The papers of Part Two focus on truth and other formal con- cepts. Hintikka’s paper argues that the traditional definitions of truth based on Tarski’s T-schema are viciously circular. He at- tempts to eliminate this flaw by means of Independence-Friendly Logic. Niiniluoto follows Twardowski’s lead and argues against alethic relativism in its multifarious forms. Künne concerns him- self with the semantic import of the notion of truth in ordinary language. Are we to understand its basic sense as a predicate ap- plicable to propositions, or is it an adverbial notion only expressi- ble via a modal particle? He advocates the predicate view. Mulli- gan’s essay concentrates on the distinction between formal and non-formal concepts. He provides a brief sketch of the different ways in which Husserl and Wittgenstein tried to understand this contrast.
“‘I know’ is here a logical insight. Only realism can’t be proved by means of it.” (OC, §59). If realism can’t be proved by the logical insight of the proposition “I know,” it is because this logic represents the beliefs that fall prior to, and are exempt from, the grounds of doubt; that is, they make up the ‘scaffolding’ of subjective presupposition or the image of thought: they construct the poles of good sense and common sense. As subjective presuppositions, they hide among the other propositions; they are of the same form all the while differing in kind. But why does this mean that they cannot be used to prove realism (as Moore’s naïve attempt would like them to)? Wittgenstein says our certainty about them does not justify their validity, it only gives them a functional role in the construction of sense within a language-game. They represent the axes of a normative system, synthetic a priori forms of judgment. And without them, quite literally one loses the power of judgment: one becomes stupid. Therefore, from the point of view of mere normativity, these propositions appear arbitrary though not ‘consensual’ in the sense of a collective project of public reason (an enlightenment). For Wittgenstein they would be inherited before they could be agreed upon. “I did not get my picture of the world by
As we noted, one of the striking phenomena in the intellectual history we are tracing here is the emergence of similar ideas in different fields of philosophy. Moving from considering all alternatives to special relevant sets of these has also been a conspicuous feature of models for knowledge in epistemology. In the original modal approach to knowledge of Hintikka 1962, knowing that ϕ meant that ϕ is true in all worlds that belong to the epistemic range of the agent. But this has several undesirable consequences, such as the automatic closure of know-‐ ledge under deduction: Kϕ and K(ϕ → ψ) imply Kψ, a principle that has been questioned by philosophers from many points of view. One may see this as an unwarranted assumption of ‘logical omniscience’ giving agents the fruits of deduction for free. But also, even for ‘ideally astute agents’ that are perfect reasoners, given that skeptics may come up with new scenarios all the time, ranges of epistemic alternatives may be open-‐ended and impossible to manage. How do I rule out that I am a brain in a vat, or that everything that happens to me is a theatre show arranged by some malevolent demon?
The upshot of this paper is simply this. The history of interfaces between logic and philosophy is rich and varied, especially when we describe it through themes, rather than formal languages or systems. Our story lines are just sketchy first illustrations, but they demonstrate the broad spirit. Before we can have any considered opinion of the current state of affairs between logic and philosophy, we need such a rich view of their past and present interactions. The resulting picture may not be quite like received opinions as to what are the most crucial topics – but it seems definitely much richer than what would be found in any standard text book. It may even help get rid of some internal research programs in 'philosophical logic' that seem to have run their course. As for more practical conclusions, past meetings between logic and philosophy have been successful, and there seems every reason for pursuing these contacts. Moreover, these contacts are often enhanced through a third party, viz. computer science, which acts as a laboratory for continuing philosophy 'by other means'. Interdisciplinary conferences like TIME, CONTEXT, or TARK lead the way in this menage à trois. But perhaps most of all, we have written on purpose in a non-conventional style. Much intellectual history seems to make what happened Platonic, heroic, inevitable, and thus: hard to identify with. But our founding fathers were just ordinary people like us, with all sorts of options open to them, including chance encounters, and outside events – and mathematical logic or philosophical logic, though shining with the halo of time, are still open to significant changes, both in terms of interpretation and in terms of real change. Just read Stelzner 1996 on how the optical firm of Carl- Zeiss Jena sponsored Frege's tenure case (with the physicist Ernst Abbe as a guardian angel), and your view of the birth of modern logic, the genesis of Begriffsschrift, and its famous metaphor of Microscope versus Eye, will never be the same again!
