monitoring and control of EUregional expenditure were carried out not to the full extent, partly because of the leading EU Member States' dominance in the field of regional development. At that time the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was used for co-funding regional development projects while limited to the national budgets for regionalpolicy. Besides, evaluation studies of EUregional development programmes were not comprehensively coordinated within the European Commis- sion. Various services of the Commission would determine their own priorities and methodologies amid low centralized control or coordination, thus entailing conflicts between EU countries hav- ing different expectations and traditions regarding evaluation practices and methodological approaches. Methods of regional development programme monitoring and evaluation within the European Community were too diverse on account of lacking general management (regulation) of such activities. Thus, the 1988 reform has led to reviewing the EUregionalpolicy, which gradually increased in scale, scope and reporting while com- prising an extensive monitoring and evaluation system. For each of the Community Support Structure (CSS) and the Acting Programme (AP) a Monitoring Committee was set up compris- ing representatives of the national and regional authorities, and a Monitoring Commission. The 1988 Charter stipulated that structural operations had to undergo ex ante and ex post analy- ses to identify their impact on the priority tasks and specific structural problems. Evaluation had to be carried out taking into account three levels of impact: the overall effect of Com- munity activities to strengthen its economic and social cohesion; effect of the activities produced on each CSS; and the effect of specific activities.
Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union, operates a regional classiﬁcation scheme of ﬁve levels for all regional units within the EU, the Nomenclature des Unit´es Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS). The highest level of regional aggregation (NUTS1) cor- responds to Germany’s Bundesl¨ ander, France’s Zones d’´ Etudes et d’Am´enagement du Ter- ritoire, the United Kingdom’s Regions of England/Scotland/Wales, Spain’s Grupos de Co- munidades Aut´ onomas, Italy’s Gruppi di Regioni Nord-Est/Nord-Ovest/Centro/Sud/Isole, or Austria’s clusters of Bundesl¨ ander, namely, West¨ osterreich/S¨ ud¨ osterreich/Ost¨ osterreich. At the other end of the NUTS classiﬁcation scheme, NUTS5 regions correspond to munic- ipalities. From an institutional point of view, two subnational aggregates are particularly important for EURegionalPolicy, namely NUTS2 and NUTS3. The following types of regions correspond to NUTS2: Regierungsbezirke (Germany), R´egions (France), Groups of Metropolitan Counties or Shire Counties (United Kingdom), Comunidades y Ciudades Aut´ onomas (Spain), Regioni (Italy), or Bundesl¨ ander (Austria). The following types of regions correspond to NUTS3: Landkreise (Germany), D´epartements (France), Unitary Authorities (United Kingdom), Provincias y Islas y Ceuta y Melilla (Spain), Provincie (Italy), and Gruppen von Politischen Bezirken (Austria). The NUTS2 and NUTS3 ag- gregates are important, since the allocation of funding is determined at those levels (e.g., eligibility under the Objective 1 line is determined at the NUTS2 level, and actual funding at other levels and reporting thereof to the EU is determined at the NUTS3 level).
At the beginning of the debate on the empirical effects of EURegionalPolicy, the diagnose was quite skeptical, since linear regressions did not reveal statistically significant positive effects of the program on per-capita-income growth of treated relative to untreated regions conditional on a set of standard drivers of economic growth (see Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Boldrin and Canova, 2001). However, two issues with this evidence emerged. First, while an important part of EURegionalPolicy is devised to the convergence objective (formerly Objective 1), not all of the programme is, so that looking for GDP growth effects of any line of the funding scheme is not in line with all of the programme’s objectives pursued. Second, a focus on binary (whether-or-not) treatment, the average effect of treatment, and assuming quasi-randomization of the treatment effect by conditioning on the drivers of growth in a linear regression framework may not have been sufficient to reveal the causal effects of EURegionalPolicy. Third, this evidence was based on a highly aggregated (country) level, where the effects of treatment at the regional level could have been concealed by aggregation bias (with some of the programme’s effects being watered down by programme-unrelated changes in untreated regions).
