From these figures alone one might conclude that the call for work that would integrate the history and philosophy of science in a meaningful way has gone, if not unheard, at least only faintly heard, since Feigl called for a change in attitude almost forty years ago. But there is one further place to look. 1996 saw the first meeting of a new international grouping, HOPOS, whose concern is with the history of the philosophy of science. Its growth since that first meeting at Virginia Tech has been truly meteoric. Meeting every two years, alternately in North America and Europe, it appears to have built up an academic constituency faster than its founders could ever have thought possible. At its last meeting, held in Paris in 2006, there were 68 sessions spread over five days, five sessions in parallel in most of the time periods. In all, a stunning 257 papers were presented. Though the US was well represented, as one would expect, what was most significant about this meeting was that the majority of the papers were presented by European scholars. It is clear that the historical dimension of the philosophy-of-science enterprise evokes an impressive degree of scholarly interest on both sides of the Atlantic. Its future in the academy seems secure. Learning philosophy through study of the history of philosophy has always been a favored route. It is all the more appropriate a way to proceed when one takes into account the historical nature of the sciences themselves and thus of the philosophical reflections that they have inspired over the ages. In at least one of the HPS doctoral programs in the US, a two-semester sequence in the history of the philosophy of science is a required part of the graduate program. HOPOS is well on its way.
The research was developed as part of the activities in classes on the history of chemistry at a Brazilian federal university in the years 2013 and 2014. In these two years, 49 chemistry students had been enrolled in that discipline and all of them collaborated voluntarily in this study. As a first step, an investigation project was presented to be developed by the students as a final task. In this project, the students would need to identify traditional knowledge relating to chemistry that existed in their community. Then, the students would need to gather data on this knowledge by means of a field investigation. For this, they conducted interviews with a view to finding out about the topic, and about how and when people learned it. This field research lasted around two months and was carried out in groups of two or three students. In the meantime, theo- retical reference points regarding the history and philosophy of science were discussed.
The crucial problem of Western philosophy of knowledge was to recognize its foundations. By comparing past mathematical and physical theories I have ob- tained a new conception of the foundations of science. In the above a dichotomy regarding the two main kinds of logic was exemplified in a crucial case-study of the history of philosophy. In addition, in Mathematics some decades ago a long and obscure work achieved a new formalization of calculus and more in general of the whole of Mathematics; this constructive mathematics is new to the extent that it avoids (almost all) idealistic notions (Markov, 1962; Bishop, 1967). At present, although its premises are incompatible with those of classical mathe- matics, it is considered by mathematicians to be on a par with classical mathe- matics. I conclude that the foundations of science include two basic dichotomies, one in mathematics and the other in logic (Drago, 1987; Drago, 1996).
In this paper we have study four quantum experiments that challenge the “common sense” of reality. In fact, in the 20 th century, the emergence of Quantum Mechanics and Transpersonal Psychology have contributed to challenge our “common sense” about the vision of the world. It is true that scientific progress have allowed us an improvement in our day to day life, but the core of the questions that were raised in the Introduction of this paper, still remain to be answered by contemporary society, such as What is the role of the human being in the Universe (the choice of the observer)? How we could explain the exceptional capabilities of the human brain (telepathic communication)?What is the purpose of Life (the perception of Life)?.In this regard, Prigogine (Prigogine and Stengers, 1986). suggested “a new alliance” between science (physics, biology, chemistry) and humanities/social sciences (history, philosophy, psychology) in order to answer the previousquestions in a transdisciplinary and in a deeper way.
In this chapter, I argued for the necessity of the historicist-hermeneutic approach for achieving a mutually beneficial integration of History of Science and Philosophy of Science. Aspects of the historicist-hermeneutic approach have been supported by various scholars during the last fifty years. I demonstrated how this approach can be applied concretely to solve one of the most problematic case-studies in philosophy of science: the reasoning underlying Jean Perrin’s argument for molecular reality. I argued that Perrin’s was a case of multiple determination. Perrin put forward a no-coincidence argument for the existence of molecules, which was based on the agreement between multiple, independent determinations of Avogadro’s number (and consequently, other molecular magnitudes). The blunt rationale of the argument was the following: it would be a highly improbable coincidence for multiple, independent determinations of molecular magnitudes to achieve concordant results, and yet for there not to be any molecules. The careful application of the historicist-hermeneutic approach, however, shows that there were additional structural elements of Perrin’s argument that were responsible for its exceptional strength and, ultimately, for its success. They were the following:
other. It may be the case that the underlying aim of early modern natural philosophy was the understanding and praise of the Creator, whereas modern scientists qua scientists usually do not have this aim. However, the essential incomparability of scientific goals should not be a postulate of history of science. Goals (and scientists or science need not have had just one goal at any time) may have been stable for some time in some respects: the ancient Greeks have never tried to split the atom, for obvious reasons, so in that sense they were not engaged (as a scientific community) in an intentional activity identical to that of some modern research communities; but on another level of abstraction (‘trying to identify the fundamental elements of physical entities’) they may have been pursuing the same goal. The verdict of progress will differ according to the ways the goal can plausibly be phrased, and according to our measure of technical progress in the realization of those goals. We are never just better at ‘science’ than the Greeks, just like polar bears are not better at ‘fur colors’ than their ancestors; we always need to find a plausible way of interpreting the purpose of what went on, then and now.
