and religion, and the struggle between ecclesiastical and civil power. However, for intellectualhistory it is not simply a matter of opposing the Enlightenment to Christianity, either as a system of beliefs or as a social organisation. This enables it to give a better account of figures such as Robertson and Priestley, who were prominent enlightened thinkers and church ministers at the same time. A fundamental step in this approach is the reconstruction of the worldview of the authors whose history it writes, that is, the reconstruction of their intellectual landscape and institutional framework, and of their ideas and methods, so far as it is possible, as they themselves understood them. The projection of our own categories and institutional contexts in the reading of the texts is therefore avoided, and regarded as an “anachronism”. This is especially the case in what we can call narratives of disciplinary history. In these narratives, the Enlightenment appears as divided into two great disciplines: natural and moral philosophy, the study of external and of human nature, both of which were variously subdivided into several subdisciplines. For example, Hume divided the study of human nature into the “sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism and Politics” (Treatise 43); whereas, according to John Millar, Adam Smith divided his lectures on moral philosophy into “natural theology”, “ethics”, “jurisprudence”, and political economy (Stewart 274-275).
In the ‘Frames’ section, Caroline Winterer’s ‘What was the American Enlightenment?’ shows that the idea of a distinctive American version of the Enlightenment served different purposes and meant different things as the cross-currents of international politics and scholarly conversation shifted. Winterer points out that when Adrienne Koch first introduced the concept in the 1950s it served her own vision of Cold War politics: the thought of the five main Founders articulated a tradition of reason-shaped public participation which would enable the US to ward off totalitarian challenges left and right. Her vision of the Founders’ thought was also resolutely secular, a vision which accorded with Koch’s own sense of the tolerant secularism she hoped to encourage in the academy of her own day. Henry May’s 1976 The Enlightenment in America, by contrast, attended to Tocqueville’s observation that in France enlightenment and democracy had to take an anti-religious turn because of the power of state religion in the ancien regime, but the religious heterogeneity of the early Republic and the role of dissenting Protestant churches as spaces of self-rule and self-
some Welsh-born but living in England or of Welsh descent and based in London; others were from outside the principality altogether, but engaged in debates which were central to Welsh culture. Indeed, one of the problems of Welsh intellectualhistory in the age of Enlightenment, though also one of its most fascinating features, concerns the difficulty of defining its scope. Unlike Enlightenment Scotland, which had five
The Moderate commitment to hierarchy and order in the Kirk was a means to this end: under Robertson’s leadership they made the reviled system of lay patronage, imposed in 1712 against the explicit terms of the Treaty of Union, work for the cause of Enlightenment by ensuring that only learned and virtuous men (meaning those sympathetic to the Moderate cause) received preferment in the Church as in the universities. Moral Culture offers a powerful revisionist thesis which should be recommended reading for scholars not only of 18th-century Scotland, but of Enlightenmentintellectualhistory more broadly. It suggests that the ‘religious Enlightenment’ in Scotland grew up from ‘enthusiastic’ theological roots, and sought to cultivate a ‘moral culture’ which conduced to national spiritual regeneration rather than merely to social peace,
The term intelligence used to distinguish the new research frontier of Infor- mation Theory resurrects the same term employed by one of the pioneers of IT, Harry Nyquist of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT & T). In 1924 Nyquist publishes an article on the Bell System Technical Journal (BSTJ) entitled Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph Speed , where deals with the factors that affect the “ maximum speed of transmission of intelligence ”. For those in the works of the period, the metaphorical term “ intelligence ” used by Nyquist for the transmission of an electromagnetic signal, appeared improper and mislead- ing, compromised by anthropomorphic and psychological references incompatible with the subject matter. The transmission of signals between machines (coder/ decoder), i.e. the sending and receiving of variations of electromagnetic state through a medium (broadcast or via cable), it could not be in any way confused with the transmission of meaning (messages) neither could be associated with intellectual property such as the ability to learn, analyze, understand, communi- cate, plan, reasoning, hypothesize, draw conclusions, formulate abstract though- ts, solve problems, etc. Four years after the publication of Nyquist’s article, a colleague of Bell Telephone Laboratories Inc., Ralph V.L. Hartley, published an article on the BSTJ, entitled Transmission of Information , where the intelligence metaphor is replaced, for reasons of “ physical as contrasted with psychological considerations ”, by the metaphor information .
en human perspectives in intellectually and socially beneficial directions. These include stimulating the (partial) re-integration of scientific disciplines after a period of extreme specialisation, and the (again par- tial) breaking down of barriers that exist between the sciences and the humanities. In addition, both disci- plines act to enhance public awareness of cosmic and evolutionary perspectives which, I will argue, consti- tute a strong, if implicit, argument for the eventual po- litical unification of humanity. Astrobiology and big history are also concerned with the future of humanity, and I will make the case that the future will be cultur- ally and intellectually richer if it includes an ambitious programme of space exploration. Not only will the ex- ploration of space further reinforce socially beneficial cosmic perspectives, but ultimately it may be the only way for human (and post-human) societies to avoid the intellectual stagnation once predicted for the ‘End of History’.
market forces, is at the root of present difficulties in the Anglo-American systems of corporate governance. It is not too late to revise this point of view, which is both more recent in origin and less institutionally embedded than is generally supposed. But if Enron’s fall is to usher in a new age of enlightenment, a profound reassessment of current orthodoxies is required.
programme, inherited from the 18th century, which may be called the "traditional" Enlightenment, that is built into late 20th century institutions of inquiry. Our traditions and institutions of learning, when judged from the standpoint of helping us learn how to become more enlightened, are defective in a wholesale and structural way, and it is this which, in the long term, sabotages our efforts to create a more
L eeuw enhoek and on Müller. The bicentenary of the publication of the posthum ous Animalcula infusoria by O tto -F ried rich M üller gave rise to a... four pages paper in the Jo urn al o f pro to zo o lo g y , though M üller is the founder of the systematics o f infusoria betw een 1773 and 1786.^27 jn the symposia on the history of protozoology (issued in J H B 1989), no study was dedicated to Müller, though he was hailed there as the D an ish L i n n a e u s Still historians take alm ost always directly their m aterial from good old classics History o f Protozoology by Francis Cole (1926), D o b ell’s Little Anim als (1932)1^9 and Bulloch’s History o f Bacteriology (1938). Such a m ethodology is somewhat surprising, because of two aspects: on one hand there are practically no historical studies about M ü ller’s works, as compared to Leeuwenhoek; on the other hand, as we will see in chapter 7, the historical knowledge from the 1840s onwards took gradually into account only L eeuw enhoek and se v en teen th -cen tu ry m icroscopy. Indeed, when com paring data on Leeuwenhoek and Müller during the 1840s with the present state of our knowledge, one is lead to think that the h istoriography about M üller and E n lig h te n m e n t’s m icroscopical research is more than one century b e h i n d the history of
to constitute a self-contradiction, the development was also unavoidable; and it would be harsh to take the modern Enlightenment too much to task for succumbing to the inevitable. As noted earlier, it seems more charitable to interpret the classic distinction between reason and culture not as asserting a strong and philosophical (but also untenable) dichotomy, but rather as expressing a sense that the particular culture within which Descartes and his successors lived had become exhausted and inauthentic—unable to support genuine, meaningful discourse or to command sincere assent. In the culture in which a founder of the Enlightenment such as Descartes lived, most people were no doubt working away in relative content: lawyers and scholars and theologians and politicians were writing, debating, expounding, drawing conclusions—just as their descendants are today. At the same time, it seems there must have been an underlying sense, felt by some, that the discourse was not working as it should, or as it once had. As discussed, Stephen Toulmin has described the easy-going, moderately skeptical mindset of the period that many may have found attractive—and that Toulmin himself recommends—but that was deeply unsatisfying to someone like Descartes, with his pressing demand for truth.
Bascongada de los Amigos del País en la ciudad de Vitoria por julio de 1786 (Vitoria, 1786), 28 (quote); and Luis Riera Climent and Juan Riera Palmero, “Los alimentos americanos en los Extractos de la Bascongada (1768-1793): el maíz y la patata”, Llull 30 (2007). On the importance of such translations see Javier Usoz, “Political Economy and the Creation of the Public Sphere during the Spanish Enlightenment”, The Spanish Enlightenment Revisited, ed. Astigarraga, 117-22. For other examples of pro-potato activity by economic societies see for instance “Explicación de la voz batata para incluir en un diccionario de la lengua”, Memorial Literario, Instructivo y Curioso de la Corte de Madrid (Madrid), Nov. 1790, no. 121, 365; Correo Mercantil de España y sus Indias, March 24, 1794, 188, Aug. 10, 1801, 50; Correio Mercantil e Economico de Portugal, April 24, 1798; SAA, March 13, 1800, vol. 7 (1800), 173; Junta pública de la Real Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Valencia (Valencia, 1801); SAA, Dec. 9, 1802: SAA, vol. 11 (1802), 173; and Juan Piqueras Haba, “La difusión de la patata en España (1750-1850): El papel de las Sociedades Económicas y del clero rural’, Ería: Revista Cuatrimestral de Geografía 27 (1992).
