The European Union’s new Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 6 3.2 Transforming EU practice: capacity to deliver
The framework acknowledges the gaps identified by the independent evaluation completed in early 2015 2 regarding institutional architecture and leadership, human resource capacity, and the integration of gender equality in monitoring systems and evaluation processes. It outlines steps to address aspects of the first and third of these gaps, but is weak on building human resource capacity, especially gender analytical capacity. It does propose some valuable measures, such as training and including gender equality in job descriptions. However, these cannot substitute for serious investment in high-quality gender analysis expertise and for a systematic human resources-driven plan to nurture and embed gender analytical capacity throughout EU institutions.
opportunity to agree on concrete plans as well as on a realistic set of activities to ensure further progress in the next phase of the implementation of the Convention’s provisions and objectives, taking into account both its accomplishments and new challenges. 5. The Council reiterates the European Union’s unwavering support to States Parties in their full and effective implementation of the Convention, and its commitment to promote universalisation of the Convention, to provide resources to fund mine action, and concrete and sustainable assistance to anti-personnel mine victims, their families and communities. In this context it recalls Council Decision 2012/700/CFSP adopted on 13th November 2012 in support of the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan.
Since the CDM promotes landfill gas capture on a profit-basis, i.e., the more gas one captures, the more profitable the project will be, landfilling of MSW—especially organics—is ultimately encouraged in this counterproductive climate mitigation strategy. This is exactly the opposite of what is recommended by the European Waste Framework Directive. Ultimately, the CDM is erecting a barrier to the development of sustainable waste management policies in the Global South that would prioritize waste minimisation, reutilisation and recycling. Although LFG systems may be a viable option for closed dumps, which cause great problems to communities and the environment if left uncontrolled, the promotion by the CDM of this end- of-pipe technology as a general waste management tool in the Global South creates perverse incentives to landfill as much waste as possible to feed the LFG energy-generation projects. The CDM argues that using landfill gas (LFG) for energy purposes reduces the amount of power that must be generated on the utility grid, transforming some of the negative effects of landfilling into a positive means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Yet approximately one third of CDM LFG projects only flare. If the gas is to be flared without generating any electricity, this is only waste disposal. Within the Waste Hierarchy, waste disposal with and without energy recovery are the least environmental options. (see Graph 2)
B. Imbalanced Application o f the “Duty o f Loyalty”
It is believed by the Commission that, given the EU's increasing powers and competences in the field of maritime safety, the EU participation in the IMO would appear justified. In particular, the Commission thinks that a stronger EU participation becomes necessary to prevent infringements by the Member States against their EU obligations and to guarantee the consis tency of the EU position.52 In order to join the IMO and the IMO Conventions, the Commission must first be mandated by the Council to negotiate with other Parties on behalf of the EU. The question is “how can the Commission persuade Member States to support EU's accession to the IMO and the IMO Conventions?'' “Speak in one voice" would seem to be the most important value for Member States in the event of the EU's acces sion to the IMO and the IMO Conventions.53 In addition, the ECJ, through Commission v. Greece (C-45/07)  and Commission v. Sweden (C- 246/07) , has judicialized the “duty of loyalty" (Article 4(3) Treaty on the EuropeanUnion (TEU)) and greatly restricted actions of Member States at the international level.54 The judicialized principle of the “duty of loyalty" could however result in concerns for Member States.
