. They also show that the amount of aid given decreases with the inefficiency of the donor government in effec- tively providing aid to developing nations. This decrease arises from (i) a reduced willingness on the part of voters to finance inappropriate donoraid and (ii) the direct effects of inefficiencies in aid giving. The authors’ empirical results are broadly consistent with their theoretical findings.
A political economy study of aid as a ‘devel- opment instrument’ shows that donors’ fail- ure to effectively incorporate conflict into their frameworks and approaches is due to two major factors: first, the inability of the neoclassical macroeconomic framework embraced by most donors to incorporate a comprehensive analysis of conflict econo- mies within its confined boundaries and assumptions; and second, the unwillingness of donors to take effective account of the conflict stemming from their political, stra- tegic and ideological interests and alliances in the conflict. To demonstrate the above, this paper examines the nature of donor operations in the occupied Palestinian ter- ritories (oPt) in the period prior to (1994– 2000) and immediately after (2000–2006) the second Intifada of 2000. The second Intifada is chosen as a point of heightened intensity of conflict, which provides a needed threshold for an analysis of the changes to donor behaviour and allocation patterns in response to an outbreak or intensification of conflict. Through this, the paper highlights the political and ideological determinants of donoraid policies, and the ways in which their aid is often structured ‘around’ the con- flict as opposed to taking account of it. The paper argues that aid to the oPt cannot bring about significant socio-economic develop- ment as long as it does not confront Israel’s policies of occupation, which affect every sphere of social, economic and political life in the Palestinian territories. Furthermore, it argues that apart from the lack of political will on the part of donors to constructively engage with the conflict, the aid policies
According to respondents, the retreat from budget support came about not because donor officials stopped believing in it, but because exogenous factors made it difficult for them to convince their own governments back home. One respondent, for example, noted that, “politically, there’s a pull back on the part of our government, […] which I think is wrong … I think we need to give it longer, we need to not abandon the process at this point” (personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, July 4, 2012). In particular, the 2008 global financial crisis resulted in declining aid budgets in many European countries. At the same time, more conservative governments less favourable to bud- get support and aid in general were elected in many donor countries, undermining the ability of donor agencies to make credible promises to providing budget support. As one respondent explained, in the future they may not be able to give GBS, “not because we have negative experience or a negative eval- uation, but simply because there are other priorities at home that are higher than the GBS” (personal communication, bilateral donor official, Tanzania, June 20, 2012). In other words, donor agencies could no longer make a credible commitment to delivering budget support as promised.
One potential concern is that rankings could be overly sensitive to findings from a single data source, the SMPD, as it provides all three indicators in the sub-index on harmonization and 5 of the 6 indicators in the alignment sub-index. However, the untied aid indicator is correlated almost as strongly (at .60) as the 5 SMPD indicators are on average (.63) with the alignment sub-index scores. Moreover, the two SMPD-dominated sub-indexes are not as strongly correlated (at .77) with the overall index scores as the selectivity sub-index is (at .83). The single indicator most strongly correlated with the overall index is not one of the 8 Paris Survey indicators, but rather poverty selectivity (at .82). As mentioned above, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that some donors may have interpreted the survey guidance more liberally than others to improve their apparent performance, but if so, any resulting bias is unlikely to affect the overall ranking very much. In Table 4, we further investigate the sensitivity of the overall rankings to alternative assumptions about indicator weightings or regarding the purpose of an overall index. The first rankings column replicates the ―Overall‖ rankings from Table 3, while the next three columns use other weighting schemes. Index_18 and Index_20 dispense with the sub-indexes altogether. Rather than averaging sub-index scores, they average the individual indicators. Index_18 uses the 18 indicators included in our sub-indexes, while Index_20 adds two more—the Transparency and Overhead indicators provided by Easterly and Pfutze (2008)—that we do not include in our sub-indexes or in the Overall index constructed from them. Relative to the latter index, Index_18 and Index_20 give greater weight to aid quality dimensions for which we have more indicators, namely Specialization and Alignment. While these changes in methodology and content affect the rankings, the general contours remain the same: the top five donors were all previously in the top 8, while all of the bottom five were previously in the bottom eight. Among bilaterals, only two smaller donors (Hungary and Luxembourg) have ranks that move more than six spots as a result of the reweightings. The EBRD is the only multilateral that moves much: shifting to Index_20 from Overall drops it by 10 spots, because it ranks poorly on specialization (which has an effective weight of 7/20 in Index_20) and on the transparency index in Easterly and Pfutze (2009).
