criticize Prescott's result, and particularly its reliance on assumptions that lead to an unrealistically high elasticity of labor supply. They offer another explanation to the differences between U.S. and Europe's labor hours, one that builds on cross-country differences in unions power. The unions effect on hours is spread throughout the economy due to the existence of a social multiplier in preferences that makes people want to enjoy their leisure together. Another related article is Blanchard (2004) who analyzes France and U.S. data and concludes that the decline in working hours in France is the outcome of growth in productivity “with part of that increase allocated to increased income and part to increased leisure” (page 5). He too criticizes the high elasticity of labor supply in Prescott (2004) and in attending to the question of “how much of this change comes from preferences and increasing income and how much comes from increasing tax distortions,” (page 9) he claims that the data suggests a greater importance for the role of preferences. A similar approach is taken by Huberman and Minns (2007). Looking at the evolution of labor hours in the U.S. and Europe not only in recent decades but since 1870, they show that during the recent decades the joint dynamics of the U.S. and Europe working hours have been repeating the same course they took more than a 100 years ago. This leads them to the conclusion that the underlying reasons for the observed cross-country differences are deep-seated and time invariant factors like religion, legal origin or climate, rather than current cross-country differences in tax-rates, union power and other labor market institutions.
Counterfactual simulations suggest that this last hypothesis is more likely to explain what was occurring in the ’70s. It seems that in those years the Fed was facing a severe credibility problem and beliefs about alternative monetary policy regimes were indeed playing a crucial role. To address this hypothesis, I introduce a third regime, the Eagle regime, that is even more hawkish than the Hawk regime. This regime is meant to describe the behavior of an extremely conservative chairman. It turns out that if agents had assigned a relatively large probability to this hypothetical regime, in‡ation would not have reached the peaks of the mid- and late- ’70s, independent of whether or not the Eagle regime occurred. Furthermore, the cost in terms of lower output would not have been extremely large. Quite interestingly, simply imposing the Hawk regime throughout the entire sample would have implied modest gains in terms of in‡ation and a substantial output loss.
The Court further added that any issues with the policy should be directed toward the political branches of the Government as it is solely entrusted with power over these matter and so it not a question for judicial determination ; thus establishing a hands off approach by the courts in the realm of immigration and in particular questions concerning the exclusion of non-citizens. However, this deference of the plenary doctrine relies on too simplistic of a conception of the institutional competence of the different branches of government. The Constitution does grant supreme power to Congress over immigration but not exclusive power.  In fact the Supreme Court has recognized that it is not possible “to delineate a fixed and precise line of separation in these matters between political and judicial power under the Constitution.”  In turn, in this “zone of twilight”  the balance surely must tip in favor of protecting the most fundamental of rights to the American scheme of justice, the liberty of individuals to be the free from unlawful detention. Yet, the plenary power in both the cases of the Guantanamo Bay detainees and the Marielitos seems to have morphed from a doctrine of judicial restraint out of respect for the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution into a creature of judicial deference which has been used by the judiciary as a mechanism for the abandonment of its constitutional role. After all, the judiciary in the U.S. has a strong tradition of  and indeed it is one of its primary functions to protect individuals against governmental excess. However, this increasing
Part of the reason why few studies have advanced theories on the role of national actors is that, due to their diverse characteristics, national factions do not exhibit generalised behaviour. The national actors in each civilwar case have unique cultural backgrounds, motives for taking up arms, material or non-material resources, and leadership styles. Also, since many intervening actors are Western, they have attracted much of the research by Western scholars. Moreover, many studies have tended to neglect close analysis of the national leaderships, regarding them as ‘a factor so obvious’ and categorising the leaders with simple criteria (Gormley-Heenan, 2007: 22, 28-9). In addition, many of the studies that do focus on the national factions’ side, particularly those seeking formal theories, simply assume that national factions will behave in accordance with the rationale shared by the authors, namely, that they will make rational decisions in response to economic and military costs and benefits (see Chapter 2).
Disappearances are not a new phenomenon to Salvadorian society. At least 8000 persons disappeared during the civilwar of 1980s (Commission on the Truth for ElSalvador 1993). During the last 10 years or so, forceful disappear- ances have occurred within a context of intense gang activ- ity, mainly by the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 gangs. The nature of gang-related disappearances is not clear cut. While it is true that the disappearance of a person implies her kidnapping, the most likely set up of most of the Sal- vadorian disappearances involves the murder and further clandestine burial by a gang, within the limits of a gang- dominated territory. The apparent gain of political power by maras as evidenced by an enhanced capacity to nego- tiate with government, together with an undisputed con- trol over significant parts of the country’s territory and penitentiary facilities, may lead one to think of Salvado- rian gangs as organizations that have evolved into a mix of mafia-like organizations and some form of politically motivated groups with characteristics that may be similar to those observed in paramilitary groups of Colombia and Mexico (Farah and Phillips Lum 2013; Ellis 2015).
