There is no good reason why humanrights principles do not extend to the combatants themselves. There is some recognition of this in the protection of former combatants, those who are hors de combat, by international humanitarian law. But to the extent that the right to life of the non-combatant is entitled to protection, at the very least as a controlling factor in assessing the proportionality of ‘permissible’ collateral damage, a similar approach should also be taken to those combatants who are still active on the battleﬁeld. The ICRC addressed this issue in principle IX of its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, adopted in 2009. This is sometimes described as the ‘kill or capture’ debate. The Committee said that although combatants were not required to take additional risks for themselves or the civilian population in order to take an armed adversary alive, ‘it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force’. 35 In effect, then, even in the most extreme circumstances of armed conﬂicts, the right to life of the combatant is entitled to some protection. The Committee expressly recognised the role of other bodies of law, and in particular internationalhumanrightslaw, in the regulation of the use of force in armed conﬂict.
Rehabilitation is a preferable form of reparation mechanisms when there is a violation resulting from acts of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The reason is that rehabilitation, as in individual measure, might play an essential role in order to reduce and diminish the consequences of such violations as much as possible. Despite its importance, internationallaw has maintained silence on rehabilitation as an element of reparation for too long and this gap has been filled, on normative ground, by internationalhumanrightslaw conventions and by the jurisprudence of internationalhumanrightslaw mechanisms of the United Nations and Inter-American Court of HumanRightsLaw.
How can internationalhumanrightslaw tackle the disadvantages faced by groups who share a number of characteristics associated with distinct groups of marginalised people ? This is an important question, since many people belong to these groups and since their complex and multivariate characteristics may create unique forms of disadvantage. The answer lies in achieving a balance between universalism and particularism. On the one hand, categorisation is practically unavoidable and even necessary for a systematic protection of humanrights. On the other hand, a focus on monolithic identities negates the heterogeneity that is the lived experience of many people. This, in turn, creates its own kind of disadvantage, rendering invisible persons who claim more than one identity. Acknowledging the permeability of various identities makes easier the discernment of how these identities interconnect. This article claimed that an intersectional approach to internationalhumanrightslaw could be used to achieve this. Through a case study of disabled people, it showed how an intersectional perspective could afford stronger humanrights protection to those people who fall under the remit of several group-specific humanrights treaties. While acknowledging that this approach has its limitations and that it may not resolve all instances of intersectionality, it allows internationalhumanrightslaw to reach its full potential for the benefit of these people as a matter of humanrights practice. Conversely, intersectionality has been criticised for being more an observation tool than a practical device. An intersectional approach to internationalhumanrightslaw will demonstrate how the concept can be put into practice and help define strategies that take greater account of intra-group differences.
the United States’ own territory. It has been discussed that both arguments do not withstand scrutiny. There is settled jurisprudence of the ICJ in Nuclear Weapons, The Wall, and Armed Activities, that the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life contained within Article 6 of the ICCPR and forming part of customary internationallaw continues to apply during a situation of armed conflict, alongside the lex specialis of international humanitarian law, and that the test of whether a deprivation of life is arbitrary must be determined by reference to the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. 7 Further, it is now almost universally accepted that a state’s obligations under internationalhumanrightslaw apply extraterritorially, and thus the US finds scant support for its assertion to the contrary, sitting as it does at odds with state practice and opinio juris. Outside situations of armed conflict, the use of lethal force is lawful under internationalhumanrightslaw only in those circumstances where it is strictly necessary and proportionate, if it is aimed at preventing an immediate threat to life, and if there is no other means of preventing the threat from materialising. As UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC rightly submits, only in the most exceptional of circumstances would it be permissible under internationalhumanrightslaw for killing to be the sole or primary purpose of an operation. 8 As the principal purpose of a drone strike is the employment of lethal force to kill a targeted individual(s), it follows that drone strikes will rarely comply with established
Finally, although a range of organisations and consequent experiences of participation were explored, this data is emphatically not intended to be representative of a general NGO perspective on participation. Rather, it is designed to explore and illuminate the ways in which NGOs participate themselves and enable others to participate, and their rationales for doing so. The epistemological perspective of this project does not view social knowledge as objective and absolute, but rather as situated and partial. In this way it rejects the assertion that social research both should and can provide objective truths or facts about the world. As Hammersley and Atkinson contend “the aim is not to gather ‘pure’ data that are free from potential bias. There is no such thing”.43 The fundamental concern of this research project is to explore how the meaning(s) of participation in internationalhumanrightslaw are understood. This will of necessity entail the collection of contextual data. The project is not concerned with uncovering the ‘true’ meaning and function of participation in internationalhumanrightslaw, but rather what different meanings exist, how and why these have been constructed and what impact they have on individuals’ and groups’ experiences of internationalhumanrightslaw, as “separating the truth or falsity of people’s beliefs from the analysis of those beliefs as social phenomena allows us to treat participants’ knowledge as both resource and topic”.44
A BSTRACT : Starting from the previous implemented processes to recognize the human right to water, and the observation that humanrights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, we argue that it is time to establish a human right to land under internationallaw. Indeed, two strong arguments constitute a convincing pillar: the first is the importance of land for the realization of a number of internationally recognized humanrights, and the second is the alarming situation of serious violations of humanrights resulting from the expansion, in the recent years, of international investment in farmlands. Such basis is supported by providing a number of widely accepted international instruments and both regionally and nationally advanced jurisprudence. However, efforts to interpret and apply international standards remain a permanent challenge, and their effectiveness has not been definitively established, given the fragmented nature of internationalhumanrightslaw.
