20 since the Biafran war (Omotola 2009: 140). Another important militia group in the fourth republic is the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force, comprised of Ijaw young men (HumanRights Watch 2005: 4). Its leader Alhaji Mujahid Abubakar Asari Dokubo threatened to launch a war unless greater control of the oil resources was given to the Ijaw people, arguing that the Ijaw are an endangered community (Ukiwo 2007: 71) . In 2005, Asari was arrested leading to increased feelings of the Ijaw of being targeted unfairly by the national government. The presence of the Joint Task Force (a government military force whose mandate is to repress (non-) violent protests in the region) adds to these feelings. In the aftermath of this struggle, another important militant group emerged: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. This group, constituted of a coalition of various Ijaw armed groups across the region, has been profiled by the Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism as “an active terrorist group that uses violent means to support the rights of the Ethnic Ijaw people in the Niger Delta”. They object to the lack of benefits the community has received from its extensive oil resources (Hanson 2007: 2). It has attacked oil companies and abducted foreign employees of such companies in order to block the production of oil in the region. The government increased its troops deployed in the region in order to ‘neutralize the militants’, regarding the group as criminals. For example in 2006 the government again crushed three Ijaw communities, leaving 20 persons dead. MEND has always stated that they want justice and fairness. The spokesperson of the organization has stated that: “We are asking for justice. We want our land, and the Nigerian government to transfer all its involvement in the oil industry to host communities which will become shareholders in these oil companies”. Also in 2006, MEND declared it would carry out ‘Operation Black Mamba Strike’ on 10 March 2006 if the government did not comply with a derivation principle of 25% (Ukiwo 2007).
The concept of civil society in Nigeria and the struggle for political independence is dated back to the colonial era, though repeated attempts to sustain and consolidate democratic government faltered. The 1980s witnessed the activation of their operations in the quest for democratic governance. Governments, hitherto unaccountable and despotic, abuse of office, reckless political decisions became the order of the day, as the state became the property of the political class. This activated a civil society, determined to check the erosion of rights, freedom and civic values. In the view of Mutfang (cited in Odeh 2012) civil society is a wide range of association and other organized collectives, capable of articulating the interest of their members, moulding and constraining state power. According to him, their demands provide inputs for the democratic political process, which at times are aggregated by political parties. Their approval or disapproval of what goes on in government contributes to its accountability. If we take civil society as the Third Sector defined as constituted by all those organizations that are not-for-profit and non- government, together with the activities of volunteering and giving which sustain them, then community based organizations such as town unions, faith based organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations like the Campaign for Democracy (CD), Civil Liberties Organizations, (CLO), Committee for the Defence of HumanRights (CDHR), Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE), Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) as well as professional associations such as Nigeria Bar Association (NBA), Nigeria Medical Association (NMA) and Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) will all qualify to be member of the civil society constituency.
What are policy implications of the result that having su¢ciently high national status is crucial in achieving the good outcome? The national status represents people’s evaluations of its interna- tional standing or reputation, particularly compared to neighboring nations, in "soft" dimensions such as culture, history, sports, and widely shared values (for example, humanrights and democ- racy) as well as in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory. Clearly, policies can a¤ect some of them. Miguel (2004) and Collier (2009), based on case study and statistical analysis, argue that "nation-building" policies, including the promotion of a national language and school education emphasizing common history, culture, and values, are e¤ective in strengthening national identity. Classic modernization theories of nationalism (Deutsch, 1953; Gellner, 1964, 1983; Weber, 1979) do stress the importance of the uni…cation of language and the spread of common culture and values through school education and universal military service for widespread national identity, drawing on the past experience of Europe.
290. Opposition forces have also carried out widespread attacks against the civilian population in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity States. As described above, when opposition forces swept through rural areas, or entered major population centres, they did not merely engage in military confrontations or assume control of a military objective. Rather, they engaged in a wholesale assault against the civilian population. Towns and villages were thoroughly looted and often saw major destruction. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been forced to flee from opposition forces. Moreover, tactics were similar across different locations and during different periods of the conflict. Organized groups of forces, including defected state security forces and armed youth, targeted civilians, primarily Dinkas but also other groups that were perceived to be against them, such as Shilluk and Darfurians. On many occasions, civilians were not only sought out but also relentlessly pursued as they fled to rural areas, as noted above. Opposition forces attacked villages, places of worship, and hospitals where civilians from other ethnic groups were concentrated in a targeted manner to seek out and kill, beat, or pillage. Recurrent patterns of the same type of inhumane acts occurred in the context of these attacks, including murder, enforced disappearance, and rape and other acts of sexual violence. This suggests that opposition forces were coordinated by a command structure and were guided by directives from a superior level.
