the intensive going empiricist, since substance is not something that can be seen or touched, one would expect that it contain an abstract phenomenal, something not de- stroyable. The history of westernphilosophy began by asking the question, what the es- sential substance of thing in the universe? That is, what is the essential foundation of things in which everything in the world is made from? Thales was the first Greek phi- losopher who offered a reasonable clarification of the universe. To the inquiry: Thales contended that this essential substance is water (Kett, 1942: p. 99). Consequently for Thales, water is the basic solidarity in all things. Anaximander held that the primordial substance, the essential stuff of which everything is made must be a nonpartisan com- ponent not the same as every one of the components we know: endless and uncertain. Anaximenes contended that the essential substance of the universe is air Anaximenes contended that the essential substance of the universe is air (Classen, 1977). While for Heraclitus, the essential way of substance (all the truth) is change, for Parmenides, it is permanence (Omoregbe, 1991). Plato dismissed all realist endeavors to clarify what substance of things is made of. As indicated by Plato, the overseeing standards were “Forms” which have material articles (attributes) endeavored to duplicate. The forces of things he calls Forms are not in the physical realm but in the metaphysical realm while the attributes are things we see in our existential world. While assessments and specific things, he alludes to as unimportant shadows, reflections or impersonations of our present world (Carpenter, 2008). Aristotle is of the view that the way we know a thing gives us the significant piece of information about what we really mean by substance (Stumpf & Fieser, 2003: p. 82). Aristotle said that we discuss substance and its nine cat- egories. In this sense, the expression “categories” allude to the predicates or the mi- shaps. He shows the different classes:
It is so that his readers can begin to come to terms with the great philosophers of the past that Kenny has produced his book. He has written it with a level of enthusiasm which is as instructive as it is infectious and, while the book is self– professedly aimed at non–specialists, I would defy anybody to read this book and not learn many things of genuine value from it, Anthony Kenny apart. In addition to offering a general account of the major contributions which have been made during the two and a half millennia of westernphilosophy, Kenny also specifies how the major strands of westernphilosophy (logic, epistemology, physics, metaphysics, mind, ethics, politics, theology, aesthetics and language) have each waxed and waned in the passing of time. The prose is didactic throughout, without ever feeling condescending, and the reader is always offered the primary and secondary, as well as the critical resources, which would allow them to pursue any topic of interest further. In what follows I offer what can only be a brief whiff of the very rich feast which Kenny has served up here, before concluding with some general remarks about books like his.
serves power interests. (Habermas 1994, 91) Habermas complains that Foucault gives no guidance to distinguish more valid from less valid power-knowledge claims. (Habermas 1994, 94) He complains that Foucault ignores the ability of communicative action to bring power interests to light and so to lead to reasoning that takes into consideration all participants’ power interests equally, (Habermas 1984, 119-20) Habermas states that Foucault ignores the fact that reasoning must prove itself with practical effectiveness in the world, which limits the control that power interests can have in shaping truth. Finally, Habermas complains that Foucault ignores the obvious progress in human flourishing in “the bourgeoisie constitutional state,” (Habermas 1994, 101-02) and “the unmistakable gains in liberality and legal security, and the expansion of civil rights” in modern societies. (Habermas 1990, 290) For Habermas, history has not been merely a series of equally oppressive power/knowledge regimes. That is, history has not been just one form of subjugation after another; rather, there has been progress in reducing subjugation, and an increase in the ability of individuals to choose their life paths outside of the dominant power structure. (For detailed documentation of such progress in the Western world, see Pinker 2011.)
Nonetheless, the repercussion of media ecology in the fields of metaphilosophy and the History of Philosophy is still rather weak. When studying how philosophical thinking was born in Ancient Greece and what demarcates philosophy from other intellectual disciplines, writing is not given much attention, despite the suggestive occurrence that the appearance of alphabetic writing -its one and only appearance for that matter, since it was only invented once and then transmitted and adopted for different languages throughout the centuries- and the birth of philosophical thinking in Ancient Greece are contemporary. If the proponents of media ecology are right in arguing that writing restructures consciousness and rationality, it seems reasonable to think that one of the causes for the birth of philosophy is precisely the rise of this kind of script. This concurrence can hardly be random happenstance. Havelock´s (1982) contention is that the cultural changes that took places in the late archaic and classical Greece, among them, the birth of philosophy were prompted by the appearance of the alphabet. This view is shared by McLuhan, Ong and Logan. The task of the present paper is to assess their claim: Is the alphabet the cause of philosophy?
