History of Philosophy (esp. Plato, Aristotle, and Wittgenstein)

Top PDF History of Philosophy (esp. Plato, Aristotle, and Wittgenstein):

Continental Philosophy Commons Esthetics Commons History of Philosophy Commons Metaphysics Commons Philosophy of Language Commons , and the Philosophy of Mind Commons

Continental Philosophy Commons Esthetics Commons History of Philosophy Commons Metaphysics Commons Philosophy of Language Commons , and the Philosophy of Mind Commons

Deleuze's foremost concern in his early work is to establish a transcendental field adequate to real experience (transcendental empiricism). Given this, when confronted with the metaphysical impasses involved in language's relation to both bodies and ideas, Deleuze finds in the dimension of expression (or sense) a third term capable of reconnecting the two great lost worlds of the history of philosophy, but without, for all that, producing a higher term, capable of unifying supposed opposites. The surface—the geographical avatar of the metaphysics of sense—inheres both to the body and to the Idea, but remains irreducible to each. It connects one to the other, and language to each. For Deleuze, thought's consistency, a way of thinking has an orientation before having an object; “...[tracing] dimensions before constructing systems.” (LoS, 127). The dimension of expression (sense) in language (which is at the same time, not merely linguistic, but is also the logical attribute of the body or state of affairs), presupposes a metaphysics of surface, an orientation on this surface. This metaphysics in turn presupposes a distinction between its philosophically traditional rivals, and the terms which correspond and are proper to them, since the surface does not exist independently of a depth and a height (or a body and a proposition). Thus, a brief elaboration of metaphysical depth, surface, and height will provide us with the necessary context for the common theme of sense in Wittgenstein and Deleuze.
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Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy

Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy

have the intuitions that they do. By studying these processes, experimental philosophers take themselves to be getting at certain fundamental issues about the way people ordinarily understand their world… Perhaps the claim [from analytic philosophers] is that research on the most fundamental concepts people use to understand themselves and their world doesn’t really count as “philosophy.” But this claim seems a bit hopeless and bizarre. It is not as though experimental philosophers are involved in some sort of radical departure from the traditional problems of philosophy. In fact the chronology is just the opposite. For most of the history of philosophy, questions about human nature and the nature of cognition were absolutely central. Then, for a comparatively brief period, many philosophers forsook these problems in favor of problems that had a more technical character. Experimental philosophy now seeks a return to the traditional problems of philosophy, the problems that played such a prominent role in the work of Plato, Aristotle and so many of their successors. (Knobe 2007, 89-91)
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The history of philosophy – an obituary?

The history of philosophy – an obituary?

philosophical refinement reaching its culmination in the philosophy of Aristotle. ‘The history of philosophy’, Kenny writes, ‘does not begin with Aristotle, but the historiography of philosophy does’ (8). It is Aristotle who points out the weaknesses of his teacher’s Plato’s philosophy, as well as those inherent to the scattered fragments and received wisdoms of the pre–Socratics, as a means of creating a system which would ultimately cast its shadow upon all subsequent philosophy. Augustine, for his part, has one foot in the Ancient period covered within the first part of the book, and the other in the Medieval period covered within the second part of the book, since his system includes elements of pagan and Christian philosophy. ‘Of all the philosophers in the ancient world’, Kenny asserts, ‘only Aristotle had a greater influence on human thought’ (94) than Augustine. The remaining three parts of the book offers testament to this claim. The Middle Ages, Kenny shows in the second part of the book, is a period of philosophical productivity which owes just as much to the intellectuals of its time, many of whom had names beginning with the letter A (Augustine, Avicenna, Anselm, Abelard, Averroes, Aquinas), as it does to a variety of practical contingencies. Among these were the contingencies of the translation of Ancient Greek texts into Latin, Hebrew and Arabic, along with the associated work of commentary; the contingencies of intellectual professionalism and institutionalisation, and, above all; the contingencies of clerical authority. Of the four philosophical periods covered in Kenny’s history, this is the one which frequently gets passed over within many university courses on the history of philosophy. It is also a period through which Kenny’s personal interests in narrating the history of philosophy, pedagogical reasons apart, are brought into sharper relief. The reader will have already begun to suspect the presence of these extra–pedagogical concerns within the first part of the book when the narration of Plato and Aristotle is populated by the sort of notation familiar to all analytical philosophers and most mathematicians. By the time the book makes it to the Middle Ages, there can no longer be any doubt that there are biographical factors guiding Kenny’s quill:
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A Redescriptive History of Humanism and Hermeneutics in African Philosophy

