Relations between Malaysia and Nigeria is be dated back to 1960’s when the then prime minister of Nigeria Abubakar Tafawa Balewa extended friendly relations with Malaysia Prime-Minster Tunku Abdurrahman since then both countries have enjoyed political and economic ties. Economicrelations between both countries have flourished putting the total trade in 2016 at over $4 billion. Recently studies abound have shown raising China-Nigeria relations due to increase in global south partnership for trade and development. However, limited studies abound on the nature and benefit of economicrelations between other Asian countries. The study hereby investigates the nature and volume of economic and trade relations between Malaysia and Nigeria with the purpose of asserting the economic relationship between both countries. The methodology used include secondary data sources from world trade integrate solution, an affiliate of World Bank and review of literature on foreigneconomicrelations. The work is divided into the following aspect, starting with an overview of the Malaysia economy and its foreigneconomicrelations and that of Nigeria, subsequently relations with both countries were examined. The study concludes that there has been a significant increase in trade relations between two countries and Malaysia has been on the benefiting side as it exports more to Nigeria
To implement international economic cooperation by establishing representative entity offices, or offices of foreign partners in the territory of Russia, the consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is required. The general procedure for submitting the documents to obtain such consent is regulated by the Recommendations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the preparation of documents for establishing the Russian Office abroad. According to the guidelines, an office may be established on the basis of the protocol that proves that a foreign partner agrees for the office to be established in the territory of the region or administrative and territorial unit, or it must be under control of any regulatory body or government body of the foreign state. The activity of the office is regulated by the document on entity office and constituent documents, as the office is a legal entity, and its activity is financed by the regional budget. Consequently, a citizen of the Russian Federation can be in charge of the office. The protocol and the draft document on the representative entity office are to be submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The representative offices are specifically created to facilitate the implementation of agreements on cooperation and development of foreigneconomicrelations. For instance, based on the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Buryatia (Decree of the Government of the Republic of Buryatia, 2014) the Office of the Buryat Republic was established in Ulan-Bator, Mongolia. It represents the interests of the Republic of Buryatia in Mongolia in terms of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The Office also assists the organizations of the republic in making foreign trade contracts, establishing joint ventures, attracting investments from Mongolia and other countries into the economy of the republic and other spheres of public life
There are only few other countries that could capitalize more in economic terms on the economic rise of Asia as Australia did, in particular over the last decade. Economically appealing to the global growth drivers such as China, India and South Korea, Australia has experienced an unprecedented demand for its production factors. However, Australia’s government intents to avoid a ,,Dutch disease’’ by using additional tax revenues 1 for structural policies that adapt to the policy challenges of a balanced shock resilient economy. 2 Additionally, this resource boom was also driven by on average very low interest rates, which affected commodity prices and currencies, trade flows and competition in challenging ways. The interrelation between capital markets, investment and terms of trade (TOT) is discussed below. However, in most of the industrialized world, the ultra-low interest rate policy of buying time for gradual structural adjustment to the fast changing distribution of growth and wealth and the high degree of indebtedness to mostly Asia also seriously affects Australia, not through the disposition of its trading partners alone. The self-dynamics of the capital markets add to the already existing resource boom pressure and challenges the system stability of the global financial system as well as Australian industry structure, internal prices, industry and productivity as an open coupled-system in particular.
Annotation. There are few countries in the world for which foreign trade is a vital sector of the economy, as for Singapore. In this island republic, all raw materials and fuel needs and most of the food needs are being met through imports. This article analyzes foreigneconomic policy, directions and indicators of export and import. And also, proposals have been developed that are more advanced than the Singapore experience in foreigneconomic policy in Uzbekistan.
A study of the commodities’ competitiveness and the manufacturing sectors’ efficiency level is fulfilled by matrix constructing method, allowing implement a differentiated approach to the development of innovative development’s strategies of production and social risks’ minimization. Manufacturers’ internal capacity on the basis of resource and innovation potential are evaluated. Previous stage in the development of targeted events should be devoted to a detailed analysis of the producers in order to identify objective reasons which lead to lowering of goods’ competitiveness’s level. The study of economic environment factors of foreigneconomicrelations on specific commodity items allows determining of the prospects for the development of certain export directions, predetermines the possibility of establishing a framework for targeted actions for foreign trade’s development. Results of the analysis contribute to the development of strategic solutions to optimize marketing activities, to reveal possible reasons of inefficient trade and to identify promising points for foreigneconomicrelations’ expansion.