In Darfur, for example, survey researchers questioned vil- lagers about events before, during, and after displace- ment, learning much about humanrights and health conditions in inaccessible regions . The surveys revealed that most respondents fled from militia violence, and that violent causes of death, rather than disease or hunger, predominated in the "village and flight" period. Once respondents reached organized camp locales, how- ever, medical causes of death predominated, suggesting that respondents were largely safe from direct military vio- lence. Thus even when it proves impossible to survey Dar- fur's interior regions, researchers can use retrospective surveys in safe peripheral areas to gather vital, science- based information on events in inaccessible zones. Consider also a 1999 PHR survey in Macedonia and Alba- nia among ethnic Albanian refugees fleeing Kosovo dur- ing the conflict between Serbia, NATO and the Kosovo Liberation Army. This study sought information on the time frame and reasons for displacement, and on experi- ences of humanrights abuses. PHR could not send survey- ors into Kosovo at the time, but surveys of refugees provided strong evidence that Serb forces had engaged in a systematic expulsion campaign .
As reported by United Nation (2005), throughout the period 1993 to 2003 – as well as before and after – the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was characterized by extensive corruption, fraud, pillage, mismanagement and lack of transparency. Political, military and business elites, as well as rebel groups and armies of neighboring countries, plundered these resources and got rich off the back of the Congolese population. Initially, in 1990s, the conflict in DRC region appeared to be driven primarily by political, ethnic factors. However, the exploitation of natural resources became increasingly attractive as the parties became more entrenched. Along with the fierce war, the profit derived by the exploitation of these mineral resources serve as the catalyst of the war efforts as well as the source of personal enrichment. Finally, The conflict can be regarded as a "war for profit"(Amnesty International, 2003. p.10). Given that the majority of mines in the eastern DRC are controlled by armed groups and that millions of people in that country depend in some way on the minerals trade, the result is debt bondage slavery, child labor, and sexual slavery, consequences particularly heinous for women and children. 8 Many of these conflicts are covertly or overtly supported by corporations whose products rely on conflict minerals, and extends to other countries and other industries. For example, Platform, a London-based non-government organization monitoring the oil and gas industry accused Royal Dutch Shell (RDSa.L) in 2011 of funding armed gangs and government forces to torture and kill Nigerians in the swamps of the Niger Delta. 9
Taliban’s efforts to present itself as a supra-regional group in the service of the country’s Sunni Muslims. 44 Thus, being forced to protect their civilian support base, rebels may increase the overall level of violence, which results in higher battlefield lethality. Similar case had been reported during Colombia’s civil war when encroachment by right-wing AUC paramilitaries on ELN support areas forced guerrillas to step up their attacks on perceived pro-regime targets. 45 When seeking to protect their civilian support bases from pro-regime harassment, rebels may not necessarily succeed in inflicting higher casualties on government forces and PGMs, but may instead lose higher numbers of their own fighters. Therefore, appearance of non-ethnic militias on the battleground might affect conflict lethality not only directly through militia violence against enemy combatants and civilians, but also indirectly by forcing insurgents to protect their support bases. Hence, we arrive at our first hypothesis, namely:
dependent variable in the current study. This study used the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure-Revised (MEIM-R) (Phinney & Ong, 2007b) to assess adolescents’ ethnic identity. This measure consists of two main subscales of commitment and exploration. Within each subscale, adolescents rated three different items on a five point scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. “I feel a strong attachment towards my own ethnic group” is a sample item of the commitment subscale. For the exploration subscale, a sample item is “I have spent time trying to find out more about my ethnic group, such as its history, traditions, and customs.” The authors of this measure recommend using a total ethnic identity score by calculating the average of the six items to assess adolescents’ degree of ethnic identification (Phinney & Ong, 2007b) but studies have examined each of these subscales separately as well. A reported total alpha reliability coefficient for the entire scale was .81 based on a multi-ethnic immigrant adolescent sample (N = 93, mean age = 16) (Phinney & Ong, 2007b). For the current adolescent sample, the calculated alpha coefficient was .784. Refer to Table 5 for the mean and standard deviation for the ethnic identity variable.