Humanrights have been defined in a number of terms. They are those claims made by man for themselves or on behalf of other men, supported by some theory, which concentrates on the humanity of man, on man as a human being and a member of humankind (Dowrick, 1979). Humanrights are also those rights which appertain to individuals as human beings and which they expect the society they live or reside in should respect irrespective of their color, race, reli- gion, sex or other distinctions (Umozurike, 2004). Humanrights instruments refer to international or regional treaties and conventions for humanrights as well as domestic humanrights legislation. The world is by geographical conven- ience grouped into regions and sub-regions as the case may be. Taking a clue from the United Nations after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Hu- man Rights in 1948, most regions of the world made bold efforts to crystallize humanrights within their regions for a greater and progressive impact of its widely acknowledged gains. This was so when the United Nations appeared to have gone into slumber over practical steps in the enforcement of internationalhumanrights after its conclusion of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights which spirit and letters were merely hortatory and inspirational at the time of its adoption. The world therefore yearned for more stringent and binding interna- tional law of humanrights. The European system, inter-American system, and the African system of humanrights are among major regional humanrights systems with definite humanrights frameworks that have contributed in large measures to the present body of internationalhumanrightslaw and practice. Hence, this paper is an evaluation of the inter-American system of humanrights with a view to determining its strengths and weaknesses as well as its overall in- put to global humanrights.
“I decided to go to the best school in internationalhumanrightslaw to get myself equipped with the best tools. My classmates’ experiences and their unique backgrounds related to their respective countries enriched my understanding of internationalhumanrightslaw and the application of foundational rights. I will think deeply beyond positive law by questioning the foundations of humanrights while appreciating the values of humanrights.”
Licensed under Creative Common Page 671 It is true that internationalhumanrightslaw and its implementation mechanisms require modifications and amendments to succeed in providing comprehensive assistance to the most vulnerable in the world. However, the UAE‟s continued failure to comply with legislation that will benefit a large portion of its inhabitants serves to legitimise the abuse of them. Furthermore, it could bring some serious and unintended consequences to the region. Given the high estimates of people trafficked in the world and the sheer number of migrant workers in the UAE, it would be unwise to assume that this criminal activity is not occurring without the knowledge and/or assistance of government officials or people working in the legal sphere who have connections with domestic and/or international organised criminal networks. 239 Consequently, the macro consequences of this illegal activity is strengthening the hand of organised crime. The enormous profits reaped from human trafficking can, and are, used to fuel other illegal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, arms dealing and forgery. Organised crime has been known to weaken governments, undermine the rule of law and affect the social fabric and ordering of countries. This is a sobering thought as it could potentially put the whole of UAE society - and not just its migrant workers - at risk.
Rights abuse clauses are distinctly European historical memories. In the first section of this paper, which discusses the history of the law, it is argued that they interwoven with shared hopes and fears about the future of western society. Their presence in ‘living instruments’ makes rights abuse clauses not just mere historical artefacts but components of working legal regimes with the expressed purpose of protecting humanrights. As the second section of this paper notes, whilst rights abuses clauses go some way to addressing the concern famously expressed by Hannah Arendt about the need to protect the ‘right to have rights’ in practice rights abuse clauses are unnecessary to address the actions of racist groups wishing to violate the rights of others. As the final section of this paper argues, the historical reference within rights abuse clauses actually allows internationalhumanrights tribunals to make rulings about the restrictions on rights by national authorities, in particular the right to free speech, that are deeply illiberal and seemingly antithetical to the liberal foundations of humanrights instruments. Significantly the presence of these provisions, and their subsequent interpretation by tribunals, gives an insight into a distinct counter-history of the humanrights instruments that possess them. Rather than being a collection of inherently liberal values with a distinctly liberal telos, an internationalhumanrights instrument with a rights abuse clause is
A Brief Guide to International BY SUSAN BAZlLLl Cet article a it6 h i t en vue de servir de p i d e de prhentation aux dPfenseurs &S droits humains internationaux a j n de leur permettre k d h l o p p[.]