In 1992, El Salvador’s government and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN – Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) insurgency agreed to end a 12- year civilwar. Transformed into a political party, the FMLN became the country’s leading electoral opposition, behind the governing right-wing Alianza Republicana Nationalista (ARENA – Republican–Nationalist Alliance). The Salvadoran ‘parties to the Peace Accords viewed democratization as a means to achieve peace’ (Wade 2016: 71). Furthermore, the transition benefited from the fact the insurgent elites were not so dissimilar in background to the established political elites (Blair et al 1995) and that conciliatory ideas proved more likely to attract voters than radical rhetoric (Montgomery 1995: 268). In the decades following on the peace accords, the electoral contest between ARENA and FMLN has dominated Salvadoran politics, with the FMLN frequently winning local elections in the country’s largest cities. Research on post-war Salvadoran voters’ preferences shows that ARENA and the FMLN both relied on the votes of their respective historical supporters as well as on attracting centrist voters to strengthen their electoral position (Azpuru 2010; Córdova Macías et al 2014: 198-201).
and have members in key political and administrative positions inside and outside the government. Second, they are generally not dependent on other institutions such as the state or trade unions, at least not in a way that affects these parties’ autonomy. As a matter of fact, these parties often directly control state institutions to such an extent that decisions taken by the parties’ executive committees have a direct effect on government policies, thereby almost blurring the line between party and state institutions. The control that these parties have over key state institutions and access to economic resources ensures their dominant role in the post-war party system. Third, the high degree of electoral support they receive from the population indicates that significant parts of the population identify themselves with these ruling parties, although it is not always clear whether such support is a result of the political values and positions these parties espouse, their privileged position in the political system, or their offers of financial and material benefits to potential supporters. Finally, long- running ruling parties are often strongly embedded in the minds of people and seen as the dominant factor shaping post-conflict politics. Because of their historical background as anti-colonial liberation movements, some parties like FRELIMO and the MPLA have become national symbols of sovereignty and nation-building. Other parties, such as the NRM/A and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) are credited with defeating unpopular and brutal regimes and have long symbolized a new style of African politics, by either banning competitive ethnicity-based party politics (Uganda) or, in contrast, by institutionalizing it via ethnic federalism (Ethiopia). 291
In appropriate cases it may be necessary for a frail or infirm older person’s financial affairs to be managed by an agency, such as an official trustee or guardian. However, the use of such protect- ive agencies, whilst an important safeguard, should not prevent ca- pable older persons from control- ling their own lives and finances. Various other statutory com- plaints authorities also have a role to play in investigating cases of fraud and financial abuse against older persons. Health provider registration authorities, for example, already have jurisdi- ction over acts of professional misconduct perpetrated against older health care users and are able to make use of powerful san- ctions such as de-registration. Sta- tutory authorities also regulate the activities of lawyers, account- ants, investment advisers and those engaged in direct market- ing. The effectiveness of such avenues of redress depends, how- ever, on allegations being report- ed and on the authorities in que- stion being adequately funded to undertake detailed investigations.
The potential of these posters to constitute historical memory and to mobilize support for H.I.J.@.S. project is also realized through the spatial arrangement of the posters. Because the posters were mass-produced, they could be placed in locations that draw out the tensions – historical and contemporary— of post-war Guatemala (see also Hoelscher, 2008). For example, a poster on the wall of the Ministerio Publico (MP) draws attention to the role this institution played in carrying out often-violent orders of eviction against campesinos (Figure 9). The graffiti above the poster which states, “no mas desalojos” (no more [rural] evictions), evokes the connection between disappearance and violent eviction including the many rural evictions that the newly elected president, Oscar Berger sanctioned at the time (Velásquez Nimatuj 2005). H.I.J.@.S. was particularly involved with a group of people who had occupied a farm in western Guatemala called Nueva Linda. The farm had been occupied in protest of the October 2003 unresolved disappearance of Héctor Reyes, a campesino leader who had worked there. After the occupiers were brutally evicted from the farm by Guatemalan security forces including members of the MP on August 31, 2004, members of H.I.J.@.S. organized a solidarity campaign in support of the daughters of the disappeared campesino leader and the survivors of the eviction (Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos, 2004; Rodríguez, 2007; Lassalle, 2007; McVicar, 2009). 15 The combination of H.I.J.@.S.’
in extreme cases, anarchy). Many of the great questions of war and peace, governance, regulation, diplomacy, and international regimes, to name but a few, concern order—its components, norms, actors, direction, and changes. Debate over the nature of the emerging post-Cold War ‘order’ or ‘disorder’, for example, or the impact of globalisation seems to dominate the field. Post-Cold War foreign policy structures all, in some way, try to come to terms with what the emerging ‘order’ actually is indeed and how it can be dealt with. As economic and social expansion, instability, and change emerge as foci of policy considerations (markedly differing from prior state-centric and strategic encounters between superpowers), questions and descriptions of ‘order change’ are proffered with increased frequency by many IR scholars, including Kratochwil, Ruggie, Duchacek, Taylor, Rosenau, among many others. One common strain in their thinking is a sense that the international order is being altered and, somehow, possibly integrated by transnational forces, democratisation, a globalising political economy, and increased socio-cultural transaction and, generally, some sort of change.11 The resulting questions of order, from multi-level governance, to regimes, to splintered federalism, suggest a world where anarchy, norms, and interaction may be increasingly socially constructed factors that can be reflexively understood.12 Indeed, many of these issues of social and political constitution are being intriguingly theorised within what has become known as the ‘constructivist’ school in ER which is rising in prominence as the so- called new ‘middle ground’ of the discipline.13 Regardless of approach, order should be also considered a ‘lasting’ concept as any particular ‘world order’ is a temporary and contingent situation.