Abstract We respond to two kinds of skepticism about integrated history and philos- ophy of science: foundational and methodological. Foundational skeptics doubt that the history and the philosophy of science have much to gain from each other in prin- ciple. We therefore discuss some of the unique rewards of work at the intersection of the two disciplines. By contrast, methodological skeptics already believe that the two disciplines should be related to each other, but they doubt that this can be done successfully. Their worries are captured by the so-called dilemma of case studies: On one horn of the dilemma, we begin our integrative enterprise with philosophy and proceed from there to history, in which case we may well be selecting our his- torical cases so as to fit our preconceived philosophical theses. On the other horn, we begin with history and proceed to philosophical reflection, in which case we are prone to unwarranted generalization from particulars. Against worries about selec- tion bias, we argue that we routinely need to make explicit the criteria for choosing particular historical cases to investigate particular philosophical theses. It then be- comes possible to ask whether or not the selection criteria were biased. Against worries about unwarranted generalization, we stress the iterative nature of the pro- cess by which historical data and philosophical concepts are brought into alignment. The skeptics’ doubts are fueled by an outdated model of outright confirmation vs. outright falsification of philosophical concepts. A more appropriate model is one of stepwise and piecemeal improvement.
Greetings from the History, Philosophy, and Political Science Department at the University of Cincinnati Blue Ash College. We are excited to be offering a variety of classes during the 2012- 13 academic year. For the first time you can take a course in Latin American history, as well as courses in environmental, women’s and Civil War history, and an interdisciplinary seminar in European studies. Inside you will find basic information as well as a short description for all of our courses. Please be advised that changes to the schedule will sometimes occur, and that detailed information on course meeting times and classrooms can be found on UC’s Onestop website (onestop.uc.edu). If you have any questions, please contact me or one of the listed instructors.
In his response to the presentations of Duschl and Kelley, Jacob Foster, State Director of Science and Technology for the Massachusetts Department of Education gave a realpoli- tik view of how standards are interpreted at a state level. Standards specify to a state’s education community the expected outcomes, not the methods to be used to accomplish the outcomes. Thus, for nature of science outcomes specified in the NGSS, “history and philosophy of science may be one excellent way to engage them [students] in getting there [outcomes] but so are many of the other ways that we know in science education.” Foster also reminded the audience that “science and mathematics standards for that matter are not about preparing the select few for STEM majors and careers; they are the floor for all students, what we expect for all students in terms of what we expect for being scientifically literate.” Herein lies an example of the slipperiness of what scientific literacy is. If the school perspective is that scientific literacy has been achieved when student assessment shows that the desired outcomes of the standards are satisfied, then without explicit out- comes in the standards that students should be able to understand how to apply their understanding of science to their personal lives, and how to apply their scientific knowl- edge to matters of public policy, the state view of scientific literacy and what the HPS community expects from a scientifically literate student, will deviate substantially.
of cunning, develop into consciousness in the mind. However, the problem arises when the mind succumbs to cunning insight. Namely, in the cunning of the mind, it is the mind's goal, while in the cunning deceit, the mind is sunburned into a mere agent. This paradox is particularly pronounced in the conditions of the more pronounced domains of the state which, contrary to Hegel's developmental constructs, are reflected in the repression, control, control and production of fear. It is about Fuko's permeation of knowledge and power through which techniques of reign and manipulation are perfected, which, like Platon's shadows from the cave allegory, follow the advancement of the historical idea of freedom, whereby the scene is the suppression, limitation and threat of freedom. The above refers to the turning of Hegel's spirit of the Absolute and unsafe walk to the ever more persistent departure from the spirit of the Absolute. More and more philosophers, academics, warn that the initial movement is directed towards Hegel's overcoming of the contradictions of the subjective and objective and thus the end of history, directed towards the deceitful cunning, the rise and the absolutization of the objective within which the spirit is allowed to appear and moves just as an illusion, as antispirit.
