the principle of proportionality, that protects the foundations of the political settlement. However, the jurisprudence of these domestic courts is contrasted to that of the regional courts, namely, the European and American regional human rights courts, which are less well placed to appreciate the context under which the peace constitution operates, and are in danger of unwinding the political settlement without providing a viable alternative for peace. International and regional organisations have been playing a more direct role in domestic constitution-making and in monitoring their implementation. For example, the charters for the African Union and the Organisation for American States both contain specific prohibitions on unconstitutional changes of government. The Venice Commission of the European Council also monitors constitutions among the member states. Regional human rights courts, as branches of the organisations, are likewise playing an active role in the constitutional arrangement. International and regional courts have also increasingly engaged in the interpretation of constitutional arrangements and peaceagreements. It is, for this reason, necessary to consider their jurisprudence as it relates to the peace constitutions being considered in this thesis. This is done in chapter one, looking at international court decisions as they impact on peaceagreements, and in chapter four, as regional human rights courts have engaged in decisions on the constitutional arrangement.
durability is not influenced by raising normative considerations during the bargaining process. She went on to say that the absence of provisions for justice, such as human rights, in a peace agreement does not inhibit their inclusion or role in subsequent laws. These arguments are based on the idea that principles of justice stir controversy about the ‘correct’ principle and its implementation, as well as being detrimental to peace-building. Like other principles and values, justice may evoke strong commitments that threaten the negotiation process. This was demonstrated in a series of experiments 23 and in a case study. 24 Such commitments evoked by justice may also jeopardise the durability of the agreement, and may thwart attempts to improve relationships and stabilise the political order. 25 They may also lead to sub-optimal outcomes that do not last, as noted by Bazerman and Neale. These authors claimed that ‘fairness considerations can lead negotiators to opt for joint outcomes that leave both parties worse oﬀ than they would have been had fairness considerations been ignored.’ 26 To the extent that the
By scrutinizing the various peaceagreements signed without real effects in the Central African crisis between 1997 and 2013, we highlight the bad governance to explain the recurring failure of peace processes in CAR. The peace process should allow the final cessation of hostilities against civilian populations and the disengagement of armed groups. At the same time, the peace process should pave the way for transparent management of power. This type of management requires a fair sharing of power and the implementation of institutional reforms. Like that, the political and armed opposition as well as the populations acquired to their cause could have confidence in the republican institutions. However, the management of the state’s funds in countries rich in natural resource allow bet- ter to understand the reason for the recurring failure of the peaceagreements. Also, it allows knowing the reluctance of the political opposition to support a regime that leads a patrimonial management of public affairs. Fernandez-Fer- nandez et al. (2014) links the definition of the term natural resources to the sa- tisfaction of the objectives of maintaining systems supporting life on Earth and basic human needs. In CAR, natural resources have a negative impact. The ex- plicit conclusion was described by Karl (1997). According to Terry Lynn Karl, the exploitation of the wealth of the subsoil tends to weaken the economic fabric, the social cohesion and the political institutions of the producing countries. De- spite the exploitation of natural resources (gold, diamonds, etc.), the people of CAR are still in misery due to poor governance. Institutional reforms are an integral part of the peace process with the aim of creating the conditions for consensual management. This consensual management leads to good gover- nance that aims to legitimize government action and make it more effective for the benefit of the general interest. Our data cover all the peace processes initiated under the peaceagreements signed between 1997 and February 2019 in CAR. We are conducting a prospective study with quantitative data to test hypotheses about the failure of peace processes in CAR.