This Academy Briefing was researched and written by Takhmina Karimova, Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and HumanRights (Geneva Academy). The Geneva Academy would like to thank all those who commented on an earlier draft of the Briefing, in particular Brian Wood, Avner Gidron, and Clare da Silva of Amnesty International, and Prof. Gro Nystuen of the InternationalLaw and Policy Institute (ILPI), Oslo. The Geneva Academy would also like to thank all those who agreed to be interviewed or to provide input into the analysis, including Prof. Georges Abi-Saab, Honorary Professor of InternationalLaw, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; Prof. Eibe Riedel, Professor of Comparative Public Law, International and European Law, University of Mannheim; Prof. William Schabas, Professor of InternationalLaw, Middlesex University; Prof. Sir Nigel Rodley, University of Essex, Member of the UN HumanRights Committee; Prof. Cherif Bassiouni, Emeritus Distinguished Research Professor of Law, DePaul University; Dr. Mamadou Hebie, Lecturer, The Geneva LL.M. in International Dispute Settlement (MIDS); Dr. Gilles Giacca, Programme Coordinator, Oxford Martin School Programme on HumanRights for Future Generations; Oscar Vera Parra, Senior Lawyer, Inter-American Court of HumanRights; Nathalie Weizmann, Legal Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross; Maya Brehm, Independent Expert; and Dr. Krizstina Huszti Orban, Lawyer, European Court of HumanRights. The Geneva Academy would also like to thank the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its support to the Academy’s ongoing research on the Arms Trade Treaty, in particular in relation to this Briefing. Editing, design, and layout by Plain Sense, Geneva.
Muslim scholars did not use the term (people), nor was it mentioned in the Holly Qur'an except once, when God Al- Mighty says: (Oh people, we created you from a male and female and made you peoples and tribes to know each other, the most fearful is the most generous, God has been Knowledgeable and expert) ( 46 ) . However, Muslim scholars differ in defining the term (peoples); some of them said that it is more general than tribes, which means that it includes the tribes ( 47 ) , while others State that the term (peoples) means Adam's sons ( 48 ) . It is said (peoples) meaning Arab tribes and their affiliates ( 49 ) . In the Islamic State, people consist of Muslims and non-Muslims who live in the Islamic State as they are called ((free non-Muslims)) who are enjoy the right of citizenship ( 50 ) . Scholars used the term (Muslims) instead of people. Here, they mean any Muslim person regardless of the place where he stays, even if he does not perform the religious rituals. In addition, they gave the term (a free non-Muslim) on any non-Muslim persons who stays on the Islamic lands. They used Dar Al-Islam when the Muslims rule it, even if Muslims were a minority. Moreover, they used the term (Dar Al-Harb) when the State is ruled by Non-Muslims, even if Muslims were a majority ( 51 ) . However, Dar Al-Harb is divided into two types: Dar Al-Ahd: which is called Dar Al-Muwada'a, Dar Al- Sulh and Dar Al-Mu'hada, which means that the Imama makes an oath with the people of Dar Al-Harb (for reconciliation) where he abandons fighting for a period in return for compensation or without compensation and thus it is called Dar Al-Ahd ( 52 ) . In this context, Islam did not link between man, life and the State's right to stay; Islam made humanrights close to the rights of the State. The utmost objective for the Islamic State is to apply religion, righteous and justice to serve human ( 53 ) . This means that eliminating man means the elimination of the State. God Al-Mighty addressed all people by saying: The swore for God if they receive a prophet to warn them to be believers than some nations ( 54 ) . Accordingly, Qur'an addressed the Arabs and through their call for Islam, God guided most of the peoples (Persians). They became leaders of the nations, and the Romans' State, Persia, and the eastern kingdoms ( 55 ) . Consequently, in Islam, the relationship between man and the State has been embodied as shown in (the modern political Islam) which States: (the Islamic State is a natural production of the group and its self characteristics. The group included the State and rises with it to achieve the