If President Barack Obama’s visit to the UK and Germany in April 2016 confirmed anything, it was the extent to which US political elites worry about the strength and unity of Eu- rope, and how much the president looks to Berlin to sort things out. Lack of consensus and a waning sense of shared purpose, undercurrents of political rivalry, and the grow- ing impact of identity politics are all weakening the EU and causing concern on the other side of the Atlantic. The UK’s plunge into domestic turmoil following the Brexit vote will heighten Washington’s concerns about the future of the EU. Washington’s political circles have limited appreciation for EU-style supra-nationalism. Instead, Americans want Europe to come together in order to settle the “European question”, i.e. to take responsibility for ensuring that the bloody twentieth century is not followed by yet more crises, wars, and unrest on the European continent. Obama expects Merkel to take the lead in the EU, not only in terms of build- ing internal cohesion, but also on foreign policy. The chan- cellor has welcomed the attention, but has shied away from accepting some of Obama’s farther-reaching suggestions. This includes the idea that Germany could be Europe’s be- nevolent hegemon, shelling out the resources needed to sup- port such a role. Merkel prefers to lead through rules and processes. She has been disappointed by messages from the US that signal unwillingness to respect the rules and con- straints of EU policymaking.
At a minimum, this means that the subject of economic reform – in particular the need to alter the structure of subsidies, diversify Algeria’s economy and increase investment in the country – was becoming much more common in Algerian political and commercial discussion even before the 2016 Finance Law. While much international attention has been directed to the 51/49 law, Algerian and foreign business experts and investors say that the law does little in practice to interfere with foreign investment. Instead, the centralised nature of the Algerian political system, extensive bureaucracy, and regulatory uncertainty have kept many enterprises from investing in Algeria. Business leaders frequently complain of goods blocked in Algeria’s ports with little explanation or other administrative delays in implementing investment in Algeria or the investments of Algerians abroad. In spite of these difficulties, the French government has encouraged increased investment in projects like the creation of a factory for the Peugeot auto company and encouraged other French business leaders to do business in Algeria. 43
The evidence, of course, goes well beyond the latest outrage in Paris. Nor is it confined to the immediate neighbourhood. While Europeans are becoming increasingly uninterested in the geopolitics of the world further afield, events there have become ever more important to us. As a group of trading nations, the EU is heavily dependent on the maintenance of the stable, rules-based, liberal world order that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Yet despite this dependence, Europeans seem largely content to either ignore geopolitics or leave it to others. The way they deal with China is a prime example. While the US adopts a pragmatic, precautionary approach to the potential dangers related to the emergence of a new superpower, Europeans remain divided and supine. Attempts to define a common EU approach are undermined by national capitals jostling for advantage. Individual governments prostrate themselves at the feet of China’s new emperors in their desperation to secure lucrative contracts. When David Cameron goes to Asia, he does not even talk geopolitics. The dangers of such an approach should be all too apparent. The world is an unstable place, and the role of foreign policy planners is to anticipate and prepare for the threats that will confront us. Of all policy areas, it is surely foreign and defence policies that should be governed by the precautionary principle. Until recent weeks it seemed unlikely that Islamic State (IS) would spread its tentacles and become a direct threat to the West, but it did. It may not be that China’s rise leads to unrest and potentially even conflict, but it might. It may not be that Russia continues to seek to destabilise Europe’s eastern fringes in a quest to regain lost prestige, but it might. Europeans are currently unprepared to deal with any of these eventualities. Nor, increasingly, is the US prepared to step in and take up the slack. A combination of fatigue, of increasingly insular public opinion, and of diminishing resources has undermined US willingness to act as a global policeman. Moreover, the Washington foreign policy establishment is increasingly focusing on Asia. Consequently, the US is anxious to ensure that its allies take over more of the burden of maintaining security in their own backyards. And, in stark contrast to earlier periods, Washington has increasingly come to believe that, for Europeans to be able to do this, they will need to work together more effectively within the EU. The CSDP, therefore, no longer stands in contradistinction to the trans-Atlantic relationship but, rather, should be one of its primary building blocks.