A careful study of political culture and its effects on political development can facilitate the process of democratization, especially in post-communist countries with authoritarian regime and with ethnically divided structure, as some of the countries of the Western Balkans are. Today's political culture lacks participatory element - a phenomenon shaped by the third wave of the transition which the region is experiencing. First of all, the policy in the Western Balkans should be stripped of demagoguery and amateurism that characterizes todays politics, and to become not only more representative, but, above all, more professional and accountable. Reforms in all areas of its development and, in particular, the liberalization of the economy, the focus should be seen in the creation of financial resources that create real opportunities for the public investment budget and, particularly in the areas of public service. The entire process should be undertaken bearing in mind the conditions that must be met in this context, as well as the factors that influence the processes of integration in the global economy.
tural funds required Member States to submit development plans, which were then negoti- ated with the Commission as the basis for community support frameworks (CSFs), imple- mented through operational programs (OPs) or other instruments. Later on in the 1993 Regulations, the CSF and OP was combined in a single programming document (SPD) who should be negotiated with the Commission. In the present as an answer of the devel- opment of the decision making process concerned with the expectations for decentraliza- tion and simplification of operational programs, the Commission established a new strate- gic system of planning. This system describes the functionality and every step of the deci- sion making process. According to these new system guidelines proposed by the Commis- sion and agreed by the Council should be taken into account from the national govern- ments by the composition procedure of their own national strategic reference framework (NSRF), specifying the intervention of the funds . Furthermore the NSRF has to include the overall national strategy as well as a list Operational Programs for intervention in the regions, emphasizing strategies and ﬁelds of intervention. Generally, the Ops and NRSF are the ﬁnal source for selecting and funding projects within the domestic regions. Moreo- ver a periodic reporting on the achievements of the funds in each Member State is also obligational in the mode of the operation of the EUregionalpolicy (Inforegio, Fachsheet, 2006).
This was an initial commitment for the strategic reorientation of environmental policies in the EC, which gradually took place between 1989 and 1994. The ideas of the Fourth EAP (integrated approach, sector analysis, new instruments) were further elaborated in the following years. This change is often characterised as a “paradigmatic change”, a change from “trade orientation” to a “sustainability frame”. Environmental policy is less perceived as an additive policy and more as an integrated part of economic decision-making.. “Sustainable development” gradually became a normative reference for environmental policy in the EU from the beginning of the 1990s onwards. The incorporation of the environmental dimension and the systematic search for "no regret strategies" were promoted. In other words, win-win situations were identified where both environmental and economic objectives could benefit. The White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (CEC 1993) proposed a new development model, which tried to create employment and improve the efficiency of resource use by a shift in the relative prices of labour and energy. Sustainable development was perceived as a tool for improving the state of the environment, social efficiency and competitiveness simultaneously.
Another encouraging development is with the convergence in the overall monetary policy mandate of the ASEAN economies. In particular, price stability, together with financial stability, has become the most common and primary mandate of the monetary authorities around the region. Furthermore, under the CMIM initiative of the ASEAN+3, maintaining price and financial stability plays a vital role within the overall pursuance of balance of payment stability by the member economies. Credible price stability policy, either via explicit or implicit inflation targeting framework, would anchor and stabilize inflationary expectation and in turn help to keep foreign exchange market stable. In short, the commitment to price stability should indirectly or directly require commitment to exchange rate stability in the region. Eichengreen (2009) for instance argues for the adoption of harmonized inflation targeting (IT) policy in the region. He argues that under the IT policy framework, exchange rate policy takes a subsidiary role to the commitment of inflation target. With appropriate agreed rate of inflation target, exchange rate volatility should be limited or anchored when a harmonized IT policy regime is adopted. Four ASEAN+3 economies, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand have adopted IT policy. However, having an explicit and harmonized IT regime may arguably be not necessary. Many countries in ASEAN+3, such as Malaysia and Singapore for instance, have well established reputation as low inflation economies without necessarily adopting a full-blown IT regime. It is sufficient that the ASEAN+3 economies together agree to a credible inflation target. This target could be a range (not necessarily a point target) and over a period of more than one year to provide some flexibility.
