agricultural sector development, while also contributing to the country’s economic development through the generation of new employment opportunities” (Ibid).
The group owns and operates a large asset base including a land bank of 200 thousand acres, 8 forage pressing and production plants, 4 rice milling plants and 2 flour milling plants in India and Pakistan” (Al Dahra Agriculture 2018). Egypt is one of the locations where Al Dahra is advancing its food (and water) security strategies. Al Dahra also acquired land in Sudan, however initial reports indicate that this operation has been delayed (Hillhorst 2015a). In Egypt, the company’s landholdings are estimated to be 119,560 feddan producing around 120,000 metric tons of alfa alfa (cultivation, production, and processing capacity) which represents 31% of the company’s annual forage cultivation capacity globally, and 10% of its annual production and processing capacity. Also, it engages in commercial production for export of high value crops in the international market as presented in the following section. Al Dahra’s strategy is based on acquiring large-scale agricultural farmland (or desert reclamation land) in different locations in Egypt, motivated by the availability of water resources from both the Nile and underground water resources (Interview #19). Worth noting that Egypt is a special case since there is no rainwater, and therefore supplementary irrigation is not possible, making it a unique place for irrigation and
The UN ’ s position on water security is derived from the international norms outlined in the Helsinki rules on the uses of the waters of international watercourses, also known as the Water- courses Convention, which established guiding principles on the protection, preservation and management of water resources. 18 Article 33 of the Watercourses Convention provides a fra- mework for dispute resolution between states on water management issues, including nego- tiation, mediation and third-party conciliation mechanisms, and the creation of a joint watercourse institution. Egypt is a party to the Watercourse Convention, while Ethiopia has refused to sign it in part because of the provision that is designed to prevent signi ﬁ cant harm to downstream parties. The global legitimacy of the UN as an institution means that it has the greatest leverage in solving the bilateral dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia. 19 The UN is the place to ﬁ nd measures that are applicable globally while taking the local context into consideration.
for the case of water management institutions. In spite of these cooperative regional efforts, according to Jonson and Allison, conflictual dynamics are more deeply embedded in the region (Jonson & Allison 2001).
Apart from disputes over water allocation, security problems in the region are generally transnational, e.g. international terrorism (mainly Islamic terror activities) and illegal trafficking, not inter-state. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), no pattern of amity and enmity has formed among regional states. The most remarkable characteristics of internal dynamics within the Central Asian security complex is the existence of lower level structural alignments among regional states. In general regional states have not formed structural alignments as a result of their self-interested policies. “Nobody is looking to set up a system of alliances between the republics of Central Asia” (Roy in Buzan and Wæver 2003). Thus, regional dynamics have formed at other levels. Regional states prefer to develop structural alignments with powerful actors from the second or third circle such as Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia, Uzbekistan’s pro-American attitudes, and Kyrgyztan’s military dependency on Russia. Furthermore, within the regional context, the ongoing competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan’s ambition to be the regional hegemon on the one hand and Turkmenistan’s unilateral isolationist regional policy on the other have shaped the power relations within the inner circle of the regional security complex. Competitions have influenced Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s alignments with regional states as well as other external actors.
Due to the deployment of sensors in remote, unattended areas, the adversaries can easily launch various attacks like physical attacks, tampering attack, node clone attack etc. Furthermore, the sensor is resource-constrained. Hence, it is tough to differentiate security breaches and node failure. Network security provides security mechanisms, policies and services to protect the network from unauthorized access. Most of the security mechanisms offer confidentiality, integrity and availability. WSN demands a security mechanism to protect the sensor and data packets from malicious attacks. Designing of security protocol for WSN is a difficult task due to the following reasons.
Security cooperation in the CA region is organized through the CSTO, with Russia in the lead, and to a lesser extent through the SCO, with firstly China and secondly Russia as principle actors. A common CA security policy and or corresponding organization does not exist. I recognize two reasons for this. First, because the CA states feel comfortable in the current security settings of CSTO and SCO, which saves them from organizing their own collective security entity. Secondly, and probably even more likely, because of the lack of unity among the CA states. The aforementioned account of CA regional disputes on water, energy and borders clearly demonstrates that there is no such thing as a united CA approach; not on these issues, nor on security. Moreover, in August 2015 Uzbek President Islam Karimov once again stated that Uzbekistan will never agree to let foreign states deploy military bases on its territory. Karimov said that Uzbekistan will never join any military- political blocs and let its soldiers serve abroad. 38 In 2012 Uzbekistan – once again – withdrew from the CSTO. Furthermore, Turkmenistan, with its policy of permanent neutrality, consequently also refrains from multilateral security cooperation. Moscow fills this collective CA security gap by providing bilateral military support. Within the CSTO Kazakhstan comes second in delivering troops for exercises, after Russia. Also, Astana and Moscow maintain intensive bilateral military ties. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also close allies of Russia in CA, but more importantly, are highly dependent on the Kremlin.
means. The fact is that absolute security is never going to be attained. The sacrifices any given state and its citizens would have to make to attain this would be too great. Thus we see the eternal conundrum when it comes to successful security policy: when do the ends justify the means? While this concept may seem to be obvious, it is far from being such. Security is a delicate concept, one that everyone takes seriously, especially in a post 9/11, globalized world. Therefore, it is not surprising that we find ourselves amongst security policy where the ends might not justify the means, or rather where the road and repercussions of these policies do not justify the means. The issue of policy is one that is highly complex and adds the variant of the perceptions of the elite into the mix along with the different levels and sectors of security. Buzan acknowledges that this, if any, is the area where he has left a gap. However one can understand as to why this has been done; policy changes from one day to the next, and security as a whole, as well as its separate parts, are constantly evolving issues which means that policy should be capable of evolving with it. Anything concrete that Buzan could have contributed to this might have been considered obsolete in a mere six months depending on the political climate. However, Buzan has offered a solid foundation of analytical tools that can be useful to any policy maker. As previously stated, by understanding the global idea of security as well as the breakdown of the different intricacies that affect security, a policy maker should be able, not only to calculate when a security policy’s ends justify its means, but also to see beyond the now and make decisions that take security policy to the next level.