It is so that his readers can begin to come to terms with the great philosophers of the past that Kenny has produced his book. He has written it with a level of enthusiasm which is as instructive as it is infectious and, while the book is self– professedly aimed at non–specialists, I would defy anybody to read this book and not learn many things of genuine value from it, Anthony Kenny apart. In addition to offering a general account of the major contributions which have been made during the two and a half millennia of western philosophy, Kenny also specifies how the major strands of western philosophy (logic, epistemology, physics, metaphysics, mind, ethics, politics, theology, aesthetics and language) have each waxed and waned in the passing of time. The prose is didactic throughout, without ever feeling condescending, and the reader is always offered the primary and secondary, as well as the critical resources, which would allow them to pursue any topic of interest further. In what follows I offer what can only be a brief whiff of the very rich feast which Kenny has served up here, before concluding with some general remarks about books like his.
In order to give a specific example of the above mentioned difficulty I adduce a rather long fragment of William Desmond‘s essay ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic.‘: ‗The first opposition or doublet is: On the one hand, Hegel has been with Goethe against Newton, and for resorting to a priori reasoning accused of ‗panlogism,‘ and on the other hand, of being the progenitor of ‗irrationalism‘ in his successors. One views Hegel as marked by an excess of logic, the other by an excess of illogic, masquerading as logic…On the one hand, Hegel is excessively religious, to the point of ‗mystifying‘ the processes of reality; on the other hand, he is an insidious ‗atheist,‘ equivocally masking his godlessness in a categorial system that seems to sing a hymn to God.…Here Hegel is seen, on the one hand, as supremely a foundationalist, insofar as all of being and thought seem to be reducible to one absolute principle, named the idea or Geist, or simply the absolute. On the other hand, Hegel is said to be an essentially historicist thinker who deconstructs the metaphysical appeal to eternal foundations. Hegel as foundationalist is the philosopher of absolute identity, Hegel as historicist/deconstructionist is the first philosopher of difference, as the high priest of deconstruction, Derrida himself, put it. Hegel is Hegel, but he is also other than Hegel; Hegel is the first post-Hegelian philosopher…In the first case, Hegel is accused of being an enemy of science, for criticizing empirical and mathematical science, siding in his philosophy of nature. Hegelian ‗science‘ is only metaphoric imagination. In the second case, he is accused of lacking metaphoric imagination, of not being sensitive enough to art, proclaiming its end, of making excessive claims for his science of philosophy as putatively subordinating art and religious to its own absolute comprehension. He seems to be either too scientific or not scientific enough, too metaphorical or not metaphorical enough. He is too much of one or the other, or too little, or perhaps even not one or the other. What strange figure is this?‘ The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy, HEGEL, vol.II, edited by David Lamb, ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic‘ by William Desmond, pp.225-226, (London: Darmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998).
Von Wright’s address makes many points which I would consider ‘received history’, but of course, lucidly and intelligently. He describes how modern logic came to influence modern philosophy in stages, through the foundations of mathematics, the widening of this methodology in the Vienna Circle, and finally the flowering of analytical philosophy, backed up by developments in philosophical logic. He also notices how this is the third time that logic entered philosophy concomitantly with a linguistic turn stressing the role of language in thinking – which fits the logical junction of ‘structure’ and ‘language’. These are the still melodious strains of the great classical symphony of our golden age.
