Control variables that were thought to be able to influence risk-taking were integrated. For instance, firm size was shown as a logarithm of the total assets in each year. Country information would be obtained from global sources, such as country statistics, and company information would be obtained from company websites as well as from annual reports. A valuation model and panel data from companies in the United States, UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia, France, Spain, Germany, Japan and Italy will be used. This study set out to examine the how frequency of board meetings influence risk-taking measured by R&D intensity and how country characteristics moderate the relationship between risk-taking and firm value.
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However, previous studies on board meetings most often depict them as rather homogeneous and monolithic (Monks and Minow, 2011; Tricker, 2009). Recent studies have shown significant variations in the ways in which board meetings are run. Ocasio and Joseph (2005) suggest that the topics on which boards focus, and even the board routines, can vary remarkably between corporations, with the micro-processes and topics covered potentially revealing large differences between boards. Using the number and length of board meetings as measures of board activity and diligence (e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006; Vafeas, 1999; Adams, 2005; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010) is a very useful first step, but may leave important gaps in the literature ’s understanding of the board process (He and Huang, 2011). Board meetings have also been criticized for the fact that routine tasks and inefficiencies occupy the limited time that should be available for exchanging information and establishing collaborations among board members (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, previous research mostly focuses on the largest public US firms with relatively dispersed ownership. Boards of firms without large shareholders presumably have less incentive to engage in monitoring and performance improvement. This could be why earlier studies have failed to find a significant relationship between the frequency of board meetings and CEO turnover-performance or pay-performance sensitivities (see Cornelli et al., 2013; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).
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Generally, King II builds on and expands most of the Anglo-American features of King I that were aimed at improving the independence and monitoring power of corporate boards, including maintaining the central characteristic of unitary boards operating within a voluntary CG regime (Ntim 2009; Ntim et al 2011a, b). With respect to the frequency of board meetings, and unlike King I, King II explicitly suggested that corporate boards should at least meet four times in a year (i.e., once in every quarter). Crucially, King II proposed further that the frequency of board meetings should be fully disclosed in the annual report, and thereby making available data that hitherto have been publicly inaccessible. However, critical concerns have been expressed as to whether, given the SA context, a voluntary compliance regime like King II can be effective in raising CG standards in SA by enhancing the independence and monitoring power of corporate boards. Thus, we seek to empirically investigate whether CG proposals relating to board meetings contained in King II do impact on corporate financial performance.
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Some corporate boards may be more active and vigilant than others. However, it is impossible to directly measure activity and vigilance. What can be measured is the number of board meetings per year and this can be used as an admittedly rough proxy for board activity. Frequent board meetings may be a signal of increased vigilance and oversight on top management. Alternatively, the frequency of board meetings may increase the times of financial distress or the times of controversial decisions that may involve illegal or questionable activities (Chen et al., 2005). Using the data from US, Vafeas et al. (1999) found that the frequency of board meetings is an important index of board activeness. When a firm runs into trouble, the firm’s board of directors tends to hold meetings more frequently, which is usually followed by certain improvement in firm performance. Generally speaking, the higher frequency of board meeting, the more likely a board works as effective supervisor over management. Biao et al. (2003) supported empirically that firms with more frequent board meetings and audit committee meetings tend to have less serious earnings management problems. Li et al. (2004) also confirmed a positive relationship between the number of board meetings and earnings management. Drawing on this rationale, we propose that:
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Our analysis may suffer from a number of limitations. Although our sample covers a large proportion of the market value of UK listed firms it may be limited as we exclude firms that did not disclose full information. We do not have data on the split of the compensation between cash and options components of CEOs to test whether the impact of meetings and the presence of foreign non-executive directors are more pronounced for cash or other awards. The data of the agenda and minutes of the meetings is not available, making it difficult to evaluate fully the necessity of board meetings and the negative impact of foreign non-executive directors. We do not have data on specific major decisions, such as raising capital and mergers and acquisitions that may have solicited some board meetings. We are not able to gather data on ownership to assess whether large shareholders mitigate the agency conflicts inherent in management compensation, to identify the nationalities of the foreign non-executive directors, and to find out whether the presence of foreign non-executive directors is the outcome of foreign shareholding. Finally, although we used the interaction variable to assess the joint effect of board meetings and foreign non-executive directors, there may be some causality effects across the variables that might affect our results. The extent to which such factors will alter or strengthen our results is the subject of further research. 20
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Despite this potential, much of the evidence suggests that the governance arrangements of FTs have largely failed to deliver the anticipated benefits of accountability and social ownership (Wright et al 2012). Governors are frequently unable to perform their statutory duties adequately due to a lack of influence, and limited means – in terms of time, knowledge and technical skills - to interpret and act on hospital performance indicators (Allen et al., 2012). While Governors hold the formal authority to remove under-performing executive Board members, in practice they may lack the ability and / or confidence to exert control hold executive board members to account (Dixon et al., 2010; Day and Klein, 2005).
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Outside these results, other researches establish a negative link between women's proportion in the board and the performance of the company. Van der Zahn (2004) suggests that the effect of such proportion on the company’s performance varies based on these women’s profiles. So, the appointment of a woman as an internal administrator influence negatively the performance of the intellectual capital of the company, while her appointment as an external administrator has a positive outcome. However, Rose (2007) arrives at a similar conclusion. Indeed, women tend to serve in successful companies, but there is no significant link between the appointment of a woman into the board and the variation of the company’s income. In the financial industry, Dittautta and Bose (2006), from an analysis of banks in Bangladeshi, find a positive connection between female presence in the board and the financial performance. From his investigation on MFIs, Hartaska (2005) finds a positive link between women's proportion in the board and both the financial and social performance. We, hence, form the following hypothesis:
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As expressed in Council Conclusions and in line with the wishes of all parties in the project to maintain complete transparency, the Commission keeps the Council informed, regularly, on the implementation of the global schedule for SIS II and expenditure on the central project. The Commission takes part in the meetings of the preparatory bodies of the Council responsible for the Schengen Information System and of each Council of Ministers session where SIS II is included on the agenda. The Commission has presented reports on the state of play of the SIS II project and the next steps envisaged.
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The VIS Project Management Board was set up on 15 September 2004, the Presidency of the Council is also invited to attend its meetings. During the reporting period, the Project Management Board met eleven times, discussing all project management issues with project stakeholders, the main development contractor and the quality assurance contractor. It was decided during the period under report to include, in addition to the current Council Presidency, its immediate predecessor and its two successors in order to assist in ensuring continuity in the Council’s involvement.
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Board members may submit claims for reasonable expenses incurred in the course of conducting their duties including attending Board meetings. Expenses will be paid by DHI retrospectively upon approval of claims. Board members are not remunerated other than the Executive Directors (CEO and FD) as part of their existing remuneration package from DHI and the Chairman as agreed with the academic host institution.
No member, director, officer, employee, or other person connected with the Corporation, or any private individual, shall receive at any time any of the net earnings or pecuniary profit from the operations of the Corporation, provided, however, that this provision shall not prevent payment to any such person of reasonable compensation for services performed for the Corporation in effecting any of its public or charitable purposes, provided that such compensation is otherwise permitted by these Bylaws and is fixed by resolution of the Board of Directors; and no such person or persons shall be entitled to share in the distribution of, and shall not receive, any of the corporate assets on dissolution of the Corporation. All directors, officers, employees and other persons connected with the Corporation shall be deemed to have expressly consented and agreed that on such dissolution or winding up of the affairs of the Corporation, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the assets of the Corporation, after all debts have been satisfied, shall be distributed as required by the Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation, and in accordance with California and federal law, or, if not otherwise dictated, distributed to a nonprofit fund, foundation, or corporation that is organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes and that has established its exempt status under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3).
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The first run of the milestone test took place between 21 and 24 January 2010, pursuant to testing conditions and technical parameters that were discussed and agreed with the Member States in advance of the tests. Whilst the central system demonstrated relatively stable behaviour for the first 25 hours, significant issues were encountered during the remaining 47 hours. A comprehensive technical analysis of the test results was carried out by the Commission's Quality Assurance contractor, as well as by an external contractor mandated by the Member States. As stated in the June 2009 Council conclusions, the results of milestone tests must be assessed and validated by the Commission jointly with the Global Programme Management Board (GPMB) and the SIS II Task Force.
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The JHA Council of 3-4 June 2010 set the scene for the significant progress achieved in the SIS II project during the second semester of 2010. During this period, the Commission's and Member States' experts worked intensively to finalise the refined requirements for the system and to draw up the outline of a realistic draft schedule. Valuable workshops and meetings, gathering together all stakeholders' experts, took place to highlight the areas in which the requirements of SIS II had to evolve in line with end-users' needs, taking into account the need to safeguard investments in SIS II made at national level. Several elements of this evolution were significant, not least the need to provide a system about five times the size of the system originally envisaged (from 15-22 million alerts in the initial contract to 70-100 million alerts now required) and yet which still delivers operationally-oriented performance. Following a thorough assessment conducted by all stakeholders' experts, a broad consensus was reached both on the revised system requirements and future test approach, and on the outline of the global schedule. On this basis, SIS II is expected to become operational during the first quarter of 2013.
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Board meeting is beneficial to both the shareholders and the stakeholders. And this was echoed in Vafeas (1999), when he observed that board meetings are essential during crisis in order to protect the interests of shareholders. He went on to say that board meetings will help to address issues of poor performance. Firm’s size has influence on firm’s activities. Also, on the other hand firm’s activities are expected to increase with firm size (Vafeas, 1999). The firm size being represented as the total assets of the firm is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Nwokwu, Dharmadasa, & Rathnasingha, 2018). Board members are expected to be qualified. However, to address the issue of board effectiveness and efficiency, board experience was introduced as another control variable. It is assumed that firms with qualified and experienced board members would be more effective in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities (Ehikioya, 2009; Nwokwu, Dharmadasa, & Rathnasingha, 2018). The use of leverage introduces positive changes like growth and expansion as well as motivating employees to work harder in order to service the debts and also to pay off the debts. Leverage also discourages self-serving behavior (Gibbs, 1993). In order to ascertain the monitoring level, another control variable known as firm’s leverage was introduced into this study. Because highly levered firms are closely monitored by debt providers (Broberg, Tagesson & Collin, 2010). The independent variable known as board size is very essential because, the board members are the people managing the affairs of the company. So therefore, it is needful to know the size of this board and to know how it is associated with corporate performance.
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3) “Buffering effect”. Meetings with friends provide moral and affective support which mitigates the psychological distress related to sickness. This “buffering effect” may play a role in improving patients’ ability to recover, thereby improving the health status of sick people. Moreover, the “buffering effect” may play a key role in reducing occupational stress as well as modifying perceptions of work-associated distress (Cummings 1990; Lu 1999). Workers who feel supported by others may feel less stressed. If you know that your friends will support you and there is someone with whom you can talk things through, stressful working situations may be more tolerable. The “buffering effect” of a cohesive network or community also works for healthy people by preventing depression and mental disorders often related to social isolation and acting as a source of self-esteem and mutual respect (Kawachi et al. 1999).
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However, the importance of corporate governance practices is evidenced in the way companies are directed and controlled by their organized corporate structures and processes, thereby helping them to achieve high performance. Having an appropriate mix of directors in the board is important in achieving firm performance . Other researchers focused on board involvement on earnings per share and price earning   , while this research aims at ascertaining the impact of board involvement on return on equity. Return on eq- uity is a proxy for firm performance. This is why  argues that there is no uni- versal applicability of corporate governance due to varying contextual factors per- taining to research settings, such as national diversity, status of economies, politi- cal stability, institutional constraints, cultural backgrounds, etc.
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Abstract: The study investigates the relationship and impact of corporate governance measures such as board characteristics, audit committee and Ownership Structure on the financial performance of the selected manufacturing firms listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The study empirical in nature and applies panel data regression analysis to a sample of 357 manufacturing firms listed in BSE during the period 2006-2015. The study found that board size is positively and significantly linked to both the financial performance measures, i.e. Return on assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) but the negative and insignificant impact in case of Tobin’s Q. Audit committee independence is significant and negatively affected by ROE. The same promoters' shareholding is negatively and significantly related to all the financial measures and there is an insignificant negative relationship between institutional shareholding and both financial performance measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA). The study implies that to improve the performance and accordingly the value of firms, the percentage of promoters' ownership should be decreased as it has positive linkages with the financial performance. The board members have potential knowledge and expertise in the field should be increased as it has aligned with accounting based financial performance. Further, it will help the investors to pay special attention to the corporate governance, audit committee and type of ownership of firms while making the investments.
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reliability of our conclusions to a certain degree. Second, though we entered several control variables into the regression models to reduce deviations resulted from calculating the items of earnings management, we were unable to consider all possible residual-related factors. Thus deviations in items of earnings quality measurement are unavoidable in our study. Third, an important limitation is that this study only tested the apparent association between board characteristics and the quality of financial reporting from a static perspective. This neglect of the deeper causality link might hinder us from completely understanding the relation connotations of the above two. Meanwhile, though we found some evidences revealing a certain kind of correlation between board characteristics and the quality of financial reporting, we were incapable of explaining how do the board characteristics influence and improve the quality of financial reporting, the mechanism of which still remains a black box waiting to be shed light upon.
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This research examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance of Ethiopian Micro Finance Institutions. Data was collected from eight Micro Finance Institutions in the financial year 2013-2018 and multiple regression analysis was used to determine whether the existing corporate governance mechanisms influence the firm performance or not. The analysis was based on balanced panel data over a period. To achieve the objectives, variables Return on assets and Return on equity were employed as the key variables that measure the performance of firms. On the other hand board size, Board gender diversity, Frequency of Board Meetings, Board’s political affiliation, were used as independent variables and firm size and firm leverage used as control variable to measure the corporate governance. The independent variable of the study explained 50.52 percent of ROA. And there is statistically significant relationship between Board gender diversity, Board Members Political affiliation and firm profit performance (ROA) at 5 percent level of significance. Generally, the result is similar to earlier studies that corporate governance has an effect on firm performance.
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Findings in Figure 4.16 show that the skills respondents bring to the board and organisation are varied. On closer look, it shows a significant gap in skills that are prescribed for boards. Leblanc and Lindsay (2010:3) argue that directors of NPOs must collectively have knowledge, skills and experience necessary to appoint, oversee, and advice management who implements board policies and manage the day-to-day business. None of the respondents indicated legal or investment expertise and very few (8%) indicated grant making (fundraising) skills, 12% indicated possession of technology skills, 15% indicated financial accounting skills, and 15% indicated marketing skills and 15% indicated public policy influencing skills. The highest skill identified by the respondents is the knowledge of activities to be conducted in the communities (69%), followed by knowledge of targeted communities (54%) and strategic planning (54%). These are followed by Government relations (38%), funds development (31%), general board expert (27%) and human resources (23%). Board members must bring core skills to the organisation to add value. However, these findings suggest that Namibian NPOs lack skills in some critical areas and this may hamper their effectiveness. Respondents were asked to choose more than one area of skills.
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