Preventing unauthorized access into schools can be extremely challenging. Locking doors with chains is risky and presents safety concerns. So what’s the ideal way to protect a school that has open access? At The Kern Group, we believe it’s a combination of good planning, common sense and the right products. That’s why we offer a variety of access control products to meet a broad range of security needs. From simple, browser-based systems to fully integrated solutions, Interlogix™ systems produce easy access management of buildings, hallways and individual rooms. For example, you can program the system so that visitors can access the school’s general entryway, but they may not proceed down hallways without obtaining access through the administration office. Our experienced team of system integrators will work with you to design the optimal solution for your application.
Secure Preferred Vendor phones are phone types that are manufactured by 3rd-party vendors but are installed in the Cisco Unified database via a COP file. Cisco Unified Communications Manager provides security for a preferred vendor SIP phone. In order to support security, you must enable Security Encryption or Security Authentication for the preferred vendor SIP phone in the COP file. These phone types appear in the drop-down list in the Add a New Phone window. While all preferred vendor phones support Digest Authorization, not all preferred vendor phones support TLS security. Security capabilities is based on the phone model. If the Phone Security Profile includes a “Device Security Mode” field, then it supports TLS security.
Security SMU Law Review Volume 4 Issue 3 Survey of Southwestern Law for 1949 Article 15 1950 Security Paul Thorp Follow this and additional works at https //scholar smu edu/smulr This Article is broug[.]
Security SMU Law Review Volume 6 Issue 3 Survey of Southwestern Law for 1951 Article 13 1952 Security W Dawson Sterling Follow this and additional works at https //scholar smu edu/smulr This Article i[.]
Linux. But by far the easiest way to get hold of all the software covered in this eBook (plus plen- ty more to experiment with) is by downloading a "live" Linux security distribution CD image and burning it on to a CD, or copying the contents on to a USB drive (since most netbooks lack an optical drive.) The bene- fit of a "live" distribution is that the entire operating system and all the software can be run from the removable media without the need for hard disk installa- tion.
knowledge, skills, and abilities related to locking devices and security systems that can be of substantial value in providing guidance, solutions, and information on these products. The Technical Support Hotline is structured to provide quick and accurate answers to technical questions on hardware selection, requirements, training, specifications, stock numbers, and troubleshooting of equipment failures. The Hotline personnel are also knowledgeable on many other types of security equipment such as vehicle barriers, magazine doors, emergency destruct equipment, etc., and can often provide immediate guidance or at least get you headed in the right direction. Please call us today.
This section discusses some general types of security solutions considering the tools presented in the preceding sections. The section is structured according to the different players in telecommunication: users, service providers, and net- work operators. Manufacturers would have to be included, if the development process were discussed. Choosing different security solutions, the maximum achievable security is derived, assuming correct implementation and manage- ment. This means that we do a best case evaluation! Trusted paths (assumed at- tacker-free zone) and the efficiency and effectiveness of respective solutions are explicitly discussed. The readers will not find comparisons of products. This would require a closer look at specific application cases which is out of the scope of this contribution.
ASISNET is the official online service of ASIS. This is another resource that gives subscribers direct access to the information and services required to remain current with developments in the security industry. In addition, ASIS provides members with a catalog containing over 200 educational books and related published items, and their annual Security Industry Buyer’s Guide – both online and in print – to make informed purchasing decisions. Purchasing discounts are available to all members.
With an overwhelming volume of security data available, it is crucial for organizations to closely examine the integral roles that incident management and risk assessment play in a successful security information management program. Understanding how they interact can aid organizations in identifying the data that is most useful in mitigating risk, as well as how this data may be used to proactively prevent incident activity and its related loss. Indeed, awareness of the common operations of these processes is key to better managing incident activity, risk and security. Of course, it is obvious that incident activity is the necessary pre-condition of both security management and risk management. Without incidents, there would be no risk and there would be no need for security. If it were possible to guarantee that incident activity would not occur, corporations and businesses would have no need to employ security staff. Clearly, this is not the case.
The management of ongoing incident activity is an inevitable reality for all organizations. Detailed information about what is going on within and across an organization’s operations enables deployment of effective security safeguards that help reduce incidents and losses, and provide a built-in defense against accusations of negligence or inadequate security. However, gathering and extracting the right information from the mountains of data available is one of the most common challenges facing organizations today. This challenge can be easily overcome with the aid of powerful and sophisticated incident reporting and investigation management software solutions.
* Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law where she teaches national security, civil rights, and Middle East law. Professor Aziz thanks the Texas A&M Law Review students for their hard work in organizing an informative confer- ence addressing issues that affect all Americans. She also thanks Dean Andrew Mor- riss and Vice Dean Aric Short for their support of the conference as part of a broader scholarly initiative to make Texas A&M School of Law a center of excellence.