Inaction and non-cooperation by EU Member States and new Member Sta tes has hindered effo rts to stem the flow of European arms to criminals in Brazil, which is plagued by one of the world’s highest levels of gun violence. Firearms cause nearly 40,000 deaths annually in Brazil. Guns are the number one killer of young males aged between 15 and 19 (causing 65% of deaths in Rio de Janeiro state in 1999). As part of initiatives to combat this devastating gun mortality, the Brazilian authorities and NGOs have been attempting to trace the origins and means by which small arms and light weapons enter the Brazilian criminal world. Of 225,000 guns confiscated by the police in Rio de J a n e i ro Sta te in 50 years, the majority were domestically produced, although many may have left Brazil and re-entered the country via Paraguay. Of the weapons produced outside Brazil, the countries of origin (in descending order) were as follows: the USA, Spain, Belgium, Argentina, Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, Austria, France, China, Israel, Russia, and Switzerland. 382
The sporting rules are opposed to EU competition law because they contra- dict articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU) in most of the cases  . The reason behind sports regulation becomes contro- versial in respect of these two articles of TFEU is the restrictive characteristics of the decisions or actions taken by the sports federations and monopolistic creation of the sports regulation framework. In an opposing manner to such specialities of sports regulation, article 101 brings prohibition to anti-competitive actions or practices and article 102 aims to prevent abuse of a dominant posi- tion. However, because of the reasons that have been discussed above, the EU makes a sporting exemption in regards of the competition law and provides sports federations an open area to regulate. As an example, the package sale of the media rights of the major European leagues is anti-competitive in terms of article 101 of TFEU because the sports clubs that have significant publicity are losing the opportunity to market their own media rights  .
EU founding contract European legislation on government contracts has been evolving since the 1970s. Under the European Community’s founding charter, public bodies are obliged to give equal treatment to all economic operators, ensuring a transparent tendering process, with genuine competitive tendering, free movement of services and mutual recognition across the entire EU. The four European directives on public procurement processes have been consolidated into two new directives, which came into force in April 2004 (the deadline for their implementation by Member States was 31 January 2006):
accountability would spell the end of their regimes. They also understood that wealth distribution inside the EU was such that they could operate a democratic system without fear of revolution; and that free market capitalism works once an economy has passed an initial stage of development, but that before such a stage has been reached, an economy could be wiped out by competition. Finally, Arab regimes were party to the special pleadings of European leaders to do bilateral deals to stem migration flows, to protect the EU from an influx of migrants that would upset the prevailing social harmony and perhaps also open the doors to potential terrorists. By the time of the Arab uprisings, the Arabs had witnessed the effects on Europe of the global financial crises and thus had new reasons to question EU advice on how best to manage economic development. In light of this, it is remarkable that the Europeans themselves seem not to have questioned their own assumptions when the ‘Arab Spring’ erupted. They did, however, express regret that they had not done more to promote their own democracy agenda in the recent past and vowed to make amends.
(2007) analyzed the failure of the constitution in retrospective and concluded that its failure should not have been unexpected. The process of constitution making started in an inappropriate moment in time with several flaws and concerns surrounding the document itself. It was not formulated in an accessible fashion for citizens, lacked vision and ambition, and unclear language, meaning it read like a treaty instead of constitution. The constitution and its implementation were not only badly managed and marketed, there also was no strategy for constitutional ratification. Lastly, Podonjak (2007) argues that it was a mistake to directly involve the European citizens into accepting the constitution, because it was supposed to be an international treaty. Eliminating one of those points could have influenced the ratification process positively (Podonjak, 2007). Concluding, the Treaties could be perceived as a constitution, but the realization and implementation is posing problems.
Figure 3.1 Share of soil sets by dominant identifiers in the EuropeanUnion (%)
The dominating influence of parent material is evident on less than 5% of the areas having similar extent to those zonal soils which receive strong influence of continental (steppe region) climate. The importance of all soil forming factors in the genesis of soils has to be emphasized; for example, topography and parent material play a key role in the formations of steppe soils as well (e.g. Chernozems develop on level land). However soils in these set can only be found under specific climatic zone. Aridity (and the particular chemical composition of the soil solum) is a prerequisite for the genesis of soils in the 7 th set which occupies approximately 0,80% in the EU. Another soil formation process is driven by the warm and (sub)humid climates. Acrisols found in these regions – having a small share of 0.26% in the EU’s total soil resources- contribute greatly to the pedological and ecological diversity of Europe.
was continued by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris 1951. At that time the coal and steel sector provided vital inputs in the defense industry. By integrating these two sectors, a new confrontation between Germany and France was considered to become less obvious. Italy was included as well because of its history of collaboration with Germany during World War II.