knowing that they might subsequently decide to renege on their rules. In Tallberg’s (2002: 611) words, “states’ interests may include signature but not compliance.” From this perspective, non- compliance can only be deterred through effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The enforcement approach assumes that both systemic and domestic level factors could alter the structure of incentives at a particular time, leading states to shirk on their commitments (Downs, Rocke and Barzoom, 1996). Consistent with power politics approaches, one group of scholars argues that powerful states tend to be less sensitive to changes in the structure of material incentives (Borzel et. al., 2006). According to the power preponderance hypothesis, therefore, economically and politically strong states are less likely to comply with and to implement international agreements. In contrast, others argue that stronger states are able to exercise their power at the decision-making and negotiating stages, so that only those agreements that reflect their preferences will emerge. Powerful states are thus expected to exhibit higher levels of compliance and implementation. Moreover, and consistent with hegemonic stability theory, regional hegemons can act to provide centralized mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning defection, thus leading to higher levels of compliance and implementation within the organization (Mattli, 1999).
national procedure and practice. Implementation of the teleworking and work-related stress agreements in the Czech Republic and Hungary was, at the request of the social partners, effected through the Labour Code. This choice was in fact consistent with established practice in both countries of social partner consultation over changes to the Labour Code. In contrast, in what amount to an innovatory departure, the UK social partners concluded advisory guidelines on both occasions. On both occasions, the views of the peak employers’ (CBI) and trade union (TUC) organisations differed: the TUC’s proposal for an inter-sector agreement was opposed by CBI on the grounds, amongst others, that there was no such tradition in the UK. The TUC was unable to mobilise the pressure required to secure its preferred course of action, and the alternative approach of agreeing non-binding guidelines – equally unfamiliar to UK tradition – was adopted (Prosser, 2011). Crucially, the absence of well-defined national practices and procedures meant that the national social partners in these countries face choices, which they exercised differently – with power relations shaping outcomes.
Nevertheless, at that time “no nation would be prepared to contribute to a chapter-seven mission to a country where there were no strategic national or international interests and no major threat to international peace and security” (71). When Rwanda’s mission statement was being written, the Secretariat was busy constructing a policy that needed to be consistent with the newfound identity of the UN in relation to peacekeeping after Somalia; policy was constructed in connection with the objective of tending to cease-fire lines and negotiating the settlement of disputes, strict adherence to the neutrality and impartiality objectives of the mission. Peace enforcement was out. The Secretariat needed this internal construction of a strict peacekeeping policy because they needed to adjust to and be consistent with the broader political context and changed US-UN relations. Instead of asking what the situation required from the UN, they defined the situation by using the strict rules attached to a peacekeeping mission (Adelman & Suhrke 300). Conversations in New York were about the conditions under which the Security Council would authorize an operation, instead of what an operation needed to succeed (Dallaire 55). Secretariat members abided by these rules about when and where the UN would have a role, which meant generally only when they thought there was a ‘peace to keep’ (Barnett 2002, 46). Richard Betts suggests “the UN’s efforts in Rwanda failed because of a “destructive misconception” that these types of limited and impartial peacekeeping operations can keep peace where none exists” (in Taras & Ganguly 92).
This study analyze the impact of the implementation of trade agreements within the framework of ACFTA on Indonesia»s export by using the GTAP model; a Multi Regional Computable General Equilibrium Model. Results shows that ACFTA provide opportunities for increased export from Indonesia; Indonesia obtained a net trade creation of international trade amounted to 2% and total exports growth increased by 1.8. However, the export performance of Indonesia in the period showed a decrease of competitiveness, as shown by the decline in share of Indonesian export commodities which are highly competitive and high intra-industry linkage. This paper also find that because the commodity structure of China and the non compeeting behavior of ASEAN countries including Indonesia (tends to complement), China is relatively easier to penetrate export to the Asean market. The entering products from China should provide opportunities for domestic producers to increase production capacity in ASEAN, due to wider choice of relatively cheap capital goods imports.
