When the change in demand for the services of the durablegood is certain, the study has differentiated, in a two period context, situations where the market size increases and where the market size decreases. The results for the case where the size of the market increases are analogous to those in the literature on durable goods. In the case where the size of the market decreases, however, important differences with previous results have been obtained. In this case it has been proved that welfare may be higher under a monopolist seller with commitment ability (or a monopolist renter) than under a monopolist seller without commitment power and the equilibrium under a monopolist seller with commitment ability may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under a monopolist seller without commitment power. These results have also been obtained for the case where the change in demand for the services of the durablegood is uncertain. The paper has derived the set of parameter values where each of these results occur.
We fully characterize the effects of per unit subsidies for the purchase and rental of durable goods, considering subsidies in the present and subsidies in the future, under imperfect competition. We show how welfare is affected by the simultaneous consideration of subsidies on renting and selling and how the effects of a change in one of those subsidies depends on its interaction with other subsidies. Among other results we explain why a subsidy in the future mitigates the commitment problem of producers when they sell and rent the durablegood in the present, we find the region in the space of subsidies where a subsidy on sales in the present simultaneously increases the consumer, producer and total surpluses, and we show that the cost of subsidies may change in the opposite direction to the direction of change in any one subsidy.
literature. Bond and Samuelson (1984) show that depreciation and replacement sales reduce the monopolist’s tendency to cut price. Kahn (1986) shows a similar result when the monopolist faces an upward-sloping marginal cost schedule. Also, there have been many studies analyz- ing means and practices durable-good monopolists can employ to overcome or mitigate the time-inconsistency problem, notably leasing (Bulow, 1982), planned obsolescence (Bulow, 1986; Waldman, 1993), contractual provisions such as best-price provisions or most-favored-customer clauses (Butz, 1990), and more recently product-line extension using quality diﬀerentiation (Hahn, 2002; Inderst, 2002; Takeyama, 2002).
The results obtained thus far suggest that it is important to analyze whether mergers in durable-goods industries potentially pose as many problems as in non- durablegood markets. Put diﬀerently, a relevant question is whether mergers in durable-goods industries may be posing a threat of significant anticompetitive harm. In a context with two periods of time and where the demand for the services of the good does not change over time, the comparison of the welfare loss due to merging in the cases of selling and renting-selling firms with the welfare loss corresponding to the case of renting firms is identical to the comparison with respect to the case of a non-durablegood industry. The reasons are that there are no costs of production and that, as shown ealier, the quantity rented each period by a durable goods industry coincides with the quantity produced each period by a non-durablegood industry with the same number of active firms. Taking into account the expressions corresponding
On the contrary to the early studies, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) show that if buyers condition their strategies on not only payoff relevant part of the histories but the past actions as well, there exist equilibria in which the monopolist creates a reputation and maintains some or all of his market power when the marginal cost of production is no less than the lowest valuation of the buyers. In addition to establishing a reputation, depreciation of a durablegood can also help a durable goods monopolist avoid the time inconsistency problem. Bond and Samuelson (1984) show that in a discrete time, infinite horizon game when the good depreciates, replacement sales may deter the monopolist from cutting the price as long as the time period between successive offers of the monopolist is nonzero. However, in the limit, as the time period approaches zero, the competitive outcome is achieved and the Coase Conjecture holds. Karp (1996), on the other hand, by using a continuous time model with replacement sales constructs continuous time equilibria in which the monopolist can earn profits above the competitive level. However, Karp (1996) also shows the existence of an equilibrium that verifies the Coase Conjecture. Following Karp (1996), Deneckere and Liang (2008) characterize the effect of the depreciation rate on the market outcome of a durable goods monopoly when agents use Markov strategies. They conclude that below a certain level of durability, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium in which the monopolist charges the static monopoly price in each period which continues to exist even when the seller becomes highly impatient. Intuitively, when the product depreciates, replacement sales become more profitable than penetrating the market by cutting the price of the good.
Second, we show that a durable-goods monopolist may credibly deter entry by means of limit pricing. Lowering the price of the old generation of the durablegood in the first period increases first-period demand and hence the number of second-period consumers who are will- ing to pay only for the incremental utility derived from the new generation of the product over the old one. Interestingly, this may prevent the entrant from investing in innovation without necessarily making the innovation investment unattractive to the incumbent. The reason is that innovation by the potential entrant results in price competition with vertically differentiated products, while innovation by the incumbent yields a multiproduct monopoly. In particular, we show that the entrant would never implement a cross-upgrade policy due to competitive pressure, whereas the multiproduct monopolist may find it optimal to offer upgrade discounts
In this section, we discuss the role of commitment and how it a¤ects the buying-frenzies strategies. It is well known that when a durablegood monopolist cannot commit to future price and quantity, it will make too much sales in the second period with respect to what the monopolist would like to do from the …rst period point of view. Therefore, in order to maintain a high resale value for the good, the monopolist will try to counterbalance this e¤ect by reducing even more the quantity sold in the …rst period which in turn leads to a larger fraction of consumers rationed to the second period. Speci…cally, the next proposition shows that
methods of creating porous substrates. Many porous coatings are not applicable on a large scale, depending on the method used to create surface architecture, so except for smaller scale applications such as in heat exchanging appliances, SLIPS are tricky to employ. 94 Lubricants and/or plasticizers incorporated into polymers might be better suited than lubricated porous materials. Different gel-type materials applied to deicing research, with varying degrees of exploration.86, 17, 95-97 The less explored are hydrated icephobic materials that utilize water as a lubricant. These materials are interesting because they offer low ice adhesion ~50 kPa, and do not have the same concerns of lubricant loss as SLIPS because there is virtually no concern with water entering the environment, and if the lubricant is depleted it may even be replaced by water from the atmosphere. 98-99 From a classical standpoint it is not obvious why hydrophilic materials, or those containing water should be interesting as icephobic materials. Polyelectrolyte brushes were shown to inhibit ice attachment on the surface through an ion-exchange mechanism with the first few layers of the brush, which disrupts the formation of ice crystals. 99 A second example showed water that hydrates a gel experiences a significant depression in its freezing point to below -20 °C, remaining fluid well below temperatures where ice forms on the surfaces and preventing strong attachment of ice. More work in the field would certainly be interesting, particularly if highly durable systems could be created. Organogels are more extensively researched, and many examples of polymers lubricated with organic or silicone oils exist in the literature.