In the last section I provided a small bit of a much more complex history, not as an end in itself, but as an example of how a phylogenetic analysis of a current problem in the foundations of evolutionary biology can help clarify the problem for philosophical purposes. The method I have used is to trace back historically to a point where the problem does not exist, and then work forward historically until one can see it beginning to emerge. As in this case, it is often true that at that point, those involved in the scientific debate will be quite self-conscious of problems that a couple of generations later are submerged as unquestioned, unanalyzed presuppositions of the field’s common set of concepts and methods. People see the problems, but cannot see the conceptual and methodological assumptions that are producing the problems. Nor, while working with those concepts and methods can they imagine any other way of approaching their subject that will avoid the problems they are facing.
different theorists might be resolved at a political rather than conceptual level. What we need then is not an integrated history and philosophy of science but a political philosophy of science. This leads me to a broader point about the nature of the history of science today. As this collection of articles demonstrates, the history of science as a discipline developed in response to Cold War politics. From an emphasis on socialist planning to a concern with postcolonial science, the clash between communism and capitalism structured how historians approached the sciences. Within this context, much of the history of science worked as a form of critique against the scientific establishment. With the threat of nuclear war, the growth of the military-industrial complex, and the immense power invested in scientists, engineers and doctors, it is easy to understand why. To an extent, this continued in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. If anything, the 1990s and early 2000s produced an even greater concentration in the power of science. Pharmaceuticals, mobile phones, and the internet all penetrated deeper and deeper into everyday life. Once again, historians of science, particularly feminist and postcolonial scholars, used history as a form of critique. Yet at the same time, many found the new cultural approach to society, filled with competing identity and truth claims, profoundly troubling. The ‘science wars’ and ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s highlight this best. They also reveal the ways in which neoliberalism permeated the historiography. For better or worse, everything was up for grabs in the marketplace: identity, culture, even truth itself. 124
the most distinguished mathematicians of the time taught to students and drew up treaties. and Joseph–Louis Lagrange (1736–1813) and Gaspard Monge (1746–1818) were among the first professors of mathematics at École Polytechnique (1794), a military school for the training of engineers. In 1794 the École Normal of Paris was also born, in 1808, the École normale supérieure Paris was founded, a school that had as its goal the training of teachers of both science and humanities. On this model, with a Napoleonic decree of 1813, it was established the first foundation of the Scuola Normale in Pisa. The attention of the French mathematicians toward applications was therefore, at least in part, due to the need of educational institutions to train technicians for the new state. Such an attitude is not found in Germany, the country that in the nineteenth century was with France at the forefront of European mathematics. On the one hand, great importance was attributed to purely theoretical disciplines, such as number theory and abstract algebra, on the other hand the natural philosophy aim to frame in the same theory at all the physical disciplines. In Germany a great engineering school eventually developed which become dominant in Europe. But interaction between scientists and engineers has exist- ed since ancient times: e.g., for the study of prototypes and machines for the society. Questions might be: when, why and how the tension between mathematics, physics, astronomy, gave rise to a new scientific discipline, the modern engineering? What is the conceptual bridge between sciences researches and the organization of technological researches in the development of the industry? Generally speaking a discussion concerning history of science and technique/ technology within society and its civilization is presented such as a discipline within the his- tory of science for understanding eventual relationship between science and the development of art crafts produced by non–recognized scientists in a certain historical time. The relationship between science and science & society and consequent civilizing by science is centred on the possibility that the society effetely developed a fundamental organization in capacity to absorb science and produce technologies (i.e., water and electrical supply, transportation systems etc.) of course and technically that lacked in the past. Subsequently, a development civilization was necessary parallel to development of the science within society? Is effetely happened that? Did scientific works develop as a response to the needs of society?
everything in Pittsburgh). Without these exchanges and ties with the Pittsburgh Centre, and I repeat this without the slightest hint of flattery, epistemology and philosophy of science in Italy would not be enjoying the present period of great intensity and promise. Unless everything will not be thwarted by our current university reform. A colleague of mine and expert in the field of University legislation, has recently written that in Italy, thanks to the reform under way, “we are practically witnessing the end of philosophy of science” (and perhaps the end of philosophy tout court). Our philosophy students will no longer be able to choose a course with exams in physics or mathematics or cognitive sciences, but only in history and literature (besides those in philosophy). That philosophy belongs with the Humanities is going to be definitively ratified. In Italy we will continue to educate historians of philosophy and, in particular, due to the scarce number of annual matriculations, to regard philosophy as a kind of propedeutic study to other specialisations (including – listen to this – the didactics of philosophy, another bizarre and unfortunate invention of our pedagogues).
