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Kierkegaard's contribution to the philosophy of history

Kierkegaard's contribution to the philosophy of history

It is, of course, natural for every thinker to adopt their own vocabulary, but Hegel initiates a different logic as well. How, then, are we to translate Hegel‘s logical conclusions into a logic that he considers to be inherently inferior? What is more, one always has to be aware of Hegel‘s mixing of philosophical and theological terms. In his Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for example he uses ‗reason‘, ‗Idea‘ and ‗God‘ as synonyms. Again, although it is not unnatural for a philosopher to appropriate the concept of ‗God‘, Hegel tends to equate ‗God‘ with ‗reason‘ or with ‗Idea‘ or with ‗Absolute‘ without providing any explicit definition of any of these terms. Is ‗God‘ to be understood in the same way as it is understood in every Western Christian community or, at least, in every Western Protestant community? If yes, how can we explain Hegel‘s idiosyncratic interpretation of the ‗Incarnation‘? Of course, this is only to hint a problematic character which besets every interpretation of Hegel‘s thought: it is not the purpose of this thesis to solve this problem; yet it needs to be borne in mind in what follows. 17 Thus, there are not only many different interpretations of Hegel‘s philosophy, but many contradictory ones. 18 Some interpreters consider Hegel to be an exponent of ‗panlogism‘ (because he believes that ‗everything is rational‘), others believe him to be the father of ‗irrationalism‘ (because he uses a different kind of logic). Some define him as utterly religious and others
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Adorno and Marx's Tradition of Critical Philosophy of History

Adorno and Marx's Tradition of Critical Philosophy of History

Abstract Adorno’s philosophy inherited and developed Marx’s critical philosophy of history from the perspective of philosophy of history. Marx advanced the two principles in his philosophy of history: one is the criticism of capital or reason, the other the criticism of morality or culture. Adorn took the two principles to research into the cultural industry in late capitalism and rethink Auschwitz, while he criticized Enlightenment reason and developed Marx’s concept of the critical philosophy of history at the microcosmic level of human nature. In the critique of the cultural industry, Adorno first pointed out the essence of the capitalization of the cultural industry. He emphasized that the so-called cultural industry is to turn culture into industrial production and become a sector in the economy, subjecting it to the need for capital accumulation. Therefore, economic benefit, that is, maximizing the acquisition of currency, becomes the inherent power and direct purpose of cultural development, which will inevitably lead to a complete alienation of culture from content to form. Furthermore, he reflected the spirit of enlightenment, emphasizing that the essence of the enlightening spirit was deceit and lies, and it was through deception and lies that the cultural industry stepped out of its place of production and had an impact on people's leisure, entertainment, consumption, and the entire way of life. In the reflection on Auschwitz, Adorno presents a profound philosophical question: ‘Can on live after Auschwitz?’ This issue is a search for the value of human life, and is also a condemnation of the barbaric practices of imperialism, even more a reflection on the history of human civilization. Adorno uses the principles of moral criticism of Marx's critical historical philosophy, criticizes the enlightenment spirit with a mode of civilized and barbaric dialectics, and pointed out that the deceptive elements of the spirit of enlightenment was the cultural roots of imperialist barbarism, in which he developed Marx's critical historical philosophy on the micro level in studying this issue. On this basis, he constructed the metaphysics of culture taking the concept of negation as core and presented the character of criticism of culture in Marx’s critical philosophy of history.
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Towards a methodology for integrated history and philosophy of science