This paper explores the utility of these theories in terms of the extent to which they explain the phenomenon of ethnicconflict and provide a basis for meaningful intervention. It argues that given the multi-dimensional nature of ethnic conflicts, there is no single theory that is robust enough to explain the origin and dynamics of ethnicconflict and although each of these theories has significant contributions to understanding the phenomenon, they are all limited in their explanatory, predictive and prescriptive ability mainly as a result of their implicit bias regarding the origin of ethnic identity. It suggests that a framework that incorporates all the strengths of these major theories can explain how all the different factors, they highlight, interact to trigger ethnicconflict; and this will in turn produce balanced narratives that will drive more effective intervention policies and programs in specific contexts.
In this study, the spotlight was focused on how ethnic stereotyping constitutes humanrights violation in Ghana by exploring the perceptions of the students of the University of Education, Winneba. The research design adopted for the study was a case study, embarking upon a qualitative research approach. A census comprising all the 15 Level 700 students offering M.Phil in Social Studies in the Department of Social Studies Education at the University of Education, Winneba was involved in the study. Interview schedule and focus group discussion were used to collect data for the study. The data collected were analyzed thematically, based on the research questions raised for the study. The study revealed that a lot of ethnic stereotyping takes place in Ghana and these affect the ethnic groups psychologically, socially, politically and economically. It is, therefore, recommended that the concept stereotyping be incorporated into the school curriculum, via social studies, in order to gradually change people’s attitude towards such wrongful characterization of ethnic groups in the country.
In both pre-war Croatia and Bosnia, the dominant dynamic of Serb elite competition was centrifugal: despite different degrees of divisions, radicalisation was the outcome. The SDS in Croatia provided a clear example of intra-party outflanking when more radical factions continuously pressured Raskovic to take a more extreme position and ultimately replaced him as party leader. In Bosnia, the SDS leadership was in greater control of the party but this greater cohesion and ability to deal with divisions and factions was accompanied by a constant radicalisation o f the party. The rivalry was fuelled by differing views of solutions to the inter-ethnicconflict, by ideological and regional cleavages and by personal power ambitions. These issues came together in the SDS’s strong regional factions in Knin and Banja Luka. However, the Knin faction reached into the leadership of the SDS, whereas the Banja Luka faction was in conflict with the leadership of the SDS. The primary issue o f contention differed: Banja Luka wanted greater autonomy while Knin wanted the party to take a more radical course, i.e. in Croatia, the internal competition was primarily over the national or ethnic issue, whereas in Bosnia the divisions were also based on other issue. Furthermore, the Banja Luka faction was internally divided and, therefore, weakened vis-a-vis the central leadership. The Banja Luka faction was, consequently, much easier to manage than the Knin faction and the leadership only had to make minor concessions. In terms of the resulting dynamics of competition, these differences, therefore, point to the importance o f the structure of the party, the nature of divisions and the cohesiveness of the oppositional factions. Both leaderships may deliberately have created or encouraged radical factions in order to be able to stir up tensions while at the same presenting themselves as the more moderate forces who needed concessions in order to fend off the hawks. This is, however, a dangerous strategy and for Raskovic, if such a strategy was ever deliberate, it backfired.
181. Both of these points are confirmed by the negotiating history of AP II. Part II of the draft text prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which served as the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of AP II, dealt with the humane treatment of persons in the power of the parties to the conflict. Draft Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Pro- tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 1973, in 1 O FFICIAL R EC- ORDS OF THE D IPLOMATIC C ONFERENCE ON THE R EAFFIRMATION AND D EVELOPMENT OF I NTERNATIONAL H UMANITARIAN L AW A PPLICABLE IN A RMED C ONFLICTS pt. III (1978). Article 6 of the draft set out the fundamental guarantees which eventually became Article 4 of AP II. Article 7 of the draft afforded various protections to enemy hors de com- bat “in accordance with Article 6.” The relationship between Articles 6 and 7 and subse- quent discussion during the drafting process confirm that the word “persons” used in Article 6 was intended to include enemy fighters. See 8 O FFICIAL R ECORDS OF THE D IP- LOMATIC C ONFERENCE ON THE R EAFFIRMATION AND D EVELOPMENT OF I NTERNA- TIONAL H UMANITARIAN L AW A PPLICABLE IN A RMED C ONFLICTS 323–24, 332, 336 (1978). Article 7 of the draft (which during the negotiations became Article 22bis) was eventually deleted. However, it was recognized that enemy personnel hors de combat were still covered by the fundamental guarantees in Article 6 of the draft. See id. at 335; 4 O FFI- CIAL R ECORDS OF THE D IPLOMATIC C ONFERENCE ON THE R EAFFIRMATION AND D E- VELOPMENT OF I NTERNATIONAL H UMANITARIAN L AW A PPLICABLE IN A RMED C ON- FLICTS ix (1978)).
