Nevertheless, even in the absence of principled lines of demarcation, much less the foundation provided by a human right, there are good reasons to carve out some domain where government is prohibited from suppressing messages because the content of those messages is false, deceptive, or otherwise likely to cause audiences to engage in harmful conduct. Surely, and particularly in democracies, messages that are critical of the government and its policies should be protected to some extent, even if the government regards them as dangerously false or misleading. Even with a defense of truth permitted, prosecutions for seditious libel run the risk of deterring accurate criticisms of the government along with false or misleading ones. And even though we cannot in advance of receiving those messages assess whether the number and value of deterred accurate messages—remember, we are dropping the evaluative neutrality constraint— outweigh or are outweighed by the number and disvalue of the suppressed ones, there are dangers in giving the government power to suppress criticism on grounds that it is false or misleading and dangerous. Government may not act in good faith, but may try to cover up its misdeeds and embarrassments; and even adjudicative processes may not reveal all such cover-ups. And even if government does act in good faith and goes after only those messages that it sincerely believes are false or misleading or dangerous, it will quite naturally tend to overestimate the dangers of such messages, to devalue the benefits for public awareness and debate of even misguided criticisms, and to misassess the accuracy of those criticisms.
There are, however, at least two problems with this aspect of the offence of incitement to religious hatred. The first is this. It may be argued that it is not easy to draw a clear line between insulting or abusing religious beliefs, and using threatening words to stir up hatred against specific individuals in light of their beliefs. Jeremy seems confident that such a line can be drawn: there is, he says, ‘a clear distinction between criticism of a religion and the practices of its followers on the one hand, and using threatening language to incite hatred against members of that religion’ (2007: 188). But are matters so straightforward? If I claim that a particular religion is founded on absurd and offensive beliefs that lend legitimacy to abhorrent practices, am I merely expressing my antipathy to those beliefs and their associated practices or am I stirring up hatred against the followers of that religion themselves? Jeremy undermines his own claim that it is possible to make a clear distinction between criticising a religion and inciting hatred against its adherents by suggesting that ‘[w]here there is … publication of inflammatory material that vilifies the very foundations of a faith, it will not be difficult for the court to find there has been a deliberate incitement of hatred against a particular religious group’ (2007: 193). 10 So if abuse and insult shade into vilification, and if vilification amounts
Fourth, to build on the previous point, religious employers should remember that if they wish to include church teachings on matters such as pre- marital sexual relations and pregnancy, 76 marriage to individuals who are divorced, 77 or sexual orientation 78 in personnel policies and job postings, they should do so explicitly, making it clear exactly what behavior is proscribed. One way to help avoid confusion is to use incorporation by reference, citing the appropriate Church documents, and giving prospective teachers and staff members copies of these materials with their contracts. Illustrative policy language, at least for a Catholic school, might read that “all employees are expected to familiarize themselves with the Church’s teachings on sexuality as contained in The Catechism of the Catholic Church, a copy of which they acknowledged being given when they signed their employment contracts” rather than using such broad language as “employees must abide by Gospel values.” Moreover, contract language should encourage teachers to check with educational leaders, who should respond if writing to document conversations, if they have questions about Church teachings.
Since, according to our Constitution, the South African State is a secular State where freedom of religion and opinion is a fundamental right, this approach is, with respect, correct. Of course, it is true that religion plays an important role in structuring society, but given the basic differences between religions, which should nevertheless constitutionally be regarded as equal, it would be impossible to permit religious doctrine or principles to guide interpretation of the Constitution. Freedom of religion is guaranteed and insofar as the freedom to express that religion is concerned, this freedom finds its only hate speech limitation in section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution, which expressly refers to religion as one of the four grounds on which a complaint of hate speech may be based. Accordingly, offensive religious speech is permitted, as long as such speech does not amount to the advocacy of hatred based on religion and which constitutes incitement to cause harm.