Towards a methodology for integrated history and philosophy of science

Abstract We respond to two kinds of skepticism about integrated history and philos- ophy of science: foundational and methodological. Foundational skeptics doubt that the history and the philosophy of science have much to gain from each other in prin- ciple. We therefore discuss some of the unique rewards of work at the intersection of the two disciplines. By contrast, methodological skeptics already believe that the two disciplines should be related to each other, but they doubt that this can be done successfully. Their worries are captured by the so-called dilemma of case studies: On one horn of the dilemma, we begin our integrative enterprise with philosophy and proceed from there to history, in which case we may well be selecting our his- torical cases so as to fit our preconceived philosophical theses. On the other horn, we begin with history and proceed to philosophical reflection, in which case we are prone to unwarranted generalization from particulars. Against worries about selec- tion bias, we argue that we routinely need to make explicit the criteria for choosing particular historical cases to investigate particular philosophical theses. It then be- comes possible to ask whether or not the selection criteria were biased. Against worries about unwarranted generalization, we stress the iterative nature of the pro- cess by which historical data and philosophical concepts are brought into alignment. The skeptics’ doubts are fueled by an outdated model of outright confirmation vs. outright falsification of philosophical concepts. A more appropriate model is one of stepwise and piecemeal improvement.
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Integrating History and Philosophy of Science

Integrating History and Philosophy of Science

From these figures alone one might conclude that the call for work that would integrate the history and philosophy of science in a meaningful way has gone, if not unheard, at least only faintly heard, since Feigl called for a change in attitude almost forty years ago. But there is one further place to look. 1996 saw the first meeting of a new international grouping, HOPOS, whose concern is with the history of the philosophy of science. Its growth since that first meeting at Virginia Tech has been truly meteoric. Meeting every two years, alternately in North America and Europe, it appears to have built up an academic constituency faster than its founders could ever have thought possible. At its last meeting, held in Paris in 2006, there were 68 sessions spread over five days, five sessions in parallel in most of the time periods. In all, a stunning 257 papers were presented. Though the US was well represented, as one would expect, what was most significant about this meeting was that the majority of the papers were presented by European scholars. It is clear that the historical dimension of the philosophy-of-science enterprise evokes an impressive degree of scholarly interest on both sides of the Atlantic. Its future in the academy seems secure. Learning philosophy through study of the history of philosophy has always been a favored route. It is all the more appropriate a way to proceed when one takes into account the historical nature of the sciences themselves and thus of the philosophical reflections that they have inspired over the ages. In at least one of the HPS doctoral programs in the US, a two-semester sequence in the history of the philosophy of science is a required part of the graduate program. HOPOS is well on its way.
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Towards a history and philosophy of scientific education in practice

Towards a history and philosophy of scientific education in practice

Teaching is an important aspect of scientific practice. However, as Lorraine Daston has recently remarked, “we have only the barest beginnings of a history of scientific pedagogy and not even the rudiments of a philosophy” (Daston 2008, 106). Daston refers to some historical studies on scientific education, including the collection of studies edited by David Kaiser (Kaiser 2005). In the concluding chapter, Kaiser and Andrew Warwick provide some general reflections on the usefulness of the works of Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault for a philosophy of scientific education (Kaiser and Warwick 2005). Kaiser and Warwick refer to Joseph Rouse, who incorporated insights from both philosophers in his philosophy of scientific practice. However, Kaiser and Warwick merely refer to Rouse as a reader and interpreter of Kuhn and Foucault. In this paper, I will argue that Rouse’s philosophy of scientific practice deserves to be studied in its own right and that his conceptualisation of scientific practices has important implications for the study of scientific education.
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History and Philosophy of Science: A Phylogenetic Approach

History and Philosophy of Science: A Phylogenetic Approach

In the last section I provided a small bit of a much more complex history, not as an end in itself, but as an example of how a phylogenetic analysis of a current problem in the foundations of evolutionary biology can help clarify the problem for philosophical purposes. The method I have used is to trace back historically to a point where the problem does not exist, and then work forward historically until one can see it beginning to emerge. As in this case, it is often true that at that point, those involved in the scientific debate will be quite self-conscious of problems that a couple of generations later are submerged as unquestioned, unanalyzed presuppositions of the field’s common set of concepts and methods. People see the problems, but cannot see the conceptual and methodological assumptions that are producing the problems. Nor, while working with those concepts and methods can they imagine any other way of approaching their subject that will avoid the problems they are facing.
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Anticipations of Hans Georg Gadamer’s Epistemology of History in Benedetto Croce’s Philosophy of History

Anticipations of Hans Georg Gadamer’s Epistemology of History in Benedetto Croce’s Philosophy of History