In ‘Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance’, Knobe (2007) claims that the methods of experimental philosophers are more relevant than those of the analytic tradition to studying the mechanisms underlying various theoretical and practical capacities of human beings. What is more, still according to him, the attempt to understand these mechanisms is more characteristic of the long-term history of philosophy, and thus might have a stronger claim to be authentic philosophical research, than work in the analytic tradition. Knobe concedes that experimental philosophy may not have lasting relevance for the “analytic project,” except as a negative programme intended to deflate some of the claims that analytic philosophers have based on intuition, but he suggests that questions about human nature and cognition and more generally the mechanisms underlying intentionality, cognition and morality have been of interest in Westernphilosophy since Plato and Aristotle, and that philosophers as different from one another as Nietzsche and Hume have carried on this tradition.
are no exceptions to the Kantian imperative, there can be no sensitivity to context, such as when individuals struggle with ethical dilemmas found in race, class, and gender relations. Nonetheless, a rational, absolutist ethic persists in western fi lms, and is oft en presumed to be ideal. Upon exami- nation, however, it is possible to understand that the tension between an Enlightenment ideal and frontier confl ict results in a tremendous price for the one committed to an idealistic code. Th e price is evident in any number of popular westerns, including Lonesome Dove (Simon Wincer, 1989), 3:10 to Yuma (James Mangold, 2007), and the recent Appaloosa (Ed Harris, 2008). In each of these fi lms, signifi cant refl ection occurs on the part of the heroes about the ultimate worth of living by an absolute devotion to honor. Similar refl ection and uncertainty are also found in westerns set in the twentieth century, such as Lonely Are the Brave (David Miller, 1962), Legends of the Fall (Edward Zwick, 1994), and All the Pretty Horses (Billy Bob Th ornton, 2000). Here, too, in these more modern extensions of the previous era, the heroic ideal is assumed. In each fi lm, despite the appeal of the hero types, the audience is left with profound doubt concerning the value of their ide- alistic postures. In so-called postmodern westerns that employ antiheroes or intentionally subvert the notion of honor, fi lms such as Th e Wild Bunch (Sam Peckinpah, 1969), Unforgiven (Clint Eastwood, 1992), and No Country for Old Men (Ethan and Joel Coen, 2007), the notion of absolute honor is either parodied or reduced to complete ineff ectiveness by certain important characters. If we were to recognize the continuing infl uence of the western in contemporary areas of popular culture, for example, the military code demonstrated in A Few Good Men (Rob Reiner, 1992), there, too, we would see the lingering eff ect of misplaced honor.
holds an Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) block grant and scholarships are available for home and EU students in Divinity & Religious Studies, History, and History of Art. Other sources of funding may also be available. Please visit www.abdn.ac.uk/funding for more information.
The School of Divinity, History and Philosophy is a leading international provider of excellence in undergraduate and postgraduate education, at the heart of an ancient Scottish research-led University. We are located in Old Aberdeen, a beautiful and historic area, which provides a distinguished base for learning and research. Our international staff consists of over 70 lecturing and research-active members with world-leading academic credentials.
The Epicureans, named after their founder Epicurus, believed that humans ought to turn their backs on the pointless drama of politics and social competition and retire to a kind of inner contemplation. Epicurus taught that even if gods existed, they clearly had no interest in human affairs and thus did not need to be feared. Death was final and total, representing release and peace, not an afterlife of torment or work, so there was no need to worry about it, either. In short, the Epicureans believed in a virtuous renunciation of earthly cares and an indulgence in pleasure. Pleasure was not about overindulgence, however (which led to suffering - think of indigestion and hangovers), but a refined enjoyment of food, drink, music, and sex, although one interesting aspect of this philosophy was the idea that sexual pleasure was fine, but emotional love was to be avoided since it was too likely to result in suffering. To this day, the word “epicurean” as it is used in English means someone who enjoys the finer things in life, especially in terms of good cooking!