In an attempt to find a lasting peace, several peaceagreements were brokered and signed between 2007 and 2012 . The Global Peace Accord signed in Libreville, Gabon on 21 June 2008 was the most important. It was first signed by the ARPD, UFDR, and FDPC groups. The agreement granted amnesty for any acts perpetrated against the state prior to the agreement, and called for a disar- mament and demobilization process to integrate former rebels into society and the regular CAR armed forces. Of all the rebel groups, FDPC has a major threat to the government. The FDPC’s AbdoulayeMiskine signed a peace agreement with the government on 2 February 2007 in Syrte, Libya . The deal called for a cessation of hostilities, the billeting of FDPC fighters and their integration with Forces ArméesCentrAfricaines (FACA), the liberation of political prisoners, and the integration of FDPC into government. Subsequently, in August 2007, Miskine was appointed as a presidential adviser but he rejected the appointment on the basis that the government had violated the Syrte agreement . He was primarily concerned that the government would fail to protect him from prose- cution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). ICC had initiated investiga- tions into war crimes alleged to have occurred during Bozize’s 2002-2003 coup attempt. against the Patasse government, andMiskinewas a top suspect. Other rebel groups signed on to the agreement later, or signed similar agreements with the government. After the bombing of the UFDR headquarters in Birao, the Bi- rao Peace Agreement was signed on 1 April 2007 UFDR and the CAR govern- ment . This provided for amnesty for the UFDR, its recognition as a political party, and the integration of its fighters into the national army. The remaining rebel groups continued fighting the government but later signed various peaceagreements after comprise on their various demands were met.
Abstract Rice farming is one of agriculture that developed in Kampar Regency. Distribution of rice fields in Kampar regency have an area of 7,632 hectares with a total production 37189.71 Tons, Rice cultivation is not only produced by the owner of the land, but also tilled by others. Landowners and tenants are woring together using profit sharing system. The formulation of the problem in this research is how the profit sharing system implemented in rice farming and comparing with the concept of the profit sharing system in Islamic economic. The purpose of this study is to determine the profit sharing system for rice farming in the Kampar Regency and the suitability with the concept of profit sharing system in the Islamic Economics. The method used in this research is descriptive qualitative expected to answer the problem and research objectives. The results showed that the implementation of profit sharing system by customs, agreements made orally and seed borne by the tenants and the landowner, does not mentioned the term and the end of the agreement, the profit sharing ratio determined based on the custom of each area in Kampar Regency, landowners are generally not involved in harvesting rice but some are involved in harvesting. The risk if there is crop failure will be accepted as the responsibility by both parties. And if there is a dispute between landowners and tenants, they want resolved by consultation. Implementation of the profit sharing system in rice farming in Kampar generally been in accordance with the Islamic sharia. Only two variables are not in accordance with Islamic law which is the term and the duration of the agreement, and also the involvement of landowners in the harvesting.
The report goes on to cite several examples of such agreements involving LLCs, which have not yielded the desired results till date. They include the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement signed by Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire; the Central African Customs Union, created in 1964, the TIE and TRIE conventions by West African countries of ECOWAS, and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa. It will be recalled that previous chapters of this study identified the position of Burkina Faso as a third transit country to Mali from Ghana, Benin and Togo, and also to Niger from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, as a major bottleneck in the transit trade facilitation within the region. Yet, Burkina Faso has signed bilateral road transport agreements with Mali, Niger, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. (see Annex A). Indeed, like all her other neighbours, Burkina Faso is signatory to the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons and goods across countries of the sub-region. The World Bank report, therefore, identifies the caveat that underlies the success of any trade agreement. It concludes that, “Transit agreements can only work if they are backed by political will and the capacity of governments to actually control their agencies”.