In order to give a specific example of the above mentioned difficulty I adduce a rather long fragment of William Desmond‘s essay ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic.‘: ‗The first opposition or doublet is: On the one hand, Hegel has been with Goethe against Newton, and for resorting to a priori reasoning accused of ‗panlogism,‘ and on the other hand, of being the progenitor of ‗irrationalism‘ in his successors. One views Hegel as marked by an excess of logic, the other by an excess of illogic, masquerading as logic…On the one hand, Hegel is excessively religious, to the point of ‗mystifying‘ the processes of reality; on the other hand, he is an insidious ‗atheist,‘ equivocally masking his godlessness in a categorial system that seems to sing a hymn to God.…Here Hegel is seen, on the one hand, as supremely a foundationalist, insofar as all of being and thought seem to be reducible to one absolute principle, named the idea or Geist, or simply the absolute. On the other hand, Hegel is said to be an essentially historicist thinker who deconstructs the metaphysical appeal to eternal foundations. Hegel as foundationalist is the philosopher of absolute identity, Hegel as historicist/deconstructionist is the first philosopher of difference, as the high priest of deconstruction, Derrida himself, put it. Hegel is Hegel, but he is also other than Hegel; Hegel is the first post-Hegelian philosopher…In the first case, Hegel is accused of being an enemy of science, for criticizing empirical and mathematical science, siding in his philosophy of nature. Hegelian ‗science‘ is only metaphoric imagination. In the second case, he is accused of lacking metaphoric imagination, of not being sensitive enough to art, proclaiming its end, of making excessive claims for his science of philosophy as putatively subordinating art and religious to its own absolute comprehension. He seems to be either too scientific or not scientific enough, too metaphorical or not metaphorical enough. He is too much of one or the other, or too little, or perhaps even not one or the other. What strange figure is this?‘ The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy, HEGEL, vol.II, edited by David Lamb, ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic‘ by William Desmond, pp.225-226, (London: Darmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998).
Great steps of unification by annihilation from the history of theoretical physics include: the discovery that the millions of different substances that exist are made up of different chemical combinations of under one hundred different elements; the discovery that these distinct elements are made up of atoms in turn made up of just three kinds of particle: the electron, proton and neutron; the discovery that gravitation is nothing more than the curvature of space-time; the discovery that the dozens of different hadronic particles revealed in the 1950's and 1960's are nothing more than relatively few different kinds of quarks interacting by means of the gluons associated with the strong force. Great steps of unification by synthesis include: the partial unification of space and time achieved by Einstein's special theory of relativity; the partial unification of energy and matter achieved, again, by special relativity, and enshrined in the most famous equation of modern physics: E = mc 2 ; the partial unification of the electromagnetic and so-called weak force achieved by Weinberg's and Salam's theory of quantum electroweak theory; the unification of the eight gluons of the strong force achieved by quantum chromodynamics. 17
In all the uses of "Analogy" Locke mentions, i.e. IV.iii.29, IV.viii.9 and IV.xvi.12, "Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in guessing" or help us "probably conjecture" (my emphasis) Locke is careful to associate these reasoning from observed to unobserved cases with "guessing" and "conjecture", and doesn't fail to use these words. This is significant because Locke was also careful to outline what assent such judgements would enjoy. In the Chapter "Degrees of Assent" Locke lists a descending scale of probability we should attach to statements that do not amount to demonstrative knowledge. He starts at the "highest degree of Probability ... when the general consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a Man's constant and never- failing Experience in like cases ... [this is] Assurance." (IV.xvi.8) Next is "Confidence" and the next is indifferent assent to a proposition: "Thus far the matter goes easie enough." Problems arise though "when Testimonies contradict common Experience, and the reports of History and Witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature." (IV.xvi.9) In these cases, "this only may be said in general, That as the arguments and Proofs, pro and con, upon due Examination, nicely weighing every particular Circumstance, should to anyone appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree, to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different Entertainment as we call Belief, Conjecture, Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust, Disbelief etc." (Ibid)