“This project is part of a central London partnership programme known as the EQUAL Partnership-Building London Creating Futures. The project helps to create a gateway for local people into the construction industry, specifically for unemployed people. By way of background, this links into the Kings X Re- development initiative, which will be spending approx 2 million in Kings X as part of their objective to create opportunities for employment and education in the area. We nominated 18 young people, again at the fringes of the intra-ethnic youth conflict, to participate in various pre-employment awareness courses which provided them with an understanding of the various aspects of construction. Apprenticeship opportunities are now in the pipeline for these young people, providing them with work opportunities within the construction industry; working within plumbing or being trained up to become an electrician. Interviews were held, and we helped coach the young people and provide them with the relevant skills to succeed in these, which lead onto the start of the apprenticeship programmes. We hope we have achieved in our overall aim, to refer largely those young people in the 18-19 year group, divert them away from conflict and crime, and encourage them to do something constructive with their lives .“ (Abdul Hai, Senior Youth Worker, KCB).
The Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation explained in her report on stigma and the realization of the humanrights to water and sanitation (A/HRC/21/42) how the intersection of different attributes can compound the discrimination faced by certain groups or persons, such as being a woman and a sex worker, a woman infected with HIV, or being a woman and belonging to a certain marginalized group. The stigma these groups of women face greatly affects their access to water and sanitation. Menstruating women also suffer stigma and menstruation remains a taboo in many countries. Women often lack the appropriate facilities and the needed privacy to change or wash during menstruation, and cultural perceptions that menstruating women are “contaminated” or “impure” lead to their reduced mobility or even seclusion, as well as to dietary restrictions and restricted access to water resources and food during menstruation. The taboos and deeply rooted practices surrounding menstruation also have a negative impact on girls’ right to education, since girls may be absent from school during menstruation, either because there are no appropriate facilities at school or because they are isolated by their family owing to cultural practices. To combat silence and stigma, States should make sure that there is sufficient access to information on menstruation and hygiene, including comprehensive sexual education in schools on menstruation, targeting both girls and boys. The provision of adequate hygiene facilities must be ensured as well.
posed by convergence to actual military practice during armed conflict, referenc- ing in particular the dilemmas faced by coalition forces that may have different in- terpretations of the applicability of humanrights law (as was the case in Iraq), as well as the means by which the military would be asked to make humanrights– based decisions, few present a coherent theory of how their ideas can be realized. My sense is that this derives from two underlying problems with the current debate. First, due to the sense that those arguing for convergence are clearly on the “right” side of the debate and that they are obviously making arguments for more human- ity and more protection, there is little pressure for those making convergence argu- ments to normatively justify their positions and ground these normative claims in an understanding of how convergence will actually improve the status of civilians caught up in armed conflict. The operating assumption of pro-convergence schol- arship is that more humanrights obligations on the battlefield will mean more humanrights enjoyment for the affected population. Second, the ubiquitous claim that the main legal battle has been won, that with the three key ICJ decisions (the Nuclear Weapons and Wall advisory opinions and the Congo decision) interna- tional law today simply demands convergence, makes it easier to avoid the hard cases of how these vague opinions can be translated into operational guidelines for soldiers. 49
concerns that had been highlighted in the 2001 Statement and to concerns which have by now been largely recognised as constituting some of the main challenges that all actors involved in the realisation of the rights to health and food must take into account. The Draft recognises that the current expansion of intellectual property rights protection raises signiﬁcant challenges from a humanrights perspective. Thus, it acknowledges ethical issues linked to the patenting of parts of the human body. From the point of view of the realisation of social and economic rights, the Draft is much more limited and in particular more limited than the 2001 Statement insofar as it focuses only on some narrow concerns within this overall area. From the point of view of the realisation of the humanrights to food, health and education, the main implication which is considered is that ‘unreasonably high license fees or royalties’ should not undermine their realisation. However, there does not seem to be any acknowledgment that the scope of protection under existing intellectual property rights may be an issue which needs to be addressed from the perspective of humanrights. The introduction of product patents in the health sector is, for instance, an important concern in many developing countries. More speciﬁcally, in countries like India which have had speciﬁc restrictions on product patents in this ﬁeld, this may be construed as a deliber- ately retrogressive step in the realisation of the human right to health unless it is counter-balanced by measures to ensure that people affected by the higher prices of patented drugs do not lose access to these drugs. 19