The possibility for readers to judge if the information is trustworthy depends on the information shared next to the message. Without information about the speaker, it is impossible to judge if a statement is trustworthy. This lack of information causes that an anonymous voiced opinion should always be read with suspicion. Informational privacy as an individual choice to decide what private information should be made public widens the gap between author and reader. An indication exists, that citizens have little faith in information voiced by other citizens (in general) because specific background information (such as the educational background or occupation) often lacks, making the credibility of the speaker and information hard to check. 64F
Specifically, why should it not be assumed that when an addict continues to drink his will plays the same crucial role, just as it does when he succeeds in curbing his addiction? To clarify, I would maintain that in both situations the addict acts of his own free will, though in the one which sees him succumbing to his disease he may more properly be said to exhibit a weak rather than a strong will, but even a weak will I contend may be presumed to stem from either a temporary or permanent freely chosen decision to obey the one rather than the other competing desire. My suggestion is that even a weak will ought to be seen as expressing the agent’s freedom because its weakness can fundamentally be understood as something that was allowed or permitted to happen, rather than something that just took over as though it were some inexplicable opposing force that mercilessly carries a person to do things against their (free) will. It may further be assumed then that one’s weaknesses of will are still expressions of a freely acting general will, which at some particular moment chooses to withdraw from whatever volition it previously made and identifies itself with its contrary. Unfavourably however, this now implies that one’s second-order volitions could lack permanence which may serve to undermine their significance as being the primary determinants of personhood. That is, if a given volition favouring one rather than another first-order desire can easily change, and go on fluctuating, one may begin to wonder what exactly makes volitions so appropriate for defining the essence of personhood,
The national and international law protect the freedom of expression and informing against all types of censorship and interference by the public authority. This safeguards the freedom, the independence and the pluralism of the media, as well as the journalism ethics and confidentiality of information. The development of the broadcasting and the program content has its frame within the sense of Article 16 from the Constitution of Republic of Macedonia guaranteeing the right and freedom of expression and informing, and of the artistic and cultural creativity. Speaking in broader terms of the radio and TV programs, the cultural identity and the other values as well, the family as a nucleus where the personal identity is formed and where it is continuously developed still has a dominant role in this era of fast technological changes. Therefore, the recommendations of the European Union Commission in the Directive “Television without borders” underline the importance of the so-called family TV watching. Along with the comparative review of the regulative solutions for license issuing and the program offer in Europe, the French law promoting the protection and affirmation of the French language and culture is also significant fro Republic of Macedonia. Also in line is the Canadian law promoting maximal use of the main creative and other resources in Canada. Another good example is the Swedish law defining quotas for original theatrical and artistic national work from the Nordic countries. The law on broadcasting in Republic of Macedonia defines also the principle for preservation and cultivation of the national identity, the language culture and the national opus.
CASE 1: Internet Service Providers (fixed line and mobile) - Vodafone (UK, Germany, Egypt), Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, Kenya), Safaricom (Kenya) Across jurisdictions, stakeholders interviewed highlighted the importance of ISPs and their key role in enabling expression. At the same time, ISPs can be a single point of failure for expression online particularly when content or entire services are filtered (blocked from being accessed by the user) or networks are shut down locally or nationally. Because ISPs must be physically present in a country in order to provide service and operate, the extent to which they facilitate or restrict freedom of expression is most directly affected by laws, regulations, and government actions compared to the other intermediaries studied. Findings include:
We write to request information details under the “Freedom of Information Act” and would therefore be grateful if you could supply by return email, the requested information as stated below on contracts which are currently being delivered to your Constabulary in respect to the following police estates services:-
FACILITIES MANAGEMENT SERVICES TO POLICE ESTATES BUILDING AND PROPERTIES:
or should be limited based on the effect they might have and also based on the intention of the speaker.