We have seen that Croce’s subjectivisation of history prefig- ures Gadamer’s ideas; but other antecedents of Gadamer’s thought may be found in Croce’s position in the history of the hermeneutic approach. Though Gadamer may be its culmina- tion, we ought to start with Schleirmacher, for it was he who inaugurated modern hermeneutics and stressed the importance of reconstructing the meaning of the original intention of a text 14 . Schleiermacher was the first to speak of the hermeneutic circle; a metaphor for the way comprehension runs—under- standing the part from the whole and the whole from the part. Since the movement from part to whole and back was constant, in a sort of gyrating motion, progressively expanding, he called it “Zirkel im Verstehen” or circle/compass of understanding/ comprehension. According to Schleiermacher, the hermeneutic circle was the methodology of understanding; and as a philolo- gist he described the circle as the way we interpret texts. Croce was influenced by Schleiermacher’s Aesthetic and wrote about it in a late essay 15 . In it Croce acknowledged Schleiermacher’s foundational step for the independence of interpretation and language from logic, stating that “Schleiermacher circumscrib- ed appropriately aesthetical understanding as a form of know- ing that is not yet logical knowledge.” 16 Though Croce never wrote about hermeneutics directly, we may infer that he at- tached implicitly as much importance to it as Gadamer, since, as we saw, subjective understanding was to both thinkers the germ of historical thought. Croce’s belief in the inalienable historicity of history-making is an earlier and less audacious step than Gadamer’s concept that in understanding the past we bring ourselves into the historical situation; and with us we bring our own prejudices (or prejudgments) and as well as those of our age, which are history, even though some historians are still bound by the Cartesian “prejudice against prejudice” 17 and beseech impartiality 18 .
So if the point of cognitive philosophy is systematic, rather than therapeutic or merely analytic, what is the role of the history of philosophy? Do we not just have scientism back again, with a grandiose cosmological twist? No we do not, because unlike the optimists of early analytic philosophy from Frege and Russell to Carnap and Neurath, or early phenomenology from Brentano to Husserl, we do not pretend to have a magic key or formula, whether it be the logic of Principia, the Verification Principle, or the phenomenology of intentionality, which will unlock the mysteries of the universe, or more modestly, solve the ancient and recalcitrant problems of philosophy. Analytical systematics has to be modest and fallibilist through and through, while pushing away at those problems. Philosophical problems, known and unknown, remain hard for several reasons. One is our general intellectual limitation. Another is that unlike the case of science, where teamwork and massive funding helps a “can-do” mentality, philosophy is largely carried on by individuals in the time they can spare after university teaching and administration. The “arts and letters” status of philosophy, accompanied by the prejudice that the best philosophers are isolated geniuses and that cooperation and teamwork are somehow cheating, is a more considerable barrier to progress than even most professionals realise. Finally, there is the point that philosophical problems remain unsolved or unresolved in part because they are hard – not technically or combinatorially hard, like problems in mathematics, nor hard because they require outré and expensive experiments, but conceptually hard, because they typically revolve around just those deeply and complexly embedded concepts which make up the crooked backbone of our thinking. Such concepts cannot be isolated and treated separately like a virus in a test-tube. If you pull at one, lots of them move together.
This, however, captures only part of why Ankersmit was intrigued by “col- ligatory concepts.” What the analytical posing obscured was that Narrative Log- ic, based on the author’s 1981 PhD thesis, emerged out of a European or, more specifically, Dutch context in which analytical philosophy of history was rather far away. This context is clearly reflected in Ankersmit’s early writings, which include a dozen or so Dutch-language articles written between 1971 and 1981 for Groniek (a periodical published by the University of Groningen) and Bijdra- gen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (the primary Dutch history journal, nowadays known as the Low Countries Historical Re- view). These early articles, most of which are written in a far more colloquial style than Narrative Logic, reveal a couple of additional concerns that might help explain why the young Ankersmit was fascinated by “colligatory con- cepts.”
Even though the naturalized project begins with and emphasizes description, it shares many of the goals of the old normative project. HPS does not turn into a purely descriptive project because we understand it to have two tasks: descrip- tion and justification (see also Lipton, 2004). That is, we wish to give an adequate description of past and present science, but we also wish to understand how the epistemic successes and failures of science can be accounted for. However, the tra- ditional normative project took the descriptive task to be fairly trivial, while many naturalists would argue that adequate description may be the harder of the two tasks. The naturalist’s approach to the task of justification offers at least two advan- tages. First, a close engagement with the past and present of scientific practice can serve as an accelerator. Even if it were possible to do normative philosophy of sci- ence from first principles (such as logic or probability calculus), the project is likely to advance more quickly if existing practice is taken as a guide. If we wish to un- derstand epistemology, we should begin with the most successful epistemological enterprise that we know. A second, much stronger naturalistic argument holds that many issues in the philosophy of science cannot be tackled from first principles at all. This is because scientific practices such as induction or explanation may ul- timately be grounded in facts about the world (on induction, see Norton, 2003). For example, the justification for biologists’ interest in mechanistic explanations (Machamer et al, 2000; Bechtel, 2006) probably does not derive from any formal philosophical property of such explanations. More likely, biologists have learned in the course of research that mechanistic explanations are adequate to many parts of their area of inquiry. What counts as a “normatively” adequate explanatory standard in this case has a necessary empirical and historical dimension: it concerns what is the case in the world and how we have learned about it. Thus, while the old nor- mative project aimed for some sort of extra-empirical justification for the methods of science, strong naturalists expect the task of justification to be continuous with empirical science itself.
