concept of form (and is unfortunately responsible for the worst misgiving with respect to the history of Wittgenstein's readership) :32 it bears little resemblance to either its more or less 'common sense' notion (as in the shape of an object, or of the general characteristics which would form a class of objects) which would largely coincide with the Aristotelian formulation, or to the basic Platonic notion of Forms (in which case concrete objects would stand as semblances, derivatives or degradations of a model). Form in Wittgenstein has an immediately mystical content, without for that reason conceding any logical make up. The next question would be, “Why is form, at the same time pictorial and logical?”. Form marks the a priori unity (but not a synthetic one) of the sensible and the intelligible, or more strictly, it marks their original indifference or indistinction with respect to one another, without, for all that, lacking determination or coherence: form is sense (2.221). And this because there is not perception on one end (presupposing a pictorial schema) and the intellect on the other (presupposing a logical one). Sense or form, is immediately both from the outset, and more than that, we are not able to speak of them as entities which we could distinguish, even in principle. Thought is univocal with whatever can be thought (but this is a reversal of the idealist viewpoint), and sense, can stand, at least in our initial determination, as the limen between what is thinkable, and what is sayable. According to Wittgenstein, all sayable things have sense. Sense in turn is itself what is shown in the proposition. Therefore, at this level anyway, sense is never said of itself—at this level indeed it is never said at all. “A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand...and it says that they do so stand.” (4.022). Logical
It is, of course, natural for every thinker to adopt their own vocabulary, but Hegel initiates a different logic as well. How, then, are we to translate Hegel‘s logical conclusions into a logic that he considers to be inherently inferior? What is more, one always has to be aware of Hegel‘s mixing of philosophical and theological terms. In his Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for example he uses ‗reason‘, ‗Idea‘ and ‗God‘ as synonyms. Again, although it is not unnatural for a philosopher to appropriate the concept of ‗God‘, Hegel tends to equate ‗God‘ with ‗reason‘ or with ‗Idea‘ or with ‗Absolute‘ without providing any explicit definition of any of these terms. Is ‗God‘ to be understood in the same way as it is understood in every Western Christian community or, at least, in every Western Protestant community? If yes, how can we explain Hegel‘s idiosyncratic interpretation of the ‗Incarnation‘? Of course, this is only to hint a problematic character which besets every interpretation of Hegel‘s thought: it is not the purpose of this thesis to solve this problem; yet it needs to be borne in mind in what follows. 17 Thus, there are not only many different interpretations of Hegel‘s philosophy, but many contradictory ones. 18 Some interpreters consider Hegel to be an exponent of ‗panlogism‘ (because he believes that ‗everything is rational‘), others believe him to be the father of ‗irrationalism‘ (because he uses a different kind of logic). Some define him as utterly religious and others
Recent considerations of mind and world react against philosophical naturalisation strategies by maintaining that the thought of the world is normatively driven to reject reductive or bald naturalism. This paper argues that we may reject bald or ‘ thoughtless ’ naturalism without sacrificing nature to normativity and so retreating from metaphysics to transcendental idealism. The resources for this move can be found in the Naturphilosophie outlined by the German Idealist philosopher F.W.J. Schelling. He argues that because thought occurs in the same universe as thought thinks, it remains part of that universe whose elements in consequence now addition- ally include that thought. A philosophy of nature beginning from such a position neither shaves thought from a thoughtless nature nor transcendentally reduces nature to the content of thought, since a thought occurring in nature only has ‘ all nature ’ as its content when that thought is additive rather than summative. A natural history of mind drawn from Schellingian premises therefore entails that, while a thought may have ‘ all nature ’ as its content, this thought is itself the partial content of the nature augmented by it.
It is so that his readers can begin to come to terms with the great philosophers of the past that Kenny has produced his book. He has written it with a level of enthusiasm which is as instructive as it is infectious and, while the book is self– professedly aimed at non–specialists, I would defy anybody to read this book and not learn many things of genuine value from it, Anthony Kenny apart. In addition to offering a general account of the major contributions which have been made during the two and a half millennia of western philosophy, Kenny also specifies how the major strands of western philosophy (logic, epistemology, physics, metaphysics, mind, ethics, politics, theology, aesthetics and language) have each waxed and waned in the passing of time. The prose is didactic throughout, without ever feeling condescending, and the reader is always offered the primary and secondary, as well as the critical resources, which would allow them to pursue any topic of interest further. In what follows I offer what can only be a brief whiff of the very rich feast which Kenny has served up here, before concluding with some general remarks about books like his.