isters. Under this Regional Table three ‘baskets’, here called ‘Working Tables’, were established, concentrating on a whole range of topics: de- mocratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction, development and co-operation; and security issues. The Regional Table and the Working Tables consist of the participants of the Stability Pact, and might also include participants and observers from the whole region, from other interested neighbouring countries and associated countries of the EU, and from international organisations and institutions. Their objective is to fa- cilitate the resolution of differences in the region by promoting bi- and multilateral agreements, identify cross-border projects that strengthen good neighbourly relations among the countries and inject momentum in areas where further progress is needed. Each Working Table may estab- lish sub-tables and establish its own work plan. They will identify the projects in their realm and decide on the appropriate lead organisations. 46
The national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause has also been the subject of criticism. The main objection that has been raised is the existence of a large body of states in which national ‘procedures and practices’ are either ill-defined or in their infancy. In the case of the former, critics such as Berndt Keller (2003) have pointed to examples such as the UK, where there is no forum for inter-sectoral collective bargaining, sectoral bargaining only exists in a minority of sectors, and collective relations between management and labour, where there is a trade union presence, primarily take place at firm or plant level. In the case of the latter, there are the majority of the new member states that have acceded to the European Union since 2004 (Prosser, 2007). In these states, structures for bipartite dialogue are developing at the inter-sectoral and sectoral levels, but the systems are as yet largely characterized by de-centralized plant or firm level social dialogue and/or inter- sectoral tripartite concertation with a heavy emphasis on the role of the state.
To assess the effects of various preferential trading agreements concluded by the MENA countries we use a gravity equation of bilateral trade flows in its extended form that can be derived from a variety of neoclassical and new trade theory models. The gravity equation has been widely used in empirical studies of economic integration processes to investigate the changes in the geographic trade pattern and the effects of RTAs or currency unions on trade flows. However, most previous empirical studies employ the gravity equation in its simplified form that assumes complete specialization in production either at the country or the firm level and foresees no role for factor proportions. These simplistic equations predict that trade between two countries depends only on their economic size and trade costs between them.
Abstract: This paper describes the content of a proposed Data Sharing Framework for data collected in Field Operational Tests and in Naturalistic Driving Studies. These projects gather data regarding the driver behaviour in relation to the vehicle, ITS and traffic environment during normal driving. Huge amounts of data are stored from these tests and could be re-used in many different fields of research, i.e. safety, automated driving or mobility, to understand the human behaviour in different traffic environments. The framework includes topics such as data description, data protection and storage, research support services and topics to address in agreements to make data re-use possible. The purpose of the framework is to facilitate global data sharing and re-use and thereby enhance the availability of data for future research in ITS.
One of the central aims of the establishment of the PSNI was to provide a more representative police force. It was the aim of the Patten Report that existing Catholic police officers in other jurisdictions, especially the Republic of Ireland, should be approached to apply for positions in the new police force, and that an equal number of Catholics and Protestants should be ‘drawn from the pool of qualified candidates’ (The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999 paras 15.17 and 15.10). The successful implementation of this would have a debilitating effect on the legitimacy of the continued existence of a dissident vigilante presence, and resultantly would deteriorate their support.
Defections from international commitments are not uncommon. But why did Germany's national leader Angela Merkel and her foreign minister Guido Westerwelle not follow up on their international agreement made in the North Atlantic Council in 2010? The study of International Relations provides three main theories to answer this question: Realism, (neo) Institutionalism and Social Constructivism. 2 A Realist scholar had argued that military intervention was not in the interest of the German state. Moreover, he would not even recognize the importance of the existence of NATO itself (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 93-94). On the other hand, scholars within the theory of (neo) Institutionalism would have underlined the importance of an institution like NATO because they believe such an institution is deeply embedded in cultural, social, and political environments. The willingness to cooperate is often described as a response to (international) rules, laws, conventions or paradigms (Powell 2007; Lamy 2008, 131-132). To conclude, a Social Constructivist had explained defection in terms of social artifacts (Barnett 2008, 165). However, none of these theories underlines the role of domestic politics when explaining foreign policy behavior of a state. As a result of the lack of focus on the role of domestic politics, my research on the implementation of international agreements will be placed within the framework of political factors on a domestic level.
In the 2014-2020 programming period, entrusted entities are expected to play an increasingly important role in budgetary management. This became clear in 2014, the first year of implementation of the new programmes, and the trend is reflected in the 2014 AARs. The Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) and the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW formerly DG ENTR), for instance, implement 95% and 89% of their respective budget by entrusting management tasks to other entities. For the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) and the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA formerly DG MARKT), the percentage exceeds 50%.