This emergence of China has led to an increase in exports from China to African countries and at the same time an increase in China's official development assistance to Africa. This seems to be in accordance with the words of Robert McNamara, then President of the World Bank, in his address to the Governors of the World Bank on September 30, 1968: The share of aid funds (ODA) to Developing countries is very low. In practice, all the monetary grants quickly returned to rich countries in the form of products bought from them. There by contributing to the debt of the assisted country which also help finance donor country‟s exports. The objective of this article is therefore to determine the impact of the bilateral aid flow on Cameroon's bilateral trade performance vis-à-vis some OECD donor countries.
With reference to the impact on total trade, strong and positive effects are shown in the Chinese aid, but not in the US aid. This indicates that trade interests are more crucial to China than the US. Furthermore, lagged effects of Chinese aid on total trade are observed in the empirical results. For the US, we do not observe any significant effects of aid on trade. An explanation for the difference might be due to the economic development stages. China is still a developing country with a low per-capita income and a large poverty-stricken population. For this reason, the need of economic development is much more important. In reality, foreign trade is a key element of Chinese economic activities as it has contributed to approximately 50% of the Chinese GDP since China joined the WTO. Foreign aid policy reflects China ’ s national priority in terms of economic interests. 19 China ’ s aid to Africa is in line with China’s Africa Policy, which is also important for China’s ―package deals‖ to Africa (Busse et al., 2014). Being the largest donor in the aid market, trade interests in the US aid are not as important as that in China’s aid, but aid is indispensible for the US to protect its existing global structure of power and wealth (Johansen, 2014). Despite the trade interest of aid is not as important as the strategic and security interests for the US in the current global climate, it used to play a significant role in enhancing US foreign trade, e.g., the Marshall Plan. 20 However, the first US-Africa Leader Summit held in 2014 implies that the core of the US policy in Africa is shifted from security concerns into economic development opportunity.
otherwise not be willing to engage or where multilaterals are restricted by their legal mandate (IEG 2011). However, evidence about the advantages of these funds is still largely lacking and inconclusive (for multi-donor trust funds see (Barakat, Rzeszut, and Martin 2012). Moreover, the rise of these financing structures and of single-donor trust funds in particular risk creating new inefficiencies in the multilateral system due to duplication (The 1818 Society 2012, Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015), by “undermin[ing] the strategic and coherent allocation of resources for individual multilateral organisations” (Tortora and Steensen 2014: 4) and increase the influence of individual donor’s interest in the multilateral organization (OECD 2011, IEG 2011). The sheer number of these funds, more than 900 at the World Bank, generates administrative expenses that could be spent more productively in developing countries. An overall assessment of multi-bi aid is highly complex if not
To summarize our main results, we find that the increase in the amount of donors’ exports flowing from donors’ aid is more moderate than in earlier studies: around $0.50 for every aid dollar spent in the short run, rising to up to $1.8 US increase in exports for every aid dollar spent in the long run. The overall effect is remarkably robust, but decreases over time for most donors. In particular, from 2000 onwards a lower (and even insignificant) effect of bilateral aid on the corresponding donors’ exports is found. Since the late 1990s donors have increasingly been signing RTAs with developing countries as an alternative way to promote their commercial interest. We do not find evidence of a displacement effect for all donors, but only for European Union donors. Interestingly, the evidence indicates that aid from some donors is not export-enhancing, whereas for some others, the effect is strong and robust to several specifications. The effect is remarkably high for some donors (Austria, Australia, Italy, Japan, Sweden, US, Germany, Canada and Spain) and positive but smaller for France, UK, Norway, Denmark and Portugal. However for others, we find no such effect (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands 1 , New Zealand, and Switzerland). We find suggestive evidence that this could be due to the tying status of aid as well the different sectoral allocation among donors. Donors for which aid promotes trade are characterized for having higher levels of tied aid (France, Austria, Australia, Canada, Spain) or for giving aid for specific purposes (e.g. The Norwegian Oil for Development (OfD) initiative 2 ). On the
Third, we control for (logged) population of recipient countries to capture the often- reported small country bias. In the second step of the analysis, controlling for population is required as the dependent variable is not in per-capita terms. Fourth, we account for the (logged) distance between capital cities in the recipient and the donor country, assuming that new donors are more likely to give aid to countries that are closer to them. 14 To account for commercial donor interests, we include the share of the donor’s overall exports accounted for by a particular recipient country (in percent) as well as a recipient country’s endowment of mineral and energy resources, proxied by the depletion of these resources in percent of GNI. We use averages over the sample period for population and mineral and energy depletion. Per-capita GDP and corruption might themselves be affected by aid flows so that we take lagged values of these variables from the year 2000. The recipient country’s share in the donor’s exports might also be endogenous. We employ the average over the 1999-2001 period to smooth the data for annual volatility. The baseline variables will be augmented or replaced by a number of different indicators to test for the robustness of results, as will be detailed below.
