Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Internet: www.digestive.niddk.nih.gov The National Digestive Diseases InformationClearinghouse (NDDIC) is a service of the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK). The NIDDK is part of the National Institutes of Health of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Established in 1980, the Clearinghouse provides information about digestive diseases to people with digestive disorders and to their families, health care professionals, and the public. The NDDIC answers inquiries, develops and distributes publications, and works closely with professional and patient organizations and Government agencies to coordinate resources about digestive diseases.
Email: email@example.com Internet: www.digestive.niddk.nih.gov The National Digestive Diseases InformationClearinghouse (NDDIC) is a service of the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK). The NIDDK is part of the National Institutes of Health under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Established in 1980, the Clearinghouse provides information about digestive diseases to people with digestive disorders and to their families, health care professionals, and the public. The NDDIC answers inquiries, develops and dis tributes publications, and works closely with pro fessional and patient organizations and
Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Internet: www.urologic.niddk.nih.gov The National Kidney and Urologic Diseases InformationClearinghouse (NKUDIC) is a service of the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK). The NIDDK is part of the National Institutes of Health under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Established in 1987, the clearinghouse provides information about dis eases of the kidneys and urologic system to peo ple with kidney and urologic disorders and to their families, health care professionals, and the public. NKUDIC answers inquiries, develops and distributes publications, and works closely with professional and patient organizations and Government agencies to coordinate resources about kidney and urologic diseases.
The National Diabetes InformationClearinghouse (NDIC) is a service of the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK). The NIDDK is part of the National Institutes of Health under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Established in 1978, the clearinghouse provides information about diabetes to people with diabetes and to their families, health care professionals, and the public. NDIC answers inquiries, develops and distributes publications, and works closely with professional and patient organizations and Government agen cies to coordinate resources about diabetes.
The determination of collateral resources to protect against the default risk of clearing members bears similarities with the banking and insurance literature, but also presents important distinctions. Banks demand collateral when providing loans to protect themselves against losses due to asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). This is, however, markedly distinct from default fund resources because the collateral securing the loans is generally not used to absorb losses of other borrowers. Banks are also required to hold large amounts of equity capital to mitigate risk-taking behavior due to the improper pricing of deposit insurance. It should be clear that the economic problem faced by the bank is different from that of a clearinghouse: banks are both the entities contributing equity capital and the shirking agents in the principal-agent problem. Banks may shirk by privately increasing risk-taking in view of insurance protection, which is why banking equity capital is highly regulated to prevent moral hazard. In our context, it is the clearinghouse who faces asymmetric information and uses equity capital to increase revenues. The significant differences between the economic problems faced by banks and clearinghouses explain why the on-going debate over clearinghouse equity capital requirements is not yet clear-cut.
Note: This Memo was first prepared in November 2004, drawing on available information at the time relating to costs - both immediate and longer term -- associated with the birth of a drug exposed infant. During the decade since the Memo was first published, there has been little additional information published on the topic and, where references have been made, the costs cited in our November 2004 memo appear to be applicable today. Recently, however, data relating to the costs of infants exposed to opiates was recently published 1 reporting research conducted during the 2008 – 2011 period that found: that”…. hospital charges related to the diagnosis and treatment of NAS (neonatal abstinence syndrome) increased from $1.1 million per year to $1.8 million per year. Compared with the cost of caring for newborns without the risk of NAS, an additional $4.1 million was spent in the medical care of …” the 186 newborns in the study.” These research findings are reported in Section D below.