It was not Renaissance ideas, however, that had the greatest impact on the globe at the time. Instead, it was European soldiers, colonists, and most consequentially, diseases. The first people from the Eastern Hemisphere since prehistory to travel to the Western Hemisphere (and remain - an earlier Viking colony did not survive) were European explorers who, entirely by accident, “discovered” the Americas at the end of the fifteenth century CE. It bears emphasis that the “discovery” of the Americas is a misnomer: millions of people already lived there, as their ancestors had for thousands of years, but geography had left them ill-prepared for the arrival of the newcomers. With the European colonists came an onslaught of epidemics to which the native peoples of the Americas had no resistance, and within a few generations the immense majority - perhaps as many as 90% - of Native Americans perished as a result. The subsequent conquest of the Americas by Europeans and their descendents was thus made vastly easier. Europeans suddenly had access to an astonishing wealth of land and natural resources, wealth that they extracted in large part by enslaving millions of Native Americans and Africans.
Abstract Adorno’s philosophy inherited and developed Marx’s critical philosophy of history from the perspective of philosophy of history. Marx advanced the two principles in his philosophy of history: one is the criticism of capital or reason, the other the criticism of morality or culture. Adorn took the two principles to research into the cultural industry in late capitalism and rethink Auschwitz, while he criticized Enlightenment reason and developed Marx’s concept of the critical philosophy of history at the microcosmic level of human nature. In the critique of the cultural industry, Adorno first pointed out the essence of the capitalization of the cultural industry. He emphasized that the so-called cultural industry is to turn culture into industrial production and become a sector in the economy, subjecting it to the need for capital accumulation. Therefore, economic benefit, that is, maximizing the acquisition of currency, becomes the inherent power and direct purpose of cultural development, which will inevitably lead to a complete alienation of culture from content to form. Furthermore, he reflected the spirit of enlightenment, emphasizing that the essence of the enlightening spirit was deceit and lies, and it was through deception and lies that the cultural industry stepped out of its place of production and had an impact on people's leisure, entertainment, consumption, and the entire way of life. In the reflection on Auschwitz, Adorno presents a profound philosophical question: ‘Can on live after Auschwitz?’ This issue is a search for the value of human life, and is also a condemnation of the barbaric practices of imperialism, even more a reflection on the history of human civilization. Adorno uses the principles of moral criticism of Marx's critical historical philosophy, criticizes the enlightenment spirit with a mode of civilized and barbaric dialectics, and pointed out that the deceptive elements of the spirit of enlightenment was the cultural roots of imperialist barbarism, in which he developed Marx's critical historical philosophy on the micro level in studying this issue. On this basis, he constructed the metaphysics of culture taking the concept of negation as core and presented the character of criticism of culture in Marx’s critical philosophy of history.
However the content of her frame of mind on humanism promotes and deepens the “humanness” of African philosophy rather than the Humanism of African philosophy. But for the use of the problematic conceptual label, “humanism”; Olu- wole’s self-redescription on African philosophy would have been distinguished more than the notion of the collective. Our finding here, is that Oluwole confuses her undertaking with the task of Petrarch the father of humanism. Petrarch devoted his life to the recovery, copying, and editing of Latin manuscripts. Yet, their tasks are different. Since Oluwole concerns herself with the location of philosophical concepts in Ifa corpus in both its oral offering and literary readings. Whatever the conception of her philosophical mission, it is no longer “humanism”. Her concern with the recovery, translation and interpretation of oral offerings of Ifa Corpus and doubt concerning what may have been ascribed to Orunmila goes to show that she intends to exhibit the primordiality of the African philosophical experi- ence. She is concerned with the “grace of humanness” offered by the indigenous knowledge of African traditional society.
The Depression started in the United States with a massive stock market crash on October 24, 1929. The ill-conceived cycle of debt described above had worked well enough for most of the 1920s while the American economy was stable and American banks were willing to underwrite new loans. When the stock market crashed, however, American banks demanded repayment of the European loans, from Germany and its former enemies alike. The capital to repay those loans simply did not exist. Businesses shut down, governments defaulted on the American loans, and unemployment soared. In one year, Germany’s industrial output dropped by almost 50% and millions were out of work. In turn, inspired by liberal economic theories, governments embraced policies of austerity, cutting back the already limited social programs that existed, balancing state budgets, and slashing spending. The result was that even less capital was available in the private sector. In the United States and Western Europe, the Depression would drag on for a decade (1929 - 1939), at which point World War II overshadowed economic hardship as the great crisis of the century.