A Redescriptive History of Humanism and Hermeneutics in African Philosophy

Nonetheless, these concepts above are presented as rede- scriptive alternatives in the history of philosophy. None of them offers any epistemic Archimedean point from which we can say that one description is more appropriate or adequate than an- other. In other words, our conceptual descriptions are contin- gent upon one another. This posit does not deny that some self- descriptions are more influential than others, it claims, however, that the influence of one self-description over another is due to the power relations available at the time it makes its appearance and not because of its epistemic superiority over others. An example will suffice; the Hegelian self-description of Africa as a “dark continent” has been rebutted but this does not imply that it has stopped being influential as a concept in the history of philosophy. The criterion of truth does not imply here; since in the case of the history of philosophy, truth can be sought from any sources of knowledge and relevance can be sought from what is interesting and significant;
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Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections

Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections

“alternatives : scientific theories :: objections : philosophical theories” (Mizrahi 2014, 428). In that respect, it is important to note that Stanford’s PUA is supposed to point to a real problem in the history of science, not merely to a logical problem. That is to say, Stanford’s PUA is not merely a logical problem of failing to conceive of logically possible alternatives to then- well-confirmed theories. Rather, Stanford’s PUA is a real problem of failing to conceive of empirically viable alternatives to then-well-confirmed theories, which turned out to be equally confirmed by the evidence. This is because, for Stanford, an unconceived alternative is a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual evidence we have in hand” (Stanford 2006, 18). That is, a mere logical possibility is not an unconceived alternative because it is not a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual evidence we have in hand.” For example, the hypothesis that the universe is accelerating because God is blowing wind on galaxies is not an unconceived alternative to the dark energy hypothesis because it is not confirmed (let alone well confirmed) by the body of actual evidence we have in hand. On the other hand, the Tychonic system was an empirically viable alternative, not merely a logical possibility, and hence a serious contender and a serious objection to the heliocentric model. For this reason, it will do scientific antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science no good to object to the New Induction on the History of Philosophy by saying that some (not yet conceived) objections lack the power to undermine now-defensible theories.
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Integrating History and Philosophy of Science

Integrating History and Philosophy of Science

From these figures alone one might conclude that the call for work that would integrate the history and philosophy of science in a meaningful way has gone, if not unheard, at least only faintly heard, since Feigl called for a change in attitude almost forty years ago. But there is one further place to look. 1996 saw the first meeting of a new international grouping, HOPOS, whose concern is with the history of the philosophy of science. Its growth since that first meeting at Virginia Tech has been truly meteoric. Meeting every two years, alternately in North America and Europe, it appears to have built up an academic constituency faster than its founders could ever have thought possible. At its last meeting, held in Paris in 2006, there were 68 sessions spread over five days, five sessions in parallel in most of the time periods. In all, a stunning 257 papers were presented. Though the US was well represented, as one would expect, what was most significant about this meeting was that the majority of the papers were presented by European scholars. It is clear that the historical dimension of the philosophy-of-science enterprise evokes an impressive degree of scholarly interest on both sides of the Atlantic. Its future in the academy seems secure. Learning philosophy through study of the history of philosophy has always been a favored route. It is all the more appropriate a way to proceed when one takes into account the historical nature of the sciences themselves and thus of the philosophical reflections that they have inspired over the ages. In at least one of the HPS doctoral programs in the US, a two-semester sequence in the history of the philosophy of science is a required part of the graduate program. HOPOS is well on its way.
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Kierkegaard's contribution to the philosophy of history