Here Carnap clearly believes to have made advances over the Tractatus by finding a way to formulate exact syntactic statements. As he notes about Wittgenstein, “If I am right, the position here maintained is in general agreement with his, but goes beyond it in certain important respects” [Carnap, 1967, 282]. In the history of analytic philosophy this Carnapian account of the Wittgenstein- Carnap relation has become widely accepted. According to it, merg- ing influences from Hilbert, G¨odel and Tarski, Carnap managed to overcome the limitations of the Wittgensteinian position, i.e. the silence imposed on logic by Wittgenstein’s saying/showing distinc- tion, according to which, it is impossible to speak about the logical characteristics of language, and the conjoined conception of phi- losophy as consisting of nonsensical elucidatory statements. To borrow words from recent characterizations of the Wittgenstein- Carnap relation, by breaking out of “Wittgenstein’s prison” Carnap went from “slave to master” developing a “radically different” ap- proach [Awodey and Carus, 2009, 88-91, 93] that in the respects just described is in “outright contradiction” with Wittgenstein [Wag- ner, 2009, 190] or “radically transforms” the Tractatus’ conception [Friedman, 1999, 168]. Consequently, Wittgenstein’s view was su- perseded by what is now known as the model theoretic conception of logic, characteristic of which is a distinction between an object- and a meta-language (corresponding to Carnap’s syntax-language), where the latter is a medium for statements about the logical char- acteristics of the former. This view of Carnap’s achievement finds an early expression in the reviews of the Syntax by Nagel and Quine in 1935 who seem to have simply accepted Carnap’s account of his relation to Wittgenstein. Perhaps this partly contributed to Carnap’s account becoming engraved into the history of analytic philosophy. Arguably, however, Carnap’s departure from Wittgenstein is in certain ways less radical than it might seem, and a more balanced account of their relation is called for. The question may even be raised, whether what Carnap says about the Tractatus in the Syntax
Abstract Adorno’s philosophy inherited and developed Marx’s critical philosophy of history from the perspective of philosophy of history. Marx advanced the two principles in his philosophy of history: one is the criticism of capital or reason, the other the criticism of morality or culture. Adorn took the two principles to research into the cultural industry in late capitalism and rethink Auschwitz, while he criticized Enlightenment reason and developed Marx’s concept of the critical philosophy of history at the microcosmic level of human nature. In the critique of the cultural industry, Adorno first pointed out the essence of the capitalization of the cultural industry. He emphasized that the so-called cultural industry is to turn culture into industrial production and become a sector in the economy, subjecting it to the need for capital accumulation. Therefore, economic benefit, that is, maximizing the acquisition of currency, becomes the inherent power and direct purpose of cultural development, which will inevitably lead to a complete alienation of culture from content to form. Furthermore, he reflected the spirit of enlightenment, emphasizing that the essence of the enlightening spirit was deceit and lies, and it was through deception and lies that the cultural industry stepped out of its place of production and had an impact on people's leisure, entertainment, consumption, and the entire way of life. In the reflection on Auschwitz, Adorno presents a profound philosophical question: ‘Can on live after Auschwitz?’ This issue is a search for the value of human life, and is also a condemnation of the barbaric practices of imperialism, even more a reflection on the history of human civilization. Adorno uses the principles of moral criticism of Marx's critical historical philosophy, criticizes the enlightenment spirit with a mode of civilized and barbaric dialectics, and pointed out that the deceptive elements of the spirit of enlightenment was the cultural roots of imperialist barbarism, in which he developed Marx's critical historical philosophy on the micro level in studying this issue. On this basis, he constructed the metaphysics of culture taking the concept of negation as core and presented the character of criticism of culture in Marx’s critical philosophy of history.