The Perugia group demonstrated the potential role for NK alloreactivity in protecting against relapse after T-cell-depleted HLA-haploidentical grafts for patients with myeloid malignancies (Ruggeri et al. 1999 ; Ruggeri et al. 2007 ). In an analysis of 112 patients, with AML, NK allore- active clones were detected before transplant in all KIR epitope mismatched donors whose recip- ients did not express HLA-C group ligands and two-thirds whose recipients did not express HLA-Bw4 alleles, whereas none were detected in donors whose recipients expressed the class I HLA groups present in the donor. Multivariate analysis confi rmed that donor-versus-host KIR “ligand mismatch” was an independent factor for survival, associated with a twofold reduction in death or relapse among all patients ( p < 0.001), including those with relapsed disease at time of HCT (DFS 30 % versus 6 %, p = 0.04). In con- trast, when the analysis took into consideration patients who lacked expression of at least one KIR ligand, for whom there was potential for NK alloreactivity according to the “missing ligand” model, no survival advantage was dis- cerned. Although these results have not been confi rmed by others (Bishara et al. 2004 ), they suggest that the search for HLA-haploidentical donors should be extended beyond immediate family members, guided by KIR genotyping (Ruggeri et al. 2005 ).
This empirical literature on development aid issues has also already established that recipient-country characteristics such as income level, population, and political system (see e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Levin, 2006) affect aid inflows. However, the part of the literature that deals with the donor side’s determinants of aid, especially the part that focuses on the fiscal variables, is brief and inconclusive. For example, Faini (2006) finds evidence that higher budget deficit and higher stock of public debt reduce aid, whereas Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) find no significant relationship between deficits and aid provision. Moreover, none of these studies explore the effects that the fiscal episodes in donor countries may have on aid provision. In this paper, we focus on macroeconomic determinants of aid generosity (while controlling for potential other political and institutional variables) to investigate how donors behave in terms of (real) aid supplies during the fiscal episodes. In other words, we explore the long-run average (LRA) 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 1111111111111111111
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in the aggregate imply unrealistically high recurrent expenditures in future years – so that roads are often built but not repaired, and schools are built but not staffed (Brautigam, 2000). Donors engage in these practices to increase the visibility of their efforts and the short-term appearance of success for their individual projects, at the expense of coherent pol icy making and capacity building in the recipient country’s public sector (World Bank, 1998: 84). It is well-known in the aid business that however successful a project appears on its own terms, it will have little or no sustained impact in a poor sector-policy environment, and where it is not integrated into other donor-funded or government projects (Easterly, 2003: 7; Kanbur and Sandler, 1999: 29). However, where there are numerous donors, any one of them would gain only a small share of the total benefits, in terms of project success, from devoting resources to improving administrative capacity in the country, and would be subsidizing the success mostly of other donors’ projects.
We reviewed the records of 441 patients who received deceased kidney transplants at two transplantation centres (Seoul National University Hospital and Samsung Medical Center) between June 1994 and April 2008. A non heart- beating donor was not used in our centers. We restricted our cohort to recipients with at least 1 year of documented follow-up, in order to use their renal function at 6 months and 1 year after transplantation as prognostic outcomes. Fifty recipients who received kidneys from donors younger than 15 years were excluded. Another 34 recipients were also excluded, because their follow-up periods were less than 1 year. We excluded 2 patients who died of surgical complications and 18 patients with insufficient information about the donor kidneys. Finally, 337 patients were includ- ed in the study. Five-year graft survival rates were calculated only for patients who had been followed for at least 5 years or lost their grafts within 5 years (n = 224). Graft failure was regarded as an estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) less than 10 mL/min/1.73 m 2 or conversion to dialy-
benefitted from redistribution over the past three decades, even while authorizing legislation has changed four times. These findings suggest that our first two hypotheses—to satisfy highway needs and to aid poorer states—are not good explanations for the geographic redistribution of Federal-aid highway dollars. Given that these are the most easily justified policy rationales for redistribution, this poses serious questions about the continued presence of redistribution in the federal highway program. In short, the donor state criticisms are well founded. On the other hand, states that were better represented on the key Congressional committees, particularly in the Senate, have generally received more highway aid per capita than those that were not, and also have been beneficiaries of redistribution. The importance of the rural population variable, and in a positive direction, indicates that the highway program’s rural origins and/or the