It is curious that Gadamer disregarded Croce despite the phi- losophical similarities of his Italian antecedent. That Gadamer praised Vico for his crucial role in the reaction against the preeminence of scientific knowledge over all other forms of knowledge makes Gadamer’s disregard for Croce ever more conspicuous. After all, Vico influenced Croce more than any other thinker, and, as we have seen, Croce himself indubitably anticipated Gadamer’s thought. Yet in Truth and Method Gada- mer mentions Croce but once and does not acknowledge neither his contribution nor his landmark position; he mentions Croce only in passing—and unfavorably—in a passage where dis- cussing Emilio Betti, an Italian legal historian who wrote on legal hermeneutics: “Clearly reacting against Croce’s extreme position, Betti seeks the mean between the objective and the subjective element in all understanding.” 26 Gadamer here is displaying the same superficiality, as we saw above in the facile criticism that had been directed at Gadamer himself, when the latter was accused of relativism. Croce, as we saw above, in stating that “truth itself perishes […] because it is not re- thinkable save when included in the system of a vaster truth […]” he affirmed that the ‘subjective’ truth a historian gener- ates in his understanding of history is always set against “a vaster truth” which contravenes its possible excesses. This is exactly the same defense that Gadamer made when countering the portrayal of his thought as relativistic: Gadamer’s saying that our being indissolubly rooted in history means we under- stand it by fusing our own truths with that of history—the very thing we are trying to understand—is strikingly similar to Croce’s argument. The similarity of the criticism leveled against both Gadamer and Croce, as well as their defense, abuts these two philosophers considerably.
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The history of philosophy – an obituary?

The history of philosophy – an obituary?

philosophical refinement reaching its culmination in the philosophy of Aristotle. ‘The history of philosophy’, Kenny writes, ‘does not begin with Aristotle, but the historiography of philosophy does’ (8). It is Aristotle who points out the weaknesses of his teacher’s Plato’s philosophy, as well as those inherent to the scattered fragments and received wisdoms of the pre–Socratics, as a means of creating a system which would ultimately cast its shadow upon all subsequent philosophy. Augustine, for his part, has one foot in the Ancient period covered within the first part of the book, and the other in the Medieval period covered within the second part of the book, since his system includes elements of pagan and Christian philosophy. ‘Of all the philosophers in the ancient world’, Kenny asserts, ‘only Aristotle had a greater influence on human thought’ (94) than Augustine. The remaining three parts of the book offers testament to this claim. The Middle Ages, Kenny shows in the second part of the book, is a period of philosophical productivity which owes just as much to the intellectuals of its time, many of whom had names beginning with the letter A (Augustine, Avicenna, Anselm, Abelard, Averroes, Aquinas), as it does to a variety of practical contingencies. Among these were the contingencies of the translation of Ancient Greek texts into Latin, Hebrew and Arabic, along with the associated work of commentary; the contingencies of intellectual professionalism and institutionalisation, and, above all; the contingencies of clerical authority. Of the four philosophical periods covered in Kenny’s history, this is the one which frequently gets passed over within many university courses on the history of philosophy. It is also a period through which Kenny’s personal interests in narrating the history of philosophy, pedagogical reasons apart, are brought into sharper relief. The reader will have already begun to suspect the presence of these extra–pedagogical concerns within the first part of the book when the narration of Plato and Aristotle is populated by the sort of notation familiar to all analytical philosophers and most mathematicians. By the time the book makes it to the Middle Ages, there can no longer be any doubt that there are biographical factors guiding Kenny’s quill:
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Philosophy of Development Economics: Creating a Dialogue between Rawls and Development Economists

Philosophy of Development Economics: Creating a Dialogue between Rawls and Development Economists

Rawls can serve as the bridge between the philosophy of history and the philosophy of development economics by highlighting the prominence of ideas, and moreover ‘moral powers and political conceptions of justice’ (whereby the ‘overlapping consensus’ and ‘the idea of public reason’ become facilitators) prior to the discussion of areas germane to development economics: for the latter, most prominent topics are the following—comparative development processes and assumptions, knowledge transfer through international trade, technology diffusion, foreign direct investments, tax regimes, incentives, and Schumpter’s inventions/ideas and innovation distinction. 4
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Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement

Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement

Philipp Frank––physicist, philosopher, and early member of the Vienna Circle––is often neglected in retrospective accounts of twentieth century philosophy of science, despite renewed interest in the work of the Vienna Circle. In this thesis, I argue that this neglect is unwarranted. Appealing to a variety of philosophical and historical sources, I trace the development of Frank’s philosophical thought and, in so doing highlight the roles played by history, sociology, values, and pragmatism in his philosophy of science. Turning to contemporary literature, I then argue that Frank’s work should be understood as an early instance of what is now called “socially engaged philosophy of science.” This understanding is explored through a careful consideration of his work on education, where previous work on history, sociology, values, and pragmatism is applied to an important, real-world problem. This socially engaged reading of Frank extends beyond pragmatic issues of theory application, because as I show, Frank used sociology to argue for the meaningfulness of metaphysical claims. However, Frank’s account of meaning may seem to be problematic since it heavily relies on Percy Bridgman’s operationalism. So, I outline the problems associated with Bridgman’s account of operationalism and show that Frank’s view does not fall prey to the same criticisms. After these objections are addressed, Frank’s work is contextualized in the broader debate about value-free science, where I argue that Frank did not endorse the value-free ideal. As a result of these findings, we will not only have a clearer picture of Frank’s philosophical contributions, but also a better understanding of how the philosophy of science can better engage important social issues.
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Introduction : photography between art history and philosophy

Introduction : photography between art history and philosophy

about photography, brings a fresh perspective to recent debates concern- ing agency and automatism by setting them within the context of founda- tional work on the concept of intention and the philosophy of action by Elisabeth Anscombe and Donald Davidson respectively. By doing so, Lopes shows that agency cannot simply be reduced to intention. Intention may require agency, but agency does not require intention. Thus it is pos- sible for agents to perform acts unintentionally. In Lopes’s example, Ham- let stabs the figure behind the arras intentionally, but he does not stab Polonius intentionally, though they are the same act under different de- scriptions—Polonius being the figure behind the arras. The gap that Lopes’s account opens up between agency and intention shows that stan- dard philosophical intuitions about the automatism of the photographic apparatus somehow compromising artistic agency with respect to photog- raphy only arise by running agency too close to intention. But Lopes shows that photographic agency can vary (indeed can be present or absent) while automatism is held constant; so agency and automatism need not be in competition. On the account to be preferred, a photographic process in- volves agency, irrespective of its mechanical or automatic dimensions, just in case it is intentional under some description.
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Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections

Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections

Another historical induction against scientific realism was put forward by Stanford (2006). Like Laudan’s pessimistic induction, Stanford’s (2006, 19) New Induction is an “induction over the history of science” (original emphasis). According to Stanford (2006, 20), “the history of scientific inquiry itself offers a straightforward rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories equally well confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time.” Stanford calls this the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA). Based on the PUA, Stanford advances an inductive argument he calls the “New Induction” on the History of Science, 1
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A Redescriptive History of Humanism and Hermeneutics in African Philosophy

A Redescriptive History of Humanism and Hermeneutics in African Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the on-going debate about self-redescription in the history of Af- rican philosophy using the method and theory of redescription. This method and theory of redescription has become the deep concern of not only Western philosophers but of many African philosophers which is markedly present in their agitated pursuits of wisdom. This self-redescription is always resiliently pre- sented in the works of Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Appiah, Gyekye Kwame, Olusegun Oladipo, Wole Soy- inka, Sophie Oluwole, Jim Unah, Martin Heidegger and Maduabuchi Duko;r who is the most recent emergence of the problem of theory and method in African philosophy. So, the general purpose of this paper is to enact the intellectual concern of this self-redescription in the history of African philosophy while the specific purpose is to determine the adequacy of humanism and hermeneutics as concepts cov- ering the self-image of African philosophy. This paper will further show the incoherence and incongru- ence of humanism and hermeneutics with the concrete self-image of African philosophy by redescribing them in the mould of emerging concepts such as the humanness of Orisa intellectual culture, in particular; and orunmineutics as a general philosophical theory.
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A history of normal plates, tables and stages in vertebrate embryology