But the usual De Morgan story is misleading and historically quite false. Inferences like the one with the horse tail were well within the scope of traditional logic, which was much subtler than its modern critics acknowledge. They blame it for defects it never had – all the way to the invective of Peter Geach, who even saw demoniacal political consequences, in his phrase ‘The Kingdom of Darkness’. Indeed, the Aristotelean Syllogistic was the main tool of traditional logic, and this might seem merely a trivial theory of single-quantifier inferences with patterns Q AB on unary predicates A, B. But this view in terms of ‘formal systems’ is a modern way of looking which does no justice to what the Syllogistic really was: a method for one-step top- down analysis of statements of any kind into one layer of quantification. In particular, A, B could be predicates with further structure, of whatever expressive complexity: they are not constrained at all to some fixed formal language.
From the above, it would be grasped that we need to pay at- tention to creation and formation of concepts in African phi- losophy. A crucial problem that we need to tackle now is the problem of alternative theories to humanism and hermeneutics in the history of African Philosophy. There are strong argu- ments in favour of the position that contemporary African phi- losophy is discontinuous with its ancient origins. It can no longer be denied, however, that most contemporary African philosophers have turned their attention to concepts and theo- ries formulated by ancient thinkers and have explored the rele- vance of these concepts to contemporary problems. In line with this observation, we present three major contemporary African philosophers who have explored the orisa intellectual culture to establish this continuity. These three philosophers have the same cultural background; Yoruba cultural background, but we in no way claim here that this cultural background is the only cultural background through which the redescriptive of African philosophy could be enacted; it is just one among many of such cultural background.
a range of experts in a small- group environment. History at Aberdeen boasts a large number of internationally-recognised scholars — particularly those working under the University's strategic research theme 'The North'. We focus on developing a range of skills to enable future research and employability. In addition, in these programmes you will be able to engage in specialist training in a range of areas unavailable at most other institutions, including ancient languages and palaeography. Our students gain an in-depth knowledge of their subject areas
The University of Aberdeen holds an Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) block grant and scholarships are available for home and EU students in Divinity & Religious Studies, History, and History of Art. Other sources of funding may also be available. Please visit www.abdn.ac.uk/cass/graduate/funding for more information. Our research quality was recognised in the 2008 RAE, with over 95% of the School’s research deemed to be of international quality.
have the intuitions that they do. By studying these processes, experimental philosophers take themselves to be getting at certain fundamental issues about the way people ordinarily understand their world… Perhaps the claim [from analytic philosophers] is that research on the most fundamental concepts people use to understand themselves and their world doesn’t really count as “philosophy.” But this claim seems a bit hopeless and bizarre. It is not as though experimental philosophers are involved in some sort of radical departure from the traditional problems of philosophy. In fact the chronology is just the opposite. For most of the history of philosophy, questions about human nature and the nature of cognition were absolutely central. Then, for a comparatively brief period, many philosophers forsook these problems in favor of problems that had a more technical character. Experimental philosophy now seeks a return to the traditional problems of philosophy, the problems that played such a prominent role in the work of Plato, Aristotle and so many of their successors. (Knobe 2007, 89-91)
well-formed programs and well-formed thread t respectively. The rely condition R and the guarantee G specify the interference between the environment and the thread. The judgments say informally that starting from a trace satisfying both ⊟ (R ∨ G) ∗ true and p, if the environment’s transitions satisfy R, then W (or C) would not abort, its transitions satisfy G, and q holds at the end if W (or C) terminates. The invariant I specifies the well-formedness of the shared resource. Unlike in the LRG logic, R, G, I, p and q are all trace assertions now. Figure 8 gives the main inference rules. The prog rule allows us to ver- ify the whole program by verifying the n parallel threads t 1 .C 1 ,t 2 .C 2 ,. . ., t n .C n