Both exchanges were cooperatively owned and governed by their members, with a board of governors, including a president, elected by members of the exchange, and committees with members appointed by the president overseeing various functions of the exchange. The constitution of both exchanges also allowed either party in the transaction for the sale or purchase of stocks, bonds, or any outstanding contracts to call, at any time, a mutual de- posit of cash for margin, with as little as 30 minutes ’ notice. The NYSE and CSE allowed any party to demand maintenance margins of 5 percent, while the NYSE and CSE constitutions provided for initial margin requirements of 10 and 5 percent, respectively. We have found no change in the official margin requirements in either constitution after 1892, but in practice it is unclear if these minimal margin constraints were actually binding. As noted in a report by the CSE’s governor’s Committee on Securities and Commodities in 1909, “the amount of margin which a broker requires from a speculative buyer of stocks depends, in each case, on the credit of the buyer” (State of New York 1909, 9). On the basis of minutes from the NYSE ’ s Insolvency Committee from 1876 – 1925, brokers were occasionally removed from the exchange because they required insufficient margins from customers. In one instance, for a trader they note that they “ found that he was guilty of doing business in an unbusiness like manner i.e.: without margin.” Even among this subset of potentially reckless brokers, the majority reported margins of 5 – 8 percent and sometimes as high as 25 percent, depending on the reported trustworthiness of customers. All additional information on governance structure comes from the Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange and Constitution of the Consolidated Stock Exchange from 1892.
The Centre for Entrepreneurial Leadership Clearinghouse on Entrepreneurship Education defined Entrepreneurship education (EE) as the process of imparting structural and formal entrepreneurial concept, entrepreneurial behaviour, entrepreneurial culture, skills and mental awareness to be used by students and individuals to develop abilities, and willingness, to seek out investment opportunities, initiate, start, manage and develop business and entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurship education is an imperative component of university education providing a motivation, self efficacy and confidence for students in making career choice of becoming entrepreneurs. Thereby, creating and increasing the new venture creation, economic growth and development. The new businesses established play very important and significant role in the economy.
This paper further adds to the literature on margin setting by providing risk measures that specifically incorporate an agent’s degree of risk aversion. In theory, the clearinghouse should use a risk measure that takes account of the nature and extent of its risk aversion. Thus a clearinghouse that is more risk averse would have a higher estimated risk measure and impose a higher margin requirement, other things being equal. Such risk measures have recently been proposed by Acerbi (2002, 2004). These measures are known as spectral risk measures because they relate the risk measure directly to the user’s risk spectrum or risk-aversion function. ‘Well-behaved’ spectral risk measures are a subset of the family of coherent risk measures, and therefore have the attractions of coherent risk measures as well. One attractive type of spectral risk measure is based on an exponential risk aversion function. A nice feature of this type of spectral risk measure is that the extent of risk aversion depends on a single parameter γ : the lower is γ , the more risk-averse the user. In principle, once a clearinghouse chooses the value of γ that reflects its own attitude to risk, it can then obtain an ‘optimal’ risk measure that directly reflects its risk aversion. So, whereas the VaR, previously applied in the literature, or even ES, are contingent on the choice of an arbitrary parameter, the confidence level, whose ‘best’ value cannot easily be determined, a spectral-coherent risk measure is contingent on a parameter whose ‘best’ value can in principle be ascertained by the clearinghouse that uses it.
This means that variation margins should be modelled conditionally (so that they can take account of current market dynamics) and at more conventional (i.e., non- extreme) confidence levels. The need to take account of current market conditions suggests that we should use some sort of GARCH process (e.g., as in Barone-Adesi et al. (1999), McNeil and Frey (2000), Giannopoulos and Tunaru (2005) and Cotter (2006)). We want conventional confidence levels because the clearinghouse is concerned about the prospect of possible default in the near future, but the confidence levels should not be too low because that would involve very frequent changes in variation margins, and this would be difficult to implement in practice.
An application user can request that one or more trademarks be recorded with the Clearing- house. Each mark must be submitted to the Clearinghouse, providing sufficient information to identify the trademark and confirm that the submission meets the criteria for Clearing- house inclusion. That information might, for example, include the words making up the trademark, its international class or equivalent, the jurisdiction in which it is protected, infor- mation about the owner, and/or the authority under which the mark is protected (for example, by judicial ruling, treaty, statute or registration in a trademark office). All trademarks submit- ted to the Clearinghouse will undergo verification of the provided trademark data. In addi- tion, when requested by the rights holder or agent, a submitted sample intended to demon- strate proof of use will also be verified to establish sunrise eligibility.