A history of normal plates, tables and stages in vertebrate embryology

ABSTRACT Developmental biology is today unimaginable without the normal stages that define standard divisions of development. This history of normal stages, and the related normal plates and normal tables, shows how these standards have shaped and been shaped by disciplinary change in vertebrate embryology. The article highlights the Normal Plates of the Development of the Vertebrates edited by the German anatomist Franz Keibel (16 volumes, 1897–1938). These were a major response to problems in the relations between ontogeny and phylogeny that amounted in practical terms to a crisis in staging embryos, not just between, but (for some) also within species. Keibel’s design adapted a plate by Wilhelm His and tables by Albert Oppel in order to go beyond the already controversial comparative plates of the Darwinist propagandist Ernst Haeckel. The project responded to local pressures, including intense concern with individual variation, but recruited internationally and mapped an embryological empire. Though theoreti- cally inconclusive, the plates became standard laboratory tools and forged a network within which the Institut International d’Embryologie (today the International Society of Developmental Biologists) was founded in 1911. After World War I, experimentalists, led by Ross Harrison and Viktor Hamburger, and human embryologists, especially George Streeter at the Carnegie Depart- ment of Embryology, transformed Keibel’s complex, bulky tomes to suit their own contrasting demands. In developmental biology after World War II, normal stages—reduced to a few journal pages—helped domesticate model organisms. Staging systems had emerged from discussions that questioned the very possibility of assigning an embryo to a stage. The historical issues resonate today as developmental biologists work to improve and extend stage series, to make results from different laboratories easier to compare and to take individual variation into account.
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Intellectual history

Intellectual history

Much has been written on the Cambridge School of Intellectual History, not least by its leading exponents, who seem to have entered a phase of self-memorialization. With the awe-inspiring eloquence that brought him many admirers, Quentin Skinner has given countless interviews in the last fifteen years, recalling his own intellectual socialization and constructing a compelling narrative of the School's evolution. Apparently it all started in the 1960s. Peter Laslett, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, published his pathbreaking edition of John Locke's Two Treatises of Government in 1960, an edition which placed the classic firmly in the historical context preceding the Glorious Revolu- tion of 1688, thereby altering the treatises' interpretation for generations to come (they had traditionally been viewed as a celebration of the Revolution). 25 John Pocock pub- lished his first methodological inquiries into the history of political thought in 1962 as part of an important series founded and co-edited by Laslett. 26 John Dunn, a fellow of King's College, Cambridge, followed suit with reflections on the "identity" of the his- tory of ideas, which appeared in 1968 and made the case for a fundamental revision of the history of philosophy in general and the history of political thought in particu- lar. Mocking the "bloodlessness" and unhistorical nature of a field preoccupied with Platonic ideas and reified reconstructions of "great books", Dunn argued in favour of a history of thought that rendered thinking a "social activity" and that investigated the question as to what thinkers were "doing" in saying things, that is, when they engaged in "speech acts" (John Austin) in a particular context at a particular time. 27
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Bochenski and Balance: System and History in Analytic Philosophy

Bochenski and Balance: System and History in Analytic Philosophy

sign saying “No Exit” or “Dangerous Bend”. It can suggest solutions that with modification can be viable today: wheels that were first rolled out centuries ago need not be re-invented. If modern philosophers of mind had read Brentano and Husserl rather than Wittgenstein and Ryle they would have saved their subject years of detour. If Russell had read Paul of Venice he would have realised the Vicious Circle Principle was a tried and tested paradox-blocking solution. If Frege had done so he might even have avoided Russell’s Paradox in the first place. If Wittgenstein had known 18 th century botany he would not have though family resemblance classes were a marvellous new idea of his. The list can be extended. It is notable that the single most impressive advance to come out of the Polish school of logic, namely Tarski’s theory of truth, is deliberately set by Tarski in the context of Aristotle and the ancient semantic paradoxes. Tarski was no historian of logic or philosophy, but his teachers Kotarbiński and Łukasiewicz knew their history well. Historical knowledge can help a philosopher (or even better, team of philosophers) struggling with a problem to a less blinkered or restricted view as to what they might do.
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Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy

Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy

In ‘Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance’, Knobe (2007) claims that the methods of experimental philosophers are more relevant than those of the analytic tradition to studying the mechanisms underlying various theoretical and practical capacities of human beings. What is more, still according to him, the attempt to understand these mechanisms is more characteristic of the long-term history of philosophy, and thus might have a stronger claim to be authentic philosophical research, than work in the analytic tradition. Knobe concedes that experimental philosophy may not have lasting relevance for the “analytic project,” except as a negative programme intended to deflate some of the claims that analytic philosophers have based on intuition, but he suggests that questions about human nature and cognition and more generally the mechanisms underlying intentionality, cognition and morality have been of interest in Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle, and that philosophers as different from one another as Nietzsche and Hume have carried on this tradition.
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The demand for pregnancy testing : the Aschheim–Zondek reaction, diagnostic versatility, and laboratory services in 1930s Britain

The demand for pregnancy testing : the Aschheim–Zondek reaction, diagnostic versatility, and laboratory services in 1930s Britain

Beyond pregnancy testing, I have begun to explore a lost world of laboratory services. We do not yet have an inclusive enough pic- ture of laboratory life to cover ‘not just the cutting-edge research laboratory, but also the ordinary school laboratory, [as well as] those commissioned for standardized testing and calibration, mo- bile fieldwork, diagnostic medical analysis, and industrial quality control’ (Gooday, 2008, p. 788). For instance, the literature on can- cer is largely silent about serological tests, the most famous of which, ‘Bendien’s test’, caused a sensation in the 1930s (Panton, 1937, p. 793). Historians of postwar biomedicine tend to focus more on biological research than routine services. 61 And although in the late 1970s the U.S. diagnostic laboratory industry was worth billions of dollars and was roughly the same size as the pharmaceu- tical industry (Creager, 2008, p. 216), we know comparatively little about it. To better explain the rise of scientific medicine, we need to start recovering the history of diagnostic laboratories—how they were set up and maintained, how they worked in practice, and how the services they offered changed, for example, before and after the creation of the NHS.
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Defending Liberal Education: Implications for Educational Policy

Defending Liberal Education: Implications for Educational Policy

In the foreword to the eighth printing of The Postmodern Condition (1991) Frederic Jameson tells us the term "post-modernism" refers to "the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies" (Jameson in Lyotard, 1991, p. xxiii). He frames the state of philosophy and science today as "the crisis of metanarratives" (Jameson in Lyotard, 1991, p. xxiii). The crisis of metanarratives is the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of our social and civil institutions whose justifications have historically been based in its arguments and reasons. Transformations in technology, it is argued, have led to transformations in the nature of knowledge and reality. Lyotard's vein in The Postmodern Condition (1991) is aligned with the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and is intended as a polemic against Jurgen Habermas (Jameson, 1991). While Habermas concerned himself with the philosophical status of authority and consensus, Lyotard aims mainly at the "game of dialogue," or how language influences the scope of, and determines, the possibility and structure of social bonds. It is important to remember, underlying the debate, that the whole constellation revolves around the problem of justice. Defining justice is consonant with the problem of defining liberal education; it is a hugely complex task and resists easy explanation.
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M.A. 1980 Miami University (Ohio)

M.A. 1980 Miami University (Ohio)

[Reviewed in Novel 33 (1999): 122-24; Albion 32 (2000): 654-56; Philosophy and Literature 24 (2000): 490-93; Studies in English Literature 40 (2000): 585-86; South Atlantic Review 65 (2000): 174-77; TLS (22 Dec. 2000): 24; History of Education Quarterly 41 (2001): 274-76; 18th-Century Fiction 13 (2001): 593-95; History of Education 30.2 (2001): 202-3; 18th- Century Studies 35 (2002): 137-39; British Journal for 18th-Century Studies 25 (2002): 271- 72; The Age of Johnson 13 (2002): 610-13.]

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