Kierkegaard's contribution to the philosophy of history

In order to give a specific example of the above mentioned difficulty I adduce a rather long fragment of William Desmond‘s essay ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic.‘: ‗The first opposition or doublet is: On the one hand, Hegel has been with Goethe against Newton, and for resorting to a priori reasoning accused of ‗panlogism,‘ and on the other hand, of being the progenitor of ‗irrationalism‘ in his successors. One views Hegel as marked by an excess of logic, the other by an excess of illogic, masquerading as logic…On the one hand, Hegel is excessively religious, to the point of ‗mystifying‘ the processes of reality; on the other hand, he is an insidious ‗atheist,‘ equivocally masking his godlessness in a categorial system that seems to sing a hymn to God.…Here Hegel is seen, on the one hand, as supremely a foundationalist, insofar as all of being and thought seem to be reducible to one absolute principle, named the idea or Geist, or simply the absolute. On the other hand, Hegel is said to be an essentially historicist thinker who deconstructs the metaphysical appeal to eternal foundations. Hegel as foundationalist is the philosopher of absolute identity, Hegel as historicist/deconstructionist is the first philosopher of difference, as the high priest of deconstruction, Derrida himself, put it. Hegel is Hegel, but he is also other than Hegel; Hegel is the first post-Hegelian philosopher…In the first case, Hegel is accused of being an enemy of science, for criticizing empirical and mathematical science, siding in his philosophy of nature. Hegelian ‗science‘ is only metaphoric imagination. In the second case, he is accused of lacking metaphoric imagination, of not being sensitive enough to art, proclaiming its end, of making excessive claims for his science of philosophy as putatively subordinating art and religious to its own absolute comprehension. He seems to be either too scientific or not scientific enough, too metaphorical or not metaphorical enough. He is too much of one or the other, or too little, or perhaps even not one or the other. What strange figure is this?‘ The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy, HEGEL, vol.II, edited by David Lamb, ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic‘ by William Desmond, pp.225-226, (London: Darmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998).
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Intellectual history

Intellectual history

Much has been written on the Cambridge School of Intellectual History, not least by its leading exponents, who seem to have entered a phase of self-memorialization. With the awe-inspiring eloquence that brought him many admirers, Quentin Skinner has given countless interviews in the last fifteen years, recalling his own intellectual socialization and constructing a compelling narrative of the School's evolution. Apparently it all started in the 1960s. Peter Laslett, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, published his pathbreaking edition of John Locke's Two Treatises of Government in 1960, an edition which placed the classic firmly in the historical context preceding the Glorious Revolu- tion of 1688, thereby altering the treatises' interpretation for generations to come (they had traditionally been viewed as a celebration of the Revolution). 25 John Pocock pub- lished his first methodological inquiries into the history of political thought in 1962 as part of an important series founded and co-edited by Laslett. 26 John Dunn, a fellow of King's College, Cambridge, followed suit with reflections on the "identity" of the his- tory of ideas, which appeared in 1968 and made the case for a fundamental revision of the history of philosophy in general and the history of political thought in particu- lar. Mocking the "bloodlessness" and unhistorical nature of a field preoccupied with Platonic ideas and reified reconstructions of "great books", Dunn argued in favour of a history of thought that rendered thinking a "social activity" and that investigated the question as to what thinkers were "doing" in saying things, that is, when they engaged in "speech acts" (John Austin) in a particular context at a particular time. 27
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History of Substance in Philosophy

History of Substance in Philosophy

A lot of words investigated by philosophers get their inception for conventional or extra-philosophical dialect. Yet the idea of substance is basically a philosophical term of art. Its employments in normal dialect tend to derive, often in a twisted way, dif- ferent from its philosophical usage. Despite this, the idea of substance differs from philosophers, reliant upon the school of thought in which it is been expressed. There is an ordinary concept in play when philosophers discuss “substance”, and this is seen in the concept of object, or thing when this is contrasted with properties, attributes or events. There is also a difference in view when in the sense that while the realists would develop a materialistic theory of substance, the idealist would de- velop a metaphysical theory of substance. The problem surrounding substance spans through the history of philosophy. The queries have often been what is substance of? And can there be substance without its attributes? This paper tends to expose the historical problems surrounding substance. This paper criticizes the thinking which presupposes that there could be a substance without its attributes or substance exist- ing alone. This paper adopts complimentary ontology principles which state that for anything to exist, it must serve as a missing connection to reality. This suggests that everything interconnects to each other and substance cannot exist in isolation.
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Bochenski and Balance: System and History in Analytic Philosophy