On Friday 15 July 2016, most Turkish citizens were finishing their dinner or sitting down for a favourite television drama when news started trickling through that the Bosporus bridge had been closed. Shortly afterwards, the sound of helicopters and fighter jets flying over the skies of Ankara suggested that an extraordinary set of events was taking place. It soon became clear that a faction within the Turkish armed forces was attempting to seize power. The ensuing 12 hours turned into a horrifying episode for Turkish citizens: clashes between the military and the police, fighting among air force units, and firing on civilian demonstrators resisting the takeover. In the end, the pro-government forces prevailed and were able to avert the most significant coup attempt against a European democracy for decades. July changed nothing in terms of the governing structure and the role of the ruling AKP in politics. But in many ways it changed everything about Turkey’s domestic situation, the consolidation of power in the hands of its strongman president, and relations with its Western allies – in particular the United States and Europe.
As al-Adnani’s calls for improvised attacks indicate, ISIS is an opportunistic and fluid organisation that frequently devolves authority to local networks or supporters in foreign countries to design their own methods. Even where attacks are supported from Syria, there is little sign that senior members of the organisation are playing an irreplaceable role. Against this background, targeted strikes against ISIS members in Syria or Iraq often seem more like a blow struck in the battle of perception and propaganda than a security measure, especially since individuals like Reyaad Khan or Mohammed Emwazi have a profile in videos or on social media that is disproportionate to their larger strategic role in the terrorist organisation, however shocking their words or actions may be. Furthermore, when security services have information about the specific time or place of an attack within Europe, they can most effectively respond with domestic law enforcement measures rather than military action overseas.
For a number of states the prospect of enhanced bilateral ties with Israel is incredibly attractive. Greece, for instance, is interested in securing an energy cooperation agreement with Israel (and Cyprus) and is therefore susceptible to political trade-offs on the Palestinian issue to keep Israel onside. However, Israel’s decision to reconcile with Greece’s rival — Turkey — coupled with a largely pro-Palestinian Greek public means that the ruling left-wing Syriza party may not always have the same appetite for defending Israeli interests. These calculations differ from those of eastern European states that have significantly more pro-Israeli elites and publics. While trade interests have been a factor in shaping these relations, the sense of historical injustice perpetrated against Jewish populations in these countries during the Second World War continues to loom large. As such, there is domestic sensitivity in a number of these states over actions that are perceived to be boycotting or otherwise harming Israel.
which contributed to the breakdown of Iran’s relations with Europe. Iran may also endorse future positive developments on Palestinian reconciliation or an Arab League peace initiative. Ironically, if escalation between Hezbollah and Israel seems likely, then Iran could be encouraged by the West to play the external guarantor role for Hezbollah – effectively substituting for Damascus, which took a similar position in ending 1996’s Operation Grapes of Wrath. Yemen is the site of the latest proxy conflict in the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and tensions have considerably worsened since March 2015 as a result of the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes. Many saw this mission as a kneejerk reaction to the seizure of Sana’a by the Houthi opposition in alliance with ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, because the group has been deepening its links with Iran. Some European member states have voiced concerns about the prospects for and humanitarian costs of this airstrike campaign, but others have either turned a blind eye to or been complicit in Saudi behaviour. The warring sides in Yemen are now further away from returning to a political track – and meanwhile, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, one of the al-Qaeda affiliates that has proved most harmful to Western interests, is gaining territory and consolidating its power base in Yemen.
The EU can use new investment funds to finance industrial or agricultural projects, that will do more than just creating work for migrants. They will also provide a labour motor for economic growth in North Africa, which in turn can help create more sustainable regional economies and provide increased remittances for Sahelian and West Africa. While this will not eliminate migration to Europe, funding for projects like these – when combined with legalised labour migration and an easier movement of capital across borders – can help provide more sustainable growth that stays within the region, particularly within the Sahara and Sahel. The EU Trust Fund can and should also be used to help facilitate voluntary returns and the standardisation and provision of identity papers within the ECOWAS region.