The third clause of sub-Article 6 imposes an obligation on the legislature to enact laws that prohibit propaganda of war and also speech that is intended to injure human dignity. These could be taken as exceptions to the effect and content based limitation prohibition of the first clause. on the other hand, the second clause gives the legislature permission to enact laws that would protect the well being of the youth and the honor and reputation of individuals. This difference between giving permission in relation to the well being of the youth and imposing a duty in relation to propaganda of war and human dignity, could have been intended to reflect the importance attached to human dignity and peace by the framers of the Constitution. When one takes into account the horrors of civil war and various atrocities that were in the background of the constitution making process, this is quite understandable. so, from the second and the third provisions, the need to outlaw propaganda of war, and the protection of the well being of the youth, and the honor and reputation of individuals emerge as legitimate grounds of limiting freedom of expression on account of its effect. Hence, these constitute additional exceptions to the prohibition of effect and content based limitations that are imposed as a principle in the first clause of sub-Article 6.
These events are explicitly mentioned in the Autobiography in connection with a series of letters written by John Stuart Mill which were published in the Morning Chronicle in January and February 1823. ‘The prosecutions of Richard Carlisle and his wife and sister for publications hostile to Christianity,’ he tells us, ‘were then exciting much attention, and nowhere more than among the people I frequented.... I wrote a series of five letters under the signature of Wickliffe going over the whole question of free publication of all opinions on r e l i g i o n T h e s e letters draw extensively on the writings of both James Mill and Bentham, and mention the Encyclopaedia Brittanica article on the liberty of the press as a ‘most satisfactory’ exposition of the topic. Yet the arguments are very narrow in focus, and while they can be said to achieve their purpose, it is questionable whether they really come to grips with the issue of freedom of speech at all. The first letter challenges those who believe that free discussion contributes to the discovery of truth on most subjects to show why it should not equally contribute to the truth on religious matters. If people are not allowed to choose their own opinions, then the government must be choosing their opinions for them: ‘But if the Government is allowed to chuse opinions for the people, the government is d e s p o t i c T h i s line of argument, borrowed almost verbatim from James Mill, was to be resurrected by John Stuart Mill again and again in various forms: because opinion with regard to religion does not deal with matters of fact but with subjective feelings regarding what is true, people should be allowed to make up their own minds by weighing the evidence on all sides. To decide for others which opinions are worthy of their consideration is to have ultimate power over them. It may be generally felt that atheism is false, but this is not a valid reason for preventing discussion on the topic ‘since before discussion, if their
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holder make demand before commencing an action, the name ‘demand’ instru- ment is a misnomer.”). The application of the rule that a demand note is mature at the moment of its execution should be confined to the context for which the rule was designed—the statute of limitations. See Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich. 487, 491 (1877) (“If the judgment [of the lower court] is correct, it can only be so because, by the terms of the contract the holder had a right to postpone the ma- turity of the debt as long as he chose to do so. For if the debt did not become payable until fixed by demand, and the demand was optional with the creditor, no tender could be made which would bind him, and he could keep the debt alive in spite of the debtor, for an indefinite period. If there was an infirmity in the consideration, or any defect in the binding character of the obligation, he might retain it until all testimony was lost, and defeat the defense. This is the mischief which the statutes of limitation were intended to remedy.”). See West and Hag- gerty, supra note 68, at 108–09 (discussing Palmer). Other courts that have held U.C.C. Section 1-304 does not apply to demand notes have cited with approval the notion that Section 1-304 cannot be applied to override the express terms of a contract. See, e.g., Flagship Nat’l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986). This analysis disregards the plain language of Section 1-304, which refers to “every contract or duty” and violates the plain language of Section 1-302, which prohibits the elimination of the obligation of good faith even by agreement of the parties. U.C.C. § 3-304 (2002) (emphasis added); id. § 1-302 (2001).
Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann  sheds the light on the theory of “the spiral of silence”. She stressed that the “Cumulation, ubiquity and consonance of mass communication combine and produce powerful effects on public opinion” . As a matter of fact, humans need a sense of fellowship but they fear isolation. Therefore, they always try to determine whether they belong to the majority or the minority, when they sense that public opinion is changing. If they sense that they belong to the majority, they will speak up their opinions; if not, they will not express it. In the same context and according to Seitel  attitudes towards any subject are positive, negative or neutral. Studies confirm that most people tend to be neutral. They are called the silent majority. While the theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that people seek information that supports their points of view and avoid that which challenges their opinion, most people, especially the neutral majority, have latitude of acceptance within a range of opinions concerning any particular issue of public interest. It is within this range that social media can operate to sway people’s opinion in order to gain more support of whatever is advocated. Hence, the objective of the spiral of silence theory is to explain how the media can influence opinion expression and how the “spiraling” effect of the majority can silence the minority opinions, in new digital interactions  and incorporate user- generated content into their offer.