Bochenski and Balance: System and History in Analytic Philosophy

So if the point of cognitive philosophy is systematic, rather than therapeutic or merely analytic, what is the role of the history of philosophy? Do we not just have scientism back again, with a grandiose cosmological twist? No we do not, because unlike the optimists of early analytic philosophy from Frege and Russell to Carnap and Neurath, or early phenomenology from Brentano to Husserl, we do not pretend to have a magic key or formula, whether it be the logic of Principia, the Verification Principle, or the phenomenology of intentionality, which will unlock the mysteries of the universe, or more modestly, solve the ancient and recalcitrant problems of philosophy. Analytical systematics has to be modest and fallibilist through and through, while pushing away at those problems. Philosophical problems, known and unknown, remain hard for several reasons. One is our general intellectual limitation. Another is that unlike the case of science, where teamwork and massive funding helps a “can-do” mentality, philosophy is largely carried on by individuals in the time they can spare after university teaching and administration. The “arts and letters” status of philosophy, accompanied by the prejudice that the best philosophers are isolated geniuses and that cooperation and teamwork are somehow cheating, is a more considerable barrier to progress than even most professionals realise. Finally, there is the point that philosophical problems remain unsolved or unresolved in part because they are hard – not technically or combinatorially hard, like problems in mathematics, nor hard because they require outré and expensive experiments, but conceptually hard, because they typically revolve around just those deeply and complexly embedded concepts which make up the crooked backbone of our thinking. Such concepts cannot be isolated and treated separately like a virus in a test-tube. If you pull at one, lots of them move together.
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Philosophy of Development Economics: Creating a Dialogue between Rawls and Development Economists

Philosophy of Development Economics: Creating a Dialogue between Rawls and Development Economists

Our investigation requires that we take a step back and look at the phenomenon in a more primordial way, i.e. something apriori that conditions thinking about the future of development economics. It is our intuition that a ‘special’ development theory is in fact needed, one that is sensitive to general and particular questions that arise in political-economy in relation to development, and this special theory is neither an ‘applied’ form of economics nor a ‘supplement’ to mainstream economic theories. The ‘special development theory’ is far more expansive: it draws from the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy to critically question the epistemological, normative and scientific assumptions of ‘development economics.’ Our project in contrast to Meier’s, for example, is an attempt to fashion a new field called the ‘philosophy of development economics’ by way of the resources available in moral and political philosophies of justice and global ethics, namely Rawls’s endeavor in The Law of Peoples. And prior to such construction, one must keep in mind advanced problems in the philosophy of history, namely time, transformation, motion and causality. If development does not inherit basic problems in metaphysics (being, becoming, time, motion, rest, the thing in motion, the thing as motion, substance, permanence), then we are forgetting an important historical precedent that made the idea of ‘development’ even possible, particularly in its 20 th century expression. Rawls takes up questions for moral and political philosophy intrinsic to discussions of international justice, but he does so in a way that does not prioritize a single philosophical or metaphysical or religious comprehensive doctrine; the point is to see how these doctrines can be maintained from the standpoint of individual proponents but be subjected to reasonable and rational debate on which non-metaphysical or purely ‘political conceptions of justice’ become possible to which a single international order can adhere, i.e. a ‘society of peoples.’ This way the idea of justice as fairness for the basic structure of a single society can be expanded to justify principles of fairness and decency for the entire human species and the international order within which all human beings live.
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MAN AND LOGOS: HERACLITUS’ SECRET

MAN AND LOGOS: HERACLITUS’ SECRET

For two and a half millennia, many comments have been written on the teachings of Heracli- tus of Ephesus and many reconstructions have been created, in the light of which all the shad- ows, it would seem, should have long receded. In addition to the traditional for the history of philosophy themes, oppositions of Heraclitian becoming and Parmenides being (Christidis, 2012), the image of the river as a symbol of variability (Narecki, 2012), the concept of Logos (Brann, 2011; Johnstone, 2014), Heraclitus attitude to religion (Adomenas, 1999), a reconstruc- tion of his philosophy of nature (Habash, 2019; Neels, 2018) and political philosophy (Popper, 1945; Robitzsch, 2018), more specific questions are raised. For example, the problems of oblivi- on in the philosophy of Heraclitus are considered by David Michael Schur (1994) in a thesis, which was defended at Harvard University. The specific style of Heraclitus discusses Celso Vieira (2013), and Robin Reames (2013) discusses the influence of Heraclitus on the formation of rhetoric. But something prevents from depriving him of the nickname he got from his compat- riots.
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Towards a history and philosophy of scientific education in practice