So if the point of cognitive philosophy is systematic, rather than therapeutic or merely analytic, what is the role of the history of philosophy? Do we not just have scientism back again, with a grandiose cosmological twist? No we do not, because unlike the optimists of early analytic philosophy from Frege and Russell to Carnap and Neurath, or early phenomenology from Brentano to Husserl, we do not pretend to have a magic key or formula, whether it be the logic of Principia, the Verification Principle, or the phenomenology of intentionality, which will unlock the mysteries of the universe, or more modestly, solve the ancient and recalcitrant problems of philosophy. Analytical systematics has to be modest and fallibilist through and through, while pushing away at those problems. Philosophical problems, known and unknown, remain hard for several reasons. One is our general intellectual limitation. Another is that unlike the case of science, where teamwork and massive funding helps a “can-do” mentality, philosophy is largely carried on by individuals in the time they can spare after university teaching and administration. The “arts and letters” status of philosophy, accompanied by the prejudice that the best philosophers are isolated geniuses and that cooperation and teamwork are somehow cheating, is a more considerable barrier to progress than even most professionals realise. Finally, there is the point that philosophical problems remain unsolved or unresolved in part because they are hard – not technically or combinatorially hard, like problems in mathematics, nor hard because they require outré and expensive experiments, but conceptually hard, because they typically revolve around just those deeply and complexly embedded concepts which make up the crooked backbone of our thinking. Such concepts cannot be isolated and treated separately like a virus in a test-tube. If you pull at one, lots of them move together.
With regard to the other side of the question, the answer is that our current beliefs about nature are hermeneutically inevitable (or ‘inescapable’, in order to distinguish this sense of inevitability from the thesis that our current science is historically inevitable), precisely because nature is causally integrated in the whole history of science: we cannot understand past science without assuming anything about the natural world in which it developed, and there is no reason why in so doing, we would opt for any assumptions about the natural world other than those we actually hold. Here our alignment with many authors discussed in previous chapters gets inverted relative to that concerning the causal question: though we may disagree with Weber, Merton, Koyré and the Marxists about the historical inevitability of our science, we embrace their presentism. Though we disagree with Bloor and Collins about the explanatory relevance of nature, we follow them in their acceptance of current science as providing the best understanding of nature available to us. And though we agree with Latour about the contingency and historicity of our current beliefs and categories, and about the causal inextricability of nature and science, we decline the methodological prescriptions he draws from this, that in order to understand, we need to be radical empiricists and simply follow the actors.
The first meetings were devoted to achieving a compromise to avoid both Foreign Office loss of responsibility in the Western Pacific and the disadvantages of divided authority. By early March the Foreign Office proposed to modify Wylde's earlier proposal: Layard should go on a tour of inspection, but would be accompanied by Gordon. Their joint report would 'place H.M.'s Govt, in a position to deal comprehensively with the Labour question, and to frame a Policy to be pursued in that part of the world'. In the meantime, 1 in order to meet as far as possible Lord Carnarvon's desire that uniformity of procedure in dealing with British Subjects both within and in the neighbourhood of Fiji, may be established', Derby would 'concur in the apptt. of the Govr. of Fiji to be H.M.'s Special Commr. in and over such Islands as may be agreed upon, with powers to be conferred upon him by an Order in Council... for dealing with cases in which British subjects are concerned, but with no others'. Cases involving the persons or property of foreigners were to be dealt with solely by a consul directly responsible to the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office representatives, who were genuinely
Frank Ankersmit is often perceived as a postmodern thinker, as a European Hayden White, or as an author whose work in political philosophy can safely be ignored by those interested only in his philosophy of history. Although none of these perceptions is entire- ly wrong, they are of little help in understanding the nature of Ankersmit’s work and the sources on which it draws. Specifically, they do not elucidate the extent to which Anker- smit raises questions different from White’s, finds himself inspired by continental Euro- pean traditions, responds to specifically Dutch concerns, and is as active as a public intel- lectual as he has been prolific in philosophy of history. In order to propose a more com- prehensive and balanced interpretation of Ankersmit’s work, this article offers a contex- tual reading based largely on Dutch-language sources, some of which are unknown even in the Netherlands. The thesis advanced is that Ankersmit draws consistently on nine- teenth-century German historicism as interpreted by Friedrich Meinecke and advocated by his Groningen teacher, Ernst Kossmann. Without forcing each and every element of Ankersmit’s oeuvre into a historicist mold, the article demonstrates that some of its most salient aspects can profitably be read as attempts at translating and modifying historicist key notions into late twentieth-century categories. Also, without creating a father myth of the sort that White helped create around his teacher William Bossenbrook, the article argues that Ankersmit at crucial moments in his intellectual trajectory draws on texts and authors central to Kossmann’s research interests.