Even though the EU is not a state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, it amounts to a powerful command- ing height to be seized by the citizenry. Compared to what is the case with ordinary regimes and international organizations in the transnational realm, the EU is ‘ more ’ . European states ’ self-help means of reciprocity and countermeasures have been removed, and the institutions of the EU affect the freedom, security and well-being of all the subjects – they benefit and threaten, reward and punish EU citizens as well as third parties. Hence, a particular context of social cooperation ex- ists, which gives rise to obligations and legitimate claims. There are morally arbitrary sources of equality that are in breach with the principle of equal citizenship; and the Euro- pean Treaties have achieved the function of a superior legal structure, which establish both a unitary European citizenry distinct from national ones and a set of autonomous European bodies. There is thus a comparable context of justice and democracy to that of the nation states. However, then there is a second claim of the ‘sovereignists’, that is that the
focus in the paper is more on implementation as a process rather than sets of outcome and the explanation is almost exclusively institutional. This is not to say that the research avenue that compares the requirements set out by EU documents with the legislative outcomes at the national level is unimportant. Nonetheless, the paper aims at identifying the issues of capacity that explain the limited effect that the EURP has had on the domestic structures of the country discussed. The argument that I put forward is that despite the participation in the EURP offered substantial opportunities and indeed promoted change in the domestic institutional practices, previously established characteristics seem to have cancelled these effects. These problems seem to have been more evident at the stage of the implementation of the programmes funded through the EURP. No political or administrative actor in Greece seems to have doubted the importance of the funds for developmental purposes. Nonetheless, when it came to the phase of putting the programmes into practice previously existing practices overrode any concerns about the need to comply with the EURP regulations. Thus, I conclude that in accordance to the conceptual framework proposed by Leonardi, 27 the domestic authorities seem to have
Vertical coordination among levels of government and cross-sectoral coordination of regionalpolicy remains a challenge within the EU. Inherent in the territorial nature of regionalpolicy is the need for coordination among EU institutions, member states and regions. Often coordination is not as fruitful as it could be due to rivalries and jealousies between levels of government. Member states attempt to maintain sovereignty over their own territories. Control over the implementation of EUregional development funds can affect regional government policymaking ability and often times national governments would prefer not to devolve so much autonomy to the regional level. As a result, national governments can use constitutional stipulations as a way to avoid direct coordination between the EU and regions. In addition, since member states need to maintain substantive legitimacy and provide “goods” to their constituencies, often times EU programs or directives may seem counter productive to the member states goals or agenda. As a result, coordination may also be limited. Although the “partnership principle” was established to improve coordination among the EU, member states and regions, with an emphasis on EU-regional coordination, the principle has not been realized due to territorial jealousies and constitutional limitations that have been used to reduce regional coordination with the EU.
Last, transitional arrangements were made for the so-called ‘statistical effect’ regions. These are regions with GDP per head above the EU25 qualifying threshold, but which would have qualified as ‘a’ areas had it not been for enlargement (equivalent to Phasing-out regions under EU Cohesion policy); the qualifying threshold was 82.2 percent of EU25 GDP(PPS) per head. Significantly, not all of the eligible regions had ‘a’ region status in the pre-2000 period – namely: Hainaut (Belgium); Lüneburg (Germany); and Highlands and Islands (UK). Statistical effect regions will retain ‘a’ region status at least until 31 December 2010. During 2010 Commission reviewed the position of the regions concerned on the basis of the most recent GDP data available (2005-7). Regions where GDP per head had fallen to below 75 percent of the EU25 average retained ‘a’ region status; the remainder became ‘c’ areas from 1 January 2011. Consequently, Hainaut (Belgium), Basilicata (Italy), Kentriki Makedonia and Dytiki Makedonia (Greece) have full ‘a’ region status for 2011-2013 while the remaining statistical effect areas have ‘c’ area status.