Towards a history and philosophy of scientific education in practice

The prioritisation of the situation and the situated nature of learning also have implications for the way we should study scientific education. To begin with, it invites us to take this situation (in the sense outlined above) into account if we want to have a full understanding of how people are educated as scientists. Moreover, if scientific education is to be seen as an initiation or an incorporation into a certain practice, and if (as we have seen) the stakes of practices are continuously contested, the nature of scientific education can also be expected to vary historically. Analyses of scientific education should take this historicity into consideration. The only hope for a philosophy of scientific education thus lies in an integrated history and philosophy of scientific education.
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Anticipations of Hans Georg Gadamer’s Epistemology of History in Benedetto Croce’s Philosophy of History

Anticipations of Hans Georg Gadamer’s Epistemology of History in Benedetto Croce’s Philosophy of History

In Truth and Method Hans Georg Gadamer revealed hermeneutics as one of the foundational epistemo- logical elements of history, in contrast to scientific method, which, with empiricism, constitutes natural sciences’ epistemology. This important step solved a number of long-standing arguments over the ontol- ogy of history, which had become increasingly bitter in the twentieth century. But perhaps Gadamer’s most important contribution was that he annulled history’s supposed inferiority to the natural sciences by showing that the knowledge it offers, though different in nature from science, is of equal import. By showing history’s arrant independence from the natural sciences, the former was furnished with a new- found importance, and thrust on an equal footing with the latter—even in a distinctly scientific age such as ours. This essay intends to show that the idea of history’s discrete ontology from science was prefig- ured almost a century earlier by Benedetto Croce. Croce and Gadamer show compelling points of contact in their philosophies, notwithstanding that they did not confer equal consequence to what may be identi- fied as Gadamer’s principal substantiation of history’s epistemology—hermeneutics. Of course this essay does not aspire to be exhaustive: the thought of both philosophers is far too dense. Nevertheless, the main points of contact shall be outlined, and, though concise, this essay seeks to point out the striking similari- ties of these two cardinal philosophers of history.
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Adorno and Marx's Tradition of Critical Philosophy of History

Adorno and Marx's Tradition of Critical Philosophy of History

functions of the construction. The goals of Gramsci, Kirsch and Lukács' research are to solve the tactical problems of the proletarian revolution in the West. To achieve this goal, they reconstruct Marxism’s practical ontology as an academic approach, creating cultural leadership and the ideological theory of the proletariat, which endows their theory with an intensive class character of the proletariat and it is the ideological weapon of the proletarian revolution in the West. While the majority of Scholars of the Frankfurt School sticked to the position of non-partisanship, in philosophy, they did not advocate the study of the Marxist ontology, but tried to rebuild the critical theory of Marxism on the basis of the critique of political economy in order to carry out a critique of the capitalist system and explore the economic problems of the Soviet Union. Adorno’s philosophy is a classic of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory, which determines that his theory is necessarily different from the theory of Gramsci, Kirsch and Lukács. [45] [46] Inside the Frankfurt school, Adorno's critical theory is different from Marcuse's critical theory. Marcuse is the most radical philosopher of the Frankfurt School. In theory, he was the first person to interpret Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and expounded Marx's humanitarian thoughts from the perspective of existentialism. [37] [38] [41] [47] He who accepted Kirsch and Lukács’s Western Marxist philosophy, is an influential Hegelian Marxist philosopher. In practice, he had participated in the German Social Democratic Party in the early days and later because of protesting against the participation of the German Social Democratic Party in the assassination of Li Bulknessi and Rosa Luxemburg he withdrew from it. Owing to the theoretical and practical radical position, Marcuse regards the revolution and the liberation of man as the central concern of all his theoretical creations and practical activities, which make his theory transcend the theoretical framework of the Frankfurt school in vindicating the rationality of the revolution and the prospect of cultural criticism. Therefore, it is closer to the western Marxist theories of Gramsci, Kirsch and Lukács. In contrast, Adorno moves towards pessimism on account of the Frankfurt school’s non-partisan stance.
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The Development of Cartographical Studies and

The Development of Cartographical Studies and

for Studies of History and Geography, Basic Academic Studies, Faculty of Philosophy, Niksic) Nikšić, 714. 2004; pp[r]

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Reasons as causes of action :  a non Humean account of the causal status of action : explanations in terms of reasons

Reasons as causes of action : a non Humean account of the causal status of action : explanations in terms of reasons

"The Explanation Action" in of Social Gardiner, P.: The Philosophy of History, University Presst 1974... on Miracles and Providence 1980..[r]