Consumers and investors world- wide started to realize that the financial crisis’ impact on real economies may be longer and more severe than they had expected. They pulled back signif- icantly, leading to declines in total con- sumption and investment that spilled over into global trade. Particularly hard hit were consumer and producer purchases of long-lasting goods. We will see that demand for these durable goods played an important role in the recent global trade collapse.
Because prices differ across sectors, there is a difference between the aggregate price level and the price of either the durable or the nondurable alone. We define the aggregate price level as P t ≡ P C C t , + P X X t , where C and X are steady state levels of nondurable and durable goods production. In the figure, the aggregate price level (the dark line) jumps after the shock and then slowly converges to the higher level. The figure also shows that both individual prices adjust slowly. Even though the price of the nondurable is completely flexible it behaves in a manner similar to a sticky price good. Like the model with symmetric price rigidity, real interest rates show almost no change when nondurables have flexible prices and again, the nominal interest rate rises slightly due to expected inflation.
However, according to Eq.(30) the mean price decreases in time and as a consequence the market volume v(μ(t)) increases. That means, when the spreading process due to social contagion slows down the number of potential adopters who cannot afford the good increases due to the decline of the mean price. This is an additional diffusion process related to the evolution of the mean price and the amount of adopters limited by their income. However, by studying the income distribution a peak in the income distribution is evident representing income limited potential adopters getting unemployment insurance or other social insurance income . 13 When the mean price declines such that these potential adopters can afford the good an additional second spreading wave is initiated in the maturity phase. It can be described by Eq.(38) as spontaneous purchase with A=A’ , B=0 and the corresponding market volume n 1 .
The mix proportion of LWFC should be worked out such that it keeps the desired physical properties and compressive strength, sand to cement ratios are important as they are used to arrive at optimized concrete strength and water to cement ratio are carefully designed to obtain good workability as well as good binding property. Here LWFC are to be designated as Mix-A, Mix-B and Mix-C according to their increasing densities.
The Defender's transit speed is 160 knots, but it also has exceptional low-speed handling and manoeuvring capabilities at around 70-90 knots allowing for continuous tight turns during low level observation, inspection and photography. At this low speed it has an endurance of around 8 hours assisted by an extended fuselage and larger wings which has been developed for improved fuel capacity. Fitted with durable and fuel efficient Rolls Royce Allison engines, 250-B17F flat-rated at 400hp with 200amp generators, the Defender has a proven track record as the world's most versatile, reliable and economic task-oriented aircraft.
Your agent can act on your behalf only after signing this Special Durable Power of Attorney before a notary public. You can request information from your agent at any time. If, by executing this Special Durable Power of Attorney, you are revoking a prior authority with respect to TRS retirement benefit transactions made under a previous Power of Attorney, you should provide written notice of the revocation to your prior agent(s) and to any third parties who may have acted upon it, including TRS.
IDPs have to be given the opportunity to voluntarily choose a durable solution. In principle, a voluntary choice is based on an individual decision. However, in many settings it is acceptable and appropriate in the local context to have decision-making by family or by community. In such cases, women, children (in accordance with their age and level of maturity) and persons belonging to groups who have special needs or are potentially marginalized need to be fully included. Moreover, there should be individual support options for adults who have valid reasons to choose a different type of durable solution than their family or community (e.g. people who are too traumatized or vul- nerable to return or others who would like to finish their education). The best interests of the child should be the primary consideration guiding durable solutions for children. The perspectives of chil- dren need to be heard and their views given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity.
The starting point for this paper are the models of Stokey (1979) and Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel (1984), as examined in Section 3.2. Other authors introduce dynamics into durable goods models in different ways. Conlisk (1984), Laffont and Tirole (1996), Biehl (2001), and Board (2004) have stochastic valuations. Cost variations have been analysed by Stokey (1979), and Levhari and Pindyck (1981). When consumers and the firm have different discount rates the optimal price may fall over time as examined by Sobel and Takahashi (1983), Landsberger and Meilijson (1985), and Wang (2001). Rust (1985, 1986), Waldman (1996) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) allow the good to depreciate and for consumers to scrap their the product.
Durable DepSpace (DDS). The second use case is a durable extension of the DepSpace coordination ser- vice , which originally stored all data only in mem- ory. The system, named Durable DepSpace (DDS), pro- vides a tuple space interface in which tuples (variable- size sequences of typed fields) can be inserted, retrieved and removed. There are two important characteristics of DDS that differentiate it from similar services such as Chubby  and ZooKepper : it does not follow a hierarchical data model, since tuple spaces are, by defi- nition, unstructured; and it tolerates Byzantine faults, in- stead of only crash faults. The addition of durability to DepSpace basically required the replacement of its orig- inal replication layer by Dura-SMaRt.