The expression “attribute”, originate from the Latin word “to” and tribuere “ascribe”, alludes to what belong to a thing. Subsequently an attribute is what is appropriate to a thing: its vital property. In metaphysics an attribute is what is vital to a spiritual and physical substance, that which communicates the way of a thing, or that without which a thing is unimaginable. Substance can be said to have properties (Thomas, 1999). Sub- stance, be that as it may, has an interminable property or “essence” as some scholars will call it16. In that capacity, an attribute suggests fundamentally a connection to some substance of which it is a viewpoint or a component in its origination. Attributes can likewise be said to inhere in their substance. Descartes opined Attribute has the guide- line property which constitutes its tendency and substance, and to which all its different properties are alluded (Kirkebøen, 2001). Spinoza also defines the term “attribute” as, what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence (Kirkebøen, 2001). For instance for Descartes, the attribute of the mind is thinking, doubting. Attributes is also at the very heart of Spinoza’s metaphysics. For him they empower us to compre- hend and discuss an augmented world and a reasoning world as far as which we com- prehend bodies and brains. In their attempt to answer the problem, thinkers have taken after two great inclinations. Some have precluded the objectivity by claiming that attribute can exist independently; others have made it subjective, claiming it is impossi- ble. Aristotle comprehensively recognizes substance and attributes. Aristotle attempted to separate between a substance and its attribute with this in the sentence: “The house is red”, the subject of the sentence “the house” alludes to an individual thing, a substance; and the predicate of the sentence “is red” alludes to the attribute of the substance. Along these lines an essential substance as subject is linguistically recognized from its properties as descriptor which “is available in and predicable of a subject”. Secondary substances are communicated by all inclusive terms, things, and by its definition; it is not present in a subject but rather is predicable of it.
unavoidable. In his writings and letters sent to Hegel, Schelling points out that the freedom of the alpha and omega of philosophy. For Hegel, history is first and foremost a development of awareness of freedom. At the same time, Hegel points out that the spirit of the trend developing within certain social structures and areas and, depending on the society in which only one free (India, China), through the Greek and Roman construct within which, depending on the status, available only a while to Christian-European world within which each individual becomes free. While for Kant freedom from something, just outside of us (negative sloda), Hegel construct freedom is the basis of freedom of (positive freedom), as well as meet the need. Unlike Locke and representatives of liberalism, according to which freedom is external and negative, Hegel considers freedom from the standpoint of internal and positive. This means that the person develops and is released in proportion to the degree of understanding and realizing their potential. The idea of freedom is a product of the new age - the civil world, modern as a pre-existing developmental disadvantage on the way to man. Therefore, the meaning of the State, according to Hegel, reflected in the search for domains which is conditioned by human freedom. By expanding the formal formalized moral law enforcement to the level of the idea, Hegel emphasizes that the freedom of the individual does not stem from obedience to the law, but rather because the individual observes the law of freedom as the law of the mind.
More important were developments since then in the two academic fields. Isis, the first- born of history-of-science journals publishing in English, has evolved in ways that, I suspect, would have bothered Feigl and would have utterly dismayed George Sarton, the journal's founder. What integration amounted to for a great many historians of science was taking on board a much broader conception of science as a multifarious human activity. The social, political, and broader intellectual contexts that shaped in so many ways the sciences of the past now shifted from the periphery to the center of the research concerns of a great many historians, among the younger generation in particular. What accelerated this trend, to my mind, was that the internalist aspects of the science of the great figures of the past could easily have come to seem to someone in search of an original research topic to have been already been worked over, if not to the point of exhaustion, at least to the point of diminishing returns.