In contrast to official and public optimism, these results sug- gest that the crisis has yet to pass. Moreover, expectations of the crisis among both the public and experts were based on the experience of the two V-shaped crises the Russian economy went through in 1999 and 2009. Those crises were characterised by a sudden and drastic decline followed by a quick recovery. In that light, the economic performance at the beginning of 2015 looks promising if seen as evidence that the full force of the crisis will be followed by gradual eco- nomic improvement. But it seems increasingly plausible that the current crisis will radically differ from the previous one and that it is following the pattern of a depression – that is, step-by-step deterioration that gradually drags the economy deeper into a quagmire. In other words, shrinking consump- tion leads to output contraction, triggering a further drop in household income and a further decline in consumption. During the crisis of 2009 the government supported con- sumption by preventing the ruble’s devaluation, and then poured money into the banking system and industrial pro- duction, thereby maintaining the consumption-led growth model. This time, however, it has sacrificed private consump- tion to preserve state and government finances. But while the consumption-led growth model was destroyed by the ruble’s devaluation, the drop in imports did not lead to substantial import-substitution growth because of the decline in con- sumption and high prices for investment.
and IT capabilities in international relations. Interconnectedness among states is perceived as an opportunity for economic growth. This interconnectedness also makes states interdependent. Russia identifies unbalanced development in the world and imposed ideology in the Middle East as a cause leading to terrorism. It believes such developments, combined with extremism, is best fault by international organisations, with the UN at the centre, with common values. In order to promote international law Russia is willing to work together with the leading states and NGO’s. In this light it emphasises non-interference in domestic affairs of state as one of the most important international agreements. Therefore it is against the responsibility to protect (R2P) and will counter attempts by certain states to change the UN charter. Concerning the Balkans Russia states it aims ‘to develop inter-State cultural and humanitarian ties between Slavic nations’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016, point 45h). Russia believes that problems in the Balkans are mainly caused by the geopolitical expansions pursued by NATO and the EU. It is the unwillingness of these organisations to collaborate on a common security and cooperation framework is the main cause for ‘a serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the Western States’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016, point 61). It believed that the UN Security Council resolution on Srebrenica would provoke ethnic conflict and therefore vetoed it (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2015). Concerning the referendum in the RS, Russia officially stated that it would prefer to see a dialogue between the RS and other parties. It identifies international actors and the OHR as the major obstructors (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2017). In 2010 Russia committed itself to working together with BiH to quickly meet the remaining conditions in order to phase out the OHR (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2010).
In discussions with other EU governments one encounters a growing concern about Brexit. Martin Kotthaus, head of the Europe department at the German Foreign Office, spoke for many when he said “we hate the idea of Britain leaving, and we will do almost anything to prevent it.” However there are still many in EU capitals who downplay the dangers of Brexit. They tend to subscribe to one of two perspectives: that a British exit would be a positive development because it would remove the UK as a barrier to further integration that they feel is badly needed. Without Britain, they assert, France and Germany could push forward projects both in the economic and foreign-policy spheres that were not possible with the UK at the table – just as De Gaulle feared. The other perspective is that a Brexit, although certainly unwelcome, would not be a catastrophe for Europe. And, as a result, the whole unpleasant business, which is in any case a domestic problem, does not warrant much attention. Both of these perspectives are dangerously wrong.
It is not just political coordination – as demonstrated by the embassy closures – that is key in this regard, but donor coordination as well. Contradictory moves with regard to humanitarian and political aid – whether in terms of carrots or sticks – risk undermining collective European policy on Yemen. But divisions within Europe regarding how to respond to rapidly shifting events risk damaging joint European interests in working towards Yemen’s stability. While ostensibly on the same page, European policy in Yemen has often been stifled by key players’ mixed priorities: Germany has maintained a focus on economic development, France has been perceived as focusing on its economic interests in the country, while the UK has focused on political matters and a security agenda that dovetails closer to that of the US than any other partner. Still, despite the challenges represented by these divisions, collective action can allow European nations to potentially shape Yemen’s political path for the better.