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Towards a methodology for integrated history and philosophy of science

Towards a methodology for integrated history and philosophy of science

rylation. This is the main process by which mitochondria transform the energy in foodstuffs into a chemical compound called ATP, which cells, tissues and organs then use to drive their various processes. Mitchell received a 1978 Nobel Prize for the formulation of the mechanism, and it has long counted as one of the most spec- tacularly original contributions to 20th century biology. Leslie Orgel once wrote that “[n]ot since Darwin and Wallace has biology come up with an idea as counterintu- itive as those of, say, Einstein, Heisenberg and Schrödinger” (Orgel, 1999, p. 17). In our study we were able to show that the genesis of the theory can be explained using concepts from two recent strands in the philosophy of scientific hypothesis generation. One is interested in how the unknown causes of phenomena are sought (Graßhoff and May, 1995; Lipton, 2004); another is interested in how new mecha- nistic hypotheses are generated based on known entities and interactions (Darden, 2006). The first strand allowed us to see that Mitchell’s process of hypothesis gen- eration, however spectacular the result, occurred in a well-defined space of possible causal hypotheses. The second strand allowed us to see how this well-defined space of possible hypotheses was investigated by generating “how possibly” mechanisms. Our study has special probative force because it deals with a hard case of scien- tific discovery. No one would claim that the mechanism of oxidative phosphoryla- tion was a trivial extension of existing biochemical knowledge: It was a theory of acknowledged novelty and originality. If its genesis is intelligible in terms of a num- ber of basic heuristics, then the power of those heuristics is credibly demonstrated. Moreover, that the hard case could be accommodated provides some warrant for the speculation that many further but less difficult cases of scientific discovery are amenable to similar analyses.
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A history of normal plates, tables and stages in vertebrate embryology

A history of normal plates, tables and stages in vertebrate embryology

ABSTRACT Developmental biology is today unimaginable without the normal stages that define standard divisions of development. This history of normal stages, and the related normal plates and normal tables, shows how these standards have shaped and been shaped by disciplinary change in vertebrate embryology. The article highlights the Normal Plates of the Development of the Vertebrates edited by the German anatomist Franz Keibel (16 volumes, 1897–1938). These were a major response to problems in the relations between ontogeny and phylogeny that amounted in practical terms to a crisis in staging embryos, not just between, but (for some) also within species. Keibel’s design adapted a plate by Wilhelm His and tables by Albert Oppel in order to go beyond the already controversial comparative plates of the Darwinist propagandist Ernst Haeckel. The project responded to local pressures, including intense concern with individual variation, but recruited internationally and mapped an embryological empire. Though theoreti- cally inconclusive, the plates became standard laboratory tools and forged a network within which the Institut International d’Embryologie (today the International Society of Developmental Biologists) was founded in 1911. After World War I, experimentalists, led by Ross Harrison and Viktor Hamburger, and human embryologists, especially George Streeter at the Carnegie Depart- ment of Embryology, transformed Keibel’s complex, bulky tomes to suit their own contrasting demands. In developmental biology after World War II, normal stages—reduced to a few journal pages—helped domesticate model organisms. Staging systems had emerged from discussions that questioned the very possibility of assigning an embryo to a stage. The historical issues resonate today as developmental biologists work to improve and extend stage series, to make results from different laboratories easier to compare and to take individual variation into account.
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The 'battle' between science and religion over evolution in nineteenth century New Zealand : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History at Massey University

The 'battle' between science and religion over evolution in nineteenth century New Zealand : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History at Massey University

The themes articu l ated by Bowen were repeated by the foundation presi dents of the o ther Institutes as the ethos of co l on i a l s cience was estab l i shed. M r . Justice Ward 's attitude to science , as presi dent of the Otago Institute , was as pragmat ic and uti l itarian as Bowe n ' s . Sur v eying the history and phi l osophy o f sci ence from P l ato t o Hume h e asserted that it was 'our own great countryman' Franci s Bacon who showed that 'the highest end of wisdom is to be of use'. Ev ery n e w scienti fic disco v ery added a n e w source o f wea l th t o t h e co l ony and a fresh incenti v e to immigration.64 Al fred Eccles echoed this v iew to the same body l ater in the year. The most usefu l and pract i ca l end o f the Institutes , he decl ared , was t o obtain knowl edge o f t h e raw
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