The 1988 reform established five priority objectives for the Structural Funds. Objective 1, 2 and 5b were specifically regional in nature; they involved measures restricted to certain eligible regions. The definition of eligible regions under the reform was based on a typological approach. Three types of eligible regions were defined which the EU adopted as "objectives" of policy under the Structural Funds. The first of these objectives, objective 1, aimed at promoting development and structural adjustment in regions which were lagging behind, defined as those with GDP per capita below 75 per cent of the EU average. The second objective, objective 2, aimed at promoting the conversion of areas affected by industrial decline. The key defining characteristic of these areas is their relatively high unemployment rate. The third objective, objective 5b, is aimed at rural areas affected by problems of structural adjustment linked to the decline of agriculture. Objective 3 (combating long-term unemployment), objective 4 (occupational integration of young people) and objective 5a (development of rural areas) covered the whole of the EU.
others have had to introduce them following the economic and financial crisis and therefore are revising their operational programmes. In general, financial engineering has attracted interest because of its revolving character as resources can be used over and over again, whilst it helps by moving away from the one-off grant culture and therefore increasing the efficiency of cohesion policy. Financial instruments also have shorter routing time (from submission to payment), constitute less of a risk for deadweight and make more sense for projects that can have a financial return.
Two other factors mentioned by nearly half of the respondents as preventing stronger regional governance are interrelated: lack of coordination and provincial administrative structure. While there is a need to establish coordination at the regional level, this is pre- vented by the provincial administrative structure of Turkey. The Turkish public administration system is basically composed of the central government and the local authorities. According to Article 126 of the (1982) Constitution, in terms of central administrative structure, Turkey is divided into provinces; provinces are further di- vided into lower steps of administrative districts. The central gov- ernment is comprised of the ministries and their field organisations. The governing authority for the province is a centrally appointed governor. The governors have been mainly responsible for the over- all management and coordination of the field directorates of the central government ministries within their jurisdictional areas. The field directorates or administrations of the central Ministries can be at the provincial scale or at the regional scale, depending on the needs of their particular functions. The practice until present has been that various central Ministries have set up regional directorates independent of each other with the result that the geographical area of regions that these regional directorates (of which there are hun- dreds) cover do not overlap with each other. Moreover, regional di- rectorates escape the co-ordination function of provincial governors as the former comprise more than one province.
derives from microeconomic theory and has shed light on the processes and challenges of delegation of power to the European Commission (EC) from the member states in order to represent them and negotiate on their behalf at the WTO. Nevertheless, its contribution to the exploration of agenda-setting and policy formulation at the EU and WTO level is rather limited. It concentrates more on whether the European Commission is acting more independently than planned rather than on the way policies and initiatives are prioritised at the EU level and then transferred to the WTO negotiations via the Commission. The role of the European Parliament, which had been strengthened since the Lisbon treaty, is totally neglected. The key problem with the PA approach is that although it acknowledges the existence of multiple principals (e.g. member states, lobby organisations, European and national interest groups) it does not manage to disentangle the complex dynamic relationships between all these different principals and to analyse the coalitions and networks that emerge (e.g. Kerremans, 2011). Some fair attempts have been made but still the focus of the analysis remains the autonomy of the Commission (Elsig, 2007). In this article it is argued that during the agenda-setting and policy formulation the Commission can play a similar role to the rest of the principals and thus an analysis of the transnational networks that are formed will allow us to better understand the hidden dynamics and subsequently the role of the EU in international organisations.