approaches to intellectual history that have been advanced by two very different schol- ars: Mark Bevir and Dominick LaCapra. Informed by post-analytic philosophy – and hence no easy read for historians unfamiliar with the philosophical discipline – Bevir's Logic of the History of Ideas, published in 1999, provides a normative second-order study of intellectual history and the human sciences in general, exploring key concepts of the field such as tradition, meaning and belief. As Bevir explained in one of the numer- ous debates on his book, the Logic may also be read as an attempt to put the approach of the Cambridge School on a surer philosophical footing. 39 Taking his cue from the philosophical strands of "holism", "postfoundationalism" and "folk psychology", and drawing on philosophies of mind, language and action as developed by Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson, Bevir maintains that ideas cannot have any innate meanings but possess meaning only in relation to agents, which alone are able to provide the "back- ground theories" that lend meaning to ideas. Therefore, ideas only exist as beliefs, which historians are to ascribe to people while being governed by logical presump- tions in favour of sincere, conscious and rational beliefs – "rational" being defined as "consistent". These beliefs are, moreover, part of wider "webs of belief" which arise against the background of intellectual and social traditions. "Webs of belief" is one of the Logic's pivotal terms, one which Bevir borrows from Quine and Ullian's classic in- troduction to the study of rational belief, 40 and which is, in fact, at the heart of Bevir's
Before we do so, we must take a slight detour through Rawls’s The Law of Peoples (1999) and Political Liberalism (1993). In our estimation these works carry philosophies of history within them but couched within the general fields of moral and political philosophy on theories of domestic and international justice. In contrast, A Theory of Justice (1971) is restricted to the domestic case in which it tries to abstract from the social contract tradition an ideal ‘moral basis for a democratic society’ outside the scope of historical time. Political Liberalism, however, deems that kind of society ‘impossible’ given the supervening fact of ‘reasonable pluralism’—or the possibility of consensus among competing moral, philosophical and religious ‘comprehensive’ doctrines: within the latter, each tries to found their own ‘liberal yet non-comprehensive’ principles of justice regardless of whether they live in liberal- democratic or non-liberal/ non-democratic political systems. 3 Reading Rawls while trying to appropriate great figures in the history of Western philosophy (Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel come to mind) can provide the framework by which we dissect assumptions in Frontiers of Development Economics. It is our hypothesis that Rawls, while drawing from the history of philosophy, is absolutely critical if we were to examine how the philosophy of history and its questions of time, motion, transformation and change relate fundamentally to outstanding issues that arise from the philosophy of development economics.
My dissertation establishes the basis for a systematic outlook on the role language plays in human cognition. It is an investigation based on a cognitive conception of language, as opposed to communicative conceptions, viz. those that suppose that language plays no role in cognition (its only role being to externalize thought). I focus, in Chapter 2, on three paradigmatic theories adopting this perspective, each offering different views on how language contributes to or changes cognition. In Chapter 3, I criticize current views held by dual-process theorists, and I develop a picture of the complex interaction between language and cognition that I deem more plausible by using resources from the literature on the evolution of the faculty of language. Rather than trying to find one general explanation for all cognitive processes, I take seriously the idea that our mind is composed of many subsystems, and that language can interact and modify each in different ways. There is no reason offered in the empirical literature—besides maybe parsimony—that suggest that language has to interact in the same ways with all cognitive processes. Yet, this is seemingly taken for granted, especially within dual-process approaches. On my view, it is a central requirement for a theory of the role of language in cognition to explain how language might have effects, at once, on and within various parts of cognition. In Chapter 4, I explore how this framework can modify how we think about some experiments in psychology, specifically in research on categorization. My idea is that language, once it (or any possible primitive forms) evolved, changed how some cognitive capacities worked and interacted with each other, but did so in more than one or two ways. Cognitive systems are changed in very different ways—sometimes the transformation is very subtle, such as our way of forming categories by using how similar objects are, while other times it is deep and changes the very way the system works.
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is finally gaining the attention needed to begin to solve this common problem. It is defined as chronic airflow obstruction that is progressive and only partly reversible (Pauwels et al 2001; Global Initiative for Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease 2004). COPD includes chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and chronic asthmatic bronchitis (defined further below). Today, COPD is the fourth most common cause of death in the USA, and is the only disease state that is rising in morbidity and mortality amongst the top five killers. It resulted in a $32.1 billion loss to the USA economy in direct and indirect costs in 2003, and by 2020 is expected to become the third most common cause of death (NHLBI Data Fact Sheet 2003). Approximately 16 million adult Americans have COPD. Probably an equal number have asymptomatic or even symptomatic disease but are not diagnosed or treated (Mannino et al 2000). Interest in COPD is a recent development and few know the origins of this interesting disease spectrum. This review offers a glimpse into the rich history in the development of our present understanding of COPD.
I.G. Perfect, now we would like to note that from the approach of Big History it can be argued that current societies have achieved very high levels of complexity. However, most of the data have been obtained by measurements of the levels of energy consumption in countries with higher standards of living, with large gross domestic products and with high levels of technological development. What would happen if we observed the energy consumption of countries with scarce resources, with high levels of poverty, in with people who have little access to cutting-edge technology? Could we talk about a uniform trend in the increase of the planet’s complexity? Under what conditions has Big History observed such systemic variations in the degrees of complexity in which today there are various degrees of complexity in different areas of the planet?