The Secretary, Ministry of I &B V. Cricket Association, Bengal with Cricket Association, Bengal V. Union of India 17 is a landmark judgment as is recognises the right to information as part of fundamental right to speech and expression under Art. 19(1) (a). The court observed that a citizen has a fundamental right to use the best means of imparting and receiving information through electronic media. Albeit with a caveat: the airwaves are a public resource and must, therefore, be regulated in the public interest. The court ruled that the freedom and expression includes the “right to educate, inform and entertain. Sport is an expression of self.” 18 The government can impose restriction on such a right only on the grounds specified in Art.19 (2). State monopoly on electronic media is not mentioned in Art.19 (2).
In the information society like in the industrial society, freedom of expression is a right for each and every one. That right includes the right to freedom of doing research, and the right to receive and disseminate information and all sorts of ideas regardless of any boundaries and in any form and any way of his or her choice: oral, written, printed or artistic. That freedom includes in practice special duties and social responsibilities. That right may be then restricted within clearly fixed rules of the law with the aim of securing: a) Respect for rights or reputation of others; and b) Safeguard of national security, public order, health or morality. Along with the other ICTs, the Internet is recognized as a global facilitor of information but its use should not be limited to journalism. Intellectual property, children’s rights, cultural diversity, electronic commerce and international security need to be secured with the defined boundaries of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the other international resolutions adopted for that purpose and cyber criminality just like all other forms of crimes have to be fought. To this end, the right should be combined with ethics and this should be guaranteed by the four partners of the WSIS. It is these principles that should be ceaselessly defended by the southern countries.
I see the restrictions in positive sides standing from the consciousness that we have in our context. Our consciousness and development to permit is not expected and allowed to do that, because, if it is permitted, there will be people that use this for negative purpose by the cover of the right of freedom of expression and this will enter the country for unremitting war. For instance we are hosting some fundamentalism indicators in the print media. This shows that how much we are under developed in the profession. And broadcast media cannot easily control if aired and we can raise the Rwanda case. The media can be destructive. Therefore the restriction does not limit the freedom of religion but to save from destruction. And that is why I accepted the ban positively. In this case, ownership has to be governmental since there are many religious institutions so, for whom do you permit? It is very difficult (Personal interview, january29, 2012). But our radio, Bisrat Wengel, ( ብ ስራተ ወንጌል ) and Mekane Eyesus radio (Yemisrach Dimts ( የምሰራች ድምፅ ) were not to be banned from service. Derg confiscated them. And we have been returning our property that the Derg confiscated. Therefore, what is wrong with this? It is like a property. On the other hand why the EPRDF was using Radio Fana? When we asked him his answer is it was even when we were at the jungle and ours’ is in the emperor regime. It is immoral. At the same time, though it is restricted here in our country, indirectly others are transmitting their messages from abroad. This is permitting for the rich and prohibiting for the poor. This has to be looked by the government (personal interview January 17, 2012).
The view quoted at the start of this section, with its talk of the ‘expression of the mind in the sensuous nature that depends on it,’ seems to envisage a more intimate connection between reason and sensibility than any of those views that see sensibility as non-cognitive. However, it also seems to gesture towards something more than just an ‘inclination for duty,’ however that should be understood. Indeed, if one accepts that reason can inform, shape and perhaps initiate forms of sensibility such as an inclination for duty then perhaps there is no principled reason why one should not accept other forms of interaction between reason and sensibility. At any rate one would need to make controversial meta-ethical assumptions to explain why only duty can be the object of those cognitive emotions whose existence one has accepted. Otherwise, by allowing at least one inclination that depends for its nature on existence on the way its object is cognized, one has opened the doors to a wide range of