Regionalpolicy is a strategic part of the social- economic development the country pursues. The policy is supported by the strategies of regional development. In order to form effective regionalpolicy, necessary missions for the region must be designed and the missions should define concrete goals the region pursues (J. N. Gladki, A. I. Čistobajev, 1998, pg. 154). As two opinions about the country’s regionalpolicy prevail, there are two ways of how to form the mission of regionalpolicy – oriented to stimulate the growth of economy in the region or eliminate the social-economic differences. It is important to mention that the strategy of regional development must not oppose to the mission the region pursues. The strategy of regional development should support the mission the region and the country pursue.
External evaluation in the strict sense is carried out virtually everywhere. In some cases, however, this occurs in a more disjointed fashion than would be necessary to allow a comprehensive view of the effectiveness and impact of the policy in a given country. This appears to be particularly the case where policy is devolved to sub-national authorities and lacks strong coordination or oversight from the centre. In Italy, for example, the central Evaluation Unit has been employed over the past couple of years in supporting the new programming work related to the 2014-20 Partnership Agreement (PA) and Operational Programmes, for instance coordinating the PA ex-ante evaluation, defining the operational framework for the results-orientation of programmes, and drafting parts of the PA. By necessity, this has entailed a reduced emphasis on evaluation activities (though a lot of the programming work, for example in the area of urban development, could rely on previous evaluation activities). At the same time, some of the regional authorities have been active in pursuing their own independent evaluation agendas, including undertaking ex-post evaluations of programmes, fields or schemes (examples include the ex-post evaluation of the 2000-06 ROP in Campania, the ex-post evaluation of the aid scheme ‘programming contracts’ in Apulia, the ex-post evaluation of the 2000-06 ROP impact on transport infrastructure in Sicily, various evaluations in Lombardy and many others). There is no national overview of these evaluations, however.
The objectives of regionalpolicy are commonly discussed in terms of whether their primary orientation is to promote ‘efficiency’ or ‘equity’ although the definition of these terms varies greatly. An efficiency goal in regionalpolicy is typically interpreted as maximising the contribution of regions to national growth, whereas an equity goal frequently means reducing socio-economic differences between regions. In practice, the differences are not so clear cut: a strategy to reduce disparities by exploiting underused potential in lagging regions, or improving productivity, is likely to improve overall national efficiency, at least in the long term. Thus, the regional policies of many countries involve a mix of efficiency and equity objectives, with different policy elements or interventions serving different aims. The objectives of regionalpolicy and the level in the legislative hierarchy at which they are set vary considerably. Many countries enshrine provisions relating to balanced regional development or territorial equality in their constitutions, whereas elsewhere the key objectives are set out in primary legislation. However, constitutional provisions are rarely self-executing so the nature of the legal base is not necessarily significant. The extent to which high level objectives related to regional equity and efficiency actually feeds through into policy instruments also varies, often owing to political will and budgetary pressures. This is perhaps particularly true in many of the Central and Eastern European Member States, but also Greece and Portugal where regional development objectives are given some prominence, but tend to be rather formulaic and all-encompassing, moreover, in practice, policies in many of these countries actively promote national prosperity, at the expense of targeting problem regions, often exacerbating regional differences – in spite of the stated policy aims of reducing regional disparities.
Despite being the cornerstone of international refugee protection, not all member states interpret and apply the Geneva Convention in the same way. According to one NGO (interview NGO8), ‘some EU states’ interpretation of the law has no basis in the wording of the 1951 Geneva Convention, is not in the spirit of that convention and is in contradiction to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ official advice.’ Differing definitions of ‘refugee’ create different levels of protection and an uneven sharing of the responsibility. Most member states have a range of statuses to confer on refugees, with varying socio- economic and judicial rights. They differ sharply on whether to award refugee status (which confers full legal protection and access to social security and the labour market) in cases of persecution by non-state agents, such as war lords, paramilitary groups or mafia organisations. This gap in interpretation provides clear opportunities for an EU asylum policy.