As a newborn child is practically devoid of the conceptual network, it is ob- vious that it does not possess (self-) consciousness. Its appearance and develop- ment constitutes the fifth aspect of the evolution of the conceptual network dur- ing ontogenesis. (Self-) consciousness must develop gradually, together with the evolution of the conceptual network. It was proposed previously (Korzeniewski, 2010, 2013a, 2015a) that the neurophysiological background of (self-) conscious- ness consists in a recurrent directing on itself of the cognitive center in the hu- man brain, receiving by it signals from itself. Within the framework of the con- ception of the conceptual network, this is equivalent to the creation within this network not only of a representation of the external world, but also of a picture (model) of itself. This means, in a sense, that the network enters at a certain me- ta-level and looks from above, i.e., perceives its own existence. In the uncons- cious psyche, the processes of thinking occur at the level of the conceptual net- work, and their “field of vision” comprises only a representation of the external world in this network. Together with the appearance of self-consciousness, this field starts to also comprise the conceptual network related to the “cognitive ap- paratus” itself. This is the origin of the differentiation into “I”, that is the area of the conceptual network that knows both the world (its picture in the conceptual network) and itself, as well as the “world”, that is the area of conceptual network which is known, but itself does not constitute a part of the cognitive apparatus. This is the source of the extreme opposition in our psyche of the mind and the external world (broadly understood matter). They appear to be categorically identical only at the level of the conceptual network, for both are parts of this network (concepts or complexes of concepts, depending on the approach). Gen- erally, the external world, physical reality or broadly understood matter is represented by (“contained in”) the part of the conceptual network that is not directed on itself, while the internal world, subjective psyche or self-conscious- ness corresponds the fragment of the conceptual network that is recurrently di- rected on itself, creates a model (representation) of itself within itself. This is strictly related to the superior topic of the present article that does not deal with the relation between the mind and the external world, but rather between the representation of the mind and the physical reality in our psyche (conceptual network).
Whether individual characteristics (eg, age), illness characteristics (eg, severity of hairpulling), and/or impair- ment of HRQoL are associated with treatment history of TTM individuals is not yet known. Thus, learning more about the similarities and differences in the characteris- tics of treated and untreated TTM individuals may guide researchers and clinicians to find individualized approaches to access and support those who have never been treated or identified through the conventional therapeutic network. One approach to support untreated individuals may be via Internet/mobile-based interventions. 26,27 However, whether
Moreover, in historiography, social theory and psychoanalysis, something of the same insistence on the need to integrate Nazism into accounts of what Mazower calls ‘the mainstream’ can all be registered. States of mind described in the critical literature on Nazism were not to be seen (so it was argued by various historians and psychoanalysts alike) as entirely alien or as confined to Germany. The fantasies and projections that we can see so flagrantly at work in the Fascist period also raise more fundamental questions about politics at large: remember Freud’s own suggestion in the ‘Group Psychology’ paper that something quite mad may be lurking in, or be a structuring fantasy of, any organized group – an army or a church, for instance, not merely in the delusions of the rampaging ‘mob’. Rather, such propensities, that Fascist strain, could be understood as potentially a part of all of us and/or of European culture and thought. The question was then, as it is now, how far there are other forces – or resources – available to counteract rather than to exploit sadism, to contain or lessen, rather than to fan the flames of, collective hatreds or mad idealizations of the avenging ‘superego’ figure who promises final purification and redemption from the morass. Psychoanalysis offers a rich vocabulary, perhaps partly inspired by those convulsions of history, and certainly a vocabulary that could be used to think about that history. Its concepts should not serve to ‘explain away’ the wounds of the continent in the 1930s and 1940s as the work of a few madmen, but rather to grasp the unconscious fantasies mobilized in the ideology and practice of Fascism.
Another well researched, fascinating, and illuminating book by Marie D. Jones and Larry Flaxman. It was interesting to read about the ancient customs on mind control, I never really thought about how people have always used it to control the "sheep." This is some scary material. This book will make you look at every advertisement, news program, and even pharmaceutical companies. Once you read this informative book, you'll never look at the world in the same way again.7 of 8 people found the following review helpful. Groupthink Articulated and Countered !
prompt, I led thorough reviews of the definitions of the elements of mind. Students reflected on Stages One through Four, held an essay contest in preparation for an exam and debate, and made close studies of rhetoric in essays, fiction, and film related to a topic of interest: the nature and future of artificial intelligence. This topic gave students another opportunity to examine the question of how to define “real thinking.” Continuing with this Turing Test-like theme, I asked the students to define “real reading” and to explain how one does it, through examples and through abstract description (see the detailed prompt in Appendix E). The students took a full week and weekend to compose their responses. I waited until after the students had completed their essays to describe another step in the process: I asked them to use their various stated methods to redesign their thinking in a subject area where they feel especially challenged.