This directive joins a number of others that complement each other in applying to digital transmissions and uses. 94 Article 8 of this Information-Society Directive obligates Member States to assure "effective, proportionate and dissuasive" remedies for rights and entitlements for which the Directive provides. These remedies are to include seizures and injunctions, even against intermediaries, for example, Internet services, used by third parties to infringe copyright or related rights. However, Recital 16 of this directive confirms that monetary liability for network activities concerns, not only such rights, but also other areas such as in Recordings in the Light of the Information Society Directive),  GRUR Int. 317; M. Hart, “The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an Overview,”  E.I.P.R. 58; M. Favale, "Fine-tuning European copyright law to strike a balance between the rights of the owners and users,"  E.L. Rev. 666 (analyzing the national implementation of the Information-Society Directive in the 27 Member States and assessing the extent to which it has attained the intended harmonization and whether it is effective to achieve the balance of rights).
oil is not an enough stable energy resource from the price and political situation viewpoint to secure the energy needs of the EU in future. The EU disposes of oil reserves only for the next 8 years, while the European oil production is very costly compared to the world level. The production costs are two- to seven times higher (European commission 2001). on the other hand, coal is one of the most accessible energy resources in the EU which can play its role in securing the future energy supplies. The coal industry is still functioning in germany, great Britain, Spain, Poland and the cr. nevertheless, the price of European coal has not been hitherto competitive to the world prices, as the European coal production is four- to five times more expensive (Ec 2001). Mining was gradually dampened in the individual member states in past, therefore coal is at present used rather as a reserve resource. The EU relies on solid fuels in the electricity production from 27%, the new member states from 65%. The share used to be considerably higher but it decreased with regard to its ecological impacts and the transition to the resources like oil and natural gas. in 1992, coal mining was stopped in Belgium, two years after in Portugal. Also France planned to finish coal mining (Blanc 2004; iEA/oEcD 2004a, 2004d).
Table 5 and Figure 1 show the uneven distribution of EU budgetary resources. Al- though the ultimate impact of such inequalities on the redistribution of income inside the EU is small, it nevertheless does exist and is to a certain extent intelligible as compared with the levels of income in the member states of the EU. Exceptions are found in Den- mark, Luxembourg and Belgium. The positive net transfers of the latter two countries can be justified by their hosting important EU institutions like the European Council and the European Council. Although we are dealing here with a limited amount of resources, the recent enlargement and all future enlargements will tend to aggravate this problem.
According to Taggart and Szczerbiak, (2002, p.3) there are three main factors that leads Euroscepticism to grow across Europe. First of them is a sense to decline the permissive consensus, especially during the approval period of the Maastricht Treaty. Second one is having a stimulation of interest in European issues created by the tendency in the European integration project to resort to referendums to ratify treaties. The last one is the enlargement procedure that widened the scope of the integration project. Many studies showed that the ‘permissive consensus’ was an accepted process for the integration in Europe. However, it began to be replaced by a more prominent opposition to the EuropeanUnion. During this change, it is easy to see that there is a diversity within this opposition. Because both the left and the right parties, even within the same country, are against to the European integration. (Sutcliffe, 2010, p.3)
The founding fathers of the supranational Europe believed that once European integration had begun (in the field of coal and steel), internal dynamics would push integration to comprise more and more fields, which would inevitably result in monetary and political union. However, this automatic integration mechanism worked out only partially. Economic integration allows, at least in principle, for quantification of the interests of the partners involved, and a difficult process of negotiations and exchange has led to results. In the 1990s, the EU stimulated the process of European unification in several ways. It responded quickly to the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in August/September 1991. As early as December 1991, the EU signed Association Agreements with Poland and Hungary. These agreements formed the legal basis for bilateral relations between the EU and the associated countries. The Europe Agreements, as these agreements were called, offered trade concessions and other benefits normally associated with full membership of the EU. The aim of the agreements was to establish a free-trade area between the EU and the associated countries and, ultimately, to enlarge what was then still the EEC with new members in Central and Eastern Europe. In the next phase, Europe Agreements were also concluded with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia (1993); Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1995); and Slovenia (1996). The process was concluded by the accession of eight new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe in 2004, 3 followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania