To protect the systems exposed to the Internet against attacks, a security sys- tem with the capability to engage with the attacker is needed. There have been attempts to model the engagement/interactions between users, both benign and malicious, and network administrators as games. Building on such works, we present a game model which is generic enough to capture various modes of such interactions. The model facilitates stochastic games with imperfect information. The information is imperfect due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over other multiple states, we use Euclidean distances between the outputs of the sensors. We build a 5-state game to represent the interaction of the administrator with the user. The states correspond to 1) the user being out of the system in the Internet, and after logging in to the system; 2) having low privileges; 3) having high privileges; 4) when he successfully at- tacks and 5) gets trapped in a honeypot by the administrator. Each state has its own action set. We present the game with a distinct perceived action set corresponding to each distinct information set of these states. The model faci- litates stochastic games with imperfect information. The imperfect informa- tion is due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over the states, we use Euclidean distances between outputs of the sensors. A numeri- cal simulation of an example game is presented to show the evaluation of re- wards to the players and the preferred strategies. We also present the condi- tions for formulating the strategies when dealing with more than one attacker and making collaborations.
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a dynamic model of the voluntary provision of public goods and show that con- ditioning each agent’s contribution on the collective contributions aggravates the degree of the free-rider problem. Using endogenous growth models, Tornell and Velasco (Ref. 4) and Shibata (Ref. 5) show that the balanced growth rate with- out commitment is lower than that with commitment. Moreover, Benhabib and Radner (Ref. 6), Cozzi (Ref. 7), Dockner and Sorger (Ref. 8), Sorger (Ref. 9), Vencatachellum (Ref. 10), Vencatachellum (Ref. 11), Dockner and Nishimura (Ref. 12), and Luckraz (Ref. 13) study the other aspects of equilibria in similar situations. However, contrary to the literature, our daily experience and obser- vation tell us that monitoring behavior mitigates the free-rider problem: e.g., the behavior of agents conditioned on natural resource investigations tends to raise the growth rates of natural resource stocks. Therefore, this paper develops a simple dynamic game model of common capital accumulation with consumption exter- nalities that can explain our daily experience and observation.
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In this note we use a static game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment that is shared by two college students. Both students dislike clean- ing. However, they also prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one. Student i ’s utility function embodies the idea that the more time one student spends cleaning, the less valuable is the time spent cleaning by the other student. In this setting, we first determine the best response function of each student (player) i where i = 1, 2. Second, we determine the cleaning time choices that survive one round of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). Finally, we ascertain the cleaning time choices that survive all rounds of IESDS.
and SAC problems. Based on the newly developed embedded game model, we have explored the feasibil- ity of F-RAN control decision process and the practi- cality for the real-world implementation. In our embedded game structure, the SAC algorithm is nested in the spectrum allocation algorithm to effect- ively control the conflict problem of F-RAN system agents. Based on the interactive feedback mechanism, the proposed scheme has the potential to handle mul- tiple targets without using more complex multi-target tracking algorithm. The extensive simulation result is very encouraging, showing that our embedded game- based approach provides a more effective way to con- trol the F-RAN system than the other existing schemes. Open issues for the further research are the designs and validations of the original F-RAN systems for big data mining, cognitive radio, software-defined network, and network security problems. The pro- gress of trial tests and test bed development of F- RANs can be anticipated to be promoted in the fu- ture, which makes F-RANs’ commercial rollout as early as possible.
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iteration scheme that can improve the …nite sample properties by imposing some structure for the …rst stage estimators; see Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008,2012) for further discussions and some theoretical justi…cations. At each iteration, the structural estimator can update the choice probabilities implied by the pseudo-model that are then used to de…ne a new pseudo-likelihood function. To incorporate our estimator, alternatively one can use the updated probabilities to construct an objective function that de…nes the distance between the (updated) observed and implied expected payo¤s. For the latter, the recent nonparametric identi…cation results of Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) and Hu and Shum (2012) show any two-step approach can also be readily applied to estimate a more general dynamic model than the one considered in this paper.
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We have developed a general game-theoretic model to study the contention/interaction among wireless nodes, and propose a novel medium access method derived from CSMA/CA in which each node estimates its conditional collision probability and adjusts its persistence probability or contention window, according to distributed strategy update mechanism achieving the Nash equilibrium. This results in simple dynamics, controllable performance objectives, good short-term fairness, low collision and high throughput. As wireless nodes can estimate conditional collision proba- bilities by observing consecutive idle slots between transmissions, we can decouple contention control from handling failed transmissions. This also opens up other op- portunities such as rate adaptation to channel variations. As a case study of medium access control design in game-theoretic framework, we present a concrete medium access method and show that it achieves superior performance over the standard 802.11 DCF, and can provide flexible service differentiations among wireless nodes. In addition to guiding medium access control design, the random access game model also provides an analytical framework to understand equilibrium properties such as throughput, loss and fairness, and dynamic property of different medium access pro-
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their ability to win the auctions, and we show that the values of the L´evy flight exponents to which the model converges are very close to those measured in real data. This approach relaxes some of the assumptions made in the traditional game theoretical analysis, and deepens the understanding of the results: The optimality of the strategies adopted by bidders in on-line auctions can be seen as the outcome of a (evolutionary) learning process. The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we pro- vide a detailed description of the type of auctions studied and modeled in this paper. Section III is devoted to the description of the model and its analytical treatment. In particular, section IIIA describes the case in which all players can choose only a bid value, while, in section IIIB, we generalize the model to the case in which players can place an arbitrary number of bids. Section IIIC is dedi- cated to the evolutionary game theoretical implementa- tion of the model. Sections IV and V are respectively devoted to the description of the numerical simulations of the model and to the estimation of the computational complexity needed to simulate or solve the model. In sec- tion VI, we provide a detailed description of the results of the model. Finally, in section VII, we draw our final comments and considerations.
comprehensive insight of their role within a serious game should be analyzed with a larger number of indicators. Instead of a generic self-developed questionnaire, with one item for each variable, a validated instrument should be adopted, mapping multiple items to variables through factorization. This simplification is due to the very basic structure of the tested games. Such a simplicity is functional to their original planning for mobile devices. The serious games were conceived to be played anywhere and at any time, at work or at home or even on the way to/from work/home. Games’ interface was designed in such a way that a simple touch, or click, was enough to interact, thus enabling one-hand playing.
In the model presented here a differentiated good duopoly in which two firms exploit a common renewable resource is studied. Four cases are distin- guished corresponding to four different types of fisheries with different types of search costs. Firstly, a schooling fishery with no costs of harvesting is considered in which two firms exploit a common fishery. For reasons of ana- lytical tractability it is assumed that the stock of the resource grows linearly. This corresponds to an assumption that the resource is being harvested at a rate that would maintain the stock far from it’s natural equilibrium.
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championship tennis match, both players have a higher probability of winning a point when serving than when receiving. It is the physical characteristics of the game of tennis with the over-arm service action and the volleying strategy that gives a player an advantage wT hen serving. Many top squash players believe that there is no corresponding advcintage in squash when serving. In squash, a player who loses a rally when serving only loses the right to serve, whereas, if he loses a rally when receiving his opponent is actually awarded a point. Thus there is an incentive to "try harder" when receiving. There appears to be no inherent physical or strategical advantage in receiving and so any
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In addition, we test the effects of intrinsic costs related to uncertainty, which employers face when changing the alternative, on the behavior of the model. This means that employer is not prone to changing current alternative, especially when it is expected that the benefit of adopting a new alternative would be relatively small. Rubinstein (1998) defines such behavior by the tradeoff between complexity and efficiency of alternatives, where agents (employers in our case) prefer efficient and simple alternatives. 1 The inclusion of intrinsic costs into the decision-making does not change the behavior of the model significantly and only smoothes the wage policy. The paper proceeds as follows. Model is derived in Chapter 2, and simulations are performed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 summarizes simulation results, and the last chapter concludes.
This model was implemented with the aim to reproduce Lipowska’s results. She argues that her model is fairly robust to both population size and her given arguments; however, our experiments do not support this: as the Baldwin effect unfold, it does not follow the same abrupt course as in Lipowska’s model. This could be due to some as- sumptions that had to be made, since Lipowska (2011), for instance, presents no details on how age is calculated. We thus assume that every time an agent is allowed to communicate, its age gets incremented. Another possibility could be to in- crement every agent’s age at every time step, so that agents get older even if they do not commu- nicate. Furthermore, the initial values for learn- ability are not clearly stated. Lipowska uses sev- eral different values in her analysis. We have used 0.5, which makes a decrease in learnability a part of the evolutionary search space as well.
We shall assume that the populations converge to equilibrium exponentially fast, and we thus concentrate on these equilibrium values only. For the model of Broom and Ruxton (1998), this fast convergence was shown in Luther and Broom (2004). The proof of Luther and Broom (2004) also works for the special case of a single strategy population for each of the four strategies of our model. We believe that this result holds more generally for our situation with multiple strategies, and this has certainly proved the case in simulations. The parameter values that we have chosen are plausible for real populations when the time units are minutes; a sample set of simulated solutions in Figure 2 show convergence within ten minutes from a population initially composed of searchers, as is reasonable at the start of a foraging period (e.g. at the start of a new day).
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DOI: 10.4236/jss.2019.77039 493 Open Journal of Social Sciences Communication can help learners to solve practical problems encountered in the process of games to improve game strategies, and make learners study from each other. Feedback of accurate information can help learners to find short- comings in the process of games, correct and make up for them to improve learning efficiency and enhance learning confidence at the same time . In some game activities in the classroom, direct face-to-face communication may achieve the desired effect. However, in some games, real-time online communi- cation may be more convenient and effective. Computer, ipad and other elec- tronic devices are stationed in the classroom, which provides good support. In the whole game process, the different roles of students need to constantly com- municate and adjust the site layout to achieve the final satisfactory results.
Nowadays, Game–Based Learning (GBL) approaches with interactive multimedia in much familiar in the modern learning environments. Many researchers suggest game theory based learning and assessment which motivates the learners to actively participate and learn and on the other hand, enables educators in providing interactive learning contents. It is evidenced that the future learning setups especially e-learning and m-learning will have game based learning applications in the near future. Wang  developed a web-based formative assessment system, named GAM-WATA based on quiz and multiple choice questions. The uniqueness of the design of system was a approach based ‘Ask-Hint Strategy’. The assessment turned into an online quiz game. During this study, different types of FA
At every point in the game, a certain set of the states-of-affairs is being deemed sufficiently pro- bable by the public to require consideration. Sup- pose that initially any state of affairs within the in- terval [0, 1] is assigned a uniform probability and thus merits public attention. Each in her turn, the players propose to the public to concentrate on a subset of the currently considered states of af- fairs, arguing that those are the likelier ones to ob- tain, hence merit further attention. The metaphor used to deliver the proposal describes the newly proposed subset in a way that makes those states- of-affairs that are in it aligned with the metaphor, whereas all other states are left out of the proposed metaphorical frame. As the game proceeds, the public attention is concentrated on successively smaller sets of eventualities, and these are given a more and more detailed metaphoric description, providing the educational gratification of increa- singly knowing better and better what is going on. At each step, each player strives to provide maxi- mum public gratification while leading the public to focus on the frame (i.e. subset of states of af- fairs) that best meets the player’s preferences. 6
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Jean – Jacques Rousseau described a situation in which two persons go out for hunting. Each can independently choose to hunt a stag or hunt a rabbit. Each player must take an action without knowing the preference of the other. If a person hunts a stag, they must have the association with the other in order to succeed. An individual put up a rabbit himself, but a rabbit is valueless than a stag. This is useful correspondence for social cooperation, such as international agreements and climate change. Another names for it or its variants include “assurance game”, “coordination game” and “trust dilemma”. Every player must choose an action without conscious about the choice of the other. The stag hunt vary from the prisoner’s dilemma in that there are two pure strategy nash equilibria : while both players cooperate and both of the players defect. In the stag hunt, in spite of the fact that both players cooperating is pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. The general form of stag hunt game is
We first show the performance surfaces of the bond to a parallel shift in the yield curve and a change in the volatility. The yield curve is shifted in parallel from 4.5% to 5.5% every a 10 bp, and the volatility from 0% to 20% every a 2% increment. Figure 1 presents the straight coupon bond, the callable, the putable, and the game option bonds, respectively. It shows that the bond prices drop with the upward-shift in the yield curve for all bond type, because the discount factor increases. In contrast, a volatility change has different effects for each bond. The coupon bond is not influenced by a volatility change. On the other hand, as the volatility increases, the callable bond value drops, while the putable bond value rises. Besides, we see that the game option bond drops slightly with the increase of volatilities.
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In this work, we have seen how a different set of heterogeneous functions approached the game theoretic model without any impact arise in older version of program with a set of strategieswritten in mainstream languages such as Java. We run real web applications like e-commerce, e-learning, online student sdmission independently with different types of heterogeneous functions, by each feature to 20 heterogeneous functions per client. The previous took reachability testing model with game theory approach 30-35 seconds to perform the job whereas the proposed reachability testing model with game theory approach in heterogeneous environment completed the same job in 10 seconds.
same way – war. Back in the old days, mercantilism may have made sense - at least, mercantilist nations got shiny metal trinkets for their trouble. Today, in the world of fiat currencies, mercantilism is utterly destructive - your counterparty can simply print an infinite amount of money to cover any deficit. Chinese, Japanese, old US people, and others who hold US debt will find this out the hard way. Once again under globalisation and rise of MNC and TNCs there is the threat of zero-sum game. "There is a case for freer trade — it may make the world economy more efficient. But it does nothing to increase demand." In other words, it looks like that there is free trade but not essentially fair trade. Prof. Yan Xuetong writes that “China’s quest to enhance its world leadership status and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game.” Since the end of the Second World War, they have believed that every nation can better its lot with free markets, free trade, and free politics. Chinese leaders have eschewed all three of these “Western” concepts, but they have appropriated that awful phrase, “win-win,” and assure us they believe in it. With a win-win mind-set, governments around the world have sought to “engage” China, nurture it, and ease its entry into the international community. Zero-sum game also gives rise to cold war or at its worst international terrorism.