jurisdiction of political power for Ireland, was the frontline for the practical performance of civilization, essential to the Irish patriot movement. The question of Irish civility in this sense had been much in question—if not outright dismissed—in the wake of 1641 and reports of Irish barbarism and savagery. Theatre and its writers and performers offered a very public and potent stage for the Irish to demonstrate their capacity for civility in this sense. Like Godwin, Irish dramatists saw theatre as offering a bridge to political justice; in the Irish case this bridge involved shifting English perceptions of Ireland from barbarism to civilization. Certainly, attitudes towards the Irish in London were often uncivil right through the century and the theatre was also at times a rather raucous space to present civility but, collectively, through their command of dramatic genres, technical craft, behaviour on and off stage, and— crucially—their mediated selves across the mediascape of Georgian Britain, they could present a highly visible and cultured counter-narrative to centuries of historiographically rooted prejudice. And if we agree that the event of Enlightenment must involve a principle of singularity, our period of intense theatrical activity coincided with an enabling
DOI: 10.4236/jss.2018.611002 16 Open Journal of Social Sciences have raised alarms about how executives can effectively avoid intellectual prop- erty risks and gain a firm foothold in the market share competition. How to make enterprises try to avoid and reduce the risks caused by intellectual proper- ty infringement or infringement in commercial activities, and how to help com- panies reduce the economic burden on intellectual property litigation cases, is the main concern of many market players in today’s society. From the above, we can see that how important for the market body’s early formulation of the risk management and control system enables it to actively respond to intellectual property rights infringement disputes or lawsuits at the time of its occurrence, thereby reducing its adverse impact on itself. In this risk management system, intellectual property insurance is undoubtedly a scientific response to reduce the risk of companies participating in intellectual property litigation. However, China’s practice in this area is less than that of developed countries, and there are relatively few relevant research materials. As early as last century, developed countries such as Europe, the United States and Japan began to design and ar- range intellectual property insurance according to their own national conditions. It is necessary to combine foreign research on intellectual property insurance and conduct in-depth research and discussion on the results of developed coun- tries in this regard. At the same time, it also put forward relevant suggestions on the construction and development of China’s field in the light of the current de- velopment status of China’s intellectual property insurance. It is expected that this will help the academic community to make more in-depth research and ref- lections on this field and make a contribution to China’s early construction of a legal system for intellectual property insurance.
The long history of enlightenment is thus the demystification of nature and the development of pure calculative rationality. What is left behind, however, such as the now obsolete frames of refer- ence such as magic and myth, has a tendency to return. There is a dialectic backlash of the op- pressed forms. The belief in science, in technology, in capitalism, in consumer goods, and in the stars of the media, takes on the air of worship, of ritual behaviour, fetishism and deliverance to blind fate. It has become difficult to think critically about alternatives to "the system" (e.g. "the financial system" is today above all a metaphysical term) and about its progress - as well as its possible crisis. We have developed the technological and productive capacities to do away with poverty, hunger and sufferings around the globe. That, however, is not what we see as impending. But we can still amuse ourselves by means of the culture industry that parades all promises of the enlightenment, the hopes of all scholars, scientists and artists, and all ideals of the bourgeois era as fulfilled - or just about to be so round the corner. And, at the least, if you win in the weekly lot- tery: then you will be truly happy.
As Nietzsche presents it in Dawn 197 the basic idea is that the enlightenment project we are to further is to make its claim, “not against but rather beyond a great revolution (socialism) and a great reaction, beyond the conservative frame of mind” (Montinari 2003: 52). It is thus an error in Nietzsche’s account of the story to conceive the Enlightenment as the cause of the Revolution, a misunderstanding that is the “reaction” itself and it would be equally an error to conceive the continuing enlightenment as the cause of socialism. As Montinari notes, the new great reaction in the form of the conservative mentality consists in this error. As he further notes, from 1878 onwards, Nietzsche considers a new enlightenment as the noble task for the free spirit of his own times. There have been to date two great historical periods in which an enlightenment has sought to flourish but has been halted by a paired revolution and reaction: first, the enlightenment of Italian and European humanism, or the Renaissance (Petrarch and Erasmus), but followed by the German Reformation and the Counter-Reformation; the Enlightenment of France, notably Voltaire, with the French revolution and German romanticism as the corresponding revolution and reaction. In progress now is a third