Reactions to cesarean Only two non-border Latinas mentioned cesareans at all in their responses. And un- like border Latinas, non-border Latinas did not give their past selves advice about avoiding the procedure. Rather, both women brought up their cesareans to high- light interactions with hospital staff. For instance, Lidia, a mother with an associate’s degree and Medicaid, said that she loved her hospital because “they informed me of the reasons why they recommended certain things, including the c-section.” Karla, a mother with an associ- ate’s degree and private insurance, said she would not go back to her hospital partly because she had to “deal with a c-section all by [herself]” and because her “dr didn’t discharge [her] or visit [her] after [her] c section.” However, both of these women appear to have understood that cesareans are serious procedures. This explains why Lidia appreciated her hospital staff’s thorough information about the need for surgery and why Karla was dissatisfied with her doctor’ s absence after the procedure.
a natural result of replacing the old systems was that the fleet had to be re-tested in a similar fashion to the original Mot&e programme. since MLu kits were also ordered by the usaF, the usaF seek eagle programme office was responsible for ensuring that the package was airworthy and effective. But, just like the test programme carried out for ePaF’s initial F-16 procurement, these tests were also mainly undertaken in the us. therefore, Belgian, Dutch, Danish and norwegian MLu F-16s began flight testing in July 1996 at the rnLaF base at Leeuwarden. the rnLaF played a leading role in the testing of the upgraded aircraft and requested nLr support with this intricate and complex task which lasted for over a year. During this time, a series of software enhancements was incorporated. nLr analysts were involved in ensuring these incremental upgrades were effective. By taking such a prominent role in such test programmes, nLr has become a unique resource when it comes to the future of the F-16. one example of an important test result was the discovery of an incorrect functioning of the ground collision warning indicator leading to a critical software modification.
A growing number of court cases in Australia have found security firms liable for breaches of con- tract or tortious duties and awarded compensation to clients. However, while civil remedies provide an incentive to security firms to comply with contract arrangements and other respon- sibilities, they are essentially a form of individualised remedy and do nothing to detect illegal or unethical behaviour in any systematic fashion. Taking civil action also involves considerable risk to the plaintiff in losing and being left with large legal fees. This risk is particularly high for individuals aggrieved by the aggressive actions of security personnel (Sarre 1994).
Figure 3 shows variation in homicide rates due to unstructured heterogeneity. There were five municipali- ties spread over the Salvadoran territory with very-high variation due to unobserved variables. Some of the few municipalities with highest posterior means for V also appeared as part of the group with highest posterior means for U (refer to the map in Fig. 3). An examination of the WinBUGS output for these places showed that the posterior mean of V represented more than half the sum of the posterior means of the random components ( U + V + δ ). This result suggests that for the referred (red-colored) places, homicide risk is due to characteris- tics other than spatial variation. There was one munici- pality corresponding to San Miguel, the most important city of the Eastern region (blue-colored circle), for which variation in homicide risk was dominated by unobserved heterogeneity.
In principle, two competing approaches exist, top-down or bottom-up change. Traditionally, Europe has been a disorderly and decentralized place, where each country has gone its own way. The European Union changed that from its very outset. The essence of the Treaty of Rome is that the EU members get together and decide unanimously what the Union as a whole should do. That is, the Rome Treaty introduced a top-down approach that was previously alien to Europe as a region. All joint EU decisions, including the whole acquis communautaire and the Lisbon Agenda, belong to this category. Strangely, this top-down mode of action has been taken for granted for long. The sources of inspiration were many. The fundamental EU idea – no more war! – suggested that all countries should get together and agree. Another inspiration was of course the ideas of central planning and social engineering so prevalent after World War II. The soft version of central planning is international harmonization and standardization. Even when the EU has advocated deregulation of various markets it has done so in a centralized fashion rather than in a competitive manner.
author argues that while today’s strategy is largely defined by binaries (success or failure, attack or defend), strategy of the Hundred Years’ War revolved around a concept of divine justice and norms of the era wherein opposing sides communicated with one another regularly during a campaign. Divine justice explains why Henry elected to fight at Agincourt against a larger foe and provides an explanation for why Shakespeare’s famous speech in Henry V had such a galvanizing effect on his army, despite the persistent reminder of potential death. Norms of the era explain why Henry felt comfortable sail- ing to France with such a comparatively small army and why he felt comfortable sleeping within view of the French army on the eve of battle. 14 While this does